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Abstract

In security engineering, including software security engineering, there is a well-known design paradigm telling to prefer safe and secure defaults. The paper presents a systematization of knowledge (SoK) of this paradigm by the means of a systematic mapping study and a scoping review of relevant literature. According to the mapping and review, the paradigm has been extensively discussed, used, and developed further since the late 1990s. Partially driven by the insecurity of the Internet of things, the volume of publications has accelerated from the circa mid-2010s onward. The publications reviewed indicate that the paradigm has been adopted in numerous different contexts. It has also been expanded with security design principles not originally considered when the paradigm was initiated in the mid-1970s. Among the newer principles are an "off by default" principle, various overriding and fallback principles, as well as those related to the zero trust model. The review also indicates obstacles developers and others have faced with the~paradigm.

Details

1009240
Title
SoK: The Design Paradigm of Safe and Secure Defaults
Publication title
arXiv.org; Ithaca
Publication year
2024
Publication date
Dec 23, 2024
Section
Computer Science
Publisher
Cornell University Library, arXiv.org
Source
arXiv.org
Place of publication
Ithaca
Country of publication
United States
University/institution
Cornell University Library arXiv.org
e-ISSN
2331-8422
Source type
Working Paper
Language of publication
English
Document type
Working Paper
Publication history
 
 
Online publication date
2024-12-24
Milestone dates
2024-12-23 (Submission v1)
Publication history
 
 
   First posting date
24 Dec 2024
ProQuest document ID
3148978595
Document URL
https://www.proquest.com/working-papers/sok-design-paradigm-safe-secure-defaults/docview/3148978595/se-2?accountid=208611
Full text outside of ProQuest
Copyright
© 2024. This work is published under http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.
Last updated
2024-12-25
Database
ProQuest One Academic