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In order to be eligible for a marriage or divorce in Israel, one must meet the requirements of the relevant religious institution--which, for Jews, whether or not they are religiously observant, is the Rabbinical Court system. Although both men and women are equally required to prove their Jewish status within this system, the question of "who is a Jew" is really a question of "who is a Jewish woman," since, according to rabbinic law, Judaism is passed from a mother to her children. In recent years, the Israeli religious establishment's growing requirements for "proof of Judaism," especially towards FSU immigrants and their descendants, has led to media attention, social protest and petitions to the civil courts, raising legal questions regarding the authority of the Rabbinical Courts when they conduct investigations into Jewish status and the extent of private information the court can use as part of such an investigation. Investigations into Jewish status take place mostly at lifecycle events, such as marriage and divorce. The verdict is given by an all-male Rabbinical Court, yet the verdict impacts women more than men, because of the implications for their offspring and for some rights in the case of a Jewish divorce. Women in general, and women whose Jewish identity is in doubt in particular, do not belong to the hegemony that controls the religious establishment. This article will aim to understand the jurisprudence of Israel's rabbinical courts on this issue and its implications for women. After reviewing when proof of Judaism is required by the rabbinical court, with examples of Rabbinical Court rulings on this issue that affect women, it will strive to understand how a gender analysis and feminist perspective could impact on the age-old question of "who is a Jew" for matters of "proof of Judaism."
In order to be eligible for a marriage or divorce in Israel, one must meet the requirements of the relevant religious institution- which, for Jews, whether or not they are religiously observant, is the Rabbinical Court system. Although both men and women arc equally required to prove their Jewish status within this system, the question of "who is a Jew" is really a question of "who is a Jewish woman," since, according to rabbinic law, Judaism is passed from a mother to her children. In recent years, the Israeli religious establishment's growing requirements for "proof of Judaism," especially towards FSU immigrants and their descendants, has led to media attention, social protest and petitions to the civil courts, raising legal questions regarding the authority of the Rabbinical Courts when they conduct investigations into Jewish status and the extent of private information the court can use as part of such an investigation.
Investigations into Jewish status take place mostly at lifecycle events, such as marriage and divorce. The verdict is given by an all-male Rabbinical Court, yet the verdict impacts women more than men, because of the implications for their offspring and for some rights in the case of a Jewish divorce. Women in general, and women whose Jewish identity is in doubt in particular, do not belong to the hegemony that controls the religious establishment. This article will aim to understand the jurisprudence of Israel's rabbinical courts on this issue and its implications for women. After reviewing when proof of Judaism is required by the rabbinical court, with examples of Rabbinical Court rulings on this issue that affect women, it will strive to understand how a gender analysis and feminist perspective could impact on the ageold question of "who is a Jew" for matters of "proof of Judaism."
In front of the court is a sage teaching-The people of Israel are shy, compassionate, and reciprocal in kindness. [. . .] So, when the woman removed her disguise of natural shame that every Jew has, the Rabbinical Court began to suspect that she was not actually a daughter of Israel.1
Divorce is often an unpleasant legal matter, but a case brought before the Haifa Rabbinical Court in September 2018, involving the revocation of the State of Israel's recognition of Jane Doe's Jewish status,2 raised a particularly troubling issue. In an earlier hearing in the divorce proceedings, in January 2015, the husband had claimed that his wife was a prostitute. At first, the Rabbinical Court judges reprimanded him for making such an accusation. But when he presented a video of his wife discussing her sexual life, the judges made the issue central to the discussion. They saw in her words grounds to examine not only her commitment to the marriage, but also her Jewish status and consequently her right to a halakhic divorce. The court nullified Jane Doe's State-certified Jewish status on the grounds that it had been granted under false pretenses, required her to undergo a State investigation of her Jewish lineage, and, moreover, extended its findings to her mother and sister. Thus, her marriage was invalidated, and she and her family members were added to the State's list of citizens ineligible to marry according to Jewish law (and so ineligible to wed in a State-sanctioned marriage), until, and if, their Jewish identities could be proven by a State investigation.
This case is one of many dealing with "Jewish status verification" that arc adjudicated annually in the Israeli Rabbinical Courts. It illustrates the potential risk to individuals who enter the Israeli Rabbinical Court system of having their Jewish status challenged. In this instance, the revérification of Jewish status was directed at Jane Doc within the context of divorce proceedings, in a manner that intruded upon her privacy and challenged her religious identity and legal status.
This article will examine the processes of Jewish status verification in the Rabbinical Courts, their implications and the worldview underlying them. I will argue that verification of Jewish status is a gendered issue: Despite apparent neutrality, the process of Jewish status verification is inherently gendered, systematically disadvantaging women through its procedures, its impact and its underlying assumptions.
In recent years, there has been increased rabbinic writing and some academic attention given to issues of proof of Jewish status, but there has not yet been a gender analysis of the issue and its implications for women's rights.31 aim herein to shine light upon the jurisprudence of Israel's Rabbinical Courts on this issue and to identify its implications for women. After providing background on Jewish status verification procedures and the changes that have occurred in this field, I shall examine who undergoes these procedures, how they differ for men and women, and in what contexts they occur. Finally, I shall conduct a gender analysis of these procedures and their impact on the age-old question of "Who is a Jew?" in matters of establishing Jewish status.
BACKGROUND ON VERIFICATION OF JEWISH STATUS
Legal Framework
Israel's State Rabbinical Courts, which exercise exclusive jurisdiction over Jewish citizens in matters of marriage and divorce,4 can require citizens to prove their Jewish status as part of various court procedures.5 The courts' procedures in this area are anchored in the Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts (Marriage and Divorce) Law enacted in 1953, according to which "matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel-citizens or residents of the State- shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinic courts,"6 and "marriages and divorces of Jews shall be conducted in Israel according to Torah law."7
This law is an Israeli revision of the millet system established by the Ottoman Empire and maintained by the British authorities in Mandatory Palestine (1920-1948), according to which marriages and divorces of all citizens and residents arc administered by State-recognized religious institutions according to the sectarian laws of the religious communities to which they belong, by way of either descent or official conversion.8 There is broad consensus, based on a series of court rulings, that the term "Jews" for the purposes of this law is to be interpreted according to religious/rabbinic law, which does not necessarily correspond to the civil law definition used in determining eligibility for Israeli citizenship.9 According to rulings by Israel's (secular) Supreme Court,10 State Rabbinical Courts are obligated to certify the Jewish status of litigants as a basis for obtaining jurisdiction; this must be done according to rabbinic law, but it can be based solely on a party's declaration of their Jewish identity.11 Casting doubt upon a litigant's Jewish status limits the Rabbinical Court's authority, which is confined to matters of personal status of Jews.12
Rabbinical Court investigations into Jewish lineage have been on the rise since the late 1980s, when there was a wave of immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union (FSU) to Israel. The immigrants had the right to immigrate and become citizens of Israel on the basis of the "Law of Return," which defines a Jew as someone whose mother is Jewish or has converted to Judaism and does not belong to another religion.13 According to the "Law of Return," close family members of Jews are also eligible for Israeli citizenship, although they will not be registered as having a Jewish status in the population registry if they are not themselves Jewish as defined by the law.14 Soviet Jewry was characterized, for the most part, by detachment from religion and Jewish tradition due to the pressures of the Soviet regime, and by a significant percentage of intermarriages between Jews and non-Jews. As a result, many of those eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return arc not recognized as Jewish according to rabbinic law, and individuals requesting to marry or divorce, having been registered by the State's civil authorities as Jews according to the definition in the "Law of Return," may find themselves subject to the independent investigation of a State Rabbinical Court. While many of those requested to prove their Jewish status arc FSU immigrants or their descendants, the request may be directed at anyone turning to the State religious authorities for services that require Jewish status, and these demands have increasingly been directed at immigrants from all Diaspora countries.15
Another instance where a State Rabbinical Court may question the validity of a citizen's Jewish status is in the case of conversion to Judaism.16 In various State Rabbinical Court cases, the court has questioned if a conversion was conducted according to rabbinic law. The investigation often centers upon the question of whether the convert fully accepted rabbinic law when he or she converted. Because natal Jewish status is determined by the mother's Jewish status, a court ruling invalidating a woman's conversion would apply not only to her but also to her children and further descendants.
