The Transcendental Status of Beauty: Evaluating the Debate among Neo-Thomistic Philosophers

Abstract

Over the past 150 years, Thomists have been divided over whether or not St. Thomas Aquinas himself held to the transcendentality of beauty. Francis J. Kovach divides the Thomists into three groups: (1) the transcendentalists, (2) the anti-transcendentalists, and (3) the undecided. Some contemporary Thomist philosophers in the transcendentalist camp, such as Étienne Gilson, see beauty as the forgotten transcendental. We will briefly trace the historical context of the debate by mentioning how philosophers viewed the transcendentality of beauty in ancient and medieval times. Then, we will summarize a contemporary Thomistic transcendentalist view of the nature of beauty and its transcendental status, followed by a contemporary Thomistic anti-transcendentalist view of the nature of beauty and its transcendental status. After that, we will evaluate the nature of beauty according to St. Thomas, as well as the criteria which determines transcendentality. Finally, both the transcendentalist and anti-transcendentalist positions on beauty’s transcendental status will be evaluated to determine whether it is metaphysically consistent to regard beauty as a transcendental according to Thomistic thought.

1. Introduction

Over the past 150 years, Thomists have been divided over whether or not St. Thomas Aquinas himself held to the transcendentality of beauty. Francis J. Kovach divides the Thomists into three groups: (1) the transcendentalists, (2) the anti-transcendentalists, and (3) the undecided (Kovach 1963, p. 386). Some contemporary Thomist philosophers in the transcendentalist camp, such as Étienne Gilson, see beauty as the forgotten transcendental (Gilson 1960, p. 159). However, Philosopher David C. Schindler writes,

… the question of the ‘forgotten transcendental’ is much more than a question of intellectual history. In the end, it does not matter whether or why or under whose influence the principal thinkers of the Middle Ages seem to have departed from the classical tradition in certain ways by marginalizing beauty and conceiving love more exclusively in terms of the appetitive order of goodness. What matters, finally, is what is true, and what this implies for our self-understanding, but also for our understanding of the world in general, still today.

(Schindler 2017, p. 356)

We will briefly trace the historical context of the debate by mentioning how philosophers viewed the transcendentality of beauty in ancient and medieval times. Then we will summarize a contemporary Thomistic transcendentalist view of the nature of beauty and its transcendental status, followed by a contemporary Thomistic anti-transcendentalist view of the nature of beauty and its transcendental status. After that, we will evaluate the nature of beauty according to St. Thomas, as well as the criteria which determine transcendentality. Finally, both the transcendentalist and anti-transcendentalist positions on beauty’s transcendental status will be evaluated to determine whether it is metaphysically consistent to regard beauty as a transcendental according to Thomistic thought.

2. A Brief History of Beauty’s Status as a Transcendental

2.1. Ancient and Early Medieval Development

Although the term “transcendental” can often signify something beyond the sensible world, Joseph Owens explains a different sense in which St. Thomas uses the term: “The understanding of ‘transcendent’ as ‘climbing across’ the [Aristotelian] categories many be seen in St. Thomas: ‘… the multiplicity that is not in any genus, but belongs to the transcendents’ and ‘multiplicity according as it is transcendent’, ST, I, 31, 3c.” (Owens 1963, p. 111). Kovach claims Aristotle was the first to conceive of the formal theory of transcendental properties of being as he considered the metaphysical notion of “the one” in Met. IV, 2, 1004b 6, II, and 20, respectively (Kovach 1974, p. 237), and argued for the convertibility of the of being and unity in Met., X, 2, 1053b 21-24 (Kovach 1974, p. 238).¹

Yet prior to Aristotle, Kovach traces the indication that beauty is a transcendental back to Heraclitus, Socrates, and Plato as they all taught that whatever is good is also beautiful (Kovach 2003, p. 184). However, Kovach explains that Aristotle did not list beauty among these transcendentals:

Expounding his theory, Aristotle lists unity (Meta. 1003b 22–23, 1054a 13–19), truth (ibid. 993b 31), and goodness (Eth. Nic. 1096a 23–24) as transcendental properties, but not beauty—a feature that has become just as characteristic of the Aristotelian tradition as the inclusion of beauty among the transcendentals is characteristic of the Platonic tradition. Among the Platonists, PLOTINUS (Enn. 5.8.9, 6.6.18, 6.7.31–32) adds beauty to the Aristotelian list of transcendentals, as do St. AUGUSTINE (Civ. 11.4.2; Ver. relig. 20.40) and Pseudo-Dionysius, all of them maintaining that every being is both good and beautiful.

