The Myth of Islamist Victimhood: Unpacking the Myths of Realities Behind the Narrative

Abstract

The enduring narrative of Islamist victimhood, particularly for those who call for a just governance system on behalf of devout Muslim society, which they claim has been systematically repressed and forced underground by the Kemalists, has been prominently echoed in both Turkish and Western scholarship from the late 1990s to the early 2010s. Scholars argued that loosening the hegemonic Kemalist grip on state institutions would promote democracy and civil rights; however, when Islamists took control of the state apparatus in the 2010s, it became evident that this support contributed to the rise of an autocratic electoral regime with Islamist overtones, worsening democracy, which became more repressive than ever after the Kemalist threat was removed. Despite the prominence of these victimhood narratives, the origin and credibility of these claims have not been critically and systematically examined. Through a detailed analysis of biographies, official texts, and personal memoirs, this study assesses the validity of the foundational Islamist victimhood narratives. The findings challenge the narrative of widespread repression, demonstrating that many religious figures continued to operate openly under the Kemalist regime, using the closure of Sufi lodges as a tool to construct a narrative of collective victimhood for political leverage. This study is significant because it highlights how academia can fall into similar “victimhood traps” elsewhere in the world by amplifying victimhood narratives without fully understanding their dynamics or verifying their factual basis, ultimately worsening the situation.

1. Introduction

The narrative of Islamist victimhood in Turkey has long centred on the exclusion of Islam from both social and political spheres, a process that began in the early republican era. A key aspect of this narrative is the claim that Kemalism—a secularist, republican, and modernist ideology founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—systematically repressed Islam, a claim that Islamists in Turkey have consistently used to garner political support and legitimize their existence, portraying themselves as defenders of Islam and devout Muslims against what they describe as an oppressive, irreligious, secularist state. This sense of victimhood dates back to 1925, when Atatürk introduced a series of reforms aimed at modernizing the country and curbing the influence of religious leaders who sought to restore the Caliphate.

One significant reform was the government’s 1925 ban on Sufi convents (called tekke, zawiya, or dargah), which also led to the increased surveillance of traditional religious education, often provided by popular religious leaders within these lodges, particularly those associated with the Naqshbandi tariqa. Islamists frequently argue that this ban pushed “Islam” itself into retreat and underground, a concept referred to as “uzlet”, in Turkish discourse, claiming that many prominent religious leaders either went underground or were forced into exile. They further allege that the Qur’an was banned, the adhan (call to prayer announced from mosque minarets five times a day) was silenced, and even mentioning Allah’s name was prohibited during the one-party rule from 1925 to 1950.

During the multi-party era, these victimhood narratives, which had until then been circulating orally, became much more visible and began to dominate devout Muslim milieus. This shift was particularly evident when former staunch Kemalist and later Islamist Naqshbandi intellectual Necip Fazıl, who had begun working for Menderes’ Democrat Party in the late 1940s as the political climate shifted, started to popularize these stories through his publication Büyük Doğu. He skilfully used Islamic symbolism in politics, and his work culminated in the book Son Devrin Din Mazlumları (The Religious Victims of the Latest Era), which drew heavily from the experiences and stories of Naqshbandi shaykhs and religious leaders. This text, along with later works by other Islamist authors such as Kadir Mısıroğlu, Sadık Al-bayrak, and Emine Şenlikoğlu, further entrenched these narratives within the broader Islamist discourse.

After the Constitutional Court closed Erbakan’s Refah Party in 1998, rendering Erbakan and his close associates politically banned, the remaining members of the Milli Görüş movement—originally founded in 1969 by Erbakan and his friends, who were Naqshbandi disciples of the Gümüşhanevi and Erenköy convents (Şama 2015; Erturk 2020)—began to adopt a new narrative. Previously known for their opposition to democracy, secularism, and Western values, these Islamists shifted their stance, now claiming that they would support democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and align with Western-friendly policies in a new political party named the AKP (Justice and Development Party). This marked a sharp departure from their earlier anti-Western position (Hale and Ozbudun 2010). In the meantime, they continued the long-standing promotion of the narrative of victimhood, accusing secularists of systematically oppressing and alienating them, emphasizing their exclusion from education, public visibility, and the right to practise their religion—portraying themselves as devout Muslims persecuted simply for living according to their faith.

Many scholars, in their efforts to promote democracy and civil rights, echoed these Islamist victimhood narratives, perceiving Islamism as a “bottom-up reaction” to the “top-down, or authoritarian Kemalist regime” and its radical secularism (Lord 2018, p. 1). This discursive shift among Islamists gained momentum internationally, especially after the 9/11 attacks, garnering support from various academic circles claiming Turkish Islamism is different from radical Islamism because of its peaceful Sufi-orientated character, which Kemalists historically perceived as an enemy but does not demand Shari’a as an Islamic regime, is not revolutionary, and precedes moral struggle by seeing jihad as an inner struggle (Mardin 2005, p. 160; Perekli 2012, p. 3; Mecham 2004; H. Yavuz 2014; Heper and Toktas 2003; Guida 2010). This perspective influenced Western scholars, journalists, and U.S. and European policymakers, with the Obama administration and other Western leaders promoting Turkey as a model of “Muslim democracy” for other Muslim-majority countries (Recknagel 2009; Thomas 2011; Fuller 2008; Yavuz and Esposito 2003; Stepan 2000). Many contended that reducing the state’s pressure on Islamists was an essential step toward achieving this model.

Thus, in their works the victimhood narratives were echoed and became a theoretical framework that legitimized the “new” Islamists in Turkey in the 2000s. Generally speaking, these well-known scholars in the English-speaking academic world, through their writings in top journals and participation in conferences, significantly shifted the dominant narrative in the literature, which until then had been largely shaped by Huntingtonian classifications. The earlier argument that Turkey, as a Muslim-majority country, was closest to democratic and Western values because its Islamic tradition had been forcibly rejected by Mustafa Kemal (Huntington 1984, 1991, 1996; Karatnycky 2002; Lewis 2002) was largely replaced by these scholars through their academic contributions.

For instance, Heper naively defines Islamists “as those who wish to see Islam play a greater role in the society and/or the polity” and were not permitted to have their political or social organizations by the secular regime (Heper 1997, p. 33). Similarly, Kuru, in his comparative study of secularism in France, the US, and Turkey, claimed that Kemalists assertively confined Islam to the private sphere while Islamists only sought greater visibility of religion in public life (Kuru 2007, p. 584). Kuru and Stepan argued that from the 1920s until 1949, the teaching of Islam was legally banned, with only a few illegal Qur’anic courses operating clandestinely in rural areas (Kuru and Stepan 2012, p. 108), while Shively further noted that devout Muslims who only desired to follow the “will of God” had no choice but to join these underground, illegal courses, and organizations (Shively 2008, p. 688).