According to current guidelines, State Rabbinical Courts do not rely solely on declarations or affidavits and instead use investigators who seek evidence to clarify a litigant's Jewish lineage. The testimonies of those in question, which in cases of "proof of Jewish status" are primarily those of women (sometimes the mother or grandmother of the party in court), are viewed as being of little value. Near absolute decision-making authority is given to the investigators.17 Information on individuals whose Jewish identities arc rejected or remain in doubt following these investigations is added to a list of those ineligible to marry in State-sanctioned weddings.18
According to the Rabbinical Courts annual reports, 50,757 cases of "proof of Judaism" were adjudicated between 2010 and June 2024. In 54% of cases the main interested party was a woman, and in 46% of the cases a man. Only a few of the decisions have been published, following redaction of the parties' personal details, but we can discern some guiding principles from these cases. Some jurists appear to have made efforts to establish and make known a rabbinic legal infrastructure and worldview for dealing with this issue.19 The Rabbinical Courts sometimes view their role in these investigations as crucial for safeguarding the entire Jewish people against assimilation and protecting Jewish genealogical purity by preventing the integration of non-Jews into the Jewish people. This perspective informs their rigorous approach to Jewish status verification.
Halakhic Context
Establishing proof of an individual's Jewish status is rooted in the epistemic issue of knowing if he or she is Jewish according to rabbinic law. Matrilineal descent may be difficult to prove, as it may involve research going back generations. One can be the descendant of a Jewish or a non-Jewish woman without knowing it, and therefore the rabbinic legal definition relics on a presumption of Jewishness-hezkat Yahudut-a normative-legal basis for a person's classification as a Jew.20 There are various positions within rabbinic legal discourse about what is required to establish a "presumption of Judaism."21
Historically, rabbinic authorities largely agreed that, under specific circumstances, an individual's self-declaration of Jewish identity could be accepted, and reservations were expressed against questioning such declarations.22 This principle goes back to the days of the Talmud, wherein the Sages plainly stated: "a family that assimilated [into the Jewish community], assimilated," even if their lineage might have been questionable.23 In other words, one should not seek to invalidate the Jewish status of a family that had become part of the Jewish community.24 Even today, there is broad consensus that the "presumption of Judaism" can theoretically be applied when immigrants and their children seek to validate their Jewish status in the Rabbinical Courts. However, the extent of the investigation that should be conducted in putting the "presumption of Judaism" to the test is a matter of debate.25
In the past, based on the tradition of rabbinical law, local rabbinic authorities generally gave individuals seeking to establish their Jewish status the benefit of the doubt in cases in which full documentation was not available. However, Israel's State Rabbinical Courts have increasingly argued for a distinction in this regard between ancient and modern times and demanded that individuals provide extensive documentation of their Jewish status.26 When Jews faced persecution, there was less incentive for non-Jews to claim Jewish status, and so self-declaration was considered more reliable.27 In modern times, however, the rights to gain Israeli citizenship by virtue of the Law of Return and to be considered eligible for a State-sanctioned marriage can make claiming Jewish status or being recognized as Jewish worthwhile. The Rabbinical Courts have therefore expressed concern that the civil registration of Jewish status cannot be trusted and that some immigrants' records, especially from the FSU, arc inaccurate, on account cither of errors in documentation or of a suspicion that documents could have been forged to enable the person's immigration to Israel.28 This has led the Rabbinical Courts to rely increasingly on documentary and forensic evidence, professional investigators and databases containing more information than was previously available.29 The moment a Rabbinical Court casts doubt on an individual's Jewish status, that person will not be allowed to marry until their Jewish status is confirmed or they undergo a conversion to Judaism.
The Impact of the Increased Stringency
Jewish status verification procedures by the Rabbinical Courts can infringe upon fundamental rights, including the privacy of those being investigated. They can damage reputations, especially for immigrants and their children, who have lived their entire lives with a Jewish identity and suddenly find it questioned. For many immigrants, recognition of their Jewish status by the State of Israel is crucial to their sense of Jewish identity, making these investigations particularly distressing. Critics argue that the verification procedures can be humiliating and lead to alienation from Judaism.30
While it's possible for Israelis to marry in civil ceremonies abroad and have those marriages recognized by the state, thus avoiding recourse to the Rabbinate, this process requires resources and creates a distinction between those wedded in officially State-sanctioned marriages in Israel and those who must "exile" themselves in order to marry. Nevertheless, many couples, mostly secular Jews, choose this option, either out of preference or out of necessity, if they are ineligible or unsure of their eligibility to marry according to the Israeli Rabbinate's guidelines.31
Should they wish eventually to divorce, however, even couples who celebrated their civil marriages abroad will still need to go through the Israeli Rabbinical Court to dissolve them, if both members of the couple are registered as Jews in the population registry, potentially facing the very Jewish status investigations they had sought to avoid.32 Moreover, the implications of Jewish status verification extend beyond marriage and divorce; among other things, it may threaten one's eligibility to be buried in a Jewish cemetery, further complicating the personal and religious status of those affected.
Increasing stringency in Jewish status investigations under the aegis of the Rabbinical Courts has been documented by the media, and it has led to social protest.33 Generation 1.5, an organization that represents young FSU-Israelis, has accused the religious establishment of viewing them as "second-class citizens" when they come to register their marriages, and it has advocated for the State religious establishment to stop investigating the Jewish lineage of FSU immigrants.34 In 2019, the organization's "Cultural Brigade" staged a play in which actors portrayed the humiliating scenes that Israelis from the FSU face when they apply to register their marriages with the State.35 In 2021, the One Million Lobby, an NGO representing the interests of over 1.2 million Israelis from the FSU, compiled a list of demands made by the religious establishment of citizens trying to prove their Jewish identities, in an effort to "stop the humiliating policy of Jewish status investigations of citizens who had already been recognized as Jews upon immigrating to Israel." The One Million Lobby has demanded that marriage registration be turned over to local marriage registrars who would be empowered to verify Jewish status, in order to prevent Rabbinical Courts from interfering in the process of proving Jewish lineage.36 The frustration engendered by these difficulties, particularly among Israelis with FSU roots, is reflected in the growing number of couples rejecting weddings officiated by the State Rabbinate and choosing alternative ceremonies that are not recognized or registered by the State authorities.37
Some of these organizational initiatives have been accompanied by presentations before Knesset committees and by court petitions. Various Knesset committee hearings have raised questions about administrative deficiencies in the State procedures for recognizing official Jewish status and concomitant violations of individual rights to privacy.38 Court cases have advocated for individuals' rights to privacy, dignity and a fair procedure. These have raised legal questions regarding the limits of the authority of the Rabbinical Courts in conducting Jewish status investigations, and the extent to which they are entitled use private information in the framework of such investigations.39 These proceedings have led to certain procedural changes, reducing the infringement of some individual rights, but they have not materially changed the policy of the Rabbinical Courts.
ARE WOMEN MORE AFFECTED?
The integration of rabbinic law into Israeli family law has profound implications for gender equality, particularly in issues of personal status.40 To understand why Jewish status verification, which affects both men and women, is fundamentally a gendered issue, we can draw a parallel with another well-known issue in rabbinic law-get refusal, which occurs when a husband refuses to grant or the wife to accept a religious divorce (get), leaving the other spouse unable to remarry within rabbinic law. While both men and women can be victims of get refusal, the implications arc markedly different for women, for whom entering a new relationship before receiving a religious divorce could affect not only their ability to remarry but also the legitimacy of their children born outside of marriage.41
Similarly, in Jewish status verification, both men and women may find themselves in a situation where their status as Jews is questioned and not recognized by the Rabbinical Court; as we saw above, only slightly more women than men have been subjected to such proceedings.42 However, the implications for women arc more severe and far-reaching. If a woman's Jewish status is placed in doubt, so too is that of her children. This is not the case regarding a Jewish man, whose Jewish status does not affect that of his children or future generations. Additionally, challenging a woman's Jewish status can affect certain rights in divorce proceedings. Moreover, even in cases where a man is the main party in court, it is the women in his family tree who are under investigation. Only if the man himself is a convert to Judaism will this, and not his matrilineal lineage, be the focus.
Furthermore, we should look not only at those whose Jewish status is investigated, but also at those conducting the investigations. Women arc automatically barred from qualifying as rabbinical judges. Thanks to legal efforts, women now serve in minor roles within the Rabbinical Court system, but there are no women Jewish status investigators (although in principle there is no legal barrier to this).43 This absence is particularly relevant in proof of Jewish status proceedings, since the questions asked of the person under investigation, even if he is male, will relate to their mother and grandmothers, and, in some cases, may relate to pregnancies and births. The allmale judges and investigators discuss certification of women's Jewish status in their absence, within a legal system operated by men. The experience of women is not voiced in the discussion or analysis of a case and is not considered part of the court's jurisprudence.44
These factors combined-the matrilineal nature of Jewish status, the disproportionate impact on women and their children, and the exclusion of women from the investigative and decision-making processes-demonstrate the deeply gendered nature of Jewish status verification in Israel's Rabbinical Courts.
