MYANMAR IN 2024 Struggle Continues for Glimmers of Light

Abstract

The year in review saw a Myanmar still mired in conflict. Both sides of the political divide continued to assert their claim to govern amidst deteriorating socio-economic conditions, conscription fears and an increasingly uncertain future for many communities struggling with the consequences of the 2021 coup. As of Dec 2024, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) listed at least 6,000 deaths since the 2021 coup and over 28,000 arrests, of which over 21,000 remain in detention. Despite its receding administrative control across several parts of Myanmar, and the loss of significant and strategic commands and posts, particularly in the northern Shan and Rakhine States, the State Administrative Council (SAC) remains unlikely to lose control of major cities, such as state and regional capitals, or in ethnic Bamar areas. Even so, the aftermath of Operation 1027 in late 2023, along with its second phase launched in Jun 2024, have revealed the implausibility of the SAC's nationwide census efforts, which are intended to pave the way for an election aimed at legitimizing the SAC's governance.

The year in review saw a Myanmar still mired in conflict. Both sides of the political divide continued to assert their claim to govern amidst deteriorating socio-economic conditions, conscription fears and an increasingly uncertain future for many communities struggling with the consequences of the 2021 coup. As of December 2024, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) listed at least 6,000 deaths (outside of armed clashes) since the 2021 coup and over 28,000 arrests, of which over 21,000 remain in detention.

Despite its receding administrative control across several parts of Myanmar, and the loss of significant and strategic commands and posts, particularly in the northern Shan and Rakhine States, the State Administrative Council (SAC) remains unlikely to lose control of major cities, such as state and regional capitals, or in ethnic Bamar areas. Even so, the aftermath of Operation 1027 in late 2023, along with its second phase launched in June 2024, have revealed the implausibility of the SAC's nationwide census efforts, which are intended to pave the way for an election aimed at legitimizing the SAC's governance. The election is now projected for 2025, after a census in October 2024 that was preceded by two incomplete attempts at household surveys in 2023. Nevertheless, the SAC's confidence in the nationwide census and subsequent election remains unfounded given its receding control in several ethnic minority-dominated states and the People's Defense Force (PDF) units' demonstrated ability to intimidate and assassinate local officials in ethnic Bamar areas. Even so, the SAC's election narrative continues to seize the attention of various external interlocutors as a means towards a political solution to the current conflict.

Governance: Realities Belie Assertions of Control

In early 2024, Frontier Myanmar reported growing dissatisfaction with Min Aung Hlaing's leadership, both within the military's ranks and among his supporters.1 Those with pro-military views, including some hardline Buddhist nationalist monks, called for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to step down in favour of his deputy, Vice Senior General Soe Win. The dissatisfaction towards Min Aung Hlaing stems from the Myanmar military's losses of several strategic outposts and border trade points following the surprise offensives of Operation 1027 in late 2023. A second phase of Operation 1027 continued in June 2024, while clashes between the Myanmar military and various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs)-notably, in Rakhine, Shan, Kachin and Kayah (or Karenni) states-led to a further loss of functional and military control by the SAC in several parts of Myanmar.

The Myanmar military lost two significant strongholds in 2024. In early August 2024, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), leading an alliance of resistance forces, took control of the Northeastern Regional Command situated in Lashio, in northern Shan State.2 On 21 December, following several weeks of intense fighting, the Arakan Army (AA) seized control of the Myanmar military's Western Command in Ann township in Rakhine State,3 and, at the time of writing, is now intent on taking over the state capital Sittwe. Though the SAC still has administrative control of state and regional capitals, and considers the Naypyidaw federal territory and the Yangon, Mandalay and Ayeyarwaddy Regions as "pacified" areas,4 EAOs and resistance forces have continued to contest the SAC's authority and military might, and they now control an estimated 42 per cent of the country.5

Amidst its growing challenges, the Myanmar military has taken decisive actions. Faced with a shortage of troops, the SAC announced the enforcement of a hitherto dormant conscription law on 10 February 2024.6 The SAC also sought to reshuffle the cabinet to consolidate control over state administration for regime and personal survival. On 1 February 2024, the SAC announced its first cabinet reshuffle of the year7 and its sixth since the onset of the 2021 coup.8 Another reshuffle followed on 18 December 2024, with more loyalists appointed to key cabinet and security positions.9