Birtek and Toprak described Islam in Turkey as a “language of the dispossessed”, claiming that the republican ideology adopted a form of “pagan nationalism” influenced by post-Enlightenment ideals and a “radical model of laicism” that relegated religion to the private sphere (Birtek and Binnaz 2011, pp. 3, 16–17), while Yilmaz similarly argued that Islam was excluded from public life (I. Yilmaz 2005). Zubaida, Alam, and Kalaycıoğlu also pointed to the 1925 closure of Sufi orders, madrasas, and dervish lodges, stating that their reorganization was prohibited and that these orders were forced “underground” (Zubaida 1996, p. 12; Kalaycıoğlu 2005, p. 72; Alam 2009). Alam, in particular, emphasized that Islamist communities, mainly the Naqshbandis, remained “underground throughout the one-party rule” (Alam 2009, p. 360). Yavuz referred to this phenomenon as the “inward migration of Turkish Islam”, while Islamist scholar Aktay likened it to a “diaspora within one’s own country”, echoing Kısakürek’s famous couplet:

“You’re estranged in your own country, a pariah in your own land”.

(M. H. Yavuz 2003; Aktay 2003)

Many other scholars argued that the “secularist policies of de-Islamization” (Introvigne 2006) treated any Islamic mobilization outside state control as a threat, emphasizing that this repression was particularly severe during the one-party era (1925–1950), forcing groups like the Naqshbandis and Nurcus to operate clandestinely until the advent of the multi-party system in the 1950s, when they could finally emerge from the “underground” and reestablish a presence in public life (Yükleyen 2008, p. 382; Cornell 2015; Yilmaz and Barry 2020; Ahmad 2008).¹

Although many of these scholars withdrew their support for the Islamists after 2013 seeing how the Islamists used “politics of suffering” (Guiler 2021) and victimhood strategically to replace the regime with an Islamist hegemonic one, the AKP had already neutralized the Kemalist “threat” and systematically transformed the state bureaucracy with Islamist and Naqshbandi influences by ending the rule of law, the separation of powers, and essential freedoms (Freedom House 2024). The narratives of Islamist victimhood were amplified and refined by this scholarship, which played a crucial role in this process. These narratives not only facilitated the dismantling of Kemalist influences—now viewed as comparatively less oppressive—but also paved the way for the rise of an electoral authoritarian regime with Islamist overtones.

Gap, Significance of the Research Question, Methodology

While the AKP’s use of victimhood narratives as a strategic and a political tool has been explored by a handful of scholars in recent years, significant gaps remain in the literature. Yesil analyses how the AKP uses media and television to promote its victimhood narrative, while Al-Ghazzi examines the party’s invocation of historical grievances to bolster its support both nationally and globally (Yesil 2023; Al-Ghazzi 2021). Yilmaz offers a more nuanced perspective, exploring the AKP’s strategic use of victimhood to deepen its political power by exploiting historical grievances from the early Republic, such as the secularist bans on religious teachings and headscarves (Z. Yilmaz 2017).

However, despite these studies showing that victimhood plays a significant role in the political success of Islamism in Turkey, a critical gap remains with regard to the volume of repression faced by Islamists during the one-party period—whether they were truly “crushed” or pushed “underground”—and how these narratives were constructed, settled, and deepened in the collective consciousness. In other words, the authenticity of these victimhood narratives and to what extent they accurately reflect the political realities of the era versus being mythologized has not been fully addressed.

This article aims to bridge this gap by critically analysing the foundational victimhood narratives constructed by Islamists and echoed by academics, assessing to what extent these narratives hold true and accurately reflect historical realities. In doing so, this study not only interrogates the veracity of these victimhood claims but also explores how these narratives have been mythologized and used strategically in con-temporary political discourse. This research is important because it offers a more nuanced and evidence-based understanding of how victimhood narratives are constructed and leveraged, challenging both the Islamist narrative and the insufficient counter-narratives from the Kemalist side.

To address this gap, this article will employ a critical analysis of historical documents, including official court reports, religious texts, biographies, and political speeches. The analysis will focus specifically on claims related to the alleged ban on Islam in the civil realm, such as the closure of Sufi lodges and tekkes and the assertion that religious leaders were pushed “underground” during the one-party period.

This study is structured into five sections. First, it will analyse the Kemalist perception of Islamism, providing historical context to the victimhood narratives and focusing on key political events before the 1925 reforms. Next, it will explore the closure of the dervish lodges, examining the sociopolitical factors that motivated this ban, which helps frame the dynamics underlying the Islamist victimhood narrative. The third section will investigate some of the important foundational victimhood narratives propagated by mainstream Islamists and echoed later by scholarship. The analysis will centre on the one-party era, with a particular focus on the Naqshbandi elites deemed as the founders of Islamism during the republican era. In the fourth part, these victimhood narratives will be critically examined for their accuracy. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the findings of the research.

Before moving on to examine the Islamists’ foundational victimhood narratives on the ban on Islam, it is essential to first understand how Kemalism historically viewed Islamists. Providing this background will offer valuable context and help to reveal the broader political landscape in which these narratives developed.

2. The Kemalist Perception of Islamism

Kemalism did not emerge overnight. As a modernist member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), often considered to be the “second generation” of the Young Turk Movement, Mustafa Kemal’s ideology has its roots in the Ottoman period (Hanioğlu 2012; Zürcher 2005). The relationship between the Kemalists and religious groups, particularly Islamists, was deeply shaped by the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the sociopolitical transformations that occurred during the Tanzimat period (1839–1876), the First Constitutional Era (Meşrutiyet I, 1876–1878), and the Second Constitutional Era (Meşrutiyet II, 1908–) (Koçak 2009; Mango 2000, 2008). These periods marked the Ottoman Empire’s initial efforts to modernize its state apparatus including bureaucracy, army, education, and society while centralizing power; however, they also sparked resistance from many religious and legal scholars (ulema), an important pillar of the empire, who traditionally claimed Muslims are inherently superior to non-believers, and that imitating non-Muslims in any way was a sign of apostasy (Deringil 1999; Findley 2008; Bein 2011).

Additionally, they argued that certain legal rights, particularly opposing the introduction of essential freedoms—most notably, the idea that Muslim and non-Muslim (dhimmi) citizens of the Ottoman Empire would be treated as equals—could not be granted to the diverse non-Muslim subjects living in Ottoman lands, as this would contradict the traditional dhimmi status (Zürcher 2010; Findley 2008; Hanioğlu 2010, p. 72; Davison 1954). Some members from the ulema and Sunni (orthodox) Sufi orders, particularly the Naqshbandis, engaged in propaganda and conspiratorial activities, became involved in secret political organizations such as the Muhafaza-i Şeriat Cemiyeti (Society for the Preservation of Shari’a), and the Fedailer Cemiyeti (Society of the Self-Sacrificers), which actively worked to undermine these reforms (Algar 2007, pp. 85, 431; Abu-Manneh 1990; Berkes 1998).

The forefathers of the Young Turks urged the Sultan to transition to a parliamentary regime, which led to the establishment of a constitution and parliament in 1876. However, the First Constitutional Era was short-lived, as Sultan Abdulhamid II dissolved the parliament in 1878, sending many pro-constitutional bureaucrats into exile, where they spent the next thirty-one years under surveillance and persecution (Fortna 2008). Despite implementing some reformist measures, Abdulhamid consolidated his power by invoking Islamic legitimacy and co-opting anti-Western religious leaders to justify his authoritarian rule (Deringil 1999; Ocak 1994). During their exile, these reformists—later known as the Young Turks—were heavily influenced by the motto of the French Revolution, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”, as well as by positivist ideology, which shaped their preference for secularism, and for science over religion. This period of repression created deep grievances among the reformists and eventually gave rise to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).

