Strong presidents and grand corruption scandals in the Philippines

Abstract

Purpose

This paper provides evidence from the Philippines that strong presidents (termed here as hyper-presidents) have failed to address systemic corruption despite their anti-corruption rhetoric and promises.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper uses a case study methodology to review how “strong presidents” have dealt with the problem of corruption in the Philippines and to examine their handling of grand corruption scandals. Data were collected from court decisions, congressional reports, news reports, journal articles, and other academic publications.

Findings

The paper has two major findings. First, none of the strong presidents were able to build the social and political foundations for anti-corruption reform. Second, in dealing with corruption scandals, the strong presidents observed selective persecution and particularistic concealment (cover-ups) instead of allowing the rule of law to prevail. These findings dismiss the idea of the sufficiency of strong presidents, some of whom project the possession of the political will necessary to combat corruption in the country.

Originality/value

While the need for strong leaders has been emphasized in the anti-corruption literature, this paper argues that such leaders do not necessarily add to the political commitment needed to fight systemic corruption or even lay the political, institutional, and social foundations for reform. Strong presidents in the weak Philippine state are powerless against the institutions and culture that encourage and tolerate grand corruption.

Introduction

How have strong Philippine presidents dealt with the problem of entrenched corruption and handled the grand corruption scandals during their term of office? There is a popular notion that strong presidents and autocrats are necessary for governments to succeed in the fight against entrenched corruption. This notion is not entirely wrong, but the record shows a mix of successes and failures. Authoritarian regimes that have succeeded in cleaning up government were also high-performing in terms of their governance and economic performance (Carothers, 2022). However, there are also failure cases, such as the Marcos and Suharto dictatorships in the Philippines and Indonesia, respectively.

Despite the failure of authoritarianism in the Philippines, many Filipinos still believe in strong leaders (Table 1). In waves of the World Values Survey from 2001-19, the results showed that most respondents overwhelmingly favor a democratic political system. However, the results also suggest the prevalence of values supporting delegative democracy and hyper-presidentialism. Citizen support for strong leaders (as described in Item 1 of Table 1) is indicative of their delegative democratic attitude (Pernia and Panao, 2023).

Delegative democracy (DD) is a type of democracy in which citizens delegate vast powers to the president, who in turn “governs as he sees fit” and is only constrained by “the existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office” (O’Donnell, 1994, p. 59). Horizontal accountability (or institutional checks and balances) is absent or lacking (O’Donnell, 1998). Some scholars have treated the Philippines as a DD based on characteristic features of executive hegemony and weak horizontal accountability (Ronas, 2011; Thompson, 2018; Pernia and Panao, 2023). The exercise of the president’s vast legislative and non-legislative powers, both constitutionally expressed and implied, are inadequately checked by Congress and the judiciary (Wufel, 1988; Bolongaita, 1995).

DD provides the background for the presidents’ excessive intrusions into the powers of other branches of government and constitutionally independent bodies. Other authors have used terms such as “executive aggrandizement” (Bermeo, 2016) and “hyper-presidentialism” (Nino, 1992; Rose-Ackerman et al., 2011) to describe such intrusions. Hyper-presidentialism shall be used in this paper referring to the regime of “strong presidents” in the Philippines.

From 2001 to 2022, the Philippines experienced a period of hyper-presidentialism (Rose-Ackerman et al., 2011; Balisacan, 2015; Thompson, 2022; Dressel and Susilo, 2023). The period is represented by presidents Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Benigno Aquino III, and Rodrigo Duterte. These are the “strong presidents” of the post-authoritarian Philippines. The other previous post-authoritarian presidents — Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, and Joseph Estrada — were not known for the characteristic abuse of executive powers.

Figures 1 and 2 show that regardless of administration, whether hyper-presidential or not, popular or not, corruption control estimates and corruption perceptions in the Philippines have barely changed. In addition, the Social Weather Stations (SWS) Survey of Enterprises on Corruption, indicates that for several years, most people believed that there was a lot of corruption in the public sector. The surveys since 2000 have also consistently shown the Office of the President’s negative net sincerity ratings in fighting corruption (SWS, 2016).