Myanmar's resistance forces also increased their efforts in 2024 to provide local administrative services in areas "liberated" from SAC's functional control.10 There are those within the resistance who demand absolute support for the resistance movement as a prerequisite for assistance. These demands have affected the employment of former SAC civil servants in several liberated areas to continue administering services and have also complicating the enrolment process for students seeking to attend resistance schools as their eligibility seems to be based on their participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).11 The issue surrounding the employment of non-CDM civil servants in liberated areas and the acceptance of the enrolment of non-CDM students in resistance schools12 has further compounded the challenges confronting the resistance movement's administrative bodies and individuals seeking employment or education opportunities in post-coup Myanmar.13

In May, the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) established a Security and Special Task Force (SSTF) to investigate and punish human rights abuses committed by the SAC, PDF and local defence force (LDF) groups not under the NUG's command. Upon formation, the focus of the NUG's SSTF unit appeared to be on the Sagaing region, which had experienced both alleged abuses by PDFs and tensions between PDFs and LDFs. Some scepticism exists over the NUG's neutrality and whether the SSTF unit(s) might create resentment or divisions among resistance forces on the ground.14

On 26 November, the NUG's acting president, Duwa Lashi La, urged cabinet members living in exile to return to Myanmar, stating that the NUG "could not remain a government in exile" if it wanted to consolidate and unify the NUG's on-ground reach. The NUG's spokesperson also highlighted the need to expand services, improve administration, and strengthen ties with resistance forces facing pressure from China, including the EAOs in northern Shan State that participated or took a lead role in a surprise offensive against the Myanmar military in late 2023 and 2024.15

Contests for Control Continue

In 2023, the term "Operation 1027" entered the lexicon of Myanmar's resistance against the military. The forces spearheading the offensive have also been brought into focus: the Three Brotherhood Alliance, or 3BHA, and its individual members, the ethnic Kokang MNDAA, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the AA, and resistance groups, including PDFs under the NUG that have attacked the SAC regime forces in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region.

The major objectives of Operation 1027 appeared to be the retaking of Laukkai town, the capital of the Kokang self-administered zone, an area it controlled until 2009. The 3BHA also successfully captured the strategic stronghold of Kunlong, which had been held by the Myanmar military since 1948. It was a historic source of pride for the military in its battle against the forces of the Burma Communist Party. In June 2024, the second phase of Operation 1027 first seized Nawnghkio, a significant road and rail junction connecting Mandalay and northern Shan State. A month later, Lashio, where the Myanmar military's Northeastern Command was located, fell to the MNDAA a day after the TNLA captured Mogok, the locus of Myanmar's famed ruby mines. The MNDAA captured three high-ranking generals and thousands of troops in the process. Amidst the fighting in northern Shan State around the MNDAA's attempt to retake Lashio, the United Wa States Army (UWSA)-which had not participated in the EAO offensives against the Myanmar military-took administrative control of additional townships in Shan State. This move raised concerns regarding the implications of the UWSA's expanded administrative reach along the Thai-Myanmar border given its positionality and proximity to China.16

The second phase of Operation 1027 has revealed tensions in the Chin State between Chin resistance forces and different alliances. After the Chin Brotherhood Alliance (aligned with the AA) joined forces with the Yaw PDF and the AA to take Matupi town, the Chin Brotherhood Alliance and the Chinland Council (which is aligned with NUG) had further clashes. The two are now engaging in mediated peace talks in India.

Operation 1027 also prompted concerns from China as the conflict broke out in the areas near or along the Myanmar-China border. The SAC initially stoked anti-Chinese sentiments, with Min Aung Hlaing alleging on 5 August, when acknowledging the fall of Lashio, that the conflict in Myanmar was being prolonged by "foreign countries backing armed groups", though he did not explicitly name China. Min Aung Hlaing also claimed that these groups received support in the form of weapons (produced along the China-Myanmar border), along with medicine, food, technology, and administrative assistance. In response, pro-military supporters organized rallies against the MNDAA in Yangon and NPT. Meanwhile, the TNLA received a letter, the authenticity of which is questioned, telling it to cease hostilities and cooperate with China in maintaining peace and stability in northern Shan State and along the China-Myanmar border "or face deterrent and disciplinary actions". In September, the SAC designated the 3BHA as terrorist groups and indicated that anyone associated with these groups would also be tarred with the same label and face equally harsh retaliation.