WHEN DOES VERIFICATION OF JEWISH STATUS TAKE PLACE?
The Rabbinical Court's Jewish status verification process affects many Israeli citizens at key junctures in their lives, often with far-reaching personal and legal consequences. Understanding these junctures can help us comprehend the broader significance of these procedures for women's rights.
Marriage
Marriage registration is the most common trigger for Jewish status verification. Each year, thousands of citizens who apply to register their marriages with the State arc required to prove their Jewish identities by supplying documents, testimonies and other evidence.45 The rabbinic legal principle that serves as the foundation for defining marriage "according to the Torah" is that a Jewish man may only marry a Jewish woman, whether born Jewish or converted to Judaism according to rabbinic law, with certain stipulations. From this, the question arises: What degree of verification is required to make sure that a person who declares himself or herself Jewish is indeed Jewish?
In 1976, the Attorney General gave substantial authority to the State religious establishment by publishing a directive allowing rabbis who perform State-sanctioned marriages to ascertain whether those applying to register their marriage with the State are eligible to marry according to religious law. It also gave the Ministry of Religious Services authority to compile a central list of "denied marriages" based on information gathered by the marriage registrars and Rabbinical Courts.46 Spurred by the perceived need to address the issues raised by immigrants from the FSU seeking to register their marriages with the State, including those who immigrated as Jews ing to the law definition, the 1998 Marriage Registration Procedures included guidelines for Rabbinical Courts in determining Jewish status.47 These guidelines, which were specifically aimed at immigrants who arrived in Israel after 1990, established that a marriage registrar must refer them to a Rabbinical Court or special "investigation committee" for a Jewish status investigation before registering their marriage.48
The current guidelines, in effect since 2010, oblige marriage registrars to verify the Jewish identities of all couples who apply to have their marriages registered with the State in one of the following ways: (1) Ascertain that the parents of the applicants were married in Israel through State marriage registrars. (2) Ascertain that the parents of the applicants were married outside of Israel by communal rabbis recognized by the Chief Rabbinate of Israel for the purpose of marriage.49 (3) Ascertain that a marriage certificate was issued to a first-degree maternal relative in Israel by a State marriage registrar.50
When it is not possible to verify Jewish status in these ways, the guidelines require marriage registrars to refer applicants to Rabbinical Courts for investigation.51 Investigations may also be pursued in cases in which the Jewish status of maternal relatives has formerly been recognized.52 Sometimes investigations take place years after positive verifications of Jewish status have taken place or even after the rabbinate has sanctioned marriages and adjudicated divorces for the individuals in question or their close relatives.53 The Rabbinical Courts' expanded policy for verifying Jewish status for purposes of marriage is reflected in recent rulings claiming that, unlike in the past, they now have the knowledge and tools they need to verify Jewish status.54
Divorce
In Israel, divorces between Jews arc carried out according to religious law and require a get.55 Calling a woman's Jewish status into question in a Jewish divorce proceeding can have significant implications for her legal rights. In a divorce executed according to religious law, a man may have to pay the ketubah fee, a predetermined sum of money given by a husband to a wife upon dissolution of the marriage. However, if it can be proven that the woman is not Jewish, he may be exempted from having to pay, thus making it potentially beneficial for the man to question his wife's Jewish status.56
The Rabbinical Court's authority to verify Jewish status as a fundamental requirement of a divorce proceeding was established in the 1964 Supreme Court case Basan vs. Judges of the Great Rabbinical Court.57 The question of Mrs. Basan's Jewish status arose when the couple, married two years before by a State rabbi in Tel Aviv, came to a Rabbinical Court to request a divorce. Mr. Basan claimed that his wife was not Jewish, and therefore he was not obligated to pay the ketubah fee. The Great Rabbinical Court granted the divorce on appeal and found in Mr. Basan's favor that Mrs. Basan was not entitled to the ketubah fee, because her Jewish status was in doubt. The case came before the Supreme Court, which ruled that the Rabbinical Court was not authorized to hear the case, precisely because of the doubt concerning the plaintiff's Jewish status, since the Rabbinical Court has authority to effectuate divorces only between Jews. Based on this ruling, Rabbinical Courts are required to determine the Jewish status of husbands and wives seeking divorce as a condition of the divorce settlement. However, the degree of verification required for that determination was not specified at the time.
A similar question arose in the 1985 Banakovsky case, concerning a couple that had filed for divorce at the Haifa regional Rabbinical Court. The woman had converted to Judaism along with her mother and sister at the age of 15, after they immigrated to Israel. During the proceedings, the woman's lack of observance of the laws of kashrut, the Sabbath and family purity surfaced, which led the court to determine that her conversion had been in name only and should be annulled.58 In this case, too, the Supreme Court later ruled that the Rabbinical Court did not have the authority to hear a case involving a plaintiff whose Jewish status was in question. The obligation of one of the parties to undergo investigation when there is only minimal doubt, and the court believes it is possible to effectuate a divorce, has recently been considered in two cases before the Supreme Court, without a precedent-setting ruling being handed down.59
There arc different ways in which doubt may arise as part of a divorce process. Casting doubt on a conversion can trigger a Jewish status investigation and a request to annul that conversion.60 Similarly, casting doubt on the Jewish status of someone who has not converted to Judaism can trigger an investigation into their lineage.61 Various Rabbinical Court rulings mention either the Rabbinical Court or the spouse casting doubt on a woman's Jewish status to trigger an investigation.62 It seems that as Rabbinical Court investigations increase in scope, so does the possibility that they will occur more often within the framework of divorce proceedings, since any level of doubt may lead to an investigation.
Surrogacy
The rise of surrogacy has introduced new complexities into Jewish status verification, creating additional challenges that can place women's bodies and identities under heightened scrutiny. In surrogacy cases, the question arises as to whether the Jewish status of a child is determined by its egg donor or by the woman who carries it, and whether the baby's conversion is required in the event that one of them is not Jewish.63 Further complicating the issue is the requirement of State law that the egg donors remain anonymous, unless the donation is intended for a specific woman.64 Thus, even if both the donor and the woman who carries the baby arc registered as Jewish in the State Population Registry, the religious establishment may find it difficult to verify that the baby is Jewish according to their increasingly stringent standards.
In 2019, a case was brought before a Becrsheva Rabbinical Court in which the plaintiff argued that the child's Jewish status could be verified, because both the egg donor and the woman who carried the child were registered as Jewish. The court ruled that registration in the State Population Registry was insufficient proof of Jewish status, and that the anonymous egg donor had to undergo a Rabbinical Court Jewish status investigation.65
This decision was widely criticized. In a detailed opinion submitted to the court, the Ministry of Justice's Jewish Law Unit argued that there was no need to investigate Jewish status in such cases, because there is an overwhelming probability that the egg donor is Jewish.66 Avishalom Westreich and Avraham Stav considered this issue from the viewpoint of rabbinic law and concluded that in cases where either the egg donor or the woman who carries the baby is not Jewish, the child can undergo a simple conversion procedure (giyur lehumrd) to remove any doubt of non-Jewish status, but that there is no need for conversion in cases of anonymous egg donation, if the donor is registered as Jewish in the Population Registry.67 Rabbi Yitzhak Oshinsky, a Jerusalem Rabbinical Court judge, also reached the conclusion that in such a case there is a basis in rabbinic law not to require conversion, but in practice he agreed with the Rabbinical Court that the Jewish status of the egg donor must be investigated.68
Family Conflict
Even outside of marriage and divorce proceedings, Jewish status verification can be weaponized in family conflicts. In 2016, a case came before a Jerusalem Rabbinical Court in which a woman had embarked on a campaign to prove that the second wife of her deceased father was not Jewish.69 She had engaged a private investigator and presented alleged evidence that her stepmother was not Jewish to the rabbi of Kiryat Motzkin, Yosef Ohana, who had registered the couple's marriage, and to the Population and Immigration Authority and other government agencies. Rabbi Ohana appealed to the Rabbinical Court, which summoned the widow to prove her Jewish status.
The court initiated a re-examination of the widow's Jewish status and, after hearing the details of the case, found that none of the information presented invalidated her Jewish status. However, the court also stated that "even though the motives of the above arc not legitimate nor in good faith, we cannot ignore the facts and documents presented," and it initiated an investigation, even though the widow had immigrated to Israel as a Jew according to the Law of Return and married as a Jew many years before in a State-sanctioned marriage. The case illustrates how casting doubt upon a person's Jewish status can be used by individuals acting with malice or seeking revenge with the court effectively facilitating such actions by summoning third parties to transmit information that may undermine the Jewish status of litigants.
