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A growing body of literature has found that citizen participation and elite pluralism (contestation)—the two key dimensions of democracy according to Dahl's democratic theory—in constitution-making are associated with several desirable political and social outcomes, such as reduced violence and increased democracy, among many others (Widner, 2007; Eisenstadt et al., 2015; Negretto and Sánchez-Talanquer, 2021). Given the potential of processes of constitutional change to foster these outcomes, what explains the variation in the democratic character of constitution-making processes worldwide? This dissertation examines this question by proposing and testing a theory that emphasizes the role of two critical factors: the configuration of political elites and the type of conflict that precedes the process, either among political elites or between citizens and the state. The theory predicts that conflict among political elites fosters contestation and reduces participation in constitution-making, while conflict between citizens and the state increases participation. The configuration of actors is the primary determinant of contestation, and it also determines the stage of constitution-making (origination, deliberation, or ratification) at which conflict affects these democratic dimensions. I test this theory using a multi-method approach. First, I employ quantitative analysis to identify global associations between the variables of interest using an original dataset on the democratic characteristics of processes of constitutional change, which includes 346 cases across 164 countries between 1945 and 2024. The results strongly support the predictions related to contestation and offer mixed support for the hypothesis concerning participation, highlighting the need for better data and theory refinement to explain variation in the latter democratic dimension. I supplement this analysis with a qualitative case study to identify the motivations of incumbents and opposition in implementing a democratic process of constitutional change in response to the major wave of protests in Chile in 2019. The analysis reveals the threat these protests posed to the incumbent's survival, compelling it to negotiate a constitutional agreement with an opportunistic opposition that viewed these protests as a means to advance its constitutional agenda. Overall, the dissertation's theory and data contribute to the growing empirical literature on the causes and consequences of constitution-making processes.