Fight for Rakhine

Since January 2024, the AA has continued its advances across Rakhine State. From January through May, the AA captured most of Rakhine State, including Mrauk-U, the ancient Rakhine capital, and the Buthidaung Maungdaw area, where a large Rohingya community resides. There have been news reports about the treatment of Rohingya, who are caught between the Myanmar military (and its forced conscription recruitment) and the AA in its single-minded intent to resist the Myanmar military. In July, the AA captured Thandwe, a key town in Rakhine with an airport and home to Ngapali Beach, making the AA the first EAO to have an airport under its control. In December, the AA succeeded in its siege of the Myanmar military's regional command at Ann, further shifting security dynamics in Rakhine State and allowing it to turn its sights to the state capital, Sittwe.

Other Pockets of EAOs Seeking to Be New Governance Actors

In February, while the AA made major territorial gains in Rakhine state, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) clashed with the Myanmar military for control of a key jade mining region in Kachin state. In March, the PDF units also attacked local officials involved in SAC conscription efforts. The KIO also launched a major offensive along the Bhamo-Myitkyina road, capturing numerous outposts of the Myanmar military. It further attacked various security outposts of the Myanmar military around the KIO's stronghold Laiza and clashed with the military around Hpakant township. By May, the KIO had captured Myanmar military bases along the Myitkyina-Laiza highway and another base in Tanai township.

Conscription and its Consequences

On 10 February, the SAC reported that it would enforce the 2010 People's Military Service Law for the first time, allowing it to call up men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 to serve in the military for at least two years. SAC spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun stated that five thousand people would be conscripted monthly starting in April, with a target of fifty thousand in 2024.

The enforcement of this law is a further indication of the Tatmadaw's severe manpower shortages.17 It reportedly triggered unprecedented queues of Myanmar citizens outside foreign embassies in Yangon seeking education or work visas to leave Myanmar. Young people who fell within the conscription age revealed their preference to either leave the country or self-mutilate to avoid conscription, join resistance forces, or perform acts of sabotage if forced to join.18 The regime's response was a clamp-down on the recruitment drive for Myanmar workers by overseas agencies19 and a further enforcement of the 2010 Reserve Forces Law,20 with both announcements coming on 13 February. The Reserve Forces Law allows for the recall of retired military personnel (under the age of 67) for service as reservists. The regime, however, exempted women from conscription following the negative public reactions.

Since April, reports of conscription lotteries, tacit bribes for conscription exemption, press-ganging of pedestrians, and night-time abductions or arrests accompanied the regime's enforcement of the conscription law. Such reports were accompanied by others of resistance groups assassinating village and ward administrators who attempted to enforce the law.

By June, PDFs had killed some eighty SAC-appointed administrators at both the village and ward levels for assisting with the SAC's conscription drive.21 Though some administrators sought to shield youth from conscription,22 many were willing to carry out SAC orders and risk threats to their lives. As a result, the SAC was able to conduct conscription exercises in 224 of Myanmar's 330 townships by having village and ward administrators report to the General Administration Department (GAD) branches at the township level.23 The National League for Democracy (NLD) government had earlier transferred GAD to civilian control as part of administrative reforms, but it has since reverted to the military's control under the Home Affairs Ministry following the 2021 coup. Village and ward administrators are now appointed by SAC-created Township Administration Councils instead of being elected as they were before. Reports of arrests and ransom related to conscription exercises continued as recently as December 2024.24

The conscription enforcement also created confusion for people seeking employment overseas, especially men in the conscription age bracket. The SAC's Ministry of Labour suspended consideration of work permit applications in early May only to reverse the decision on 6 May. The suspension was lifted for men aged 18-22, but applications from those between 23 and 31 years of age remain restricted. The SAC also announced that Myanmar citizens entering China, Thailand or India must carry a ten-digit Unique Identification card, effective 1 May, as national ID cards would no longer be valid at border crossings. These moves reveal the SAC's intent to closely monitor and control the movement of people via legal channels, aiming to enforce conscription and track suspected dissidents. The consequences of the conscription enforcement are labour shortages, forcing employers to increase wages and workloads and the employment of minors.25

The SAC's conscription exercises proceeded as mounting military losses continued throughout 2024. Following the fall of the Northeastern Command to Operation 1027 forces, the SAC formed a committee on 16 August to train, arm and supply militias at the village and ward levels. The committee was also tasked with overseeing logistics support for military operations and recruiting technicians for high-tech weapons.26 At the close of 2024, the Myanmar military was on its ninth nationwide round of conscription.27

