Content area

Abstract

The convergence of IT and OT networks has gained significant attention in recent years, facilitated by the increase in distributed computing capabilities, the widespread deployment of Internet of Things devices, and the adoption of Industrial Internet of Things. This convergence has led to a drastic increase in external access capabilities to previously air-gapped industrial systems for process control and monitoring. To meet the need for remote access to system information, protocols designed for the OT space were extended to allow IT networked communications. However, OT protocols often lack the rigor of cybersecurity capabilities that have become a critical characteristic of IT protocols. Furthermore, OT protocol implementations on individual devices can vary in performance, requiring the comprehensive evaluation of a device’s reliability and capabilities before installation into a critical infrastructure production network. In this paper, the authors define a framework for identifying vulnerabilities within these protocols and their on-device implementations, utilizing formal modeling, hardware in the loop-driven network emulation, and fully virtual network scenario simulation. Initially, protocol specifications are modeled to identify any vulnerable states within the protocol, leveraging the Construction and Analysis of Distributed Processes (CADP) software (version 2022-d “Kista”, which was created by Inria, the French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation, in France). Device characteristics are then extracted through automated real-time network emulation tests built on the OMNET++ framework, and all measured device characteristics are then used as a virtual device representation for network simulation tests within the OMNET++ software (version 6.0.1., a public-soucre, open-architecture software, initially developed by OpenSim Limited in Budapest, Hungary), to verify the presence of any potential vulnerabilities identified in the formal modeling stage. With this framework, the authors have thus defined an end-to-end process to identify and verify the presence and impact of potential vulnerabilities within a protocol, as shown by the presented results. Furthermore, this framework can test protocol compliance, performance, and security in a controlled environment before deploying devices in live production networks and addressing cybersecurity concerns.

Details

1009240
Business indexing term
Title
End-to-End Framework for Identifying Vulnerabilities of Operational Technology Protocols and Their Implementations in Industrial IoT
Publication title
Volume
17
Issue
1
First page
34
Publication year
2025
Publication date
2025
Publisher
MDPI AG
Place of publication
Basel
Country of publication
Switzerland
Publication subject
e-ISSN
19995903
Source type
Scholarly Journal
Language of publication
English
Document type
Journal Article
Publication history
 
 
Online publication date
2025-01-14
Milestone dates
2024-11-26 (Received); 2025-01-10 (Accepted)
Publication history
 
 
   First posting date
14 Jan 2025
ProQuest document ID
3159469318
Document URL
https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/end-framework-identifying-vulnerabilities/docview/3159469318/se-2?accountid=208611
Copyright
© 2025 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.
Last updated
2025-09-23
Database
ProQuest One Academic