(Kovach 2003, p. 184)

In contrast to St. Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius, who either directly or indirectly spoke of the transcendentality of beauty (Kovach 2003, p. 184),² Avicenna adds two new transcendentals to Aristotle’s list (i.e., thing and something) without mentioning beauty (Kovach 2003, p. 184) (i.e., he calls “the thing” and “the existent” necessary concomitants) (Avicenna 2005, p. 27). Therefore, Jan A. Aertsen leaves out beauty when he sums up the history of transcendentals in Medieval philosophy as philosophers seeking to establish that unity, truth, and goodness adhere coextensively to being as metaphysical properties (Aertsen 1991, p. 69).

2.2. High and Late Scholastic Influence on Contemporary Views

St. Albert the Great held that there is no distinction between transcendental and common being, yet they are not completely identical before the human mind (Forlivesi 2014, p. 17), (i.e., they are conceptually distinct but not really distinct) (Owens 1963, p. 126). Kovach explains how this notion relates to St. Albert’s theory of transcendentals:

… ALBERT THE GREAT (Opusc. de pulchro et bono 11; Summa theologiae 1.6.26.1.2.3; 2.11.62.1 sol.; Summa de bono 1.2.2 sol. 8, 9) and St. THOMAS AQUINAS (In Dion. de div. nom. 4.5; Summa theologiae 1a, 5.4 ad 1; 1a2ae, 27.1 ad 3) hold the real identity and virtual distinction of beauty and goodness, and imply thereby the transcendental coextension of beauty with being, although both (St. Albert in Summa theologiae 1.6 and St. Thomas in De ver. 1.1) omit beauty from their formal list of transcendental properties.

(Kovach 2003, p. 185)

St. Albert’s contemporaries, such as works attributed to Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, list the “transcendentals notions such as ‘being’, ‘one’, ‘true’, and ‘good’” without listing beauty (Wass 1964, p. 20). In Tommaso de Vio Cajetan’s commentary on Summa Theologiae I-II, 27 ad 3, he interprets St. Thomas as saying that beauty is a species of the good (Rubin 2016, p. 82). Kovach concludes that it was Suárez’s distinction between transcendental properties of being and transcendental notions in Dusputationes Metaphysicae 3.2.1 that led to the widespread rejection of transcendental beauty during the Renaissance, all the way to the rebirth of scholasticism in the late 19th century (Kovach 2003, p. 186). For example, in 1959, R. P. Phillips did not list beauty with the other transcendental properties of being, but he simply said, “beauty is a form of the good” (Phillips 1959, p. 179). However, in the 20th century, Hans Urs von Balthasar (von Balthasar 2009, p. 9), as well as several neo-scholastics, such as Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Joseph Owens sought to defend the transcendentalist view of beauty in the age of rejection or indifference to it.

3. A Contemporary Transcendentalist View on Beauty

3.1. The Nature of Beauty

Von Balthasar builds on St. Bonaventure’s view of the transcendentals to argue for the nature of beauty. St. Bonaventure writes “For ‘one’ describes being in that it is whole, by reason of inner indivision; ‘true’, in that it is intelligible, by reason of indivision between itself and its proper species; and ‘good’, in that it is communicable, by reason of indivision between itself and its proper operation” (Bonaventure 2024). Von Balthasar reasons from this that the beautiful is the basis of a thing’s “physical appearing, because what is is not separated from being” (von Balthasar 1984, p. 334). He goes on to argue this explanation of beauty is something “the Platonic-Augustinian depreciation of sense-perception did not allow, even though perhaps no one in the Middle Ages evaluated sense-perception so positively as Bonaventure” (von Balthasar 1984, p. 334).

Maritain claims St. Thomas’ definition of beauty: “The beautiful, he said, is ‘id quod visum placet’, that which, being seen, pleases …” (Maritain 1953, p. 160). Beauty delights the intellect in knowing. The intellect is pleased in the following elements of beauty: (1) integrity (i.e., the fullness of being), (2) proportion or consonance (i.e., unity and order), and (3) radiance or clarity (i.e., light or that which causes the intelligence to see things) (Maritain 1953, p. 160). While being may not be intelligible for humans (e.g., the intelligibility may be obscured in matter, since it may be too pure or too high for one’s intellect), it is intelligible in itself (Maritain 1953, p. 161). Similar to von Balthasar, Maritain argues that, in distinction from transcendental beauty, aesthetic beauty is transcendental beauty confronting intellection as sense-perception (Maritain 1953, p. 164).