Conscription is neither new in Myanmar nor the exclusive preserve of the Myanmar military. Ethnic militias have taken similar measures to generate manpower. Both the TNLA and MNDAA have ramped up forced recruitment of boys as young as 12 in the wake of Operation 1027.28

Census and Election Rhetoric29

Despite its diminishing control in several states and regions, and concurrent with its conscription drive, the SAC amped up its messaging regarding its stated intent to hold elections, which would be preceded by a nationwide census. The SAC has framed the census as a prerequisite for preparing voter lists for nationwide elections, one of the military's promises when taking power on 1 February 2021. The SAC has also asserted the need for the census because of allegations of election fraud during the 2020 election, in which the NLD won a second landslide. However, the SAC regime initially gave itself only a year to conduct elections and has since been forced to shift the timeline twice. Between 2022 and 2023, two unsuccessful attempts were made to update household data, while preparations for a nationwide census had been under way since 2023. In December 2023, the SAC's Ministry of Immigration and Population issued a tender for 42,000 tablets and recruited a national Chief Technical Advisor to enhance census efficiency. On 5 October 2024, the SAC's Ministry of Information issued a brief update confirming that 42,000 enumerators would use computer-assisted personal interviews for census data collection.30 However, anecdotal reports of the actual census exercise have highlighted inferior or dysfunctional electronic equipment that hindered rather than facilitated the enumeration. Additionally, there has been no public announcement as to whom the tender was awarded or about the hardware imported for the 2024 census enumeration.

The present census was conducted in the first half of October and, though announced to be completed by 15 October, was extended in some parts for security reasons. This extension was likely due to the military's defeats, including the loss of its Northeastern Regional Command in Shan State near the China border. Following the second phase of Operation 1027, the practical purpose of the census became an unspoken counterinsurgency tool aimed at identifying resistance supporters and loyalists. Additionally, many population centres, including Kawlin in the Sagaing Region and parts of Kayah State, have become contested battlegrounds between the Myanmar military and resistance forces, frequently changing hands over the past few years and further complicating census efforts.

The SAC's single-mindedness in pushing forward with the census is illustrated in its prioritization of census participation over flood relief efforts. In September 2024, Myanmar experienced severe flooding following Typhoon Yagi, with the Naypyidaw capital and its surrounding areas, including the regime's military bases, among the worst affected. However, instead of prioritizing flood relief efforts, the SAC chief ordered flood victims to return to affected areas to ensure census participation-a decision widely criticized as tone deaf.

Myanmar's 2024 census aimed to target over 13 million households across 11,000 enumeration areas, covering 50 million people with 42,000 enumerators, who were reportedly trained between five and fourteen days. The census questionnaire included sixty-eight questions to be answered in twenty minutes. A voter list based on this 2024 census was scheduled for release on 15 December 2024 but has not materialized at the time of writing. The SAC faced challenges in recruiting sufficient enumerators, managing to enlist only up to 26,000, and only an average of six out of the sixty-eight questions could be asked during the exercise. Many tablets reportedly malfunctioned, and only a small portion of the census was completed by the stated completion date of 15 October.

Unlike the previous UN-supported census in 2014, the SAC independently designed the questionnaire without external input. New questions were added to identify age-eligible conscripts, track remittances and target anti-state opponents. The SAC also reused the UNFPA-designed logo from the 2014 census, though the UNFPA had distanced itself from the 2024 census. The 2024 census theme, "Helping Vulnerable Populations in Emergencies", starkly contrasted with the SAC's inadequate natural disaster responses and its ongoing indiscriminate airstrikes on communities across Myanmar. Census enumerators were accompanied by a heavy security presence, including military personnel, police and pro-SAC paramilitary groups like PyuSawHti. Despite this formidable security force, census-related violence still occurred.

The 2024 census had an added twist: the SAC introduced an "alternative" method to address potential inaccuracies, security risks or instances of dishonesty during enumeration. This alternative method allowed ward and township administrators to consult a trusted individual who could provide information on behalf of their neighbours or cross-check the data. With such a practice sanctioned by the SAC, it is likely that local officials fabricated statistics in areas where the SAC claimed to have completed the census because of insufficient manpower and technical support.

Thus, the SAC's 2024 census attempt has highlighted its growing disconnect from the population as it continues to ignore widespread suffering, public anger and ongoing crises in the country.