The Young Turks, now organized as the CUP, returned to power and initiated the Second Constitutional Era (Hanioğlu 2008). They restored the constitution, reigniting a power struggle between secularist reformers and conservative religious groups. Despite the Young Turks’ commitment to modernization, Sufi orders—particularly the Naqshbandis—continued to oppose secular reforms (Algar 2007). Religious political activism intensified during this period in the political and educational arenas with organizations such as the Cem‘iyyet-i Muhammediyye (Society of Muhammad), Teali Islam Cemiyeti (Society for the Elevation of Islam), Cemiyeti Muderrisin (Society of Madrasa Masters), and Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası (Freedom and Accord Party) orchestrating large-scale propaganda campaigns against the CUP’s policies and advocating for a governance model rooted in Islam (Zürcher 2004, pp. 91–132). Determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past, the CUP leadership became more strategic and cautious, fully aware of the substantial influence and propaganda power held by religious leaders and Sufi orders.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 led to further political upheaval. Between 1908 and 1922, religious groups—particularly the Naqshbandis—were actively involved in political unrest and rebellions, often advocating for the restoration of the Sultanate and Caliphate. This was especially evident during the power struggle between the Istanbul government, which remained loyal to the Sultan, and the Ankara government, led by Mustafa Kemal. So, religious leaders who supported the Sultanate or Caliphate were increasingly regarded as political threats by Ankara.

This historical backdrop provides critical insight into why Kemalists perceived Islamists as political adversaries rather than just religious actors. For the Kemalist regime, religious opposition was often intertwined with efforts to restore the Sultanate and Caliphate, which directly challenged the secular, modernizing vision of the Republic. The Kemalist reforms sought to diminish the influence of religion in state affairs and consolidate secular authority, actions which many Islamists propagandized as an attack on Islam. These reforms led to the dismantling of religious institutions, including madrasas from the ancient regime, and the marginalization of their religious identity. This, in turn, fuelled the strategic construction of Islamist victimhood narratives. These narratives, portraying Kemalist repression as unjust and anti-Islamic, resonated strongly within devout and conservative segments of Turkish society, where religion held a central place in both personal and communal identity. Understanding this context is key to comprehending how and why these victimhood narratives took root and gained widespread acceptance.

3. The Ban on Sufi Tekkes, or the “Ban on Islam”

Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the government initiated a series of reforms to modernize and secularize the nation and eliminate the political influence of religious groups in the parliament and society (Özbudun 2011, p. 23) seeing it necessary to break the political power of Islamists, particularly those aligned with the Sufi orders, who had played a significant role in opposing the Ankara government and these reforms. Determined to bring religion under the control of the National Assembly and wary of the power held by religious figures, the government established the Diyanet in March 1924, an institution designed to regulate religious practices and ensure state oversight of religion (Berkes 1998). On the same date, the Caliphate was abolished, followed by the closure of madrasas and the establishment of a unified secular education system. As expected, these reforms sparked fierce resistance and antipropaganda from the ulema and other religious leaders who had already labelled the Kemalist government as apostate and demanded the return of Shari’a and the Caliphate. This move marked the nature of the discourse surrounding the dichotomy between reformists and traditionalists, a divide that began during the Tanzimat period and evolved into a prolonged conflict between “Kemalists” and “Islamists” in the Turkish Republic, turning the state and society into a battleground over issues of secularism and religion, defining Turkish politics for decades to come (Koçak 2009).

The Naqshbandi order, which gained significant influence in Ottoman religious and political life through the disciples of Shaykh Khalid (Weismann 2007, p. 152; Abu-Manneh 1982), played a crucial role in the conflict. Their influence extended across the eastern Kurdish provinces; western regions, including Istanbul; the Black Sea; and among Caucasian-origin communities (Trimingham 1971; Gammer 1994; Le Gall 2003). Known for their strict adherence to Shari’a, they actively initiated counterpropaganda campaigns and uprisings throughout various parts of Turkey (Goloğlu 2011; Karpat 2010; Papas 2007), often portraying the republican government as apostate and its officials as unbelievers. The Islamists argued that the state had been overtaken by imitators of Christians and Jews and called for the restoration of the Caliphate (Şeyhu’l İslam Mustafa Sabri Efendi 2021).

A key focus of their propaganda was the condemnation of Western clothing—such as ties, suits, and hats—adopted by republican officials, and later, the use of Latin letters. They argued that Westernization, particularly in dress, symbolized the government’s abandonment of Islam, despite the fact that the practice of wearing Western attire in the state had already begun during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (d. 1839) and continued under Sultan Abdulhamid II. This sentiment was prevalent even before the official hat reforms were introduced.

This propaganda immediately gained traction in Islamic milieus through the clandestine distribution of booklets and brochures containing fatwas (legal statements) and religious decrees and led to local uprisings in Anatolian provinces such as Maraş, Erzurum, Giresun, Çorum, Trabzon, and Kayseri. One of the notable figures leading this resistance was İskilipli Atıf Efendi, a Naqshbandi Sufi leader from Çorum. However, the most significant armed revolt was the Genç incident, led by the Kurdish Naqshbandi Sufi leader Shaykh Said, who was titled “emir al-mujahidin” (Tucker 1989, pp. xvi–xix). The rebellion spread across several southeastern Anatolian provinces, supported by other Kurdish Naqshbandi leaders in the region, such as Sayyid Abdulkadir from the Küfrevi convent, in April 1925 (Olson 1989; Tucker 1989; Goloğlu 2011; Karakoç and Yalçin 2016; Olson and Tucker 1978). The uprising left a deep trauma within the regime, as it evoked memories of the 31 March uprising led by Naqshbandi Shaykh and Dervish Vahdeti, which had aimed to dismantle the Second Constitutional Era (Goloğlu 2011, p. 117). During the revolt, government offices in the affected provinces were looted, and some governors were captured (Goloğlu 2011, p. 120). After quelling the uprising in March, the Eastern Independent Tribunals issued a decree in June 1925 to close the tekkes and zaviyes (dervish convents) in the region. This suggests that the regime had not originally planned to close the tekkes prior to the uprising.

Later, on 30 November 1925, Law No. 677 expanded the ban on tekkes and zaviyes to a nationwide scale. The law also prohibited titles and practices associated with the ancient regime, including positions like çelebihood, babalık, dervishhood, discipleship, dedelik, sayyidhood, and nakiblik, which were linked to both orthodox (Naqshbandi, Qadiri, Khalwati) and unorthodox (such as Bektashi, Alevi, Mevlevi) Sufi orders (tarikats). Additionally, certain deeds performed by some of these tarikats—such as fortune-telling, sorcery, exorcism, and attempts to achieve desires through spiritual practices—were also outlawed. Given the short time between the initial regional ban and the enactment of this law, it is evident that the regime introduced these measures to prevent further uprisings and secure its authority.

