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This dissertation is a vertically-integrated collection of works that argue for a particular way of doing metaphysics about our best scientific theories. Over the course of the dissertation, I discuss directly what I think is the best way to go about doing metaphysics of science and what the conclusions of such a method must look like, and then I apply those insights and actually get to doing that metaphysics, arguing for a particular view of spacetime and then using the set of tools laid out in the first three chapters to look back at some ancient metaphysics of science.
Chapter 1 builds upon a view of metaphysical naturalism (the view that our metaphysics needs to take our best science seriously) developed by Nina Emery in her 2023 book, Naturalism Beyond the Limits of Science. In her book, she argues for two different forms of naturalism: content naturalism, the view that our metaphysical theories should not conflict with the content of our best scientific theories, and methodological naturalism, the view that “metaphysicians should, whenever possible, use the same methodology that scientists use.” In the first half of the chapter, I argue for a revision to content naturalism, expanding the notion of “content” to allow for metaphysicians to theorize about unorthodox scientific theories so long as those theories enjoy consensus among scientists regarding their broad adequacy as worthwhile research projects. Then, in the second half of the chapter, I argue that we can add a third form of naturalism to Emery’s two naturalisms and that doing so helps to evaluate certain problem cases. I call the new view Genuine Property Naturalism (GP-Nat), and it is the view that metaphysicians should, whenever applicable, use the same genuine property base that scientists use, where the genuine property base of a theory is the collection of properties used in a theory that scientists generally interpret as corresponding to real features of the world. I argue that GP-Nat is a substantive addition to Emery’s naturalisms and then develop a case in which Emery’s naturalisms appear to yield the wrong verdict on whether some theory is naturalistic unless they are supplemented with GP-Nat.
Chapter 2 presents an argument regarding the modal character of the findings of a metaphysics of science that respects GP-Nat. I defend the view that there are certain necessity claims in metaphysics that are often assumed to be metaphysically necessary but that actually should be weaker nomic necessities in line with the necessity claims of our best scientific theories. In particular, I argue that in cases where the metaphysical theory depends for its applicability on the genuine property base of some scientific theory, the novel necessity claims of the metaphysical theory can be no more general than the nomic necessity of the scientific theory. I use theories of material simplicity from mereology as a paradigmatic example of this, highlighting the dependence that such theories display upon the genuine property base of our best particle physics, especially quantum mechanics.
Chapter 3 turns to actually doing some naturalistic metaphysics. This chapter presents a response to the Hole Argument, a famous argument, originally from Einstein and given its classic form by Earman and Norton, which claims to show that any substantivalist interpretation of spacetime will be illicitly indeterministic. I first present the Hole Argument, showing how it is meant to undermine a substantivalist view of spacetime. I then present a novel substantivalist response to the Hole Argument. I begin by introducing a Neo-Spinozist conception of substances and then show how this view, when applied to spacetime substances, yields a theory that is able to overcome the Hole Argument. I conclude by responding to possible objections to my theory that arise in connection with the two most popular competing views: Metrical Essentialism and Ontic Structuralism. I argue my view can accommodate their objections while also avoiding the problems that plague those other views.
Chapter 4 extends the style of naturalistic metaphysics developed in the rest of the dissertation to do some novel historical analysis of Epicurus’ views on space, time, and matter. Epicurus’ Doctrine of Minimal Parts is one of the more obscure views that he argues for, yet the arguments he offers in support of the Doctrine are deceptively rich despite their brevity. This chapter begins by investigating the series of arguments Epicurus offers in Letter to Herodotus in support of his view regarding minimal conceptual parts within atoms. I then argue that these arguments have interesting upshots for Epicurus’ views on space and time. However, these additional commitments lead to a problem of incommensurability that seemingly demands a revision of geometry that we have no evidence was ever formulated by any Epicureans. I conclude with some speculation about ways that Epicurus potentially could have responded to this problem that don’t demand such revisions to geometry.