Marx on Leisure: An Aristotelian Interpretation

Abstract

Despite his influence on those interested by leisure, Marx's own conception of leisure is rarely discussed. Insofar as it is, he is generally either thought to see leisure as free time or as indistinct from necessary labour in communist society. In this article, I suggest that by reading Capital and the Grundrisse through an Aristotelian lens, we can find a third potential conception of leisure in Marx, which shares three features in common with Aristotle's. Leisure is distinct from free time simpliciter, it is a “state-condition” people are in when they perform ends in themselves, and it is constitutive of the final end. I conclude that adopting a conception of leisure grounded in this Marxian conception could have implications for contemporary debates around free time and the value of leisure goods like arts and culture.

It is widely recognized that leisure was an important topic to Marx. His work has influenced both those who have sought to advocate an end to work (Black, 1985: 17-34; Gorz, 1982; Lafargue, 1893; Soper, 2020) and those who critique the alienating or unfulfilling conditions of leisure in capitalist society (Adorno, 1975; Clarke and Critcher, 1985; Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002; Spracklen, 2015). Yet few have attempted to deduce a conception of leisure in Marx's writings. This is curious given Marx's towering influence over the philosophy of work—leisure's natural opposite.¹

Insofar as a conception of leisure in Marx has been outlined, there tend to be two schools of thought. One is that, in a communist society, leisure and necessary labour are amalgamated into one “unalienated praxis” in which the values of leisure are realized through our necessary labour, and leisure is no longer a separate realm of human activity distinct from work (Hinman, 1978). The other is that Marx essentially interprets leisure as free time—our leisure is the realm of human activity left over after fulfilling our basic needs in labour (Rojek, 1984). Although there is some support for both readings, neither is perfect. The first is present in Marx's earlier work but largely missing, and sometimes directly contradicted, in much of his later work. The second, as I shall argue, understates Marx's preference for essentially human or “productive” activities in free time over simple “idle time.”

In this article, I present a third interpretation of Marx's conception of leisure, garnered by reading Marx's work pertaining to leisure through an Aristotelian lens. Aristotle's work profoundly influenced Marx (see Pike, 1999). I show that there are a number of parallels between Aristotle's conception of leisure and Marx's, and that both can be seen as essentially conceptualizing leisure as an end in itself (or for its own sake).

I begin by tracing Aristotle's account of leisure. I find three features in Aristotelian leisure: it is constitutive of the final end; it is a particular “state-condition” people are in when they perform ends in themselves; and it is therefore not free time simpliciter. Then, I demonstrate that by interpreting the realm of freedom described in Capital as leisure, we can find the same three features of leisure in Marx. To add further clarity to Marxian leisure, I highlight some key differences between Aristotle's and Marx's accounts. Finally, I ask what consequences adopting Marx's conception of leisure might have for current debates surrounding leisure.

Many readers will worry that Marx rarely discusses leisure explicitly. As we shall see, Marx's references to leisure are scarce and dispersed intermittently throughout his writings. This means that my main objective is to construct a feasible conception of leisure; the argument is more interpretive than exegetical. Nonetheless, I hope to persuade that my interpretation is a fair reflection of the conception of leisure that Marx may have had in mind.

Aristotle on leisure

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle aims to find the “chief good” (1975, henceforth EN). He distinguishes between three kinds of good. Means, which refer to something that is valuable or desirable because it brings about something else; and two categories of ends: goods which are desirable for their own sake but which may also be useful or sometimes desired for the purpose of another end, and the chief good which is always desired for its own sake and which we desire all other goods in order to bring about (EN: 1097a25-35; see Richardson, 1992).

Aristotle concludes that the chief good is happiness (eudaimonia), as we choose all other goods to deliver (or “for the sake of”) happiness (EN: 1097b4-7). Aristotle's idea of happiness is different from our own. Firstly, it is an activity that is constantly realizing its ends (energeia) rather than an emotion or state of mind (Aristotle, 1988: 1325a31-32, henceforth P; EN: 1098b30-1099a6). Secondly, it is protracted rather than restricted to a specific moment in time (EN: 1098a17-19).

To conclude that happiness is the chief good, however, is a “platitude” (EN: 1097b23). The more challenging question pertains to what happiness consists of. Aristotle says that “happiness is thought to depend on leisure” (EN: 1177b4-5), so happiness as the final end is constituted by leisure. He says that “The whole of life is further divided into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace […] there must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure” (P: 1333a30-35). Our daily life of business aims toward leisure: “leisure is better than occupation, and is its end” (P: 1337b34).

But what exactly is leisure? Identifying that it is constitutive of the final end still leaves this question open. Aristotle is clear that happiness is to be found in philosophical contemplation. Philosophical contemplation can be contrasted with practical wisdom, which is dedicated to the polis and the business of humans. Because it is dedicated to action, practical wisdom “has an end other than itself” (EN: 1140b6-7). By contrast, philosophical contemplation concerns matters that transcend the human and the political. It is “remarkable, admirable, difficult and divine, but useless” (EN: 1141b5-8). In addition, contemplation is a continuous and protracted activity—the two criteria of happiness observed earlier. It is “the most continuous, since we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do anything” (EN: 1177a22-24).

