Abstract

The impact of institutional arrangements, the “rules of the game”, in terms of Douglass North’s definition, on macroeconomic dynamics has been largely detected in the economic-historical records. However, clarification of the nature of institutional currents and their relationship with the paths of economic growth is a challenge for contemporary economic theory. The paper will present a retrospective of the conceptualization of institutional change as a process that mimics the evolutionary systems, relying on relevant theoretical concepts and selective empirical material that is contained herein. In this sense, the paper gives insight into the important contributions reflecting on the relationship between instiutions and economic growth, the evolutionary theory of socio-economic changes and their possible implications for the current reform process. Total of argumentation offered in the paper indicates stability and inertia of institutional structures, whose dynamics is prone to path dependency. Insisting on universal reform solutions, neutral with respect to local circumstances in the process of stimulating economic growth, turns out to be ineffective.

Alternate abstract:

Uticaj institucionalnih aranžmana, „pravila igre“ u Nortovom smislu, na makroekonomsku dinamiku uveliko je detektovan u privrednoistorijskoj evidenciji. Međutim, razjašnjenje prirode institucionalnih tokova i njihove veze sa putanjama privrednog rasta predstavlja izazov za savremenu ekonomsku teoriju. U radu će biti učinjen osvrt na konceptualizaciju institucionalnih promena, kao procesa koji oponaša evolucione sisteme, uz oslonac na relevantna teorijska shvatanja i selektivnu empirijsku građu koja je u njima sadržana. U tom smislu, rad prezentuje važnije doprinose promišljanju odnosa između institucija i privrednog rasta, evolucionu teoriju društveno-ekonomskih promena i njihove moguće implikacije na aktuelne reformske procese. Ukupna u radu ponuđena argumentacija ukazuje na stabilnost i inertnost institucionalnih struktura, čija je dinamika trajektorijski zavisna. Pozivanje na univerzalna reformska rešenja, neutralna u odnosu na domaće okolnosti, u procesu stimulisanja privrednog rasta, pokazuje se kao nedelotvorno.

Details

Title
Evolution Of “Rules Of The Game”, Macroeconomic Dynamics And Reform Policy
Author
Stefanović, Zoran 1 

 University of Niš, Faculty of Economics, Serbia 
Pages
480-497
Publication year
2014
Publication date
2014
Publisher
De Gruyter Poland
ISSN
0353-8648
e-ISSN
2217-3668
Source type
Scholarly Journal
Language of publication
English
ProQuest document ID
3156204294
Copyright
© 2014. This work is published under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.