Content area

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables the generation of secure keys between two distant users. Security proof of QKD against general coherent attacks is challenging, while the one against collective attacks is much easier. As an effective and general solution, the postselection method tries to extend security analyses of collective attacks to be against coherent attacks. However, it gives a bad performance. To overcome this drawback, instead of directly calculating key rate by postselection method, we propose a method correlating the failure probabilities of phase error estimation against collective and coherent attacks, enabling the use of the independent and identically distributed assumption in parameter estimation against coherent attacks. Then the key rate can be obtained by uncertainty relation of entropy. Our method can be applied to various QKD protocols, providing better performance compared with the traditional postselection method. For instance, we give the finite-key analyses of the side-channel-secure (SCS) QKD and the no-phase-postselection (NPP) twin-field (TF) QKD to show their performance improvements with the proposed method.

Details

1009240
Title
Improved postselection security analysis of phase error estimation in quantum key distribution
Publication title
arXiv.org; Ithaca
Publication year
2024
Publication date
Sep 29, 2024
Section
Quantum Physics
Publisher
Cornell University Library, arXiv.org
Source
arXiv.org
Place of publication
Ithaca
Country of publication
United States
University/institution
Cornell University Library arXiv.org
e-ISSN
2331-8422
Source type
Working Paper
Language of publication
English
Document type
Working Paper
Publication history
 
 
Online publication date
2024-10-01
Milestone dates
2024-09-29 (Submission v1)
Publication history
 
 
   First posting date
01 Oct 2024
ProQuest document ID
3111726551
Document URL
https://www.proquest.com/working-papers/improved-postselection-security-analysis-phase/docview/3111726551/se-2?accountid=208611
Full text outside of ProQuest
Copyright
© 2024. This work is published under http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.
Last updated
2024-10-02
Database
ProQuest One Academic