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Auction design with data‐driven misspecifications: Inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation
Jehiel, Philippe; Mierendorff, Konrad. Theoretical Economics Vol. 19, Iss. 4, (Nov 1, 2024): 1543-1579.You might have access to this document
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