3.2. The Transcendental Status of Beauty

Maritain submits that where there are no senses for sense-perception, there is no experience of a lack of beauty or ugliness. If humans experience ugliness through their senses, Maritain explains how everything can still be beautiful. He makes the case that for a pure intellect with no senses (e.g., God), nothing is ugly. This provides the basis for all things being only more or less transcendentally beautiful (Maritain 1953, p. 164). The different types of beauty are mathematical beauty, beautiful acts, physical beauty, etc. The analogous nature of beauty extending to various categories is further reason to believe it to be a transcendental (Maritain 1953, p. 162).

If unity is being undivided, and truth is being as confronting the power of knowing, and goodness is confronting the power of desiring, according to Maritain, “It may be said that Beauty is the radiance of all the transcendentals united.” (Maritain 1953, p. 162). Maritain sees the transcendentals as universal modes of being that are as universal as being itself.” (Maritain 1939, p. 66). Each transcendental is “… being itself apprehended under a particular aspect.” (Maritain 1939, p. 67). Since each transcendental adds nothing real to being, they are convertible notions (Maritain 1939, p. 66). For Maritain, it is the intuition of being that permits one to discover transcendental notions from the individual beings one experiences through the judgment of existence (White 2016, p. 143). Although Gilson would deny the possibility of judging existence (White 2016, p. 143), he would agree with Maritain that beauty and being are inseparable (Gilson 1964, p. 2). In Maritain’s view, beauty is a transcendental as it transcends “… every limit of genus or category, and which do not allow themselves to be enclosed in any class, because they imbue everything and are to be found everywhere.” (Maritain 1962, p. 30). Thus each kind of being is beautiful in its own way (Maritain 1962, p. 30).

According to Maritain, art is a virtue of the practical intellect that concerns creating objects (Maritain 1953, p. 49). For Étienne Gilson, the essence of art is making, and the creation of art cannot occur without the intellect’s direction (Gilson [1965] 2000, p. 14). However, Maritain holds that artists, who seek to create what is beautiful, have a spiritual intelligence, which is a quality of creativity (Maritain 1953, p. 55). He calls this a creative intuition (Maritain 1953, p. 134). Yet how would man obtain these creative intuitions? According to Thomistic metaphysics, beauty is that which pleases the intellect, but the intellect is pleased only after it obtains knowledge of things by their forms. Maritain’s notion of creative intuitions seems to contradict his claim that one cannot experience beauty without sense-perception. This has to potential to affect the very nature of beauty according to the transcendentalist definition, which may, in turn, disqualify it as a transcendental. However, Gilson, who holds beauty is a transcendental, provides a proper corrective to Maritain’s error. Since there are no pure intellectual intuitions, man has no creative intuitions either: “Therefore, the divine Ideas truly are creative intuitions, but man has no Ideas, only concepts, some which he forms by abstracting from material objects the notions of their essences, others that are so many projects of possible things to be produced either for their usefulness or for their beauty.” (Gilson [1965] 2000, p. 60). As a source of creativity for making beautiful things, Gilson’s correction brings our attention back to things themselves and their forms, according to which they are all beautiful. Next, we will expound the anti-transcendentalist view as put forth by Aertsen.

4. A Contemporary Anti-Transcendentalist View on Beauty

4.1. The Nature of Beauty

According to Jan Aertsen, the relatedness between the true, good, and beautiful can be approached in two ways:

Viewed from the Greek tradition and the perspective of pseudo-Dionysius, the beautiful is identical with the good; it adds to it conceptually a relation to knowledge. Regarded from Thomas’s order of the transcendentals, the beautiful is to be taken as the extension of the true to the good. We can clarify this place of the beautiful further from the special relationship that exists between the true and the good.

(Aertsen 1991, p. 96)

Just as the cognitive and appetitive powers of the soul extend to all that exists, so one formal object must include both the true and the good. The good is something desirable, and therefore it becomes the end of the appetite (Aertsen 1985, p. 476). Although one formal object is both true and good, Artesen notes that Aquinas further distinguishes between the theoretical and practical reason that knows an object. Although they are distinct powers, the theoretical intellect and the practical intellect are related to one another as the true and good include one another (Aertsen 1991, p. 96). Artesen says, “For the true is something that is good, else it would not be appetible; the good is something that is true, else it would not be intelligible.” (Aertsen 1991, pp. 96–97). The theoretical intellect knows truth, but the practical intellect directs the known truth to a work that has to be done. Thus, the theoretical intellect becomes practical by knowing the truth and then extending it to the good (Aertsen 1991, p. 97). However, Artesen writes, “Yet the beautiful is not the object of practical reason, for beauty is in the medieval view not a good that is to be made. Beauty does not belong to the domain of art but is primarily a property of things themselves.” (Aertsen 1991, p. 97).