This paper maintains that the election of strong presidents (or hyper-presidents) is not a sufficient condition for the effective control of corruption in the Philippine context. This proposition is drawn from case studies of how strong or hyper-presidents dealt with the problem of corruption and their handling of grand corruption scandals. The next sections of the paper: 1) discuss a framework to assess presidents as agents of political change, especially targeting corruption, and 2) examine how hyper-presidential administrations have dealt with the problem of corruption and the political scandals they confronted.

Corruption and presidential leadership in political time

Typically, presidential leadership and performance are evaluated based on public approval ratings, character assessments, leadership styles, or as dispensers of patronage (Buchanan, 2016; Thompson, 2018). Often, public ratings are used. However, such ratings should not serve as the primary basis for assessing presidential performance.

An alternative way of evaluating presidents is provided by Skowronek (2011), who argues that presidential leadership should be situated in a country’s political development, i.e., his or her place in “political time” (or political context). He proposes that presidents whether affiliated or opposed to a particular regime, should be assessed as agents of political change. This therefore raises the need to examine the president’s political agency based on the existing political circumstances and exigencies. Teehankee (2016) and Thompson (2018) have applied Skowronek’s framework in their studies of Philippine presidents and regimes.

This paper builds on Skowronek’s proposition of evaluating presidents as change agents. Tusalem (2016) suggests that the approval ratings of presidents in a delegative democracy are sensitive to their ability to maintain clientelist relations and satisfy pressing citizen demands. This suggests a strong potential motive for presidents to be involved directly or indirectly in corrupt acts leading to scandal. This paper therefore proposes that Philippine presidents, as change agents, should also be assessed in terms of how they dealt with the problem (and the causes) of systemic corruption. In this regard, it is necessary to examine how they handled the grand corruption scandals during their term of office.

Scandals and high levels of corruption reflect the country’s transitional level of political development. As such, presidents in the service of change must aim their guns at the problem of corruption. Numerous studies since the 1970s have established institutionalized corruption patterns afflicting local government units, the military, business, media, the judiciary, and bureaucratic agencies such as the Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Department of Education, to name a few (Amorado, 2007; Magtulis-Briones, 1979; Parayno, 2013; Co, 2007; Barbo, 2002; Chua, 1999). Not surprisingly, public perceptions of high corruption in government have not dramatically improved in decades.

Systemic corruption in the Philippines draws largely from the personalistic character of its politics and the micro-particularistic patronage systems that dominate the weak state (Hutchcroft, 2014). Similarly, weak state institutions combined with a liberalized political and economic environment provide massive opportunities for corruption perpetrated by powerful political and economic forces. The pattern of corruption that evolves in this setting has been called the ‘Oligarchs and Clans’ syndrome (Johnston, 2008).

To address entrenched corruption under this pattern in the Philippines, Johnston (2010) recommends laying down the political and social foundations for reform backed by sustained political support. Successful interventions in areas like education (including an anti-corruption curriculum), judicial efficiency and effectiveness, poverty alleviation, and public service delivery are critical to drumming up political support from various sectors. He also recommends the consolidation of anti-corruption responsibilities that continue to be spread out to various anti-corruption agencies (ACAs).

Following Johnston (2010), Quah (2018, p. 67) likewise recommends the establishment of a single, well-resourced ACA with sufficient police and prosecutorial powers to overcome perennial problems of “lack of coordination, overlapping functions, and competition for recognition and resources” among several ACAs. He also prescribed that the ACA should be minimally involved in donor-driven projects.

Though necessary, the establishment of such an ACA is not sufficient to control entrenched corruption. In his studies of corruption in Asian countries since the 1980s, Quah (1999) has stressed the importance of: 1) the leaders’ political commitment; and 2) the adequacy of anti-corruption measures, an important part of which is attacking the causes of corruption in a particular country. In a recent analysis of Philippine corruption, he identified four major causes of Philippine corruption, namely: 1) the low salaries of civil servants and political leaders; 2) red tape; 3) the low probability of detection and punishment of corrupt offenders; 4) cultural factors; and 5) weak political will (Quah, 2018).

Arguably, anti-corruption reform will remain ineffective, if not hopeless, if the major causes of corruption remain unaddressed. Systematically attacking its major causes is essential. Likewise, effective interventions should go beyond the usual moral and legal prescriptions for deviance and should cover the systemic factors that reinforce the institutions and culture of corruption. The succeeding section provides a discussion of grand corruption scandals during the country’s hyper-presidential era (2001-2022).