If happiness is constituted by leisure, and happiness is found in contemplative activity because it is done solely for its own sake, then this must mean that leisure in some way refers to philosophical contemplation. But this is slightly confused by the fact that Aristotle discusses leisure in two ways.² To properly understand his use of leisure, we must distinguish between two types of condition. Firstly, a condition can refer to circumstances like a precondition. For instance, if I lend my car to someone, I may lend it on the condition that they return it by a certain date or time. A condition of this kind effectively works as a requirement; it is necessary for the end. It is necessary for the individual to agree to my condition of returning my car by the set time in order to borrow it. Call this a requirement-condition. Secondly, a condition can refer to a state or type of existence that something is in. We may say “that car is in a good condition” or “the car's condition has deteriorated.” A condition used in this way says something about something or describes it. Call this a state-condition. Aristotle uses “leisure” to refer to both types of condition, but while scholars often seem to focus on the first type of condition (see Balaban, 1990; Hemingway, 1988; Solmsen, 1964; Telfer, 1987), it is the second that is critical to understanding what he means by leisure.

Leisure as a requirement-condition refers to a condition one needs to pursue activities which are for their own sake. Here, leisure is effectively what we refer to as free time today—it is time away from other things such as maintaining one's health and conducting business. Leisure is both a means and an end: it is an end because we aim to complete our business to have leisure, and a means, as leisure allows us to pursue activities for their own sake. Aristotle uses leisure in this way when he asks “what ought we to do when at leisure?” (P: 1337b35) and when he worries that our discovery of happiness may be misguided if we look at how “people in despotic positions spend their leisure” (EN: 1176b16-17). Though Aristotle certainly has expectations about how people should use their leisure (see P: 1337b35-36), the definition of leisure itself is not contingent upon being dedicated to contemplative activity. People can misuse their leisure without it no longer being leisure. Leisure as a requirement-condition then, is the time one needs away from business and other means in order to pursue activities for their own sake. It is necessary for the final end of happiness but not sufficient.

Leisure as a state-condition refers to the state a person is in when they are performing activities that are ends in themselves. Here, leisure does not simply come with expectations of what activities one ought to do; one must actually do these activities to be “at leisure.” Aristotle even refers to the two types of leisure in the same sentence a couple of times:

Since the end of individuals and of states is the same; it is therefore evident that there ought to exist in both of them the excellences of leisure; for peace, as has been often repeated, is the end of war, and leisure of toil. But leisure and cultivation may be promoted not only by those excellences which are practised in leisure, but also by some of those which are useful to business. For many necessaries of life have to be supplied before we can have leisure. (P: 1334a10-20)

But leisure of itself gives pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life, which are experienced, not by the busy man, but by those who have leisure. (P: 1338a1-5)

The first quote is particularly enlightening. Leisure itself (the state-condition) can be promoted by the excellences practised in leisure (the requirement-condition). This is because the excellences that one uses during their leisure time place somebody into the state-condition of being at leisure. Similarly, in the second quote: leisure (as the state-condition) gives us happiness and is experienced by those who have leisure (as a requirement-condition). Aristotle says that “the action of the statesman is also unleisurely” and describes contemplative activity as having the “leisureliness” we associate with the happy man (EN: 1177b5-25). These activities are leisurely because they refer to more than just activities that one does during their leisure time (when it is analogous to free time); they refer to the activities one must do in order to be at leisure as a state-condition.

This equips us to look at exactly what activities, or excellences, one needs to do to be in the state of leisure. Leading from Aristotle's assertion that contemplative activity is only ever done for its own sake, clearly, when one is engaged in contemplative activity they are at leisure. Aristotle, however, also opens up the possibility that one may be at leisure when playing music (P: 1338a21-22); Destrée (2013, 316 n15) has interpreted this to be indicative that Aristotle thought all artistic activities could be leisure activities. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not give us a definitive statement.

He is explicit, however, that leisure as a state-condition is not found in play or amusement because these activities cannot be done for their own sake (EN: 1176b27-36; P: 1337b35-36). To make amusement or play life's end would be absurd in Aristotle's view. This illustrates Aristotle's distinction between the two types of leisure as a requirement-condition and state-condition, as somebody is free to use their leisure time to play, but one cannot be at leisure when doing so. For the same reason, it separates what we would today call “free time” from the Aristotelian ideal of leisure. Although Aristotle had certain leisure activities in mind, those activities follow from his core conceptualization of leisure as the state-condition one is in when performing activities which are ends in themselves. It is not the particular activities of leisure—contemplative activity, music, “not-play”—which are constitutive of leisure for Aristotle, but the fact that those activities are only ever done for their own sake.