Another traumatic event in this ongoing conflict was the Menemen incident of 1930, reportedly led by members of the Naqshbandi order. These individuals were said to be disciples of the Erenköy Naqshbandi community, the most vibrant network at that time based in Istanbul and led by Es’ad Erbili (Azak 2007; Kocahanoğlu 2013). Erbili, who initially supported the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), later withdrew his support after witnessing Atatürk’s secularist reforms (Silverstein 2009; Küçük 2007). During the incident, Naqshbandi protesters demanded the restoration of Shari’a and, in a brutal display of violence, killed and beheaded soldiers attempting to disperse them. The protesters then marched through the streets with a soldier’s head mounted on a pole (Azak 2007).

As a result of these incidents, many of those leaders and their disciples involved in the uprisings faced repression, including executions, imprisonment, surveillance, and exile. The Kemalists declared that the regime would remain in danger unless the brotherhoods were eradicated, often referring to their tekkes as “snake holes” (Goloğlu 2011, p. 130). Mustafa Kemal himself emphasized that the commanders in the Turkish army must decisively eliminate the influence of the Naqshbandi order stressing that these orders posed a significant threat to the Republic (Goloğlu 2011, p. 335; Algar 2007, p. 57).

These reactionary uprisings, coupled with the harsh measures taken by the Kemalist government, deepened the sense of trauma and insecurity among the Kemalists while simultaneously fuelling Islamist victimhood narratives. This period is crucial to understanding how these narratives, rooted in the repression of religious groups, became a cornerstone of Islamist political movements such as Milli Görüş and the AKP—both deeply influenced by Naqshbandi traditions (Erturk 2022). The state violence and suppression during this time laid the groundwork for the Islamist portrayal of Kemalist secularism as an oppressive force against pious Muslims, a narrative that was strategically framed to resonate with the broader religious community. These claims continue to echo in Turkish political discourse today. Understanding this historical context is essential for critically analysing how these foundational victimhood narratives emerged and evolved in response to the policies of the early Turkish Re-public.

In the next part, I will explore how these Islamic organizations built a corpus of victimhood, equating their closure with a broader “ban on Islam”, and stating that all religious men were forced into withdrawal or driven underground, a claim that scholars have echoed in Turkish political discourse by expanding it to include claims of a ban on the Qur’an, the silencing of the adhan, and, more generally, the suppression of Islam in Turkey.

4. The Main Foundational Victimhood Narratives Used by the Islamists Mainstream

Although Islamist victimhood narratives began circulating orally in local circles during the early years of the Republic, their initial impact was limited. It was not until Necip Fazıl, the owner of the Büyük Doğu publishing house and periodicals in the 1940s—known as the first Islamist journal to discuss so-called victimhood—that these narratives gained national prominence. His writings, which were later compiled into the book Son Devrin Din Mazlumları (The Religious Victims of the Latest Era) in 1969, deeply resonated within Islamist circles, marking the first time such narratives reached a wider audience. This was followed by other influential works, such as Kadir Mısıroğlu’s Bir Mazlum Padişah Sultan Vahideddin (A Victimized Sultan: Sultan Vahideddin) and Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Sarıklı Mücahitler (The Turbaned Fighters in the War of Independence), as well as the writings of Sadık Albayrak, such as Şeriat Yolunda Yürüyenler ve Sürünenler (Those Walking and Crawling on the Path of Shari’a) and Yiğit Düştüğü Yerden Kalkar (A Brave Man Rises from Where He Falls) during the 1970s and 1980s.

The Islamist body of knowledge and the history of victimhood were largely constructed by these books and authors, spreading widely across Islamist households and shaping the mindset of today’s Islamism. To understand their impact in Islamist politics, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once held up a copy of Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, saying:

“There are books that change your life; a single sentence can stay with you for as long as you breathe”.

He continued,

“For my generation and me, these books revealed the hardships that devout people faced during the one-party era, beyond what we had heard by word of mouth”.

(Milliyet 2011)

In the book, Necip Fazıl details how Islamist leaders and Naqshbandi shaykhs such as İskilipli Atıf, Es’ad Erbili, Said Nusi, and Abdulhakim Arvasi were allegedly victimized.

The narrative of a ban on the Qur’an holds a prominent place among these victimhood stories. The head of the Diyanet Ali Erbaş, appointed by Erdoğan in 2017, reported in his public speech how he grew up listening to his father’s stories from the one-party era. His father recounted that even in the remote mountainous villages of the Black Sea region, people lived in fear during their Qur’anic education. Erbaş explains that families would station lookouts to warn them if the republican gendarmerie approached, as keeping Qur’an teachers or even the Qur’an itself at home was forbidden. To avoid detection and punishment, learners would bury the holy book within the stone fences of their fields (Medyaninellitonu 2024). Similarly, it has been frequently claimed and preached by Sufi leaders and AKP deputies that even saying “Allah” was banned during the one-party era (BirGün 2022; İhvanlar.net n.d.). According to some Islamist authors, certain Naqshbandi shaykhs would buy train tickets or take taxis, using the journeys as an opportunity to evade the Kemalist police in order to be able to teach the Qur’an (Vakkasoğlu 1987). It is also widely circulated in Islamist media that those who were caught by the police while teaching the Qur’an were locked in small spaces called “coffin yards” (tabutluklar), similar to phone booths, where 500-watt bulbs were used to torture them (Yeniakit 2022).

In the same sense, President Erdoğan often recounts a story from his father about the one-party era, stating:

“People hid the Qur’an in jars, chicken coops, and caves to learn and teach it”.

He continues,

“Not only was the recitation of the Qur’an banned, but even hanging the Qur’an on walls was prohibited. The gendarmerie would raid homes, confiscating Qur’ans, Elifba booklets”.

(Vatan 2012)

Erdoğan further alleged, “Mosques were sold and turned into barns, and the adhan was silenced. People’s beards, moustaches, and clothing were interfered with”. More provocatively, he claimed that some mosques were turned into warehouses, their cupboards converted into toilets, and belly dancers brought in to perform, accompanied by wine being served and drunk inside (Erdoğan 2012).

Likewise, Emin Saraç (d. 2021), a prominent Naqshbandi religious leader whose father and grandfather were investigated due to their connections with Shaykh Erbili after the Menemen incident, claimed that the Qur’an was banned during the one-party era and that they had to learn it in secret. He recounted:

“In those days, reading the Qur’an was forbidden and a crime. My father and mother would get up at midnight and teach us the Qur’an until the time for the morning prayer. During the day, when we wanted to study the Qur’an, we would go under a blanket. When someone came to the house, we would pull the blanket over our heads and pretend to sleep immediately”.

He continued,

“On one occasion, someone must have reported that my father was teaching us the Qur’an, as they followed him, and the gendarmerie took him away. He was sentenced to six months in prison. […] These difficulties burned our in-sides then, and they continue to burn even now”.

(Saraç 2021, pp. 89–90)

But how true are these claims? To what extent do they reflect historical realities, and how many of them have been strategically constructed or exaggerated for political leverage? In the next section, I will scrutinize these narratives, fact-checking the claims of repression and exploring their origins to uncover the truth behind the Islamist victimhood story.