THE GENDERED CONSTRUCTIONS OF JEWISH STATUS VERIFICATION
Feminist legal scholars have identified and analyzed ways of knowing based on experiences more common to women.70 However, these experiences arc often silenced when women are excluded from shaping organizations, laws and practices.
As described above, a shift has occurred from rabbinic rulings based on "presumption of Judaism," which rely primarily on the testimony of the individuals in question, to rabbinic rulings based on forensic evidence, which rely primarily on investigators on behalf of the court.71 This is, in practice, an epistemic shift from reliance on women's testimony to reliance on that of men, since those being questioned are primarily women, and court investigators arc exclusively men.72 This transformation demands an analysis of the State's responsibilities towards religious communities, particularly regarding how State regulations affect women within these communities.73 To conduct this analysis, we must examine whose interests are served by these Jewish status verification procedures. First, we will demonstrate how these inquiries serve what the Rabbinical Courts define as the "sanctity of Israel" or the "public interest." Subsequently, we will explore how these procedures cater to men's need to ensure their descendants' Jewish status, while offering no comparable benefit to women.
In Service of the "Sanctity of Israel"
The Rabbinical Courts view verification of Jewish status not merely as a technical matter to assist litigants or to determine a Rabbinical Court's authority, but as a matter of public interest.74 Because a woman's Jewish status may affect that of generations to come, that, from this perspective, is largely where the public interest lies. For example, an Ariel Rabbinical Court stated in 2015 that proof of Jewish status is required as a matter of public interest, irrespective of the needs of the couple.75 Therefore, it argued, the court should have the authority to investigate a person's eligibility to marry "even if he did not turn to the court on his own initiative." When this case reached the Great Rabbinical Court, a similar principle was established, according to which the court should play an active role in determining Jewish status.76 To be sure, that decision, was overturned in a Supreme Court case that limited the Rabbinical Court's authority to investigate the Jewish status of third parties. However, these Rabbinical Court rulings make it clear that the State rabbinical establishment views its responsibility in this area as a matter of preventing future intermarriage, for the sake of the public, and not necessarily that of the litigants.
In two cases that recently came before Israel's Supreme Court, doubt had been cast upon the Jewish status of women in Rabbinical Court divorce proceedings, and the Rabbinical Court's authority to arrange a religious divorce consequently was questioned.77 The Supreme Court ruled that the rabbinical court could continue to arrange the divorces, based on a legal opinion provided by the Attorney General, determining that in some cases, when there is only minimal doubt regarding the Jewish status of the litigants, the rabbinical courts have the authority to effectuate divorces.78 Nevertheless, in both cases, the rabbinical court initially refused to proceed with the divorces without an investigation of Jewish status.79 While hearing one of these cases, the Great Rabbinical Court ordered that "the Director of the Jewish Investigations Department be asked to submit a report regarding the Jewish lineage of the plaintiffs and their first-degree family members, even in the absence of cooperation on their part."80 It also stated that the court's role is to serve not only as a mediator between the parties, but also as a representative of the "public interest" in gathering information about their Jewish lineage.81 This position reiterated the local Rabbinical Court's ruling in the case, which had argued that the request for "proof of Jewish status" is made not only to regulate the litigants' marital relationship but also to preserve the "sanctity of Israel."82 Only after further intervention from the Supreme Court were the divorces officiated by the rabbinical courts.83 The Rabbinical Court thus sees itself as acting on behalf of society to expose non-Jews and so to prevent intermarriage, an approach that disproportionately scrutinizes and impacts women and raises significant concerns about their rights in matters of personal status.
Safeguarding the Status of Men's Descendants
The Rabbinical Court's policies regarding verification of Jewish status allow Jewish men (individually and collectively) to guarantee the Jewish status of their descendants. Jewish women do not need such protection, as their children's status depends upon their own, rather than on that of their partner. It can be argued that men are discriminated against within the framework of rabbinical law, in that they cannot automatically pass their Jewish status on to their descendants but are required to marry a Jewish is not necessarily true of women. According to her proposed "connection thesis," women are not always and forever separate from other human beings; they experience connection to life and to other humans through pregnancy and birth, potential or actual.85 To be sure,
West's theses may lead to an essentialist perspective on women and gender. It is not at all clear, as West herself recognizes, to what extent this framework can be applied to all men and all women, and how much influence it has on various legal matters.86 In the case of Jewish status investigations, however, the "connection thesis" plays out directly, in that women's Jewish identities arc necessarily and definitively linked to that of their children;87 moreover, the female connection is based not on biology bur rather on rabbinic law. In using this thesis in the present context, then, I do not wish to imply that the essence of women is anchored in connection, but rather that the framework of rabbinical law creates such a connection between a woman and her descendants by using it to define their religious status. West sets out
by delineating two narratives that both subscribe to the "separation thesis": that of liberal legalism, the "official story" of jurisprudence, which places the individual's autonomy and fear of annihilation at the center, and that of critical legal studies, jurisprudence's "unofficial story," which leans toward connection and community.88 To reconcile these conflicting narratives, West focuses on Duncan Kennedy's notion of "fundamental contradiction," which views the rule of law as reflecting different aspects of the human condition.89 The human experience and the rule of law strive simultaneously for autonomy and protection from annihilation, on the one The Gendered Case of Jewish Status woman to do so. Yet the other side of the coin is that the principle of matrilineal descent can lead to policies and practices that focus on investigating and confirming the Jewish lineage of women more intensively than
that of men. The theoretical framework laid out by Robin West in her groundbreaking 1988 article "Jurisprudence and Gender"84 is helpful to an analysis of this issue, as it provides tools to identify possible women's narratives and integrate them into the legal framework. The basis of West's theoretical framework for feminist jurisprudence is her argument that most legal theory has hitherto been grounded in the "separation thesis," according to which the human experience is one of individuality and autonomy, and what separates us is epistemologically and morally prior to that which connects us. West argues that this definition hand, and for connection and community, on the other, expressing the individual's dread of alienation. These narratives are not necessarily separate and distinct, but coexistent. As West argues, both liberal legalism and critical legal studies view human beings as materially separate from each other and see this as fundamental to the origin of law.90
Let us examine how these two different yet complementary narratives within the framework of the "separation thesis" play out vis-a-vis court proceedings in Jewish status cases. As the Rabbinical Courts sec it, if there were no legal framework for certification of Jewish status, anyone could self-identify as Jewish; consequently, one might not know if his spouse was Jewish according to rabbinic law, and a man could not be certain that his descendants would have Jewish status.91 This fulfills the first narrative of the "separation thesis" by focusing on the individual's autonomy to determine their religious status and on the boundaries of the family and community. The second narrative, however, recognizes that a legal framework that is too rigid can hinder connection and partnership. The Rabbinical Courts serve, on the one hand, as protection against those who do not genuinely wish to join the Jewish people or have not converted according to rabbinic law, and, on the other hand, as enablers to accept individuals who genuinely wish to convert to Judaism or certify their Jewish status according to rabbinic law. According to the "separation thesis," the courts should act as caretakers of Jewish status both by rejecting those whose Jewish status is not recognized and by embracing solutions for those whose Jewish status is in doubt-for example, by making conversion procedures accessible.
This is where West's main argument lies. West's primary contention centers on the argument that both narratives within the "separation thesis" predominantly represent a male perspective. West posits that when legal frameworks fail to acknowledge women's aspirations and concerns, women are objectified and perceived as beings immune to harm.92 To address this, West articulates the female perspective by introducing the concept of the "connection thesis," which encompasses two new narratives: an "official" story, that of cultural feminism, which values intimacy and fears separation, and an "unofficial" story, that of radical feminism, which prioritizes individuation and fears invasion and intrusion.93
I propose that by embracing these new narratives and incorporating them into the discourse surrounding Jewish status investigations, a new paradigm can be developed that respects and considers the viewpoint and experience of both genders.94 The first narrative, of cultural feminism, which values intimacy and fears separation, would shift the focus from preventing nonJews from entering into the Jewish community to addressing the risks of disconnection that Jewish status investigations can precipitate, especially for women. Questioning a woman's Jewish status can result in her and her children being excluded from the Jewish community and instigate fears of separation and disenfranchisement, particularly during marriages and divorces, which arc intimately tied to family and community.95
The "service" that the Rabbinical Courts provide in conducting Jewish status investigations aligns with a male narrative, one that mandates safeguarding men's autonomy in establishing a Jewish family by verifying the Jewish status of a potential female spouse and that of their future children. However, it lacks parity for women, since scrutinizing a potential male spouse's Jewish lineage does not similarly affect a woman's Jewish autonomy. This creates a threat to the second narrative, that of radical feminism, focusing on individuation. An invasive investigative process, conducted by State investigators, replaces individual self-definition with an externally imposed identification process.