Hyper-presidentialism and grand corruption scandals in the Philippines (2001-2022)

The country’s hyper-presidential era after the Marcos dictatorship began with the Arroyo administration (2001-10) and as of this writing ended with the Duterte presidency (2016-22). The three presidencies immediately following the dictatorship — Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada — were not known for excessive abuse albeit they had their share of corruption scandals. The scandal cases during the terms of the hyper-presidents discussed below were either unsatisfactorily resolved or unresolved. Unsatisfactory because of the political particularism and cover-ups applied by the country’s leaders in resolving the scandals. This suggests the official toleration of corruption, which gives the public a signal about the seriousness of the government’s anti-corruption efforts.

Before the courts handle a case, a political resolution of the scandal usually takes place. Political resolutions typically involve selective prosecution and particularistic concealment (or cover-ups). Related practices include the suppression of evidence (using executive privilege, the disappearance/flight of witnesses, the replacement of officials), the suspension or cancellation of programs and contracts, and whitewashing investigations. The cases of grand corruption scandals presented in the following discussion of each presidential administration show this pattern of selective prosecution and particularistic concealment.

The Arroyo administration (2001-2010)

Arroyo’s hyper-presidentialism stemmed from the desire to extend her presidency. However, her victory in the 2004 elections was tarnished by election-related scandals (“Hello Garci” and the Fertilizer Fund Scam). These scandals raised serious questions about her administration’s legitimacy and threatened her political survival. The breakup of her alliance with former president Corazon Aquino at the height of the Hello Garci scandal further displaced her from the regime that previously nurtured her rise to political power. Consequently, her presidency was beleaguered by incessant destabilization attempts. Despite anti-corruption reform efforts, she was reviled by regime supporters for her administration’s corruption and bad governance. Yet, Arroyo survived impeachment and coup attempts and through “budgetary tools” successfully bought the support of police and military generals, religious leaders, legislators, and local politicians to avert threats to her presidency (Quimpo, 2007; Holmes, 2019; Hutchcroft, 2008).

Of the three hyper-presidential administrations, the Arroyo presidency was the most active in anti-corruption reform. Key reforms included among others: 1) the government procurement reform of 2003, which also established the electronic procurement system; 2) the Anti-money Laundering Act of 2003; 3) the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007 which sought transparency in transaction procedures as well as the adoption of service standards among government agencies; 4) the conduct of corruption vulnerability assessments in the executive branch; 5) increased civil society engagement in anti-corruption; and 6) enhancing the capacity of the Ombudsman as well as other anti-graft and corruption bodies (Oyamada, 2005; Quah, 2010). She even hired Tony Kwok, an anti-corruption expert from Hong Kong, as consultant to her government. Despite such measures, the president has been embroiled in several political corruption scandals. This somehow brought down her net satisfaction ratings at the SWS polls, which reached all-time lows (Figure 1).

The NBN-ZTE Deal

The NBN-ZTE scandal erupted following a media exposé in April 2007 alleging overpricing, kickbacks, and bribery in procuring the country’s digital communications infrastructure. The project was awarded to the Chinese state-controlled firm, Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) Company for US$343 million and was financed by a loan as part of China’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Philippines. President Arroyo signed the contract with ZTE on 17 April 2007 during her visit to China.

The expose appeared to have been instigated by the project’s losing bidder, Jose de Venecia III, son of then-House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. (Senate of the Philippines, 2009). Soon after the contract signing, De Venecia III through the media hurled corruption allegations. He accused Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chair Benjamin Abalos of offering him a US$10 million bribe to withdraw from the project bidding. Likewise, he accused Abalos of bribing NEDA Secretary Romulo Neri and his technical consultant, then chief executive officer of the government-owned Philippine Forest Corporation, Rodolfo “Jun” Lozada, each for PhP200 million. The bribes to Neri and Lozada would ensure project continuity. Further, De Venecia claimed that the project was overpriced by US$130 million to cover kickbacks.