5. Fact-Checking the Foundations of Islamist Victimhood Narratives

In this section, I will critically examine the core claims that form the foundation of Islamist victimhood narratives, particularly those surrounding the alleged banning of Islam, the suppression of Qur’anic teachings, and the underground status of Islam during the early republican period. These narratives, as this part shows, which are often used to portray a sweeping repression of the devout Muslim population, have been strategically employed to build a sense of collective victimhood and grievance. This part will fact-check these narratives by exploring their political motivations and the broader context in which they emerged by placing a special focus on the Naqshbandi masters from the Gümüşhanevi (known as İskenderpaşa, or Hakyol community), İsmet Efendi (İsmail Ağa, or Mahmut Hoca community), and Erenköy (Topbaşs, or İlim Yayma community) convents who are often cast as the main protagonists and central figures of these victimhood narratives, as well as other notable Muslim scholars from the same period, whose experiences challenge the notion of widespread, sweeping repression.

In this part, the following key subtopics will be critically examined: (1) the responses of Islamists and religious leaders during the closure of Sufi convents; (2) the broader claim of a ban on Islam, with a focus on whether prominent Islamist figures and tariqa leaders were truly forced underground; (3) a specific focus on Qur’anic education, which forms another critical aspect of the “ban on Islam” narrative; and (4) the role of the Diyanet in employing Islamic scholars and its function during the one-party period.

5.1. The Responses of the Sufi Shaykhs Against the Closure of the Tekkes

Following armed uprisings and popular protests among Islamists, Mustafa Kemal seemed determined to outlaw Sufi convents and shrines. After the Shaykh Said Rebellion, he famously stated, “The goal of the tekkes is to make the people madmen and beggars. However, our people have decided not to become madmen and beggars anymore. The tekkes may seem insignificant, but they have great importance”, emphasizing their role in goading the devout Muslim population against the republican regime and imposing a modus vivendi that resisted republican modernity (ATABE 2005, 17: p. 298). Moreover, when he continued by saying, “We derive our strength from civilization, science, and technology, and we move forward accordingly”, it became clear that he viewed these brotherhoods as obstacles to scientific advancement and progress as well (ATABE 2005, 17: pp. 298–99; Zürcher 2004, pp. 188–96).

However, contrary to the common victimhood narrative, the actual law did not impose harsh sanctions on shaykhs, mosques, or religious spaces. For example, the law did not confiscate the properties of shaykhs, nor did it close the mosques and masjids where religious rituals and Sufi practices were performed. Law 677, enacted in November 1925, clearly stated:

“All tekkes and zawiyas established either as foundations or as properties under the management of their sheikhs, or established in other forms, within the Republic of Turkey, have been completely closed down, while preserving the ownership and management rights of their current owners in other respects. Those which are currently used as mosques or masjids in accordance with the established procedures shall remain open”.

(Resmi Gazete 1925)

During parliamentary discussions about the law, Mustafa Kemal responded to critics by suggesting that, in ten or fifteen years, once the reforms had taken root, they could potentially be reopened (Baler 1970; Baydar 1968). These debates and the content of the law itself suggest that this closure was primarily designed to weaken the mobilization capacity of Islamists and the Sufi brotherhoods within social and political spaces rather than to be a blanket ban on the religious practices of the devout Muslim population.

Based on their previous reactions to the ban, it is clear that many religious leaders strategically used “the closure of the tekkes” as a tool to construct a foundational victimhood narrative, exaggerating the event and turning it into a saga—a fatal struggle between themselves and unbelievers—to expand their influence. Paradoxically, contrary to the prevailing victimhood narrative, the biographies suggest that many embraced the closure as a “divine act”, rather than a government-imposed decree against Islam itself at that time. For example, Shaykh Bekkine of the Gümüşhanevi convent is reported to have said that it was not the government but Allah who closed the tekkes, as they had deviated from the true path of Islam and therefore deserved to be banned (Ersöz 1992). Similarly, Bekkine’s successor Kotku echoed this sentiment, stating that the tekkes had become corrupted and many of the shaykhs lacked the spiritual perfection they once embodied, a condition that had persisted for many years (Kotku 1991, 5: pp. 252–53).

This perspective was not limited to a single branch of the Naqshbandi order but echoed across other factions as well. For instance, Necip Fazıl recounts that his Shaykh Abdulhakim Arvasi—associated with what is now known as the Işıkcı or İhlascı branch—remarked, “the government didn’t close the tekkes; they had already closed themselves”, as they had already merely been empty shells operated by deceptive or false shaykhs and had already lost their original spiritual essence long before their official closure (Kısakürek 2013).

Similarly, Shaykh Ali Haydar from the Ismet Efendi convent defended the closure of the tekkes in his court testimony, stating,

“The law 677 does not prohibit Islam. In fact, I complied with this law before anyone else because I believed that Sufism had fallen into the hands of ignorant and incompetent individuals”.

(Cited in Inanc 2023, p. 46)

He further added that the law mainly prohibited practices considered bid’a (heresy) in Islam, such as the use of specific titles or the adoption of distinct attire in the lodges, thereby serving Islam (Cited in Inanc 2023, p. 46).

5.2. Were Devout Muslims or Tariqa Leaders Forced Underground and Was Islam Banned?

Contrary to the popular victimhood narratives, a closer examination of biographica accounts and memoirs from the leadership of Sufi brotherhoods reveals a different reality. Many tariqa masters, after the closure of the tekkes, were appointed by the republican regime as official imams in important historical mosques. Far from being forced underground, these religious leaders were able to continue their Sufi practices and spiritual gatherings (sohbets), without significant disruption, both during the one-party rule and later. These historical mosques, many of which included sohbet rooms open to the public outside of prayer hours, provided ample space for the Sufi orders to grow their communities and attract new disciples. This evidence challenges the narrative that religious leaders were entirely suppressed, showing instead that they were able to operate within the system under the guise of official duties.

For instance, it is understood that Tekirdağlı Mustafa Fevzi Efendi, the shaykh of the Gümüşhanevi convent, was appointed as an imam to the Fatma Sultan Mosque after the closure of the tekkes (Uzun 1995; Eyice 1987; Kara 2012, p. 257). Upon his death in 1926, his successor Abdullah Hasib (Yardımcı) settled in the mosque’s quarters and was also appointed as an official imam by the government, allowing him to continue Naqshbandi traditions until his death in 1949, including dhikr, sohbet, vird, rabita, and khatma-i khwajagan rituals (Oral 2017; Çataklı 1999). In his memories, Oral recalls that the disciples would regularly travel from different towns to attend these sohbets and rituals when he was seventeen (Oral 2017). The memories present a different narrative here; far from being repressed or driven underground, Hasib worked as an imam in various mosques across Istanbul, expanding the number of his disciples—including teenagers—while continuing the Naqshbandi practices with little interference from the authorities during the one-party years (Oral 2017, pp. 170–77; Çataklı 1999).