This threat, at the intersection of the personal and the political dimensions of a woman's Jewish status, is at the center of the debate over "who is a Jew." For women whose status is in question, the invasive nature of the inquiry poses a substantial threat to their individual identities. The Rabbinical Courts serve men's (putative) aspiration for Jewish descendants, both by increased scrutiny in Jewish status investigations and by providing solutions in cases of doubt, thus reflecting the "separation thesis" described by West. However, this approach can make women fear both separation from their community and intrusion into their personal identities and individuation, in line with the "connection thesis." The greater the scope of the investigations aimed at validating Jewish status, the greater the peril to women's individual identity.
CONCLUSION
Let us return to the question we started with: Is Jewish status verification a gendered process? This article has demonstrated that Jewish status verification is deeply intertwined with gender considerations, despite the apparent neutrality of the procedures themselves. While both men and women undergo these verifications in Israel's Rabbinical Courts, a gender-based analysis reveals the gendered nature of the worldview that shapes them, leading to significant disparities in both the conduct and the impact of these procedures.
Although rabbinic law is inherently open to wide interpretation, Israel's Rabbinical Courts have intensified their scrutiny and adopted stringent procedures in Jewish status cases, especially following the mass immigration from the FSU in the 1990s. The effects of this stringency extend beyond the personal to the family and societal levels. When Rabbinical Courts cast doubt on women's Jewish status, they can diminish these women's rights and, by definition, call into question the Jewish identities of their children.
This issue is further complicated by State Rabbinical Courts' changing attitudes toward the purpose of validating citizens' Jewish status. As they increasingly see their roles as gatekeepers of Jewish society rather than facilitators of family life-cycle events, they seek to expand their purview. This shift has significant implications for how Jewish status is determined and validated.
This article began with the story of Jane Doe, a woman in divorce proceedings who found herself under investigation regarding her Jewish status, violating her privacy and challenging her identity and religious affiliation. This case exemplifies the extensive harm that Jewish status investigation processes can inflict on individual rights. Through a critical gender-based examination of these procedures, this analysis has revealed the profound implications of these processes, not just for individuals, but for our collective understanding of religious identity and communal belonging.
The gender perspective offers a crucial framework for defining the challenges inherent in these procedures and should inform future legal and halakhic policy discussions. It highlights the need for a more nuanced and equitable approach to Jewish status verification, one that recognizes the disproportionate impact these procedures can have on women and families. Moving forward, it is essential to consider policy changes to the process of Jewish status verification. This might include developing more inclusive criteria for Jewish status, improving transparency in the verification process, and ensuring that women's voices are represented in decision-making bodies.
It is my hope that this work will stimulate further research and dialogue on this issue. Ultimately, a more equitable and compassionate approach to questions of Jewish status and identity is not just a matter of individual rights, but a necessity for the cohesion of Jewish communities in Israel and beyond. Elad Caplan is the CEO of Ne'emanei Torah Va'avodah-Kolech, Israel's leading organization that works within religious communities to advance Jewish and democratic values. He teaches strategies for social change and state and religion at Bar-Ilan University's Faculty of Law, where he received his Ph.D. [email protected]
Notes:
1. Haifa Rabbinical Court, case no. 1017683: Jane Doe (September 6, 2018), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI-1017683.htm.
2. Aaron Rabinowitz, "Rabbinical Court Deems Israeli Woman No Longer Jewish After Admitting She Was a Sex Worker," Haaretz, (English edition), October 17, 2018.
3. Elisheva Rosman argues that while many have written about issues of religion, gender and law, there is still much room for research on the interactions among the three: eadem, "What Your Country Can Do for You: A Proposed Typology of Religious Feminist Strategies," Politics, Religion & Ideology, 23/1 (2022), pp. 77-96, at: https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2022.2057477.
4. Talia Einhorn, Private International Law in Israel (third edition; Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2022), pp. 293-294.
5. The High Rabbinical Court and Chief Rabbinate Council, Guidelines for Verification of Judaism (5770/2010), at:<https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/legalinfo /birur_2021/he/%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%97%D7%99%D7%95%> D7%AA%20%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A8%20 %D7%99%D7%94%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA%20-%20%D7%AA%D7%9 9%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%9F%202021%20-%20%D7%A0%D7%A7%D7%99 .pdf (Hebrew).
6. Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law (5713/1953), §1, at: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law00/73178.htm.
7. Ibid., §2.
8. The Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law replaced the King's Order in Council (1922-1947). For more on the millet system and its implications in Israel today, see Yüksel Sezgin, "The Israeli Millet System: Examining Legal Pluralism through Lenses of Nation-Building and Human Rights," Israel Law Review 43 (2010), pp. 631-654.
9. See, e.g., Judge Moshe Zilberg in HCJ 72/62: Rufeisen v. The Minister of the Interior, 16 PD 2428 (1962): "The meaning of 'Jew' in the Law of Return is not the same as the meaning of 'Jew' in the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction law. The latter is a religious definition, according to the tradition of Israel." And see Judge Moshe Landau in HCJ 359/66: Gitia v. The Chief Rabbinate and Jerusalem Religious Council, 22(1) PD 290 (1968): "I do not believe that the law permits us to replace the rabbinical court and rule according to some assumption in this matter, which must be decided according to the law of the Torah." See also HCJ 58/68: Shalit v. The Minister of Interior, 23(2) PD 477 (1968).
10. In its role as the High Court of Justice (henceforth: HCJ), Israel's Supreme Court hears petitions by any person against public bodies and governmental authorities, including petitions directed against judgments pronounced in the Great Rabbinical Court and in other religious courts. Website of the Israel Supreme Court, at: https://supreme.court.gov.il/sites/en/Pages/Overview.aspx.
11. Judge Zilberg in HCJ 214/64: Basan v. Judges of the Great Rabbinical Court, 18(4) PD 309 (1964), pp. 317-318: "The court can be satisfied with extremely weak evidence, or even not require any evidence and trust the parties' declaration [of Jewish status]."
12. This was discussed is several Supreme Court rulings: Basan (above, note 11); HCJ 113/84: Banakovsky v. The Haifa Rabbinical Court, 39(3) PD 365 (1985); HCJ 9476/96: Saragovi v. Jerusalem Rabbinical Court, at: https://www.nevo .co.il/psika_html/elyon/96094760-a45-e.htm. See also Pinhas Shifman, Family Law in Israel (Hebrew; Jerusalem: The Harry and Michael Sacher Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Faculty of Law, 1995), pp. 124-126.
13. The Law of Return was reformed in 1970, after the Supreme Court ruled that the son of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother would be considered a Jew. See Benjamin Akzin, "Who Is a Jew: A Hard Case," Israel Law Review, 5/2 (April 1970), pp. 259-263.
14. The Law of Return, §4a, and The Population Registry Law (5725/1965), §3a, at: https://www.nevo.co.i1/laws/#/653f453ca6fe9b229094c514.
15. Shuki Friedman, Elad Caplan and Alon Shalev, Certification of Judaism in Israel (Hebrew; Jerusalem: Israeli Democracy Institute-ITIM, 2019), pp. 13-17; Seth Farber and Elad Caplan, "The Chief Rabbinate's Policy Regarding Diaspora Jews when They Marry in Israel: A Critical Analysis," Akdamot, 31 (2019), pp. 32-45.
16. Rivkah Lubitch, From the End of the World and Beyond: The Long, Hard Road of Women's Sufferings in Israeli Rabbinical Courts (Hebrew; Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books-Chemed Books, 2017), pp. 201-234. One ruling of the High Rabbinical Court, in 2008, threatened to disqualify thousands of State conversions: Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 5489 (February 10, 2008), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/rabani-5489-64-l.htm. See also Netanel Fisher, "'Israeli' Halakba: The Chief Rabbinate's ConversionTo-Judaism Policy 1948-2018," Modern Judaism, 39/1 (February 2019), pp. 61-92, at: https://doi.org/10.1093/mj/kjy018.
17. Yisrael Rosen, Verification of Jewish Identity in the Rabbinical Courts (Hebrew; Ramat Gan: Rappaport Center for Assimilation Research, Bar-Ilan University, 2007), p. 3: "To the best of my knowledge, in cases where the investigator concludes that Jewish status has not been sufficiently proven, the court does not get into the details of the matter." See also: Friedman, Caplan and Shalev, Certification of Judaism in Israel (above, note 15), pp. 41-42. Another study that deals with the increasing reliance on forensic evidence in Jewish investigative procedures is forthcoming.