The exposé prompted the opposition-dominated Senate to launch an investigation In September 2007. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s (SBRC) public hearings on the issue lasted for 7 months, and its report was filed in November 2009. Before the SBRC could begin its full-blown investigation in 2007, Arroyo suspended the NBN-ZTE project. She also transferred NEDA Secretary Neri as head of the Commission on Higher Education. Then, on 2 October 2007, she completely canceled the deal with the Chinese firm. On the following day, Abalos resigned from the COMELEC.

During the Senate’s initial investigation, Neri testified that indeed there was a bribe, which he did not accept. He reported the bribe incident to Arroyo, who advised non-acceptance. However, when asked by the Senate why the president still approved of the NBN-ZTE deal even if she knew of the irregularities, Neri invoked executive privilege.

The use of executive privilege based on Executive Order No. (E.O.) 464 which Arroyo issued in September 2005 became a useful tool of the executive branch to respond to congressional witch-hunting activities (Batalla, 2020a). E.O. 464, as affirmed and modified by the Supreme Court, required all heads of departments from the executive branch, the Armed Forces, and the police, as well as those under the National Security Adviser to secure the President’s prior consent before appearing in congressional inquiries.

In early 2008, arrest warrants were issued against Neri and Lozada after the two ignored the Senate’s summons. On 31 January, Lozada flew to Hong Kong to evade the arrest. However, for still unknown reasons, he decided to return in early February. After claiming to have been kidnapped at the airport, he agreed to testify. His testimony revealed that his involvement started with his introduction to Abalos by Neri during a golf course meeting. He confirmed the participation of Abalos and the First Gentleman, Mike Arroyo, in the deal.

In November 2009, more than a year after completing the public hearings, the SBRC issued its report. It recommended the filing of charges against President Arroyo, her husband Jose Miguel Arroyo, former COMELEC Chair Benjamin Abalos, Jose de Venecia III, former Speaker Jose de Venecia Jr., officials of the Department of Transportation and Communication, Engineer Rodolfo Lozada, former NEDA Secretary Romulo Neri, and Environmental Secretary Jose Atienza Jr. and former Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel Gaite.

The SBRC recommendations contrasted those of the Ombudsman’s resolution. In February 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman launched its investigation following criminal complaints filed by citizens and Lower House representatives. Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez inhibited herself from the investigation because of her close relations with First Gentleman Arroyo. In acting on the complaints, the Ombudsman investigative panel “limited its inquiry” to the participation of Abalos, Neri, De Venecia III, and Lozada (Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 2023). President Arroyo was dropped as a respondent based on the presidential privilege of immunity from suit.

On 29 April 2009, the Ombudsman issued its decision. It recommended: 1) the filing of charges against Abalos and Neri for violations of corruption laws and 2) the dropping of criminal charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, Former Speaker de Venecia, his son de Venecia III, and others for lack of probable cause. The Ombudsman panel did not indict Lozada in the NBN-ZTE case but later found him guilty of graft in a different case during his stint as the head of a government corporation.

Because of the perceived selective prosecution, complaints were subsequently filed by dissatisfied citizens against the Ombudsman for grave abuse of discretion. For lack of evidence, these petitions were dismissed with finality by the Supreme Court in 2023 (Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 2023). In 2016, the Sandiganbayan, the country’s anti-graft court, likewise exonerated the Arroyo spouses, Abalos, and Transportation and Communications Secretary Leandro Mendoza for lack of evidence (People of the Philippines vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, 2016).

The one held accountable for the ZTE-NBN scandal was former Secretary Neri. In its 2021 decision, the Supreme Court reversed a Court of Appeals decision that found Neri guilty of simple misconduct. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Ombudsman’s 2009 ruling of grave misconduct. In addition, the High Court ordered the imposition of accessory penalties, including the cancelation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service (Neri vs. Office of the Ombudsmanl, 2021).

Aquino III Presidency (2010-2016)

Benigno Aquino III’s hyper-presidentialism arose from his unrelenting pursuit of a “truth and justice” agenda, which received the support of the liberal reformist regime. As Baviera (2012, p. 254) noted, the Aquino III administration “pushed the envelope in terms of what the executive can demand from the legislature and the judiciary for its single-minded pursuit of a political promise to curb corruption in the political system.” However, Aquino’s anti-corruption initiatives though in the name of “truth and justice” were primarily targeted against his predecessor, Gloria Arroyo, her allies, and former officials. His first executive order established a Truth Commission to determine graft and corruption in the previous administration. The constitutionality of this executive decree was later rejected by the Supreme Court The administration’s quest for “justice” led to: 1) a prolonged executive-judicial collision; 2) excessive intrusions into judicial and legislative functions (e.g., authorizing the Justice Secretary to issue hold departure and watchlist orders, which is a power delegated to the courts); and 3) buying congressional support for the impeachment of the Chief Justice and the Ombudsman (Holmes, 2019; Batalla et al., 2018).