4.2. The Transcendental Status of Beauty

Not all anti-transcendentalists are unified as to why beauty falls short of transcendentality. For example, Cajetan’s commentary on Summa theologiae 1a2ae, 27.1 ad3 argues that beauty is a species of goodness. This would imply beauty is not a transcendental, because species is less universal than its genus (Kovach 2003, p. 185). However, contemporary anti-transcendentalist Aertsen does not make this objection. Aertsen recognizes Umberto Eco’s thesis, which is that if beauty is a transcendental, then beauty must be objective and universal in extension (Aertsen 1991, p. 70). Universality in extension is a necessary condition for transcendentality. However, according to Aertsen, universality in extension is not a sufficient condition for transcendentality. Even though beauty may be objective (i.e., a property of things themselves) and universal in extension, regarding Aquinas’ writings, Aertsen claims, “No texts affirm that the beautiful is a universal property of being or express explicitly the transcendentality of being.” (Aertsen 1991, p. 72). Aertsen seeks to determine a place for the beautiful in a systematic fashion based on Aquinas’ view put forth in section 3 in his commentary on Dionyius and also two texts in section 4 from the Summa Theologiae—namely, that goodness and beauty are identical yet conceptually different (i.e., beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive power) (Aertsen 1991, p. 93).

Although Maritain suggests that the beautiful unites or synthesizes the true and good, Artesen sees the beautiful integrated or included in the true and good. Aertsan supports this notion by arguing the beautiful is not the object of a distinct cognitive power (e.g., theoretical or practical reason). Instead, as the true and good include one another, the beautiful is an extension of the true to the good (Aertsen 1991, p. 93). Christian Scott Sevier summarizes Aertsen’s view:

He cautions us to consider that Aquinas nowhere identifies the beautiful with Being, but only with Good; and he cautions that Aquinas nowhere lists the beautiful among the transcendentals, even in his most comprehensive account of them in De Veritate I.1. … In spite of the convertibility of the Beautiful with the Good, and of the convertibility of the Good with Being, Aertsen nevertheless denies that any addition to the Good would thereby imply an addition to being.

(Sevier 2015, pp. 126–27)

Sevier also observes that according to Aertsen, the beautiful presupposes the true when considered subjectively by cognizers, while the beautiful presupposes the good when considered objectively apart from cognizers. Therefore, Aertsen’s position is that while the true and the good modify being, beauty does not add anything new to being (Sevier 2015, p. 127).

5. A Proposal of Beauty as a Transcendental

5.1. Nature of Beauty According to St. Thomas

In St. Thomas’s Scriptum super sententiis I, he arrives at his view of beauty based on his understanding of Dionysius, whom he interprets as saying two things come together for beauty (i.e., consonance and clarity). St. Thomas also acknowledges a third aspect of beauty, following Aristotle, in which he says beauty is contained in “a sizable body” (i.e., magno corpore), which is why smaller people are typically called proportionate, but not beautiful (In Sent. I, 31.2.1 ad 3). This last criterion is similar to the concept Maritain explicated above (i.e., fullness of being) (Maritain 1953, p. 160).

In De divinis nominibus Dionysii, St. Thomas says the beautiful “is that which participates beauty, yet we say beauty is the participation of the beautiful cause making the whole of things beautiful” (emphasis added).³ In accordance with the criterion of beauty, he explains how beauty applies to all existing things (In De div. nomin. 4.5) God is the cause of proportion and radiance in things, and each thing is seen as beautiful in accordance with the consonance and clarity of its kind (whether it be immaterial or material things) (In De div. nomin. 4.5). Insofar as anything is able to be apprehended by the intellect, it has clarity bestowed upon it by the Divine Essence. Speaking of his understanding of Dionysius, he says:

Yet he shows how God is the cause of clarity, adding that God sends into all creatures, with a certain radiance, the handing on of his own luminous ray, which is the font of all light; which radiant handings on indeed of the divine ray, must be understood according to the participation of likeness, and those handings on are beautifying, that is, making beauty in things.⁴

However, rational creatures may see certain things as beautiful, while other things may not seem beautiful (In De div. nomin. 4.5). If all things are beautiful, how then would we make sense of ugliness or lack of beauty? In the case of the good, St. Thomas distinguishes between the negation of good and the privation of good. The former is not evil. The negation of a good simply refers to a good that does not exist (e.g., a rock does not possess the good of sight). Yet, a privation of good is evil, because it refers to a good that should exist in a thing for the sake of its perfection (i.e., a man who does not possess the good of sight suffers natural evil, since a fully actualized man would be able to see) (Summa theol. I, 48.3). Nevertheless, St. Thomas says, “It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good.”⁵ Following this line of reasoning, although a privation of beauty in a being can be called “ugly”, every actual being is beautiful, and likewise every potential being (possessing ugliness), as such, is beautiful, as having relation to the beautiful. For as it has being in potentiality, so it has beauty in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of ugliness is beauty.

