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The 9/11 Commission’s report, which shows how threats can be recognised, should be compulsory reading for all security professionals
The US National Commission, which inquired into the 9/11 attacks, explained what it called “imagination” in Chapter 11 of its final report, titled “Foresight and Hindsight”. This report, running into 589 pages, should be made compulsory reading for all our security professionals engaged in preventing terrorism.
In the Commission’s opinion, the elements of strategic imagination should be “understanding the danger” and “institutionalising imagination” by reading and interpreting the danger, formulating policy to counter it, building up capability to prevent and suppress danger through overt or covert means, and finally operational and institutional management.
The Commission analysed 10 “operational opportunities” from January 2000 to August 2001 and concluded that the CIA and FBI failed to recognise danger to the US by way of multiple attacks on September 11, 2001. A similar methodology was adopted by our 26/11 high level enquiry committee of which I was the second member.
Did we fail to recognise the danger from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pahalgam after what seemed to be a notable victory for India with the extradition of Tahawwur Rana who arrived in India on April 10? Terrorists operate with a different logic than others. Dazzling attacks unify their cadres, raise their international profile and boost funding, as happened after 26/11. Also, they would be most reluctant to admit defeat on such an important operation as 26/11 over which they had spent so much time and...