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Abstract
Severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome (SFTS) is an emerging tick-borne disease with an increasing annual incidence rate. In this case report, we presented two patients infected with the SFTS virus, suggesting a potential direct transmission route from camels to humans through blood contact. Both patients developed symptoms after engaging in the slaughtering of one sick camel, while their family members living in the same environment or co-diners remained unaffected. Subsequent detection revealed a high viral load of SFTS virus, reaching 1010 viral RNA copies/ml, in the sample obtained from the sick camel. Metagenomic sequencing did not identify any other pathogens. The SFTS virus was successfully isolated from both patient and camel samples. The complete nucleotide sequences obtained from the infected patients demonstrated a remarkable 100% similarity to those found in the camel, and genetic evolution analysis classified the virus as genotype A. Additionally, partial sequences of the SFTS virus were identified in ticks captured from the camel rearing environment, however, these sequences showed only 95.9% similarity to those found in camel and humans. Furthermore, immunoglobulin M and immunoglobulin G antibodies were detected in serum samples collected from the patient. Our findings provide evidence that camel may serve as a competent reservoir for transmitting the SFTS virus to humans. Further in vitro investigations into SFTS virus infections in large animals are warranted to understand their role in viral maintenance and transmission.
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1 Institute for Infectious Disease and Endemic Disease Control, Beijing Center for Disease Prevention and Control, Beijing, People’s Republic of China
2 National Key Laboratory of Intelligent Tracking and Forecasting for Infectious Diseases, Beijing Ditan Hospital, Capital Medical University, Beijing, People’s Republic of China
3 Beijing Pinggu District Center for Disease Prevention and Control, Beijing, People’s Republic of China
4 State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Beijing, People’s Republic of China
5 Institute for Infectious Disease and Endemic Disease Control, Beijing Center for Disease Prevention and Control, Beijing, People’s Republic of China; Beijing Municipal Key Laboratory of Clinical Epidemiology, Beijing, People’s Republic of China