St. Thomas also puts forward the following consideration regarding a negation of beauty:

… because all things desire the beautiful and the good, as cause in all modes; and because there is nothing that does not participate the beautiful and the good, since each thing is beautiful and good according to its proper form; and further also boldly we will be able to say this: that non-existing, that is, prime matter, participates the beautiful and the good, since the first being non-being has a certain likeness with the divine beautiful and good: because the beautiful and the good is praised in God through the removal of all things; but in prime matter, removal is considered through defect, yet in God through excess, inasmuch as he exists supersubstantially.⁶

Thus, each thing is good and beautiful pertaining to its proper form. St. Thomas shows that Dionysius believes one’s intellect judges beauty’s form, namely that it is clear (i.e., able to be apprehended) and consonant (i.e., it is proportionate to what it is):

that singulars are beautiful according to their proper ratio, that is, according to their proper form; whence it is clear that from the divine beauty the being of all things is derived. Likewise also it has been said that consonance is of the ratio of beauty, whence all things that pertain in whatever way to consonance proceed from the divine beauty; and this is what he adds: that on account of the divine beauty are the concords of all rational creatures, as regards the intellect; for those concord who come together in the same judgment; and the friendships, as regards affection; and communions, as regards act or whatever extrinsic thing; and universally all creatures, whatever union they have, have it from the virtue of the beautiful.⁷

All things contain light or clarity, as well as consonance or proportion according to one’s apprehension of its form. But do all things also contain the integrity or fullness of being, which is the third criteria of beauty, according to St. Thomas? In the following paragraph, we are reminded that St. Thomas would contend that all things meet this criteria, since all things tend toward their final cause (i.e., all things are good).

St. Thomas also argues in the Summa theologiae that beauty and goodness are fundamentally identical in accordance with its form. The difference between goodness and beauty is only a logical difference. Beauty relates to the cognitive faculty, as opposed to goodness, which relates to the appetitive power (Summa theol. I, 5.4. ad 1). He contends, “For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known.”⁸ Although good tastes or odors are pleasant, St. Thomas relegates one’s experience of beauty to sight and sound which both minister to the cognitive faculty, as the intellectual apprehension of the beautiful is pleasant in its own way (Summa theol. I-II, 27.1 ad 3). “Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that good means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the beautiful is something pleasant to apprehend.”⁹

5.2. The Criteria of Transcendental Properties

There are at least three criteria for transcendentality alluded to by St. Thomas. First, when he speaks of the transcendentals of goodness, truth, and unity, he argues each of these add something to being—not by nature—but by cognitive relation or negation. For example, oneness is the negation of division, truth is related to the exemplar form of a thing, and goodness is related to the final cause of a thing (In Sent. I, 8.1.3). St. Thomas takes notes in Quaestiones disputatae de veritate that “goodness, like being, is equally divided into the ten categories as is clear in the Ethics 1.6, 1096a19.”¹⁰ Regarding the good, St. Thomas concludes, “Therefore, it must be that it adds nothing onto being, or that it adds something, which is in reason alone. For if it were to add something real, being would have to be contracted by the notion of goodness to some particular genus.”¹¹ If “good” would be limited to a specific genus, then it would not apply to all being. St. Thomas sees this as problematic. This implies that a second criterion for transcendentality is that transcendentals must be predicated of all being. Finally, regarding the commonness of the names “being”, “good”, “one”, and “true”, St. Thomas says “they are convertible with each other, and are the same in supposit, nor do they ever desert each other.”¹²

St. Thomas’s criteria for transcendental properties coincides with the general consensus of the high scholastic philosophers who have the following criteria: (1) logical posteriority to being (i.e., an addition of a logical or general mode to being), (2) convertibility/coextension with being, and (3) predictability of every being (Kovach 2003, p. 185). Based on this criteria, Kovach summarizes from a historical perspective why the philosophy of Albert and Aquinas should include beauty on the list of transcendentals:

Now, the Summa fratris Alexandri (1.2.1.3.6 ad 3; 1.2.1.1.2.1.2.3), St. Albert (Summa theologiae 2.10.39.1.1.2.2 ad 8; 2.11.62.1 sol.), and St. Thomas (In Dion. de div. nom. 4.5; Summa theologiae 1a, 36.2) agree that both God and creatures are beautiful. They all hold also that the beautiful is cognitively delightful and, as such, directly subsequent to the good (Summa theologiae 1.2.1.2.3; 1.1.3.3.1.1.2 sol.; St. Albert, Summa theologiae 1.6.26.1.2.3.8a and sol.; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae 1a2ae, 27.1 ad 3; 1a,5.4 ad 1; De ver. 21.3). Finally, they hold coextension and convertibility either implicitly, through the real identity and virtual distinction of beauty and goodness, or explicitly (St. Thomas, In Dion. de div. nom. 4.22; De ver. 22.1 ad 12; Summa theologiae 1a, 5.4 ad 1).

(Kovach 2003, p. 185)

5.3. Logical Posteriority to Being

Although Aquinas’ view of beauty meets all the requirements of a transcendental predicate, Gilson proposes why it receives no special treatment in his writings as a transcendental—he acknowledges with Aertsen that beauty is a variety of the good. Yet he says it is a particular kind of good to be experienced by a knowing power (Gilson 1960, p. 162). Specifically, “This Thomas will show that by establishing that … beauty is a certain good, but a good distinct from all the other classes of goods.” (Gilson 1960, p. 160). Conceiving a form as good is not identical to conceiving the form as beautiful (i.e., beauty relates to the form truly known, perceived, or apprehended by the intellect or senses while the good relates to the form desired) (Gilson 1960, p. 160). Regarding the objectivity and distinctiveness of beauty, Gilson argues, “What is beautiful is not the pleasure we take in apprehending certain forms; rather it is that which, in these forms, make them objects of a pleasurable apprehension; and this of course, will oblige us to look for beauty in the very structure of the knowing power as well as the known thing.” (Gilson 1960, pp. 160–61). While the anti-transcendentalist may argue the beautiful presupposes the true when considered subjectively by cognizers, it is not simply the knowledge of the truth that causes one to judge something as beautiful. Rather, the pleasure that comes from that knowledge is what we call beautiful.

Also, a certain proportion among the elements of the knowing subject must be present in the beautiful. The beautiful consists in the due proportion of things, which is also pleasurable to the knowing power as it is created to delight in proper proportion (Gilson 1960, p. 161). So, although Aertsan argues the beautiful is not the object of a distinct cognitive power (e.g., theoretical or practical reason), and thus it adds nothing to being, Gilson shows how beauty does in fact meet the transcendental predicate criteria of a logical posteriority to being. Beauty gives pleasure to the intellect in the very act of knowing, in distinction to the good, which relates to the desire of the will (Gilson 1960, p. 162). Even though Aertsen demonstrates the beautiful must presuppose both the good and the true, it is also the case that the true must presuppose the good, since truth is formally in the intellect rather than in things (Owens 1963, p. 119). So if the true, the good, and the beautiful are interrelated in this way, there is no reason beauty should not be on the same level as truth in its transcendentality. Sevier’s modest proposal is since beauty is a conceptual addition to the good, it is as least “… a kind of tertiary or supernumerary transcendental qualifying the secondary transcendental Good in some way.” (Sevier 2015, p. 126). Not only does beauty meet the logical posteriority criteria, but it meets the criteria of having convertibility and coextensivity with being as well, which we will mention under the following section.

5.4. Convertibility and Coextension with Being

Sevier argues that it actually does not make a difference if beauty is convertible with being or merely with the good. If we grant that beauty is convertible with the good, and everything that exists is good, then everything that exists is de facto beautiful as well (Sevier 2015, p. 127). Therefore, “… Beauty will be attributable to the exact class of entities to which Being is attributable.” (Sevier 2015, p. 127). Although Gilson distinguished between one’s conception of the good and one’s conception of the beautiful (Gilson 1960, p. 160), he says, “Beauty is goodness, which itself is being. The reason beauty and goodness in a thing are fundamentally identical is that a thing is both good and beautiful for the same reason; namely, its form.” (Gilson 1960, p. 160). Therefore, being and beauty are convertible. In order to strengthen the evidence for this, we will demonstrate that beauty is predicated of every being.

5.5. Predictability of Every Being

As stated previously, beauty consists in integrity or perfection (e.g., a fine presence), harmony (e.g., satisfactory proportion in size), and brightness or clarity (e.g., a fair complexion) (Gilson 1960, pp. 162–63). Kovach argues that all finite things are beautiful. He does this by arguing that finite has limitations by definition. The finite being is composed of both act and potency, and whatever is composed is a unity. It is also true that certain accidents belong to the essence of a finite thing, although a thing may lack an accident that the majority of its species has. Nevertheless, a finite being has everything belonging to its nature—it lacks none of its necessary parts. While unnecessary and unsuitable units to a thing produce a plurality of unrelated individuals, all things in themselves constitute an integral unity of proportionate parts, and the whole of the parts is beauty (Kovach 1974, pp. 248–49). But if all things are beautiful, how is one to make sense of their experience of ugliness?