Additionally, other important figures from the Gümüşhanevi convent also held official positions as imams in Diyanet during this period. For example, Abdulaziz Bekkine served as the imam at the Çivicizade Mosque, while Mehmed Zahid Kotku became the imam of the Üftade Mosque in Bursa, his hometown. Both continued to maintain and grow the Gümüşhanevi Naqshbandi network, indicating that their religious activities were far from suppressed. When Hasib’s successor Shaykh Bekkine passed away in 1952, his appointment as the new imam at the same mosque, Çivicizade, took only a few weeks. His community, which included prominent figures like Turgut Özal, Necmettin Erbakan, Temel Karamollaoğlu, Recai Kutan, and later Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, expanded significantly among politicians and bureaucrats during this time (Coşan 2017; Duygulu n.d.; Çataklı 1999; Ersöz 1992; Demirci 2008; H. Yavuz 1997; Özal 1997; Mardin 2005).

Another key example is Shaykh Ali Haydar (d. 1960) of the Ismet Efendi Tekke, a vibrant branch of the Naqshbandi order known for its strict adherence to Shar’ia and traditional attire, including turbans and long gowns. Being one of the most fundamentalist Naqshbandi shaykhs and a staunch opponent of constitutionalism (Meşrutiyet), Ali Haydar previously served under the Sultan, opposing man-made laws by citing the verse “those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are disbelievers” (Ahıshavî 2014). Although he was sentenced in 1926 for his connections to İskilipli Atif and other reactionary figures who spread anti-reform propaganda, including the booklet Frenk Mukallitiligi ve Şapka, he was later freed. Remarkably, he continued to receive his dersiam (madrasa official) salary (hgev.org 2021), and he was appointed as a preacher in various mosques in Istanbul, where he continued to attract new disciples (Inanc 2023). By the 1950s, his historical Ismet Efendi convent was converted into a mosque, with the addition of a minaret and other extensions, allowing it to continue functioning in much the same way as a tekke. His successor, Mahmud Ustaosmanoğlu, later became an imam in 1954 and led the community, known as the İsmailağa community, until his death in 2022.

This was true for most of the Sufi orders and convents that did not openly challenge the republican regime or its reforms, including Es’ad Erbili of the Erenkoy convent, until his disciples were involved in the Menemen uprising in 1930, one of the the most traumatic events in the republican history. Even in the post-one-party era, Es’ad Erbili’s disciple Mahmud Sami Ramazanoğlu (d. 1984) rejuvenated the Erenköy Tekke and continued preaching in mosques and continued to perform Sufi practices (Tosun 2007). Moreover, these shaykhs were appointed as imams based on their Islamic knowledge without the need for any formal degree or certification under the new system.

Another notable figure is Said Nursi, a Kurdish religious leader who later founded the Nur movement, which would go on to influence both the Nurcu communities and the Gülen movement (Turner and Horkuc 2009; Algar 2001). Raised in Kurdish Naqshbandi convents, Nursi is often believed by scholars to have had a moderate and inclusive understanding of Islam. He initially supported the Ankara Government but withdrew his backing when the reforms began to deviate from what he saw as Islamic principles. As noted in his authorized biography, in 1923, Nursi famously declared the excommunication of several deputies, including Mustafa Kemal, accusing them of being non-practicing Muslims and, therefore, traitors and merdud (apostate). Examples of the widely recounted conversation between Mustafa Kemal and Said Nursi in parliament are below.

Mustafa Kemal: “A hero like you is needed here; we invited you to benefit from your high ideas. But you came and the first thing you did was write about prayer, sowing discord among us”.

Nursi, shaking his two fingers in anger:

“Paşa! After faith, the highest truth in Islam is prayer. One who does not pray is a traitor, and the judgment of a traitor is rejection (merdud)”.

(Vahide and Abu-Rabiʿ 2005, p. 171; Nursi 1994)

Nursi also called for the urgent implementation of Shari’a, arguing that Islam was under threat due to the secularizing policies and the deputies’ lack of religious observance (Nursi 1990, 1994). Despite these confrontations, Mustafa Kemal even offered Nursi a “post as “general preacher” in the Eastern Provinces with a salary of 300 liras, a deputyship in the assembly, and a post equivalent to that he had held in the Darü’l-Hikmeti’l-Islamiye, together with various perks, such as a residence” (Vahide and Abu-Rabiʿ 2005, pp. 171–72). However, Nursi could continue to disseminate his ideas during the one-party period, remaining under the regime’s surveillance, and he notably never wore a hat, instead keeping to his traditional Islamic clothing.

However, his surveillance by the regime is not without reason to a great extent, as later revealed in one of his letters to Mustafa Sabri, a notorious figure and an exile known as one of the 150′likler continuously claiming that the state had been taken over by disbelievers and must be reclaimed by Muslims. Nursi remarked:

“Our cause is the cause of faith. Send my regards to Sabri Efendi and tell him to come; let him take the lead, and we will follow him […] I, along with my five hundred thousand disciples, stand ready as soldiers at his command. This is not my fight; it is Mustafa Sabri’s fight”.

(Yıldırım 2012, p. 115)

Another important inference from the dialogue between Nursi and Mustafa Kemal is the latter’s apparent intention to gather religious leaders’ support, or at least keep them in a harmless zone to secure the regime he and his colleagues idealized, as much as he could. This becomes clearer when we consider the aftermath of the Genç Rebellion, where the involved Kurdish Naqshbandi leaders were executed, but those not involved did not face the same consequences. Contrary to the popular victimhood narratives spread by Müfid Yüksel, a Kurdish Naqshbandi Islamist playing a significant role in promoting these victimhood narratives today (Yüksel 2014), some Kurdish Naqshbandi shaykhs from the Küfrevi convent—a convent that influenced Said Nursi and Naqshbandi master Alvarlı Efe Efendi, an early mentor of Fethullah Gülen—were exempted from scrutiny. For instance, Shaykh Abdulbaki from Küfrevi (d. 1943) was spared any repercussions and was even granted the use of a mansion in Üsküdar by Mustafa Kemal, in recognition of his support during the Milli Mücadele (War of Independence) and its aftermath (Küfrevî 2013, pp. 89–104).

Nursi’s example, along with those mentioned earlier, casts doubt on the seriousness of the victimhood narratives. If these narratives were entirely true, Nursi—who publicly declared Mustafa Kemal and others in the parliament as apostates—should have been tried by the Independence Tribunals and likely executed. According to Islamic law, the punishment for a “merdud” (apostate) is death, and both Mustafa Kemal and the deputies were fully aware of what this declaration implied.

5.3. The Ban on the Qur’an

It is true that, following the law for the unification of education and the alphabet reform, the written language of education was Latinized, and public expressions of Islamic rituals such as the call to prayer (adhan), the call to summoning behind the imam (iqamah), and the Friday sermons (khutbah) were Turkified for the first time. Turkification in this context means that these texts were translated verbatim from Arabic to Turkish script. At the same time, the Qur’an also began to be translated verbatim from Arabic to Turkish. Mustafa Kemal had specific reasons for this move. First and foremost, he sought to cut ties with the wider Arab Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East in an effort to Westernize the Turkish people. Having served in these countries as an experienced Ottoman army officer, he viewed these nations as uncivilized and failed states and believed that Turkey’s success depended on modernizing not only its techniques and mindset but also the outward appearance of its people, aligning them with Western standards of civilization. In August 1925, he remarked:

“We have endured much suffering, and this is because we have failed to understand the situation of the world. Our mindset and mentality must be civilized. […] We will not care about what others say. Look at the entire Turkish-Islamic world. They are suffering great misfortunes because they have not adapted their thinking and mindset to the scope and height that civilization demands. Our backwardness up until now, and ultimately our sinking into the final disaster, was because of this”.

