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This dissertation explores two distinct but complementary themes within political economy and institutional behavior: the strategic decision-making of prosecutors under electoral pressures, and the ideological evolution of socialism and state planning. Chapter one examines the first theme: the behavioral effects of prosecutor turnover in the U.S. criminal justice system. Using a dynamic difference-in-difference design across multiple jurisdictions, this chapter assesses how newly elected, first-term district attorneys’ legal strategies differ from those of incumbent prosecutors. Contrary to previous literature suggesting increased jury trials during election cycles, the findings reveal that new prosecutors utilize plea bargains more heavily to obtain convictions. This strategic shift is interpreted as a form of risk-averse behavior intended to efficiently manage caseloads and signal effectiveness to voters. The results underscore the role of career-stage dynamics and institutional incentives in shaping prosecutorial discretion.
The second theme, addressed in Chapters Two and Three, investigates the intellectual development and historical discourse of socialism in economic scholarship in the early-to-mid 20th century. Chapter Two analyzes how prominent socialist thinkers—such as William Beveridge, Oskar Lange, and Harold Laski—advanced two central hypotheses: that capitalism would inevitably lead to industrial concentration, and that democratic institutions could be preserved only through government control or ownership of key economic sectors. These hypotheses were an impetus for Friedrich Hayek’s arguments in The Road to Serfdom. Chapter Three clarifies how socialism, central planning, and the welfare state were conventionally defined and understood between 1930 and 1950, using Data on the usage of the terms “socialism” and “welfare state” from Google Ngrams and Newspapers.com to support the intellectual context. It finds that Hayek’s critique was aimed specifically at central planning and state ownership of production, but not to welfare policies, as it is commonly misinterpreted today. This historical distinction situates Hayek’s thesis more precisely within the intellectual context of his time.
Together, the dissertation extends the understanding of how political and institutional constraints influence both legal decision-making and ideological developments. By employing empirical legal research with historical-political analysis, it highlights the persistent impact of incentive structures and conceptual frameworks in shaping public outcomes.