One important component of Aristotelian leisure that is too frequently overlooked is that this state-condition is a divine one. “Happiness,” Aristotle writes, is “something godlike and blessed” (EN: 1099b15-18); philosophic wisdom is “divine, but useless” (EN: 1141b5-8, my emphasis; see also P: 1325b28-30; Depew, 1991: 351). The chief good, in this respect, is the point at which the person transcends the merely human and becomes godlike—leisure is the state-condition of this transcendence (see also Pieper, 2009). This does not mean that leisure is not for the human though:

But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything. (EN: 1177b31-1178a2)

Nevertheless, it does make leisure exceedingly demanding in a way that excludes large numbers of people. In Snyder's (2018) words, it is conditional upon developing a “comportment”—facilitated through leisure time, virtue, and education—to be able to reason philosophically. This excludes the possibility of large swathes of the population from being at leisure, as this population either cannot develop the comportment or must perform the business necessary for Athenian citizens to be at leisure. Women, children, natural slaves and craftsmen (banausoi) are all excluded from access to leisure for Aristotle (EN: 1095b12-20; 1177a10; Nightingale, 1996: 32). Leisure is exclusively the privilege of a small, elite group of Athenian men.

My reading of Aristotelian leisure as a state-condition is not dissimilar to de Grazia's (1962) reading of it as a “state of being.” De Grazia, though, is ambiguous about whether Aristotle sees leisure as a permanent state of being or a state that one is in at a particular time. Seeing that large numbers are excluded from leisure and that it is only available to those who are not required to work shows that leisure is a permanent condition for Aristotle. Leisure as a state-condition describes the state a few privileged people are in when they are able to limit themselves to performing activities which are for their own sake.

To recap briefly, Aristotle's conception of leisure can be seen as having three features. Aristotle depicts happiness as the chief good and suggests that leisure is constitutive of it, so the first feature is that leisure is constitutive of the final end. On this basis, he portrays leisure as the state-condition people are in when they perform activities which are ends in themselves—this is the second feature. Leisure is necessarily only ever done for its own sake, which leads to the third feature: leisure does not simply refer to free time, as it is possible for somebody to perform activities during their free time which are not ends in themselves.

Marx on leisure

We can apply this Aristotelian reading to Marx's musings on necessary and non-necessary labour, free time and the realm of freedom in his work around Capital and the Grundrisse to interpret a theory of leisure in Marx's later work. However, to begin with, it will be helpful to pay attention to Marx's attitude toward leisure earlier on.

Throughout his work, Marx seeks the conditions which reflect humans’ species-being and facilitate their self-realization. Humans are different from animals because while animals are indistinguishable from their activity, humans are separate from their activity and will it with their conscience (Marx, 1994: 75). The person expresses themself in their activity. Our human nature as a species-being is constituted by the nature of, and our control over, our labour (Marx, 1994: 76). Capitalism and capitalist forms of labour mutate the human's species-being and effectively turn them into an animal:

Man's species-being includes both nature, on which man's labour operates, and man's spiritual faculties. Where man's labour is estranged, this complex species-being is reduced to a mere means to his existence as an abstract individual. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external nature and his spiritual being, his human nature. (Marx, 1994: 75-6)

In capitalist society then, the human is unable to realize themself as their labour becomes an instrument for preservation; it is a means rather than an end. Only by shifting their activity toward ends in themselves can the person realize themself as essentially human. Yet Marx seems to shift his view on whether this self-realization can come by the person performing necessary labour, which aims to satisfy their basic needs (physiological needs and the needs relative to a person's context; see Heller, 1974), or whether self-realization must exist outside of the actions the person takes to fulfill their basic needs.

The early Marx appears adamant that self-realization of humans can be engendered through necessary labour. He makes two separate arguments for this. Firstly, he and Engels suggest that necessary labour can be amalgamated with non-necessary labour. In The German Ideology, they write:

For as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. (Marx and Engels, 1998: 53)

Marx's view here is that the division of labour confines a person to one role, eliminating their control over their labour. It is through controlling one's labour—choosing what to do and setting one's own targets—that one is able to express themself and objectify their labour, thereby realizing their human nature. But the division of labour—preoccupied with market efficiency—labels them a fisherman, a shepherd or a critic, obstructing them from doing any other form of labour that they may wish to perform. In communist society, the division of labour is removed, allowing them to pursue whatever labour they wish and attain self-realization, and it is presumed that they will embark upon a variety of interests: “In a communist society there are no painters but only people who engage in painting among other activities” (Marx and Engels, 1998: 418). Crucially though, this image appears to rest on the assumption that all the basic needs of society (from agriculture to education) can be provided because somebody wants to do the activity that supplies them. One may wish to be a critic today, but tomorrow they will want to fish, and by doing so, they will contribute to the provision of basic needs. In other words, necessary and non-necessary labour merge into one form of labour which people are free to choose and realize themselves within. In effect, non-necessary and necessary labour all becomes an end in itself; there is no means to human existence any longer.