18. Nurit Yachimovich-Cohen, "The List of Those Whose Jewish Status Is in Doubt: Background Material for a Hearing in the Committee for Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora Affairs" (Hebrew; Jerusalem: Knesset Research and Information Center, 2018); and Friedman, Caplan and Shalev, Certification of Judaism in Israel (above, note 15).
19. An examination of rabbinical court rulings available in the Nevo legal database (www.nevo.co.il) uncovers a noteworthy trend regarding the "verification of Jewish status" from 2008 on. Of a total of 2,865 published Rabbinical Court cases, 86, or 3%, pertain to this subject. To be sure, this dataset is incomplete, since only a fraction of the Rabbinical Courts' cases is accessible to the public and included in legal databases. Before 2008, only one case addressing the verification of Jewish status had been published, constituting a mere 0.3% of the 303 cases made available until that year. While these figures offer a limited view, they suggest a potential surge in Jewish status investigations or, at the very least, an increased willingness on the part of Rabbinical Courts to disseminate such rulings to the public. Furthermore, a governmental agreement has been established to bolster the activities of Rabbinical Courts in verifying Jewish status, reflecting the view that these activities are part of the State's authority and responsibility, as expressed in Article 101 of the Coalition Agreement between the Likud Party and the Religious Zionism Party in the 25th Knesset, signed on December 28, 2022.
20. Michael Korinaldi, Who is a Jew: "Beta Yisrael"-From Exile in Ethiopia to the Return to Israel (Hebrew; Tel Aviv: Law Books Publishing House, 2018), pp. 43-48.
21. Friedman, Caplan and Shalev, Certification of Judaism in Israel (above, note 15), pp. 49-53; Seth Farber and Yosef Sharabi, "The Halakhic Foundations of Ascertaining Jewish Status in the Rabbinical Courts," Tehumin, 40 (5780/2020), pp. 221-246 (Hebrew); and Yael Hashiloni-Dolev and Nurit Kirsh, "mtDNA Tests as a Vehicle for Jewish Recognition of Former Soviet Union Israeli Citizens: Religious and Political Debate," BioSocieties, 17/3 (2022), pp. 461-484 at: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41292-021-00228-6.
22. Tosafot on BT Pesahim 3b; also see R. Jacob b. Meir (Rabbeinu Tam), Sefer Hay ashar 13Yr. "Since he has said he is Jewish he is seen as having a presumption of Judaism"; R. Shlomo ibn Adret (Rashba), Responsa 2:16, on a Jew who came from a faraway land: "There is no doubt at all, because they hold themselves as Israel and therefore should not be investigated"; Nissim of Gerona (Rabbeinu Nissim) on BT Pesahim 3b: "One who comes before us and says, I am of the people of Israel, is faithful and does not need evidence." A similar principle was adduced by the distinguished twentieth-century ultra-Orthodox leader and scholar R. Avrohom Yeshaya Karelitz (the "Házon Ish"), on Shulhan 'arukh, Even hďezer 1:18: "We do not expose a family that has assimilated into the community." There is also a minority opinion, from Lithuanian Jewry, that marriages should not be arranged without proof of Jewish status. See R. Hillel ben Naphtali Zevi Herz (Beit Hillel), as mentioned in Bďer heitev by R. Judah Ashkenazi on Shulhan 'arukh. Even hďezer 2:3. This position was rejected by other religious authorities; see, e.g., R. Meir Posner (Bet Meir) on Shulhan 'arukh, Even hďezer 2. For a discussion of the sources in rabbinic law on verification of Jewish status, see Farber and Sharabi, "Ascertaining Jewish Status in Rabbinical Courts" (above, note 21).
23. BT Kiddushin 71a.
24. For a discussion of whether the rule applies to non-Jews within the framework of rabbinic law, see Yoel Amital, "Is a Family of Non-Jews that Assimilated- Assimilated?" Hamďayan, 51/2 (5771/2011), pp. 21-31 (Hebrew).
25. The primary controversy surrounding this issue emerged in the 1990s, pitting two influential ultra-Orthodox religious leaders against each other: Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the former Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Israel, and Lithuanian Ashkenazi authority Rabbi Shalom Yosef Elyashiv. Both posekim acknowledged the presumption of Jewishness for immigrants from the Soviet Union, but they espoused conflicting views on the necessity of seeking evidence to affirm or challenge their Jewish status. R. Yosef, aiming to limit the scrutiny of immigrants' Jewish status to exceptional cases only, asserted: "Every woman who comes to marry is presumed fit to marry even a Cohen, and she is not required to present evidence [...] the essence of the law is that immigrants from Russia who declare that they are Jews are faithful, and in any case, if there is a basis to suspect that their statement is incorrect, we must investigate carefully." Idem, Resp. Yabiď omer, Part 7, Even hďezer 1 (5753/1993). R. Elyashiv, however, maintained that such scrutiny was nevertheless imperative: "The leaders of the public and the Rabbinical Court system have a duty to find out as much as they can, so that gentiles do not encroach upon the vineyard of the House of Israel." Quoted in Moshe Mordechai Farbstein, "Verifying the Jewish Status of Immigrants from Russia," Tehumin, 12 (5751/1991), p 28 (Hebrew). The position adopted by the religious establishment in the procedures for verifying Jewish status aligns with R. Elyashiv's stance.
26. Elad Caplan, "Jews in Doubt: Narrowing and Expanding the Rabbinical Court's Authority to Judge Those Whose Jewish Status is Questioned," Hukim, 20, preprint publication (2024) (Hebrew).
27. See, e.g., Netanya Rabbinical Court, case no. 1289007/2: Jane Doe v. John Doe (February 7, 2022), at: https://www.daat.ac.il/daat/psk/psk.asp?id=2362.
28. See, e.g., Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1168879/1: Jane Doe v. Director of Jewish Status Division at the Rabbnical Courts (Dec. 23,2018), at: https://www .nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI-1168879.htm.
29. Eliyahu Maimon,6 Agunot and Verification of Jewish Status: Courses of Action, Rules and Tools," Rabbinical Judges Convention (5775/2016), p. 325 (Hebrew).
30. Caplan, "Jews in Doubt" (above, note 26), section 5.
31. See Anna Prashizky and Larissa Remennick, "Weddings in the Town Square: Young Russian Israelis Protest the Religious Control of Marriage in Tel Aviv," City & Community, 15/1 (2016), pp. 44-63; and Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Elisheva Rosman and Ofira Fuchs, "Between Social and Legal Legitimations: Weddings Outside the Rabbinate in Israel," Religions, 14 (2023), pp. 240-254.
32. Zvi Triger, "Freedom from Religion in Israel: Civil Marriages and Cohabitation of Jews Enter the Rabbinical Courts," Israel Studies Review, 27/2 (2012), pp. 1-17.
33. Anna Prashizky, "On Generation Citizenship: The New Russian Protest among Young Immigrant Adults in Israel," Journal of Israeli History, 39/2 (2021), pp. 244-247.
34. Attila Somfalvi and Alexandra Lukash, "Israelis from Former Soviet Union Hit Back at Rabbis' Demands to Prove They Are Jews," Ynet, September 14,2019, at: https://www.ynetnews.eom/articles/0,7340,L-5585028,00.html (accessed March 24, 2025).
35. HaBregada HaTarbutit, "The Proof Season" YouTube, September 11, 2019, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZmhFLcjWCc.
36. Demands published by the "One Million Lobby" organization, which represents members of the FSU community in Israel, at: https://www.1000000.org .il/. Members of the lobby presented their demands at a Knesset hearing on November 16,2021: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B4XUxoG4quo (both accessed March 24, 2025).
37. Prashizky and Remennick, "Weddings in the Town Square" (above, note 31).
38. A number of hearings have taken place in Knesset committees over the past decade on issues relating to proof of Jewish status. For example, the Committee for Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora Affairs held a hearing on March 13, 2014, with a follow-up hearing on December 1, 2014, in the office of the Chief Rabbinate. Another hearing took place on March 8, 2016, on the issue of proof of Jewish status for immigrants from Ethiopia. Hearings on the rabbinate's policies for recognition of certification by overseas rabbis for proof of Jewish status took place on July 26,2017, and February 19,2018. On November 7, 2017, another hearing discussed a new requirement requested by kashrut supervisors for proof of Jewish status from immigrants from FSU countries as a condition for receiving kashrut certification for an event. A series of hearings took place in 2018 (March 12, June 12 and 19, and July 10) to discuss what was called "the rabbinate's blacklist" of those whose Jewish status is in doubt. On July 6,2018, a hearing was held to discuss the ruling of the Haifa rabbinical court with which this article opened (above note 1) and how the rabbinate's policy for proof of Jewish status affects immigrants and women. Another hearing took place in the Committee for Jewish Religious Services on November 16, 2021.