(ATABE 2005, 17: p. 278)

Another reason for the adoption of the Latin alphabet and translation efforts was Mustafa Kemal’s concern about the influence of Sufi brotherhoods, which traditionally maintained deep connections with Arab ulema and Sufi networks in countries like Syria and Egypt. Additionally, the regime was aware that many prominent Islamists such as Mustafa Sabri and Zahid Kevseri—both considered archenemies of the regime—and members of the Ottoman Empire had already fled to these countries and created a substantial diaspora there. As Erturk’s research puts it, students educated by members of this diaspora later dominated Turkish religious and political life starting from the 1950s (Erturk 2023). Through these reforms, the regime elites sought to further isolate Turkey from Middle Eastern ideologies, believing that this isolation would accelerate the country’s modernization. This strategy aligned with the 1924 Lausanne Treaty, which formalized the exile of 150 individuals declared as enemies of the Ankara government, many of whom were former Ottoman ruling elites and ulema.

Last but not least, a key reason for these reforms was Mustafa Kemal’s project of creating a unitary nation, distinct in its own language but orientated toward the West. From this perspective, the reforms were not aimed specifically at Qur’anic or other Islamic teachings such as the Catechism in Arabic, as they applied to all religious and minority groups such as Bektashis, Alevis, Mevlevis, Jews, and Christians. Mustafa Kemal’s remarks in Hakimiyeti Milliye in 1932, after converting the call to prayer and iqamah to Turkish, is exemplary:

“The issue at hand is not essentially religion, but language. It must be definitively understood that the national language and national identity of the Turkish nation will remain dominant and fundamental throughout its life”.

(Quoted in Jäschke 1973, p. 55; Bein 2011, p. 124)

However, while public elements of worship like the call to prayer and iqamah were Turkified, the Diyanet never imposed the translation of Qur’anic verses recited during prayers. In fact, the Diyanet even took disciplinary action against an imam who had garnered media attention as a “reformist imam” for reciting Qur’anic verses in Turkish during prayers, firmly maintaining that the language of prayer must remain in its original Arabic (Bein 2011, pp. 125–26).

There were instances of power abuse and human rights violations by regime forces. Kemalists were also adept at turning crises, like the Menemen Islamist uprising, into opportunities to suppress not only Islamists but other groups as well. In the aftermath of the uprising, not only were Islamist leaders targeted, but some Jewish groups and leftist media outlets were also closed (Azak 2007, 2010; Goloğlu 2011). However, despite the fact that all groups faced similar challenges during the early years of the Republic (Bardakçı 2018), Islamists were particularly successful in transforming these events into enduring victimhood narratives. By bending the truth, they consistently claimed that the Kemalists had banned the Qur’an, adhan, and even mosques.

In many of these “convents” today, such as the Menzil Naqshbandi community, Friday sermons are still delivered in Arabic, and it is rare to find anyone reading the Qur’an in Turkish. It is not popularly known that from the outset, many Islamists resisted delivering sermons in Turkish and translating the Qur’an into vernacular languages, as they viewed this as a distortion (tahrif) of the original sacred text—an act considered a grave sin (Bein 2011, pp. 116–17). For example, Mehmet Akif Ersoy, who was initially accepted to become a part of the Diyanet’s translation board in 1925, later withdrew after aligning himself with the Islamist diaspora and ulema in Egypt, and he even had the portion of the Qur’an he had translated burned later (Bein 2011, pp. 131–32; Erturk 2023; Argon et al. 2015).

This raises an important question: why were Islamists able to successfully propagate the narrative that translating the adhan and iqamah into Turkish constituted a ban on Islam while they failed to generate similar narratives around the Turkish Friday sermons or the Turkish translation of the Qur’an? The answer may lie in the psychological appeal of these practices. The adhan and Qur’anic recitation are vocal and ceremonial elements of religious life, which resonate more with “intuition and emotion” than with “cognitive reasoning and understanding”, a pattern often observed in right-wing ideologies (Haidt 2013). This area would benefit from further examination by social psychologists, but to summarize, these vocal practices hold deeper emotional and symbolic significance for devout people, often surpassing the importance of understanding the religious content itself. Much like scientists fine-tuning experiments, political Islamists have learned to craft narratives that focus on elements deeply resonating with the devout population, while discarding those that fail to evoke a strong emotional response.

Another factor contributing to the “ban on the Qur’an” victimhood narrative is the deep cultural reverence for the Arabic script in Turkey. In the 1920s, when the literacy rate was around 8% (H. Yılmaz 2011, p. 681), many devout Muslims viewed anything written in Arabic as sacred, equating it with Qur’anic verses because in Turkish tradition reciting the Qur’an does not necessarily require an understanding of Arabic. People would even kiss items with Arabic writing, such as cigar paper imported from Syria or Iraq, and place them in high positions as a sign of respect. This widespread reverence for Arabic made it easier for Islamists to manipulate public perception with victimhood narratives. Even today, some naively argue that if the adoption of the Latin alphabet had not occurred, more people would read and understand the Qur’an, distorting the truth by implying that pre-reform Turkish was in Arabic script, rather than Ottoman Turkish.

As stated earlier, it is likely that during inspections, security forces acted on neighbourhood complaints, leading to raids on homes suspected of spreading anti-government propaganda or collaborating with networks led by infamous Naqshbandi shaykhs. Emin Saraç’s narrative and some others fit this scenario well, as his father and grandfather were deputies and provincial representatives of one such Naqshbandi shaykh during the Menemen incident, known for their opposition to the government.

While Qur’anic teaching may have slowed or diminished temporarily in the aftermath of these reforms, the data show that it was never completely halted. Statistical tables from the one-party period reveal that, after a one-year break in 1928, the number of Qur’anic courses steadily increased (Jäschke 1973, p. 61). Additionally, a directive sent by the Diyanet to the Istanbul Mufti’s office on 10 December 1930 further confirms that Qur’anic instruction was not entirely banned:

“Nothing shall be taught to children under the age of 12, but for those older than 12, certain hodjas are permitted—under strict supervision—to teach only the Qur’an and the prayer surahs and supplications”.

(Quoted in Bahçekapılı et al. 2012, p. 78)

Notably, these courses were exempted from the oversight of the National Education Ministry—mandated by the Law on the Unification of Education—at the request of Diyanet head Rifat Efendi, and they were instead placed under the Diyanet’s supervision (Deniz 2016, p. 6; Cebeci 2005). This was a distinct privilege for Sunni Islam, especially when compared to the religious rights afforded to minority groups like the Alevi-Bektashi, Jewish, and Christian communities.