Talk of "Dialogue" Fuels Divides

In another twist, the SAC offered an opportunity for dialogue in September, publicly calling on its opponents to lay down their weapons and return to the political fold to end the conflict. The SAC's Information Team issued the invitation on 26 September, titled "Offer to resolve political issues in [sic] political means". This invitation essentially reiterated the SAC's election-fraud narrative in order to legitimize the political intervention of Myanmar's military (which the SAC continues to refer to as the Tatmadaw), as it invited EAOs and "PDF terrorists" to "resolve political issues through party politics or electoral processes".31

A second attempt at peace talks since the 2021 coup (an earlier offer was made to EAOs in 2022 but not to other resistance groups),32 the SAC's overture sparked interest among Myanmar watchers and external actors. The SAC-controlled Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper reported on 30 September that twentysix political parties, including some ethnic parties, had welcomed the SAC's offer, and that those twenty-six parties believed that the SAC's offer represented the "actual needs of the people".33 However, the NUG, EAOs and other resistance forces were sceptical of the SAC's offer and rejected it.34 The language of the SAC's offer has a historical parallel with those offered by a previous military regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council, to ethnic armed groups in the decade between 1989 to 1997. However, as in 2022, EAOs and resistance forces distrusted the SAC's motives in this, especially as the September 2024 offer came after Min Aung Hlaing's repeated diatribes against "terrorist groups and their supporters".

Foreign Relations: (Over)estimations?

The SAC's retention of Myanmar's diplomatic space, though limited mostly to bilateral channels and restricted participation at meetings of ASEAN, has afforded it a narrow advantage over the NUG in controlling the narrative through foreign relations. The SAC has also sought to use bilateral channels to request the return of Myanmar migrants from neighbouring countries and others in the region.

Following the first phase of Operation 1027, the SAC's tone towards China changed from accusatory to more conciliatory. Min Aung Hlaing attended the Chinese Lunar New Year celebrations in Yangon and called China a "good neighbour" and "good friend", in marked contrast to his remarks in November 2023, which hinted at Chinese interference. In July, he followed that up by declaring that the Chinese New Year holiday would be a public holiday in Myanmar. Some experts link Min Aung Hlaing's more cordial tone to China's efforts to broker ceasefire talks between the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the SAC. The ceasefire talks, which took place in January, resulted in an agreement committing to a withdrawal of frontline forces, protection of Chinese interests, a 70/30 split of customs tax revenue between the MNDAA and SAC, and SAC recognition of MNDAA territorial control.35 However, neither party seemed happy with the deal-details of which were leaked-particularly as the SAC was viewed as the "junior" partner. 36 The ceasefire fell through in June when fighting broke out between the TNLA and SAC forces again.

China's priorities in Myanmar in 2024 include cracking down on financial scams and related human trafficking,37 protecting Chinese business interests and infrastructure projects, preventing cross-border violence and refugee flows, and the blocking of US or Western influence on EAOs and resistance forces.

In November 2024, Min Aung Hlaing visited China for the first time since the 2021 coup, although the visit was not an exclusive bilateral one. However, he made the most of his attendance at the 8th Greater Mekong Region Summit, the Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation Strategy (ACMECS) Summit, and a meeting with leaders from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam at Kunming in Yunnan. His reward was China's acceptance of the SAC's 2025 election plans as part of Myanmar's political transition.38

The SAC's engagements with Thailand were primarily centred on the effects of migration resulting from conscription efforts and the ongoing fighting in Kayin State, which borders Thailand. The new Pheu Thai administration announced on 9 February that it would open a humanitarian corridor to deliver food and medical supplies from the Thai Red Cross Society to its Myanmar equivalent, to be further distributed to internally displaced persons in Myanmar's Kayin State. This process started on 25 March, with ASEAN observers present, but it appears to have since halted. Moreover, the humanitarian corridor initiative has faced criticism from the NUG, which cautioned that the aid would be used to the SAC's benefit while enabling the regime to bolster its international legitimacy.

Thailand, as the ASEAN member with the most institutional knowledge of and bilateral interaction with Myanmar, has sought to facilitate more interaction and dialogue between the SAC and ASEAN via Track 1.5 meetings. In December, Thailand played host to two regional meetings at the foreign minister level, inviting the SAC foreign minister to present updates. Though the Thai foreign ministry tried hard to portray the meetings as a positive step towards inclusive dialogue, no specific details came out of the meetings, and other Myanmar political actors- notably those opposing the Myanmar military-were not invited for their views.39

Meanwhile, Myanmar-Thai border trade has decreased 13 per cent year-onyear according to the SAC's Commerce Ministry.