In his Comments on James Mill, Marx also makes a second case for finding self-realization in necessary labour in communist society:

Assume that we had produced as men: each of us in his production would have doubly affirmed himself and the other. I would have (1) in my production objectified my individuality and its particular characteristics and thus also enjoyed during the activity an individual expression of life, and in contemplating the object had the individual joy of knowing my personality to be objective, sensibly perceptible and thus a power raised beyond all doubt; (2) In your enjoyment or your use of my product I would immediately have had the enjoyment as well as the consciousness of having, in my labour, satisfied a human need, and thus of having objectified the human essence, and so of having provided an object that meets the need of another human being; (3) I would have been for you the mediator between you and the species, and so known and felt by you as a complement of your own being, as a necessary part of yourself, and so would know myself to be confirmed in your thought and in your love; (4) I would in my individual life-expression have directly provided your life-expression, and thus in my individual activity, have directly affirmed and objectified my true being, my human, my communal being […] This relationship would be reciprocal: what occurs on my side would occur on yours. (Marx, 1994: 95-6)

Here again, at (1) Marx suggests that the person will find themself through the performance of their labour without drawing a distinction between necessary and non-necessary labour. But notice that at (2), (3) and (4), Marx also gestures toward a relational element of human realization. I gain enjoyment through the satisfaction of your “human need” and realize myself as a “human, communal being.” Capitalist society forces people to only look after their own interests. But humans are a distinctly social species for Marx; in communist society, human nature is realized by working for others in a community. Self-realization is found in necessary rather than non-necessary labour—hence, labour satisfies a “need”—which means that to work for others and to help them achieve their own ends is an end in itself. As an essentially social being, people realize their ends through their labour by contributing to a common goal, and, in turn, are helped to realize their ends by others who do the same. The necessary labour needed to sustain all members of society becomes an end in itself.

In either case—that necessary labour is amalgamated with non-necessary labour, or that necessary labour is an end in itself due to its social character—Marx does not appear to have a theory of leisure as a distinct condition or form of human activity. In Hinman's (1978: 201-13) words, it is an “unalienated praxis,” in which the values of leisure are realized through necessary labour, and leisure is no longer a separate space or realm of human activity distinct from work. While leisure for Aristotle was the end in itself, precisely because it was divorced from business and fulfilling the necessities of life, for Marx, fulfilling the necessities of life is the end in itself. It is necessary labour rather than leisure that is constitutive of the final end of self-realization.

But Marx subsequently adopts a far more pessimistic tone about the potential of necessary labour in his later work:

In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus, in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. (Marx, 2001: 1098)

In this oft-quoted passage, Marx very explicitly differentiates between an area of necessary labour (the realm of necessity) and an area of non-necessary activity (the realm of freedom). The realm of freedom is where human energy is “an end in itself.” The necessary labour that Marx previously envisaged as itself an end, seemingly becomes a means to that end. It is in the realm of freedom that we can interpret Marx's vision of leisure; one that is very similar to Aristotle's.

Just after this passage, Marx (2001: 1098-99) describes the “shortening of the working-day” as a “prerequisite” for the realm of freedom. Hence, communist society must reduce the amount of necessary labour people do in order to expand the realm of freedom. This is a theme Marx pays attention to at various points in Capital and the Grundrisse. He bemoans measuring the value of a society or its output according to the amount of time people spend labouring; how long one spends labouring says little about the value of their labour in terms of the rewards that they extract (Marx, 1993: 611-13). A “truly wealthy nation” will measure its wealth in terms of the amount of free time people have, and communist society reduces necessary labour time for the “free development of individualities” (Marx, 1993: 706, 708; see also Marx, 1971: 257). Thus, Marx clearly believes here that a society with less necessary labour and more free time is a better one.

For this reason, Marx (1996: 271) bemoans capitalism for extending the labour day beyond the length required to produce the necessary goods for each person. At the same time, he celebrates the advancements of technology in capitalism insofar as these advancements make a significant reduction of the working day possible (Marx, 1993: 708; 1996, 410-11; see also Marcuse, 2002: 20). As the realm of freedom exists within free time, Marx wishes to expand free time to expand the realm of freedom. However, like Aristotle, he views leisure (as the realm of freedom) as different to free time. One is not at leisure simply by virtue of having free time.

One possibility is that Marx draws a distinction between free time in capitalist society as simple free time, and free time in communist society as leisure (James, 2017: 289). Free time in capitalist society is overshadowed by the luring spectre of work: people's capacities to use it well become limited by stifling labouring conditions, and because they are constantly so tired, it becomes a mere means through rest. Free time in communist society, by contrast, is not affected by work in the same way as work takes up far less time and is more pleasant, so the labourer's free time is no longer burdened by the possibility of work or the habits they develop in work.

This is one plausible construction of Marx's view of leisure. However, while Marx frequently castigates the effect of capitalism on the person, as far as I can see, he never explicitly makes this point when alluding to how it might corrupt or change the nature of one's free time. Furthermore, he seems much more concerned that free time will be eroded into effective non-existence in capitalism rather than that people's use of it will be distorted. He agonizes more about how capitalism “usurps the time for growth, development, and healthy maintenance” and “steals the time required for the consumption of fresh air and sunlight” than how it corrupts the quality of that free time (Marx, 1996: 271).