Certainly, the governance environment during the Aquino III administration was an improvement over the previous presidency. However, in the absence of significant political and institutional anti-corruption reforms, the promise of a clean government was weak.

Beginning in 2013, the media exposed several political corruption scandals. Among these were 1) the use of executive and congressional slush funds to secure congressional support for the ouster of the Ombudsman and the Supreme Court Chief Justice, 2) the unraveling of pork barrel syndicates (PDAF scandal) involving legislators, government executives, and criminal organizations, 3) the use of executive slush funds (DAP scandal) to buy off or reward senators and state auditors during the Chief Justice’s impeachment, 4) procurement scandals at the Department of Transportation and Communication, Philippine National Police, and the Land Transportation Office, 5) the Mamasapano massacre, 6) the “laglag-bala” (or bullet drop) scam at the international airports, and 7) the alleged drug trade at the National Penitentiary. These scandals during the second half of Aquino III’s term gradually eroded public trust and approval in the administration even if the president represented the post-Marcos Sr. reformist regime.

PDAF scandal

A July 2013 exposé from the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) revealed a conspiracy based on an ongoing investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The scandal, also known as the PDAF scam, concerned the systematic diversion of congressional pork barrel funds to bogus non-government organizations (NGOs) and ghost projects. It was pointed out that the scheme defrauded the government of an estimated PhP10 billion for a period of 10 years.

The PDAF scam involved legislators, executive agencies related to budget release and implementation, and a criminal syndicate running fake NGOs. Legislators received 40-60 percent rebates from PDAF funds obtained by the syndicate (Carvajal, 2013). The PDI exposé framed the scam as a decade-long affair involving only the criminal syndicate led by Janet Lim-Napoles as well as 12 opposition legislators including Senators Juan Ponce Enrile, Ramon Revilla, Jr., Jinggoy Estrada, Gringo Honasan, and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. The NBI probe likewise focused on the Napoles syndicate.

The revelation of the scandal would have signified an achievement of good governance for the Aquino III administration. However, the events that unfolded afterward would suggest otherwise — it became a case of selective justice. Following the PDI exposé, separate investigations were launched by the DOJ, the Ombudsman, and the Senate. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit (COA) released its special audit report on the PDAF for the period 2007-2009 during the Arroyo administration.

The DOJ and Ombudsman investigations focused on the Napoles case, thereby limiting its list of suspects. In 2013, the DOJ filed complaints of plunder and corruption against Napoles, four opposition senators (Juan Ponce-Enrile, Jinggoy Estrada, Ramon Revilla, Jr., and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.), and 20 former and incumbent members of the House of Representatives. The third batch of complaints, which involved administration allies such as TESDA director-general Joel Villanueva as well as Representatives Rufus Rodriguez and Rachel Arenas, were delayed for more than a year. In April 2014, the Ombudsman indicted Napoles, Ponce-Enrile, Estrada, and Revilla for plunder, graft and corruption. The three senators were later convicted and jailed.

In contrast to the DOJ’s short list, the COA report identified 188 legislators in highly irregular PDAF projects (Parreño, 2015). Several of them were key allies and members of Aquino III’s Liberal Party-led coalition. Also, state auditors identified 82 NGOs, of which only 8 were linked to Napoles and involved in the PhP6.1 billion PDAF funds diversion from 2017 to 2019. The Napoles NGOs received only PhP1.74 billion while the other NGOs got the remainder. This meant that there were more syndicates involved other than that of Napoles. The difference in treatment of the DOJ and COA in the case led legal experts to accuse the government of selective justice and persecution (San Juan, 2015).