Owens contends, “Just as a thing may be transcendentally good without being physically or morally good, so it may be transcendentally beautiful without being esthetically beautiful.” (Owens 1963, p. 124). Ugliness is an absence of beauty that should be in a given object. If the beauty should exist in a given object due to its nature, then there is a privation of beauty. If the beauty should exist in an object, but it is not absolutely demanded by its object, then this is a case of negation of beauty (Kovach 1974, p. 259). In order to explain how objects with negations of beauty can still be beautiful, Kovach says,

He who understands beauty as being integral unity with or without proportionate parts understands also that both the integrity of any given things and the proportion of its parts, if it has any at all, admit of various degrees, and so does, then, also its order. In other words, beauty does not necessarily mean perfect, unimpaired unity with perfect, unimpaired proportion or, simply, perfect, unimpaired order …

(Kovach 1974, p. 263)

Therefore, imperfect things can and do delight us although they are not perfectly beautiful. Yet if a thing has all of its accidental perfections according to its species, it is perfectly or completely beautiful. But if it lacks some of these accidental perfections, it is incompletely or imperfectly beautiful on the accidental level. However, there are no variations in degree relating to essences. If something lacked an accident in accordance with its essence, it would be another essence. But, since something is completely what it is, all things are wholly beautiful on the essential level. Since everything is more or less beautiful, beauty is a transcendental property (Kovach 1974, p. 264).

6. Conclusions

Kovach referenced that it has generally been characteristic of the Platonic tradition to include beauty among the transcendentals, and it has been characteristic of the Aristotelian tradition to exclude beauty among the transcendentals (Kovach 2003, p. 184). Gilson and Maritain are two contemporary representatives of the neoscholastic view that beauty is a transcendental with a unique relation to the intellect and the will (Kovach 2003, p. 186). However, Aertsen notes that St. Thomas did not list beauty among the transcendentals (Aertsen 1991, p. 70). In his view, the beautiful is not the object of a distinct cognitive power (e.g., theoretical or practical reason), but it is an extension of the true to the good (Aertsen 1991, p. 93). Thus, this extension of the good would not imply an addition to being (Sevier 2015, pp. 126–27). Yet, Gilson argues that beauty gives pleasure to the intellect in the very act of knowing. This is in distinction to the good (i.e., that which relates to the desire of the will) (Gilson 1960, p. 162). Also, Aertsen believes the beautiful must presuppose both the good and the true (i.e., beauty is an extension of the true to the good). However, it is also the case that the true must also presuppose the good. So, we concluded that since truth, goodness, and beauty are all interdependent, there is no reason to deny beauty’s transcendental status (Owens 1963, p. 119). Furthermore, beauty meets all of the criteria for transcendentality: (1) logical posteriority to being (2) convertibility/coextension with being, and (3) predictability of every being. As beauty consists in perfection and proportionality, Kovach demonstrated how all beings constitute a perfect and integral unity of proportionate parts. This explains why all things are beautiful in form. It also helps us understand why things are more or less beautiful—things have a greater or lesser amount of accidental perfections (Kovach 1974, p. 264). Maritain’s assertion that the senses are what detect ugliness explains why everything is beautiful in itself—nothing is ugly to the Divine intellect (Maritain 1953, p. 164). The only aspect of beauty that was not mentioned in Kovach’s argument was clarity or brightness (i.e., that which causes the intelligence to see things). Yet Gilson explains how this aspect of beauty shows that it is predicatable to all being:

Anything is called beautiful because it has a brilliancy of its own, spiritual or corporeal, and is constituted according to due proportion. God is the cause of clarity in things because He makes them participate in His own light; and He is cause of consonance in things on two counts: by ordering all things to Himself as to their end, and by ordering them with respect to one another. Hence, everything is beautiful as having a form (through which it has esse), and this form is a sort of participation in clarity.

(Gilson 1960, p. 163)

Therefore, beauty is a transcendental. The transcendental status of beauty entails that all of humanity is beautiful—we can regard one another as beautiful regardless of the accidents that one lacks. We can see and ponder the beauty in all things. In doing so, we can be reminded that all things (including all people) participate in the Divine beauty. The finite beauty we experience all around us should occasion us to take pleasure in the thought that our end is Infinite Beauty—for He is ordering all things to Himself.