A simpler and more attractive way of understanding Marx's distinction between free time and leisure is to look at how he envisages people spending their free time in communist society. At numerous points, Marx describes free time as “time for free development” and as time for “artistic [and] scientific etc. development” of people (Marx, 1993: 634, 706; see also 1971: 256; 1993: 708, 711). Crucially though, free time dedicated to development of these kinds is different from free time dedicated to other things. What separates these two forms of free time is that developmental activities are ends in themselves in a way that other activities used during free time are not. These developmental activities are exclusively expressive. For this reason, Marx (1971: 257) distinguishes between free time that is “partly for the enjoyment of the product” and “partly for free activity which—unlike labour—is not dominated by the pressures of an extraneous purpose.” Consumption is differentiated from developmental activity because the latter is not subject to an end outside of itself, and therefore, allows the person to express their will.

This distinction is reiterated in several other places. Marx says that free time can also be dedicated to surplus labour (1993: 641), and he explicitly locates “rest time” as a subset of free time (1996: 270). Free time dedicated to surplus labour refers to time when the labourer continues producing on behalf of another beyond what is necessary for anybody's subsistence (Marx: 1993: 398-99). As we saw earlier, time dedicated toward another can be an end in itself under some circumstances, but this is not the case when the other extracts more than what they need from the worker for their species-being. As Marx (1993: 634) points out while documenting the extraction of surplus labour from workers by capitalists, at the point where the worker labours beyond necessity, the recipient assumes a parasitic relationship with the worker solely labouring on their behalf. At this point, labouring is no longer an end in itself of any form, “but rather just a means to satisfy needs outside itself” (Marx, 1994: 73). Rest time is also not an end in itself as, although it does not hold the negative qualities of surplus labour, like Aristotle's play, it is time for recuperation and relaxation rather than for the fulfillment of one's species-being.

Additionally, Marx (1971: 257, my emphasis) explicitly describes free time as “both idle time and time for higher activity.” “Idleness” is to be condemned under certain circumstances, such as the idleness of the capitalist when they live off the surplus labour of the worker (Marx, 1971: 256). During free time, when one has already completed their necessary labour, idleness may not be condemned in the same way, but it is still distinct from higher activity. Marx describes it as “not-productive” and juxtaposes it with the free time “for the production of science, art etc.,” each of which can be enjoyed as ends in themselves (Marx, 1993: 401n). Idle time is time enjoyed passively, as opposed to time in which one participates in activities where they express their will.

In short, free time includes time dedicated to ends in themselves, but it also includes time for activities which are not valuable in themselves but still serve a purpose, such as idle time, rest time and the time for consuming the products of one's labour. Like Aristotle then, Marx distinguishes between free time which is all time outside of necessary labour, and leisure—dedicated to artistic and scientific pursuits and personal development—which is an end in itself. While they appear to have slightly different leisure activities in mind, for both Aristotle and Marx, what is constitutive of leisure is not the specific subset of activities, but that those activities have the character of being ends in themselves.

Note that this reading of leisure necessarily excludes all free time in capitalist society, as it is virtually impossible in Marx's view for the worker to make the most of their free time while they are habituated by capitalist labour practices and exhausted by work. But this reading of leisure also excludes free time in communist society that is not dedicated to an end in itself. While free time can include time for rest, idle time, and non-productive activity, leisure necessarily only encompasses activities which are ends in themselves.

Admittedly, there are passages that appear to speak against this interpretation. For example, at one point Marx (1993: 634) writes that “all free time is time for free development” (1993: 634); at another, he claims that free time “corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals” (Marx, 1993: 706). Reading Marx through an Aristotelian lens can help to resolve this seeming contradiction.

Marx assumes something like the Aristotelian distinction between a requirement-condition and state-condition. Like Aristotle, Marx sees leisure qua free time as a requirement-condition in order to be at leisure as a state-condition. “All free time is time for free development” (my emphasis) because all free time could be dedicated to an end in itself. Elsewhere, Marx (1971: 261) writes that “literary and artistic productions […] owe their existence to leisure.” Literary and artistic productions, which are ends in themselves and, therefore, leisure as a state-condition, are made possible by leisure as a requirement-condition. In this regard, free time is necessary for people to pursue activities which are ends in themselves but not sufficient, as it may also include idle time, rest and non-productive activity.

On the other hand, leisure is distinguishable from specific activities which are ends in themselves like science and art. Instead, it refers to what ties these activities together. These activities are all ends in themselves because they are not for an “extraneous purpose,” and leisure is the state-condition people are in when they perform them. Therefore, leisure is the condition humans are in when they pursue an end in itself beyond fulfilling their basic needs. This is why we can interpret leisure as the realm of freedom: as a state-condition, it is a realm rather than a particular activity or temporal space.

The parallels with Aristotle run deeper because, in the later Marx, the realm of freedom is the final end. Remember that it is the realm where “human energy” is an end in itself. The realm of freedom, when people participate in distinctly human activities like scientific and artistic development, is the point where humans realize their species-being. Thus, just as leisure was constitutive of happiness as the final end for Aristotle, leisure is constitutive of the final end of self-realization for Marx.

