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This work studies compilation of honest-majority multi-party protocols secure against semi-honest adversaries and up to additive attacks, into maliciously secure computation with abort. Prior work concentrated on arithmetic circuits composed of addition and multiplication gates, while many practical protocols rely on additional types of elementary operations or gates to achieve good performance. In this work we revisit the notion of security up to additive attacks in the presence of additional gates such as random element generation and opening. This requires re-evaluation of functions that can be securely evaluated, extending the notion of protocols secure up to additive attacks. We also revisit the notion of delayed verification which points to weaknesses in its prior use and design a mitigation strategy. We transform the computation using dual execution to achieve security in the malicious model with abort and experimentally evaluate the difference in performance of semi-honest and malicious protocols to demonstrate the low cost. We first treat computation over finite fields, which has the benefit that every nonzero element is invertible, but the drawback that frequent modular reduction by values which are not powers of two is relatively expensive. We then proceed to consider computation over rings of characteristic power of two. In this setting, the above trade-off is reversed; most modular reductions are significantly more efficient, while ring elements are not guaranteed to be invertible. In both cases we seek to augment the standard linear arithmetic functionalities of addition and multiplication with gates which allow for nonlinear computation such as comparison and truncation.
