Content area

Abstract

The emergence of social order on darknet markets presents social scientists with a unique puzzle. Because these markets operate outside of conventional regulatory frameworks, there is a lack of legitimate oversight to monitor transactions and protect users from opportunistic behaviour. While existing literature often examines the role of reputation in increasing sales, little attention has been paid to mechanisms that mitigate fraud. This study fills this gap by examining one of the largest known darknet platforms, Alphabay, which was operational from December 2014 to July 2017. Using two Generalised Additive Models (GAMs), results show that costly signals, such as a positive reputation, sellers’ seniority and escrow services, are inversely associated with fraudulent activity on darknet markets. Conversely, cheap signals, such as long product descriptions characterised by complex vocabulary and a positive tone, correlate positively with opportunistic behaviour. The study provides empirical support for signalling theory, by showing that costly signals are more difficult to fake or manipulate and can reduce fraud. Conversely, the study also demonstrates empirically that cheap signals, while potentially effective in initially generating trust among buyers, are associated with an increase in fraud and opportunistic behaviour.

Details

1009240
Business indexing term
Company / organization
Title
Signalling strategies and opportunistic behaviour: Insights from dark-net markets
Publication title
PLoS One; San Francisco
Volume
20
Issue
3
First page
e0319794
Publication year
2025
Publication date
Mar 2025
Section
Research Article
Publisher
Public Library of Science
Place of publication
San Francisco
Country of publication
United States
e-ISSN
19326203
Source type
Scholarly Journal
Language of publication
English
Document type
Journal Article
Publication history
 
 
Milestone dates
2024-03-19 (Received); 2025-02-04 (Accepted); 2025-03-18 (Published)
ProQuest document ID
3178693105
Document URL
https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/signalling-strategies-opportunistic-behaviour/docview/3178693105/se-2?accountid=208611
Copyright
© 2025 Andrei, Veltri. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.
Last updated
2025-11-20
Database
ProQuest One Academic