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This paper provides an analysis of the meaning–reference problem, as traditionally advanced in the philosophy of language, for imperative programming languages. Addressing the problem is relevant for the philosophy of computer science in the context of the debate of whether simulative programs can be considered representational theories of their simulated systems. This paper challenges the thesis that, since programming languages have semantics, they also have reference, presumably to the external world. First, denotational, operational, game theoretic, and axiomatic semantics are epistemologically analysed to provide a theory of meaning for high-level language programs. It is argued that programming language semantics can be seen, to some extent, under the light of Fregean descriptivism, thereby rejecting the view that it is reference that determines meaning. Secondly, descriptivist, causal, character, and intentionalist theories of reference are examined to argue that meaning is not sufficient for programming languages to determine reference, thereby rejecting the view that meaning determines reference. It is argued that it is the intentions of agents that allow programming language semantics to identify referents. The paper concludes that if the semantics of programming languages may determine their reference, the latter is not to the external world but to the internal operations of the implementation executing them. This does not prevent simulative programs from representing empirical systems, but they do so not on the basis of programming language semantics.