39. In 2013, the ITIM advocacy center together with several couples petitioned the Supreme Court against Rabbi Yehuda Wolpa, Chief Rabbi of the city of Rishon Lezion, for sending couples to private investigators to prove their Jewish status as a requirement for marriage registration, even when they already had certification from a State Rabbinical Court. The court decided that private investigators could not be used as part of the process. The author was one of the lawyers in the petition: HCJ 725/13: ITIM v. Wolpa (June 13,2013), at: https:// www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/13007250-vl0.htm. In 2014, a petition was filed by Ofer Yahalom, requesting that the rabbinical courts database of those ineligible to marry be declared illegal. This petition was discontinued on the recommendation of the court: HCJ 2805/14: Yahalom v. The Rabbinical Courts (March 23, 2015), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/14028050-cl3 .htm. In 2017, ITIM, the Center for Women's Justice and the Rackman Center at Bar-Ilan University, along with several couples, petitioned the Supreme Court to stop the rabbinical courts from investigating the Jewish status of third parties, usually family members of those in the process of marriage or divorce in the Israeli rabbinate, and from adding information about those third parties to the rabbinate databases. During the hearings on this the petition, several changes were made to the rabbinate's guidelines to limit the gathering and use of information about third parties. The author was one of the lawyers in the petition: HCJ 6483/17: Jane Doe v. Great Rabbinical Court (November 16, 2021), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/17064830-V36.htm. In 2019, MK Avigdor Liberman and several families petitioned against the use of DNA in proceedings of proof of Jewish status and against requested reinvestigation of Jewish status when certification had been given in the past. The rabbinate's guidelines were changed to limit, but not ban, the use of DNA as an element of proof of Jewish status: HCJ 2477/19: MK Avigdor Liberman v. The Chief Rabbi (January 22, 2020), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/ elyonZ19024770-Z04.htm.
40. Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, "Women, Religion and Multiculturalism in Israel," UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, 5 (2000), pp. 347-352. 4L Eadem, Women in Israel: A State of Their Own (Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), pp. 236-239.
42. See note 19 above.
43. Israeli law requires gender equality in administrative positions within the religious establishment, but not in religious positions. See the Women's Equal Rights Law (5711/1951), §7(c), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law00/73179 .htm. As a result of legal action, women can serve within the Rabbinical Courts as legal advocates: HCJ 6300/93: Institute for Rabbinical Court Advocates v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, 48(4) PD 441 (1994); they can be appointed as directors of the Rabbinical Courts: HCJ 8213/14: Batya Kahana Dror v. The Minister of Religious Services (August 15, 2017), at: https://www.nevo.co.il /psika_html/elyon/14082130-74t.htm; and they can serve as legal advisers to the rabbinical courts: CivM (Labor Court Jerusalem) 2007/08: Center for Women's Justice v. The Rabbinical Courts (November 26, 2008), at: https:// www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/avoda/aa08002007-64.htm, and Declarative Judgment (Labor Court Jer): Moria Dayan v. Civil Service Commission (October 24,2018), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/avoda/A-15-ll-28552-122.htm.
44. For an analysis of epistemic injustice in the Rabbinical Courts, see: Nitzan Caspi Shilony and Ronit Irshai, "'Why Didn't You Leave Him?': Epistemic Injustice in Israel's Rabbinical Courts," in this issue of Nashim. For an analysis of gender biases within halachic discretion and the various engagements of feminist scholarship with these biases, see: Ronit Irshai, "Halakhic Discretion and Gender Biases: A Conceptual Analysis," Democratic Culture, 16 (2015), pp. 141-185 (Hebrew).
45. In Israel there is no system of civil marriage, and Jews can only marry other Jews who have been recognized as Jews by the rabbinate, through the rabbinate's marriage system. Couples may marry civilly abroad, and that marriage will be recognized by the State of Israel; but if they later divorce, they will be referred to a religious court according to their religious affiliation.
46. List of Persons Prohibited to Marry, 6.4501 Attorney General Guidelines (updated March 2003), at:<https://free-justice.openapi.gov.il/free/moj/portal /rest/searchpredefinedapi/vl/SearchPredefinedApi/Documents/LegalAdvisor /qbzy6YGclFcfnCFYojlMQiSYBuXwMficZNC9tGzbRIM=>. Various lists existed prior to the guidelines, which deal with the legal regulation of the collection and use of this information.
47. Chief Rabbinate of Israel, Marriage Registration Procedures (5758/1998), Chapter 9 (Hebrew). The procedures can be found in: Circular of the Director General of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 61/2 (June 2001), at: https://www.gov .il/BlobFolder/policy/07_2001/he/%D7%97%D7%95%D7%96%D7%A8%20 %D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%9B%D7%9C%20%D7%99%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99 %202001.pdf.
48. Friedman, Caplan and Shalev, Certification of Judaism in Israel (above, note 15), p. 13.
49. The Israeli Rabbinate's procedures for recognition of community rabbis abroad has been subject to public debate. See: Farber and Caplan, "The Chief Rabbinate's Policy Regarding Diaspora Jews" (above, note 15).
50. In 2002, the New Family organization filed a suit against the Chief Rabbinate, claiming that the Jewish status verification procedures discriminated against those who immigrated after 1990 and therefore against immigrants from the FSU: HCJ 5/02: New Family v. The Chief Rabbinate Council (October 13, 2003), unpublished. When the Rabbinate responded by announcing that it would rescind and replace the procedures, the organization withdrew the case. But it took eight years-until 2010-for the Rabbinate to publish the new guidelines, which are in effect today and have been updated several times to address various legal issues.
51. The High Rabbinical Court and Chief Rabbinate Council, Guidelines for Verification of Judaism (above, note 5).
52. See, e.g., Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1167046/2: Jane Doe v. Jewish Status Division (May 28, 2018), at:<https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani /RABANI-1167046.htm>, in which a woman who was born and registered as a Jew in 1992 was sent to prove her Jewish status before marriage, even though her brother had registered for marriage based on certification from the Ashdod Rabbinical Court in 2003.
53. Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 977509: Director of Jewish Status Division at the Rabbnical Courts v. The Mother P. (May 3, 2017), at: https://www.nevo .co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI-977509.htm. In this case, the woman's Jewish status was revoked by the rabbinical court because of doubt about the authenticity of a document used to certify it. She had previously been married twice and divorced once, all through the rabbinate system.
54. See, e.g., a discussion of the professional expertise requested by the rabbinical courts for certifying Jewish status, in: Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1168879/1 (above, note 28).
55. Einhorn, Private International Law in Israel (above, note 4), p. 360.
56. See, e.g., Basan (above, note 11) and Banakovsky (above, note 12); and see Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1177776: John Doe v. Jane Doe (June 4,2019), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI-l 177776-1 .htm: "The petitioner raised doubts about the Jewishness of the woman who was his wife, and in consequence the Jewishness of his children, in order to exempt himself from paying his wife's ketubah fee."
57. Basan (above, note 11).
58. Banakovsky (above, note 12).
59. HCJ 1523/22: Jane Doe v. Great Rabbinic Court (February 9,2023), at: https:// www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/22015230-010.htm; and HCJ 2742/22: Jane Doe v. Great Rabbinic Court (February 9, 2023), at: https://www.nevo.co.il /psika_html/elyon/22015230-010.htm. For an analysis of these cases, see: Caplan, "Jews in Doubt" (above, note 26).
60. See, e.g.: Banakovsky (above, note 12). HCJ 5444/13: Yonit Erez v. The Special Conversion Courts (December 17,2014), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html /elyon/13054440-zlO.htm, in which the woman's husband asked to revoke her conversion during the divorce. The court determined that the conversion court is authorized revoke a conversion in exceptional cases in which it was achieved on a false premise. HCJFH 18/15: Jane Doe v. The Special Conversion Courts (April 30, 2015), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/15000180-t08. htm, in which the Supreme Court recognized the problematic reality in which conversion can be used as a tool for revenge: "the fear for the finality of the discussion and abuse and revenge should not be taken lightly." CrimC (MC Jerusalem) 11271-09-18: The State of Israel vs. Meir Gordetzki (April 7,2019), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/shalom/SH-18-09-11271-779.htm, in which the husband refused to give his wife a get for over 20 years and claimed he was not required to do so according to rabbinic law because his wife's conversion was not valid, and therefore she was not Jewish according to halakhah. Some of these cases and their implications are discussed in Lubitch, From the End of the World (above, note 16), pp. 201-234.
