The Strategic Ripples of China’s Mega-Dam for Bangladesh

Abstract

The situation is further complicated by India’s position. Since the river flows through Indian territory before reaching Bangladesh, India is also closely monitoring China’s activities. In Bangladesh, Malik Fida Khan, the executive director of the Center for Environmental and Geographic Information Services, warned that 70 percent of the dry-season flow in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river basin comes via the Brahmaputra. For over a decade, Dhaka has awaited New Delhi’s approval of a long-pending agreement to ensure equitable distribution of Teesta waters.

When Chinese Premier Li Qiang broke ground on the world’s most ambitious dam – the Medog Hydropower Station on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet – global headlines fixated on its scale and scope. With a projected cost of $167 billion and an expected capacity triple that of the Three Gorges Dam, the project is a technological marvel. 

But it’s also a geopolitical flashpoint. As the Yarlung Tsangpo becomes the Brahmaputra in India and the Jamuna in Bangladesh, control over its headwaters bestows tremendous leverage. The Medog dam is thus a bellwether for future negotiations on water-sharing – and a potential harbinger of regional water insecurity.

For Bangladesh, far downstream yet acutely affected, the stakes are existential. The project raises serious questions regarding water security, riverine ecology, and diplomatic leverage – especially in the context of Bangladesh’s long-stalled water-sharing deal with India over the Teesta River. As Dhaka cautiously monitors China’s plans, the broader implications for regional water agreements, particularly Bangladesh-India negotiations, are beginning to crystallize.

China maintains that the Medog project will be a “run-of-the-river” project that neither diverts nor withdraws water, but Bangladesh remains cautious. In January 2025, during a bilateral meeting in Beijing, Dhaka voiced concern about the dam and formally requested detailed technical information. In response, Chinese officials and diplomats have reached out to assure Dhaka that its hydropower project is intended solely for electricity generation and will not affect the flow of water to downstream countries. 

Six months later, Bangladesh now appears to have accepted Beijing’s verbal assurances and explanation, with Foreign Adviser Touhid Hossain stating that Bangladesh currently sees no “reason for concern.”

The rationale behind Bangladesh’s shift in stance was reflected in Hossain’s remarks: “We cannot stop it… We have to see that we are not harmed.” The realist tone of this statement reflects Bangladesh’s limited leverage in this geopolitical equation. Nevertheless, Dhaka insists on transparency and access to hydrological data as a baseline requirement for trust-building.

The situation is further complicated by India’s position. Since the river flows through Indian territory before reaching Bangladesh, India is also closely monitoring China’s activities. Hossain confirmed that India has “interests here” and is “looking into the matter.” This triangulation of interests brings to light the fragile web of interdependencies in the region’s river systems and complicates existing bilateral dynamics.

The concern lies not just in what is being built but how. Water, traditionally a source of life, increasingly resembles a strategic tool – even a “weapon” – in South Asia. Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Pema Khandu likened the Medog dam to a “water bomb” that poses an existential threat to tribal populations and riverine ecosystems. A 2020 report by the Lowy Institute even argued that China’s control over Tibetan rivers gives it a “chokehold on India’s economy.” 

In 2024, Chinese authorities arrested hundreds of Tibetans protesting hydropower development, reinforcing concerns over top-down, opaque decision-making.

In Bangladesh, Malik Fida Khan, the executive director of the Center for Environmental and Geographic Information Services, warned that 70 percent of the dry-season flow in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river basin comes via the Brahmaputra. If upstream interventions destabilize this flow, Bangladesh’s already climate-stressed water security could collapse. 

Sharif Jamil of Riverkeeper Bangladesh called China’s plan for the Medog project “unilateral and geographically sensitive,” emphasizing that without transparent consultation, Bangladesh risks compounded ecological, hydrological, and socio-economic shocks.

The project has added urgency and a new layer of complexity to the India-Bangladesh Teesta River water-sharing negotiations. For over a decade, Dhaka has awaited New Delhi’s approval of a long-pending agreement to ensure equitable distribution of Teesta waters. However, domestic political opposition in India – particularly from the state of West Bengal – has delayed the deal.

Now, with China entering the regional hydrological calculus, Bangladesh might find both risks and opportunities. On one hand, the growing strategic importance of transboundary rivers may compel India to be more forthcoming in its negotiations with Bangladesh, lest Dhaka turn increasingly toward Beijing for cooperation on water issues. On the other hand, India’s own security and ecological concerns vis-à-vis China may lead it to further entrench its positions on all water-sharing matters, including the Teesta River.

From a broader perspective, the situation presents an opportunity for Dhaka to push for a more institutionalized, basin-wide approach to water governance involving all five riparian states: China, India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. Experts like Sharif Jamil argued that Bangladesh should ratify the 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention and spearhead a joint framework to manage the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin as a whole. This multilateral vision offers two-fold benefits: it would build a norms-based framework for regional water governance and shield Bangladesh from being caught in a Sino-Indian tug-of-war.

In an era where rivers are becoming instruments of diplomacy and conflict alike, Dhaka must flow with the current but steer its own course. Bangladesh faces considerable obstacles in navigating this complex hydro-political landscape. Its draft Teesta agreement with India, proposed in 2011, still faces resistance from the West Bengal government, highlighting the challenge of balancing federal-state interests even within bilateral frameworks. China’s increasing footprint in the Teesta Master Plan also positions Bangladesh delicately between two powerful neighbors. This necessitates technical foresight and diplomatic agility to prevent backlash from New Delhi while ensuring cooperation from Beijing.