5.4. The Role of Diyanet in the Employment of Religious Figures by the Regime

As discussed earlier, despite the official closure of Sufi tekkes, their activities and influence largely persisted under the oversight of the Diyanet. Many Sufi shaykhs continued their religious functions, serving as imams in mosques—formerly their lodges—without being forced underground or exiled, and without the need for formal credentials such as diplomas or certificates. Rather than excluding these religious figures, the Kemalist regime strategically sought to integrate Sufi leaders and other Islamic scholars from the old regime into the state apparatus through the Diyanet. Mustafa Kemal’s remarked to Said Nursi:

“A hero like you is needed here [in the new regime]; we invited you to benefit from your high ideas” (Nursi 1994), reflecting the regime’s intent to manage religious authority without completely marginalizing it. By incorporating rather than excluding religious leaders, the regime sought to mitigate the risk of political opposition from Islamist factions, which had previously challenged the state following the War of Independence.

One of the most notable figures in this regard was Rifat Börekçi, who issued a counter-fatwa with some other religious leaders against the Istanbul fatwa, known as hurucu alessultan (revolt against the Sultan) (Bulut 1994). The Istanbul fatwa had declared that the struggle for independence in Anatolia was a rebellion against the Sultan and Caliph, and that killing members of the Ankara Government was a farz (religious duty) for any Muslim. In recognition of his collaboration with the republican regime, Börekçi became a close friend of Mustafa Kemal and was appointed as the head of the Diyanet, a position he held until his death in 1941. Mustafa Kemal held him in high regard and never denied any of his religious requests (Kansu 1986, p. 508; Sarıkoyuncu 1995; Atatürk Ansiklopedisi 2020).

There were also several ulema from the former regime, close associates of these Sufi leaders, who were integrated into the Kemalist system despite their past associations. Notable figures like Elmalılı Hamdi (Yazır), Ahmet Hamdi (Akseki), and Ömer Nasuhi (Bilmen)—even though many had served in the Istanbul government against the Ankara government—were brought into the fold. For example, Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, who had served as a minister in the Evkaf (foundations) during the Istanbul government, was commissioned by the Diyanet to produce the Turkish translation of the Qur’an. Despite his opposing background and earlier associations, Yazır’s ability to continue his tafsir studies under state sponsorship reflects the regime’s pragmatic approach, selectively tolerating religious scholarship as long as it did not challenge the state’s authority (Y. Ş. Yavuz 1995; Flöhr 2015).

In a similar vein, Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, another significant religious leader, was put on trial in 1925 by the Independent Tribunals due to his connection with Tarikat-i Salahiye, a secret religious organization that supported the Istanbul government and various religious uprisings in Anatolia during the 1920s (Tunaya 1984). Despite these affiliations, Akseki not only survived this scrutiny but was also able to publish articles in the early 1930s, criticizing the secular tone of Hakimiyet-i Milliye, the mouthpiece of the Kemalist regime, particularly for its praise of alcohol consumption and New Year celebrations—both associated with the pro-Western lifestyle embraced by Kemalist elites (Kara 2011, pp. 831–32). Remarkably, Akseki later rose to become the vice head and eventually the head of Diyanet during the one-party period (Bolay 1989).

These examples, which stand in stark contrast to the mainstream Islamist victimhood narratives, illustrate that the experiences of many religious figures under the Kemalist regime were far more complex and nuanced than often portrayed. Rather than being systematically suppressed, many were able to collaborate with the regime and continue their religious work, undermining the notion that the religious repression was as widespread or absolute as claimed in the victimhood narratives.

6. Conclusions

This study critically examined the foundational narratives of Islamist victimhood in Turkey, challenging the long-standing claims that Islamists were systematically repressed, pushed underground, and marginalized by Kemalist policies. While these victimhood narratives have been central to Islamist political discourse since the 1950s, they were uncritically echoed by scholars, particularly between the late 1990s—post-28 February soft coup—and the early 2010s. Many of these claims were accepted at face value without thorough scrutiny and were adopted as a theoretical framework to advocate for the “victim”, civil rights, and the idea of a more democratic Turkey, as some generals in the army, under the banner of preserving Kemalist ideals, intervened in politics and imposed restrictions in the civil sphere, such as headscarf bans.

The lack of deep research in the academic field on these victimhood claims helped to legitimize political Islamism, creating a somewhat one-sided narrative in both the academic literature and policymaking. This, in turn, contributed significantly to the rise of an authoritarian Islamist regime by the 2010s, after the Kemalist “threat” had been removed. Ironically, many of the scholars who once supported the loosening of Kemalist control now find themselves either in exile, behind bars, or forced into silence as democracy in Turkey continues to deteriorate.

The research reveals that the so-called “ban on Islam”, including restrictions on Qur’anic education and the closure of Sufi lodges, was neither as absolute nor as repressive as portrayed in Islamist victimhood narratives. Through a critical analysis of biographies, official texts, and personal memoirs, the findings indicate that the Kemalist regime’s approach to Islamism during the one-party era was relatively straightforward: as long as religious leaders did not incite societal opposition by using religion to advocate for an alternative Shari’a-based governance or to support the restoration of the ancient regime, they were not persecuted. Far from being entirely suppressed, key religious figures, particularly from the Naqshbandi order, held positions within state institutions such as the Diyanet and even expanded their influence under the very regime they claimed was oppressing them.

By fact-checking these narratives, this study demonstrates how Islamists strategically used victimhood as a political tool to construct a collective sense of grievance, which ultimately helped to facilitate the rise of Islamist political movements like Milli Görüş and, eventually, the AKP. These narratives, which often depict the Kemalist state as broadly repressive of the devout Muslim population, have been strategically deployed to strengthen the political leverage of Islamist movements.

This research not only challenges the accuracy of these foundational Islamist victimhood narratives but also provides important insights for future scholarship. The uncritical propagation of such narratives—what I refer to as the “victimhood trap”—can have significant long-term fatal consequences, as evidenced by Turkey’s shift toward an autocratic regime. This study underscores the importance of fact-checking and a nuanced understanding of historical grievances to avoid similar outcomes in other contexts. The relationship between Islamist actors, who strategically and politically both propagate and exploit victimhood narratives to consolidate their support and mobilize the communities they represent for their political ends, is an important area for future research.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to the editors and reviewers of Religions for their time and valuable feedback throughout the revision process.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Footnotes

Note

1. Many of these scholars simultaneously argued that Islam in Turkey innately promotes tolerance and moderation and is different from radical Islamism due to its Sufi character, particularly represented by Naqshbandi Sufi orders (Mardin 2005; H. Yavuz 1997; Husain 2007). However, recent scholarship has critically examined this claim. Erturk 2022 and 2024 demonstrate that this view is misleading and overlooks the ideological connections between Naqshbandī orders and radical Islamic movements like Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, Ertürk points out that most Sufi communities in Turkey have not been studied in depth by social scientists, leading to their fallacious equating with the teachings of figures like al-Rumi or certain Bektashi teachings, which are often considered syncretic, as well as deviant by many mainstream Sufi communities. This mischaracterization reflects a significant logical fallacy in the literature. In contrast, Ertürk shows that many Sufi communities in Turkey, particularly the Naqshbandis, share ideological and institutional connections to more radical forms of Islam. This article, however, focuses on how such victimhood narratives, particularly those strategically constructed and echoed by Islamist figures and Sufi brotherhoods like the Naqshbandi, have been embraced by scholars, and how they have become one of the key factors that contributed to the “success” of political Islam in Turkey today.

Footnotes

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