The idea that leisure may be constitutive of self-realization for Marx may be doubted because Marx (2001: 1098) also suggests that freedom can exist in the realm of necessity, though only “in socialized man.” Given his pessimistic turn from his earlier work, this has led some to wonder whether Marx still understood the realm of necessity as an end in itself (Sayers, 2011). There is good reason to believe that he did. Earlier in the Grundrisse, Marx criticizes Smith's view that tranquility and freedom are not to be found in labour (Marx, 1993: 611) and objects to how capitalism warps the communal spirit of humans by forcing each person to “serve the other in order to serve himself,” such that “each becomes means for the other” (Marx, 1993: 243-44).

Marx still believes that there is a way to make the realm of necessity better by making it into an end in itself. Recall that there are two ways in his earlier thought that Marx believed necessary labour can be an end. The first was that the division of necessity and non-necessity would be eroded. That argument has evidently disappeared from Marx's later work, when he could not be clearer that the realm of necessity “remains a realm of necessity” different from the realm of freedom. Secondly, however, labour can become an end in itself as a communal act. It is here that the realm of necessity can be improved.

[T]he special productive power of the combined working day is, under all circumstances, the social productive power of labour, or the productive power of social labour. This power is due to co-operation itself. When the labourer co-operates systematically with others, he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his species. (Marx, 1996: 334, my emphasis)

Thus, the ability for labour to become more worthwhile as a communal act remains in the realm of necessity. As a result, there is still value to labour in this realm, not—as Klagge (1986) argues about Capital III—simply because the labour becomes more valuable as a means directed toward the final end, but because the social nature of the labour makes it an end in itself (see James, 2017; Kandiyali, 2017). Once more, an Aristotelian reading is instructive.

Pickford cites the influence of Aristotle in Marx's earlier work, drawing attention to the distinction between activities that have an end external to themselves (poiêsis) and activities that have an end internal to themselves (praxeis) and suggests that Marx's view of communal labour in his Comments on James Mill shows how labour can be a praxis (Pickford, 2017). By my labouring on behalf of another in communist society, and by their labouring on my behalf, labour's end is internal to the activity, rather than contingent upon any further outcome it may bring about. Applying this reading to Marx's later work: it is still the case in the realm of necessity that one's social labour (as a praxis) is valuable as an end in itself, and this is not contingent upon the realization of any further end. However, remember that Aristotle divides between three types of good. Goods which are means, and two types of ends: ends which are done for their own sake, and the final end which can be, and is only ever, done for its own sake. Labour in the realm of necessity is performed as an end in itself in communist society by virtue of its social nature, but it cannot be the final end as it is also a means to the realm of freedom. This is why Marx describes the realm of necessity as the realm of freedom's “basis.” For this reason, it is an end, but it is not the final end of self-realization. This also prizes out the division between necessary labour and leisure in Marx: necessary labour can still be immensely valuable and an end in itself, but only leisure is constitutive of the final end of self-realization.

Hence, the three features of Aristotelian leisure: that it is constitutive of the final end, that it is a state-condition people are in when performing activities for their own sake, and that it is not free time simpliciter, can also be found in Marx's later work.

Aristotle and Marx diverge

While these shared features show similarities in Aristotle's and Marx's conceptions of leisure, there are also important differences—studying them can give us a more precise account of Marxian leisure.

Remember that Aristotle sees leisure as a divine state. For Aristotle, the final end is the point at which the human becomes godlike. In this regard, leisure is found when the person moves away from the essentially human. “[W]e must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things,” Aristotle tells us, “for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live [happily], but in so far as something divine is present in him” (EN: 1177b26-32, my emphasis). By contrast, for Marx, the final end is firmly situated in humans’ species-being. The final end is not when the human becomes godlike, but when the human is properly humanlike; when they are no longer animalistic or “a beast of burden” (Marx, 1968, 220).

What is required for the human to transcend the human—as Aristotle stipulates—is more demanding than what is required for the human to become human—as Marx demands. Aristotle seems to suggest that leisure requires both particular circumstances and a natural disposition to be at leisure. The circumstances are the requirement-conditions for leisure. People need an adequate amount of free time to be leisurely and to have cultivated the virtues that allow them to philosophize sufficiently excellently (P: 1323b21-23, 1328b35-1329a2). The natural disposition stipulates that only some people are capable of reaching this excellence anyway. To be excellent, one must, by “nature,” “have a certain character, both of body and soul” (P: 1332a41-42). This nature belongs to Athenian citizens, but it does not belong to natural slaves, women or farmers and craftsmen (for example, P: 1252a26-1252b5; see also Heath, 2008).³ For Marx, the capacity to realize one's human species-being in leisure only requires that they are human, therefore, each human person already has a natural disposition to leisure. All that is required is particular circumstances conducive to leisure, namely, liberation from capitalist conditions that exhaust people in work and habituate them into constantly labouring as a means.