The Duterte Presidency (2016-2022)

Rodrigo Duterte’s election as President in 2016 followed a campaign promise of ridding the country of crime, corruption, and drugs. Arguably, the most hyper-presidential of them all, Duterte was a long-term mayor of Davao City, a subnational authoritarian who endured this position through alliances and the extrajudicial punishment of criminals (Sidel, 2018; Thompson, 2022). As a presidential candidate, he openly rejected the post-Marcos liberal reformist regime and promised his audience “real change” (tunay na pagbabago). The capture of the presidency quickly saw the application of the Davao formula, signaling a national drug war that ended in thousands of extrajudicial killings.

Anti-corruption efforts were traditional — the creation of the Presidential Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) and the dismissal of dispensable officials and civil servants. However, Duterte’s projection as a strong man did not prevent political corruption scandals from occurring. Just like his predecessors, his was a scandal-laden presidency.

The Duterte administration received its first shock in October 2016 with the murder and kidnapping for ransom by the police of a South Korean businessman, Joo Ick-Jee. The incident led Duterte to rant about corruption at the core of the police (Batalla, 2020b). In 2017-8, two drug smuggling cases worth about PhP17.4 billion (or about US$380 million) were uncovered. Then in 2019, the abuse of the prison term reduction law (Good Conduct and Time Allowance or GCTA) by the Bureau of Corrections was discovered after a well-known criminal convicted of rape and murder was freed. The GCTA for sale scheme led to the questionable release of nearly 2,000 heinous crime convicts (Corrales, 2019). In 2019, another scandal hit the government’s Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) for ghost kidney treatments.

In January 2020, acting on a tip by a whistleblower, Senator Risa Hontiveros exposed a modus operandi at the Bureau of Immigration (BI). The modus, also known as the pastillas scheme, allowed for the seamless entry of Chinese nationals into the Philippines, each in exchange for PhP10,000. The scheme was so-called because the bribe money was rolled in a white paper that resembled pastillas, a local pastry.

The government’s prolonged lockdown policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic served as an opportunity for massive corruption. Duterte’s Presidential Anti-Corruption Commission received over 7,600 complaints in the distribution of cash aid (“ayuda”) worth PhP200 billion to households. The distribution did not proceed smoothly causing allegations of corruption at the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and local government units.

Continuing troubles at PhilHealth exposed the weaknesses of the leadership in preventing systemic corruption in government. A whistleblower bared the anomalous procurement of information technology equipment and the fraudulent use of the cash advance fund for hospitals during emergencies. It was later discovered that billions of pesos in funds were released to hospitals that did not treat COVID-19 patients.

Pharmally scandal

The case of Pharmally Pharmaceuticals represents a syndicated effort to defraud the government of billions of pesos at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Established in September 2019 with a capitalization of only PhP625,000, from 2020 to 2021, Pharmally was able to secure supply contracts worth PhP10.8 billion of imported surgical masks, personal protective equipment, and test kits. The conspiracy was accidentally uncovered in August 2021 while the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was investigating an audit report of deficiencies in the transfer of PhP42 billion from the Department of Health to the Procurement Service of the Department of Budget and Management (PS-DBM). The latter handled the large-scale procurements for the government. The House of Representatives’ Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability reacted by launching a parallel investigation.

Key personalities implicated in the hearings were close Duterte supporters including Health Secretary Francisco Duque III, DBM Undersecretary Christopher Lao, and presidential economic adviser Michael Yang (a Chinese citizen). Undersecretary Lao was temporarily appointed as executive director of PS-DBM in 2020. After signing the April 2020 contracts worth PhP8.6 billion, he resigned from his position. He was afterward reassigned to the DBM liaison office while his subordinate and procurement director, Warren Rex Liong, successfully joined the Ombudsman.

Duterte reacted to the Senate hearings with a staunch defense of the three. Treating the SBRC hearings as hostile and the Lower House hearings as fair, Duterte issued an order invoking executive privilege and mandating members of the executive branch to ignore the summons from the Senate. Executive branch members were however allowed to attend Lower House hearings.

President Duterte’s clout both in the Senate and the Lower House soon became evident. The SBRC report on the Pharmally issue failed to get the required number of signatures. However, SBRC Chair Richard Gordon and Senator Risa Hontiveros filed before the Ombudsman administrative complaints against 33 officials of the PS-DBM and DOH. On the other hand, the House committee report recommended the filing of criminal charges against a list of Pharmally executives and minor PS-DBM officials but excluded Yang, Duque, and Lao.