61. Basan (above, note 11). See also: Ashkelon Rabbinical Court, case no. 1017728: Jane Doe (June 15,2015), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI -1017728.htm; Netanya Rabbinical Court, case no. 972321: Jane Doe (July 27,2015), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI-972321-888 .htm; Haifa Rabbinical Court, case no. 1017683 (above, note 1); Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1098318/4: Jane Doe and Jane Roe v. Jewishness Verification Department at the Rabbinical Courts (January 1, 2018), at: https://www.nevo .co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI-1098318.htm; Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1336817/1: Jane Doe v. John Doe (September 29, 2021), at: https://www .nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI-1336817.htm; and Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1177776 (above, note 56).
62. A request to investigate Jewish status can be made on behalf of the rabbinical court; e.g.: Haifa Rabbinical Court, case no. 1017683 (above, note 1); Netanya High Rabbinical Court, case no. 972321, and High Rabbinical Court, case no. 1336817/1 (both above, note 61); and Netanya Rabbinical Court, case no. 883875 (November 11, 2014), at: , at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html /rabani/RABANI-883875.htm. The request to investigate Jewish status can also be on behalf of the spouse: e.g.: Basan (above, note 11); Banakovsky (above, note 12); Ashkelon Rabbinical Court, case no. 1017728, and High Rabbinical Court, case no. 1098318/4 (both above, note 61); and High Rabbinical Court, case no. 1177776 (above, note 56). A male spouse can also ask the rabbinical court to revoke his Jewish status, even as it will impact other members of his family, in order to dispute the requirement of paying the ketubah fee as part of a Jewish divorce. See, e.g., Netanya Rabbinical Court, case no. 1289007/2 (above, note 27).
63. The Great Rabbinical Court recently ruled that if either the egg donor or the woman who carries the baby are not Jewish, while the other is, the child must be converted to Judaism to remove any doubt about its Jewish status. Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1174963/1: Jane Doe (March 28, 2022), at: https:// www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI-l 174963 .htm.
64. Egg Donation Law (5770/2010), §39, at: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html /lawOO/73517.htm.
65. Beersheva Rabbinical Court, case no. 1216693: Jane Doe [the mother] and John Doe [the son] vs. The Attorney General (October 28, 2019), at: https://www .nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI-1216693.htm.
66. Ibid. For the full opinion, see Michael Wigoda and Yarden Cope-Yossef, "Certifying the Jewish Status of an Egg Donor: A Halakhic Opinion," Assia, 115-116 (5780/2020), p. 29 (Hebrew).
67. Avishalom Westreich and Avraham Stav, "Conversion of Children Born from an Egg Donation or Surrogacy of a Non-Jew," Tehumin, 41 (5781/2021), pp. 167-178 (Hebrew).
68. Yitzchok Tzvi Oshinsky, Orot hamishpat, 6 (Israel: Hadar Print, 5783/2023), pp. 1-23.
69. Jerusalem Rabbinical Court, case no. 885943: Rabbi Yossef Ohana v. Jane Doe (November 10, 2016), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI -885943.htm.
70. Cheryl B. Preston, "Deconstructing Equality in Religion," in: Marie A. Failinger, Elizabeth R. Schlitz and Susan J. Stabile (eds.), Feminism, Law, and Religion (London-New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 34-35.
71. For a discussion of additional rabbinical court requirements, see Farber and Sharabi, "Ascertaining Jewish Status in Rabbinical Courts" (above, note 21), pp. 223-230; Caplan, "Jews in Doubt" (above, note 26); and Guidelines for Verification (above, note 5).
72. In response to a freedom of information request submitted by Adv. Yair Mevorach-Shag of the ITIM Advocacy Center, Yael Yermiyahu, on behalf of the Rabbinical Courts, sent a letter on September 9,2020, listing the names of all the Jewish status investigators working with the Rabbinical Courts. Five are employed by the Court and three are external employees; all of them are men.
73. Marie A. Failinger, "Feminism Meets Law and Religion: Commonalities and Critiques," in: Russell Sandberg, Norman Doe, Bronach Kane and Caroline Roberts (eds.), Research Handbook on Interdisciplinary Approaches to Law and Religion (Cardiff: Cardiff University, 2019), p. 337.
74. Ashkelon Rabbinical Court, case no. 1017728 (above, note 61): "If there is need for proof of Jewish status in the divorce proceedings, it is not only a matter for the court but also for the director of the Jewish Status Verification Department, which, according to Article 6, is authorized to represent the public interest in this area."
75. Ariel Rabbinical Court, case no. 1033117: Jane Doe and John Doe v. Jane Does (December 16, 2015), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI -1033117.htm.
76. Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1066237: Jane Does v. Director of Jewish Status Verification Department (December 14, 2016), at: https://www.nevo .co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI-1066237.htm. In several other cases, rabbinical courts initiated investigations into the Jewish status of third parties, until their authority to do so was limited by the Supreme Court in its judgment in HCJ 6483/17 (above, note 39). In general, the Israeli legal system is based on an adversarial model, where the court's role is typically to adjudicate between the arguments presented by the opposing parties rather than to investigate independently or decide on matters beyond those brought before it. This principle of judicial passivity stands in contrast to the more active role suggested for rabbinical courts in matters of Jewish status determination. The tension between these approaches reflects the challenges encountered when religious law intersects with civil legal frameworks. For more on this see Nitzan Caspi-Shiloni, "The Rabbinical Courts: An Island of Theocracy," Deot, 85 (2018) (Hebrew).
77. In a case in which the need for a get is questionable, rabbinic law allows for a get lehumra, in which the get is given in case there is a need for it, without the doubt being resolved. When a marriage's validity is doubted because of questionable Jewish lineage, a get lehumra allows for the execution of a divorce without proof of Jewish status, thus shortening the process and avoiding an invasive investigation.
78. HCJ 1523/22 and HCJ 2742/22 (both above, note 59).
79. Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1336817/1 (above, note 61) and Rabbinical Court Petach-Tikvah, case no. 1418839/1 Jane Doe v. The Attorney General (September 1, 2023), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/rabani/RABANI -1418839.htm.
80. Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1336817/1 (above, note 61).
81. Ibid.
82. Great Rabbinical Court, case no. 1098318/4 (above, note 61): "Assimilation of non-Jews into the Jewish community damages the holiness of Israel."
83. HCJ 8243/23: Jane Doe v. Great Rabbinical Court (December 26, 2023), at: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/23082430-E06.htm.
84. Robin West, "Jurisprudence and Gender," University of Chicago Law Review, 55/1 (1988), pp. 1-72 at: https://doi.org/10.2307/1599769.
85. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
86. Ibid., pp. 70-72. See also Martha C. Nussbaum, "Robin West, 'Jurisprudence and Gender': Defending a Radical Liberalism," University of Chicago Law Review, 75/3 (2008), pp. 985-996, at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20141934.
87. For a critique of West's essentialism, see: Angela P. Harris, "Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory," Stanford Law Review, 42/3 (1990), pp. 581-616.
88. West, "Jurisprudence and Gender" (above, note 81), p. 12.
89. Ibid., pp. 52-53, referring to Duncan Kennedy, "The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries," Buffalo Law Review, 28/2 (1979), pp. 211-212.
90. West, "Jurisprudence and Gender" (above, note 81), p. 5.
91. This role is expressed by the Ariel Rabbinical Court, in saying that if they didn't actively investigate Jewish lineage, "The negligence of the court in fulfilling its duty will . . . cause difficulty to both the individual and the people, which will divide and become many peoples. Looking into the future, the institutions of the Jewish state will be remembered for eternal disgrace as the destroyer of the Jewish people." Ariel Rabbinical Court, case no. 1033117 (above, note 75).
92. West, "Jurisprudence and Gender" (above, note 81), p. 60. According to Martha Nussbaum, objectification may occur when an objectifier treats another person as a tool for his or her own purposes; see eadem, "Objectification," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24/4 (1995), pp. 249-291. Thus, viewing women as objects of investigation for the sake of protecting the "public interest" or "sanctity" can be seen as a form of objectification.
93. The female "official" story, based on connection, can be compared to the male "unofficial" story, which yearns for connection and community, although West addresses some key differences. West, "Jurisprudence and Gender" (above, note 81), pp. 38-41. Judith Plasków sees the conviction that personhood is shaped in community as a central assumption shared by Judaism and feminism, yet on many occasions women have been rendered the "other" within the Jewish community. See: Judith Plasków, Standing Again at Sinai: Judaism from a Feminist Perspective (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), pp. 76-87.
94. West, "Jurisprudence and Gender" (above, note 81), pp. 53-58.
95. According to West, "separation of the individual from his or her family, community, or children is not understood to be a harm, and we are not protected against it." Ibid.,p. 59. Challenging a person's religious, national or legal identity can be harmful in a similar way.
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