Content area
Abstract
We hold others responsible for their conduct all the time. A teacher holds her student responsible for his tardiness by giving him detention. A father holds his daughter responsible for her disrespectful "backtalk" by sending her to her room. A wife holds her husband responsible for not cleaning the kitchen as he promised with her sharp words of rebuke. As pervasive as this activity is, however, it is not entirely clear what we are doing when we hold someone responsible. What is it to hold someone responsible? What lies at the conceptual core of this activity? What sorts of interactions serve to hold another responsible? When is holding another responsible for her conduct right to do, wrong to do, required of us, permissible, forbidden, recommended or frowned upon by an ideal?
In this dissertation, I address precisely these questions. In the first half, I introduce and develop theories of two distinct ways of holding another responsible: demanding and urging another to do as she ought. In the second half, I draw out the insights that this richer typology provides for us. I explain how adding demanding and urging to the mix helps us to better understand both what lies at the conceptual core of the activity of holding others responsible and the puzzles that remain. I also use our new typology to enrich our understanding of the ethics of holding others responsible.