This difference leads to two more substantive dividing lines in Aristotle's and Marx's conceptions of leisure. Firstly, in the nature of their leisure activities. It is important to stress that what defines leisure activities for both is that people perform them as ends in themselves, as opposed to what these leisure activities are. Aristotle finds leisure in philosophizing and art; Marx seemingly in artistic and scientific activity. What these activities have in common is not the activities themselves, but that they are performed as ends in themselves. However, Marx and Aristotle importantly diverge on whether people must master these activities. Marx clearly stipulates that leisure is to be found in the “development” and pursuit of artistic and scientific excellence. For Aristotle, this development is a requirement-condition for leisure: “[H]uman good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting excellence, and if there are more than one excellence, in accordance with the best and most complete” (EN: 1098a16-18). The cultivation of the virtues is necessary to make that excellence possible; it is a prerequisite to the performing of excellence which puts one in the state-condition of being at leisure.

Because leisure is godlike, it is necessarily perfect for Aristotle. The gods do not need to develop that perfection—it is innate to them. Humans do, because “that which is imperfect cannot attain the end” (P: 1339a31), but that process of development is not constitutive of being at leisure—it is a requirement-condition (like leisure time). Humans are not godly or perfect, which means that being at leisure in Marx's sense does not require people to have fully developed excellence. What sets humans apart from animals is not that they are perfect, but that they are able to will their activity and express themselves in their creations (Marx, 1994: 75-76). Humans can will their pursuit of excellence and express themselves in their creations even as they are developing skills. An artist does not need to be perfect to express themself in their art. Indeed, the kind of artist one develops into is itself an expression of their will. Certain conditions are still required for leisure, as a capitalist society where the person is burdened by work is not one which will allow them to express themself freely. However, what is important is that the person expresses their will (instead of being excellent), so the only conditions that are required are those that enable the person to do so (rather than those that make them perfect).

A second substantive dividing line is that Marx's theory of leisure is less exclusionary than Aristotle's. While Aristotle limits the constituency of those able to be at leisure to a select group of Athenian citizens who are capable of the divine, Marx sees the realm of necessity and realm of freedom as a part of each and every individual's life because each and every individual person can attain human self-realization. Each person must make their contribution and work to fulfill their daily needs, and once this is completed, each person may enjoy the realm of freedom. The possibility of self-realization in the realm of freedom (i.e., access to leisure) is thereby open to all.

This has a further consequence. By requiring all to make a contribution in the realm of necessity, Marx's theory of leisure as a state-condition is less permanent than Aristotle's. The Aristotelian state-condition referred to a lifestyle—“the leisure life.” This life is made possible by the work of slaves and women, who free others from the burden of doing any work. By contrast, Marx requires all to do their fair share in the realm of necessity. The Marxian state-condition refers to the condition the person is in when they are in the realm of freedom, once their work in the realm of necessity has ceased. It, therefore, refers to the state-condition they are in at the particular time of performing activities which are ends in themselves. The state-condition of leisure for Marx is less permanent.

These differences show Marx's account of leisure to be less demanding. Unlike Aristotle, he does not require people to access some sort of divine state, and therefore, he does not require them to exercise excellence. Marx has a lower threshold for what activities can be leisure: one may be at leisure in the development and pursuit of excellence, as they can still express their personhood. Further, this opportunity is open to everyone, and it means that everyone can enjoy the fruits of leisure without shirking their fair share of work.

Marxian leisure: lessons for today?

The achievability and inclusivity of Marx's account of leisure surely renders it a more useful resource than Aristotle's for applying to contemporary issues concerning leisure. In both policy and academic settings, leisure is often discussed in terms of free time. At a policy level, much current debate concerns whether to expand the amount of free time people have by rolling out a four-day week (for a summary, see Gomes, 2021). In the academy, despite wide differences elsewhere, political theorists from both liberal and critical schools often think about any claim to leisure in terms of a reduction in work hours or an expansion of free time (Rose, 2016; Weeks, 2011). Philosophers sometimes mention the value of leisure goods like public parks and arts and culture, but even then, in terms of whether they have instrumental value like educating people, creating a sense of equality or aiding democracy (for example, see Anderson, 1993: 158; Draper, 2022: 15-16; Zuidervaart, 2010). Thinking about leisure through a Marxian lens can shift these debates by urging people to ask new questions and to reconsider assumptions they previously took for granted.

Interpreting leisure as the state-condition people are in when performing activities chosen as ends in themselves encourages us to think about leisure beyond simply thinking about it in terms of free time. Initially, it presses us to ask whether people have proper access to activities—artistic, scientific or whatever they may be—which they can perform during their free time as ends in themselves.

Further, it motivates us to think about how the provision of leisure goods, like arts and culture, are good for their own sake, as opposed to considering their value on instrumentalist grounds, which can distort the reasons that leisure is important to people. That is not to say that we need to agree with Marx that these activities are the highest form of human endeavour. One can be a pluralist about self-realization and believe that being at leisure is one part of human flourishing as opposed to the only part. In my view, humans realizing their ends is likely to include both ample opportunities for leisure and opportunities for meaningful work in the Marxian sense of aiding others’ self-realization. Nevertheless, Marx offers an important reminder that leisure is an end in itself and that leisure activities are primarily valuable because they are (at least one) constitutive part of the good life rather than because they happen to contribute to a more rounded individual or just society.