In March 2023, Ombudsman Samuel Martirez, acting on the administrative complaints of Gordon and Hontiveros, issued a six-month suspension order on 33 DOH and PS-DBM officials. Then in August, finding probable cause, he recommended the filing of graft charges against Pharmally executives and several PS-DBM procurement officials, including Lao, Liong, and procurement management officer Paul Jasper de Guzman. There is yet to be a final judicial resolution to the case.

Conclusion

This paper reviewed three hyper-presidential administrations in the Philippines and examined how they dealt with the problem of corruption and grand corruption scandals. There were at least two major findings. First, none of the three hyper-presidents were able to build the foundations for anti-corruption reform as discussed earlier. There were only selective cleanups and minor structural changes made in government such as the revival of the Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council (IAAGCC) during Aquino III and the creation of the PACC during Duterte. These exemplify traditional reform approaches that reinforce the particularistic and personalistic character of Philippine politics and the toleration of corruption. In contrast, Arroyo’s tenure was marked by remarkable anti-corruption initiatives although these were overshadowed by the president’s lack of popularity as well as presidential scandals and strong perceptions of corruption. Still, the reforms were inadequate to address the major causes of corruption in the country.

Second, a common pattern can be gleaned from how the hyper-presidents dealt with corruption scandals. This involves selective persecution (political particularism) and cover-ups. This response pattern tends to generate further doubts about the sincerity of Philippine presidents, including strong ones, to address the problem of corruption.

The findings dismiss the idea of the sufficiency of strong presidents, some of whom project the possession of the political will necessary to fight corruption. However, the role of presidents cannot be understated. Following Skowronek (2011), they can serve as change agents in effectively controlling corruption. High levels of corruption, which reflect a stage in a country’s political development, undermine democracy and effective government (Kubbe and Engelbert, 2018; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 1999) and therefore require executive action.

However, it would do well for the Philippine electorate to consider programmatic political parties with serious anti-corruption platforms rather than rely on the mere promises of presidential candidates. Unfortunately, it has been difficult for programmatic political parties to be organized and institutionalized in the country because of 1) the long history and continuing repression and persecution of leaders and supporters of non-elite constituencies; 2) poor voter identification with political parties that represent particular societal interests and constituencies; and 3) the strong grip of oligarchic political families/dynasties on electoral contests in the legislature and local governments (Rivera, 2016; Hicken, 2018).

Grand corruption scandals provide citizens with a way of assessing presidential performance. However, there is an argument in the literature that they have a minimal effect on public approvals of presidents. For instance, Tusalem (2016, p. 519) maintains that presidential scandals have “no discernable effect on a president’s approval ratings if the president maintains client-patron relations and heeds the immediate pressing demands of citizens.” Instead, he argues that presidential approval ratings are more sensitive to public perceptions of poverty. Indeed, the effects of corruption scandals on public approval ratings in the Philippines have been inconsistent during the hyper-presidential period, with President Duterte enjoying high approval ratings amid his government’s scandals. This invites the need for more studies on the empirical relationship between presidential approval ratings and corruption scandals.

The author thanks the two reviewers and the journal editors for their valuable comments to improve the original manuscript.

Figure 1

Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International) and Presidential Net Satisfaction Ratings (SWS), 1996-2022. Sources: Compiled by the author from Social Weather Station (2022) and Transparency International (2024).

[Figure omitted. See PDF]

Figure 2

Control of Corruption Estimates, 1996-2022. Source: The World Bank (2022).

[Figure omitted. See PDF]

Table 1

What Filipinos think of strong leaders and democracy

Item	Very Good	Fairly Good	Fairly Bad	Very Bad	Very Good+Fairly Good	Fairly Bad+Very Bad
I. Having a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections
2019	22.7	52.4	18.2	6.6	75.1	24.8
2012	19.2	39.9	20.3	19.4	59.1	39.7
2001	16.9	44.9	30.0	7.1	61.8	37.1
II. Having a democratic political system
2019	20.8	52.9	21.0	5.0	73.7	26.0
2012	33.9	40.9	17.5	6.5	74.8	24.0
2001	27.9	53.8	15.3	2.2	81.7	17.5

Source: Compiled by the author from Waves 4, 6 and 7 of the World Values Survey, Inglehart et al. (2020).