Institutional Review Board Statement

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Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Footnotes

Notes

1. Kovach says, “Of the three, HERACLITUS (H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorwokratiker: Griechish und Deutsch, edited by W. Kranz. 22 B 102, 1:173) and SOCRATES (Xenophon., Mem. 3.8.5, 7) assert that everything is both good and beautiful. PLATO teaches the same doctrine in two ways: indirectly, by teaching that whatever is good is beautiful (Lysis 216D, Tim. 87C) and that everything participates in the good (Rep. 517C); and directly, by holding that everything is made both good and beautiful (Tim. 53B) (Kovach 2003, p. 184).

2. Kovach says Pseuo-Duonysius stresses “the real identity of beauty and goodness (De div. nom. 4.10, 7; Patrologia Graeca, ed. J. P. Migne, 3:705C–D, 704A–B) together with the goodness of God and all creatures; and directly, by teaching that God is beautiful by essence and every creature by participation (ibid. 4.7, 701C–704B; 4.10, 708A; De cael. hier. 2.3, 141C) (Kovach 2003, p. 184).

3. In De div. nomin. 4:5: “Haec enim in existentibus, in participationes et participantia dividentes: pulchrum quidem esse dicimus quod participat pulchritudinem, pulchritudinem autem participationem, pulchrae facientis tota pulchra, causae.”

4. In De div. nomin. 4:5: “Quomodo autem Deus sit causa claritatis, ostendit subdens, quod Deus immittit omnibus creaturis, cum quodam fulgore, traditionem sui radii luminosi, qui est fons omnis luminis; quae quidem traditiones fulgidae divini radii, secundum participationem similitudinis sunt intelligendae et istae traditiones sunt pulchrificae, idest facientes pulchritudinem in rebus.”

5. Summa theol. I, 48.3: “Manifestum est autem quod forma per quam aliquid est actu, perfectio quaedam est, et bonum quoddam, et sic omne ens in actu, bonum quoddam est. Et similiter omne ens in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum quoddam est, secundum quod habet ordinem ad bonum, sicut enim est ens in potentia, ita et bonum in potentia. Relinquitur ergo quod subiectum mali sit bonum.”

6. In De div. nomin. 4:5: “… quia omnia desiderant pulchrum et bonum, sicut causam omnibus modis; et quia nihil est quod non participet pulchro et bono, cum unumquodque sit pulchrum et bonum secundum propriam formam; et ulterius, etiam, audacter hoc dicere poterimus quod non-existens, idest materia prima participat pulchro et bono, cum ens primum non-existens habeat quamdam similitudinem cum pulchro et bono divino: quoniam pulchrum et bonum laudatur in Deo per omnium ablationem; sed in materia prima, consideratur ablatio per defectum, in Deo autem per excessum, in quantum supersubstantialiter existit.”

7. In De div. nomin. 4:5: “… quod singula sunt pulchra secundum propriam rationem, idest secundum propriam formam; unde patet quod ex divina pulchritudine esse omnium derivatur. Similiter etiam dictum est quod de ratione pulchritudinis est consonantia, unde omnia, quae, qualitercumque ad consonantiam pertinent, ex divina pulchritudine procedunt; et hoc est quod subdit, quod propter pulchrum divinum sunt omnium rationalium creaturarum concordiae, quantum ad intellectum; concordant enim qui in eamdem sententiam conveniunt; et amicitiae, quantum ad affectum; et communiones, quantum ad actum vel ad quodcumque extrinsecum; et universaliter omnes creaturae, quantamcumque unionem habent, habent ex virtute pulchri.”

8. Summa theol. I-II, 27.1 ad 3: “Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus.”

9. Summa theol. I-II, 27.1 ad 3: “Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.”

10. De veritate 21.1: “Sic autem bonum non addit aliquid super ens: cum bonum dividatur aequaliter in decem genera, ut ens, ut patet in I Ethicor.”

11. De veritate 21.1: “Et ideo oportet quod vel nihil addat super ens, vel addat aliquid, quod sit in ratione tantum. Si enim adderet aliquid reale, oporteret quod per rationem boni contraheretur ens ad aliquod speciale genus.”

12. In Sent. I, 8.1.3: “Respondeo dicendum, quod ista nomina, ens et bonum, unum et verum, simpliciter secundum rationem intelligendi praecedunt alia divina nomina: quod patet ex eorum communitate… Si autem comparemus ea ad invicem, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum suppositum; et sic convertuntur ad invicem, et sunt idem in supposito nec unquam derelinquunt se …”

Footnotes

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