Most importantly, perhaps, Marxian leisure prompts us to think about how the conditions and culture of a wider society organized around work can undermine people's pursuit of leisure (for a societal work ethic, see Bell, 1996: 54-80; Weber, 2001). Recentring leisure as fundamentally constitutive of human self-realization illuminates how contemporary practices may warp our capacities to be at leisure and what we can do about it. Marx stipulates that the end of capitalism is necessary for people to be at leisure because capitalist conditions contort people's capacities of expression and to perform ends in themselves. How this might occur today will have consequences for how radical we believe proposals to recentre leisure should be and how hopeful we are that such a recentring can be achieved. There are two possible interpretations.

On the first account, people's capacity to express themselves as ends is primarily undermined by the nature of work in capitalist society. Work can be exhausting and demoralizing and is often mechanical in a way that undermines autonomy (Gorz, 1985; Schor, 1992: 161; Schwartz, 1982: 637-39). It thereby stifles people's ability to have the energy to properly exercise their human capacities for leisure, and its mundanity potentially atrophies those capacities themselves because people are so used to “unexpressive” activity. Insofar as people do enjoy activities in their free time, we might then worry that they serve the purpose of amusement and play in Aristotle or as rest in Marx—as a mere relief from burdensome labour. While a serious problem for people's capacities to be at leisure, this could be corrected in modern capitalist society. After all, people work far fewer hours than they did in Marx's time.⁴ And while we might be concerned that people still work too much or perform mundane labour, governments have levers they can pull to address these problems. They can and do legislate to cap working hours, they could utilize developments in automation to reduce the number of tedious jobs, and they could direct the education system toward providing people with the skills to make the most of their leisure (see Godwin, 1831; Keynes, 2010; Russell, 1935). If too much bad work is all that prevents people from being at leisure in the Marxian sense, then modern capitalism may still offer a way out.

On the second account, the person's ability to express themselves as an end in itself is undermined by consumer culture in addition to stifling work conditions. A constant barrage of mass media and advertising, twinned with the supply of (so-called) leisure activities which are mostly homogenous, decays people's autonomous capacities, leading them to spend their free time as passive consumers rather than active and expressive agents (Adorno, 2001; Clarke and Critcher, 1985; Shippen, 2014). Given its scale, if one believes that this constant and unrelenting consumer culture is the main impediment to individuals having the will to perform ends in themselves, then a more radical overhaul of capitalist conditions and modern consumerism may be required if people are to enjoy Marxian leisure.

Either of these views is compatible with a Marxian interpretation, and they underline that Marx's account pushes us to go far beyond thinking about leisure in terms of free time or its instrumental value. Nevertheless, I prefer the first account for two reasons. Firstly, the consumer culture critique encourages us to think about how the person's capacities to be at leisure are stifled throughout their life (or through their lifestyle). Marxian leisure, though, is the state-condition people are in over a shorter time period, and it does not necessarily require them to be at leisure at all points. In this respect, perhaps people can spend some of their free time engaging in non-expressive consumer culture, which will be analogous to idle time, and they can spend other points of their free time in more fulfilling leisure activities. Secondly, it strikes me that much modern consumer culture is sufficiently stimulating that it can be a valuable end in itself. Both the production and enjoyment of arts and culture still require the employment of creative faculties, and people are still able to express themselves in their tastes for some cultural goods over others. Adorno (1990), one of the leading proponents of the worry about consumer culture, famously criticized jazz as the epitome of a debased contemporary artistic form, yet jazz is considered to be one of the most complex and expressive forms of music these days.⁵ Consumer culture may well provide people with sufficient opportunities to express themselves. All this means that adopting the Marxian account of leisure can encourage us to think critically about how modern preoccupations with work may subvert leisure, but it does not necessarily require us to call for an overhaul of capitalism or the abolition of consumer culture.

Conclusion

I have demonstrated that we can see three parallels between Aristotle's theory of leisure and a theory of leisure that can be interpreted in Marx's thought. By understanding the realm of freedom as leisure, leisure in Marx can be seen as the state-condition people are in when they perform ends in themselves; this state-condition is constitutive of the final end; and distinguishes leisure from free time simpliciter, as free time can also refer to areas of human activity like surplus labour and idle time which are not leisure. However, Marx's focus on leisure being an innately human state-condition—as opposed to a divine one—means that his account of leisure is less demanding than Aristotle's because it does not require people to exercise excellence; more inclusive, because it allows all people to be at leisure; and fairer, as each person bears some of the burdens of work and the fruits of leisure. Confronting contemporary (and growing) debates around leisure by adopting this Marxian conception urges us to go beyond thinking about leisure in terms of free time and its instrumental value. In the process, it can offer a valuable resource for reassessing the provision and worth of leisure goods and the effect wider conditions have on people's capacities for leisure.