Content area

Abstract

In this essay I identify a type of linguistic phenomenon new to feminist philosophy of language: biased evaluative descriptions. Biased evaluative descriptions are descriptions whose well-intended positive surface meanings are inflected with implicitly biased content. Biased evaluative descriptions are characterized by three main features: (1) they have roots in implicit bias or benevolent sexism, (2) their application is counterfactually unstable across dominant and subordinate social groups, and (3) they encode stereotypes. After giving several different kinds of examples of biased evaluative descriptions, I distinguish them from similar linguistic concepts, including backhanded compliments, slurs, insults, epithets, pejoratives, and dog whistles. I suggest that the traditional framework of Gricean implicature cannot account for biased evaluative descriptions. I discuss some challenges to the distinctiveness and evaluability of biased evaluative descriptions, including intersectional social identities. I conclude by discussing their social significance and moral status. Identifying biased evaluative descriptions is important for a variety of social contexts, from the very general and broad (political speeches) to the very particular and small (bias in academic hiring).

Details

Title
Biased Evaluative Descriptions
Author
Bernstein, Sara 1 

 UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   [email protected] 
Volume
10
Issue
2
Pages
295-312
Publication year
2024
Publication date
Jun 2024
Section
Article
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Place of publication
Cambridge
Country of publication
United Kingdom
Publication subject
ISSN
20534477
e-ISSN
20534485
Source type
Scholarly Journal
Language of publication
English
Document type
Journal Article
Publication history
 
 
Online publication date
2023-04-13
Publication history
 
 
   First posting date
13 Apr 2023
ProQuest document ID
3166390972
Document URL
https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/biased-evaluative-descriptions/docview/3166390972/se-2?accountid=208611
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association
Last updated
2025-11-20
Database
ProQuest One Academic