India has also expressed concern about the spillover effects of the conflict in Myanmar. Like China, India's policy towards Myanmar has emphasized engagement over isolation, though the nature of that engagement was initially subtle and gradually changed to more open engagement starting in 2022. On one hand, the recent establishment of a local currency exchange regime indicates that Delhi is prioritizing economic and strategic cooperation over democracy and human rights concerns with Naypyidaw. On the other hand, India has shut its borders following Operation 1027 to safeguard its national security and prevent spillover effects into its bordering states. This decision was influenced by the perception among Indian policymakers that the Myanmar conflict is connected to the instability in Manipur. The Indian government has also announced plans to fence its thousandmile border with Myanmar over the course of the next decade while also adding parallel roads and feeder roads to military bases.

Elsewhere in ASEAN, Malaysia's imminent ASEAN chairmanship in 2025 has raised both expectations and anxiety over whether the administration of Anwar Ibrahim would prioritize greater engagement with the SAC or uphold ASEAN Charter principles related to ensuring good governance and respect for democracy and human rights. Like other neighbours of Myanmar, Malaysia is also concerned about the influx of migrants, both documented and undocumented. Currently, it is estimated that there are around 300,000 undocumented Myanmar migrant workers in Malaysia.

On 12 April, UN special rapporteur Thomas Andrews stated that exports of "weapons materials" from Singapore to Myanmar had dropped by 83 per cent, following his 2023 report on the SAC's foreign sources for arms procurement. The Singapore government and state-owned enterprises were not involved in such shipments, and the actions of the Singapore government will likely have added to the SAC's existing supply chain and maintenance problems. However, the SAC continues to rely on Russia, China and Thailand to fulfil its arms requirements. Singapore has also clamped down on the SAC's access to Singapore banks following the implementation of US sanctions on the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and the Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank in June 2023. The Financial Action Task Force had also added Myanmar to its blacklist in 2022.

The NUG's efforts, backed by civil society within and beyond Myanmar, to end the global sale of aviation fuel and insurance for such shipments to Myanmar have yet to succeed. The widespread use of airstrikes by the Myanmar Air Force has resulted in heavy civilian casualties, which ASEAN members have condemned in the past. The NUG's efforts did, however, persuade the United States and the United Kingdom in August 2023 to sanction foreign companies that ship jet fuel to the SAC. Even so, the situation in 2024 regarding the shipment and use of jet fuel in Myanmar remains murky. Research by Amnesty International indicates the widespread use of intermediaries to obscure final customers, with shipments arriving in Myanmar by sea from Vietnam.

The human rights violations experienced by the Rohingya continue to receive significant attention from ASEAN and international organizations. On 27 November, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced it had applied for an international arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing. The ICC prosecutor stated that Min Aung Hlaing was responsible for "crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution of the Rohingya", committed during the Myanmar military's 2017 crackdown on Rohingya communities in northern Rakhine State.40 The ICC judges are to decide whether to agree to the application and issue the warrant.

The Economy in 2024: No Light at the End of the Tunnel

The intensification of conflict nationwide and accompanying humanitarian crises have compounded the negative effects of the SAC's economic policies. Such policies have been increasingly focused on securing the junta's interests through control and coercion at great costs to the economy and people of Myanmar.

These costs were especially felt through the SAC's foreign exchange policy and its ramifications for trade and investment. The policy relied on military oversight of the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM), which had reintroduced multiple administratively fixed exchange rates below those of the market. The CBM had also issued forced conversion rules for traders, migrant workers and other holders of forex. These rates and rules enabled the junta to acquire and distribute forex at a discounted price. An estimate of the rent to the SAC generated by this policy in 2023 was 6.4 trillion kyat (US$1.8 billion), an amount assessed to be close to the country's military budget and forex earnings from the export of natural gas the same year.41

The mounting costs of this forex policy could be tracked thanks to the Business Confidence Survey of the European Chamber of Commerce in Myanmar (Eur°Cham Myanmar), conducted quarterly since the coup in February 2021. In 2024, banking and forex challenges ranked as the country's severest and growing issues for European investors, increasing from 58 per cent of respondents in February to 74 per cent in October. Companies reported operational costs and business losses linked to forex rate volatility together with domestic and international banking compliance challenges.

Another growing set of challenges reported by businesses surveyed by Eur°Cham Myanmar included logistics issues, which increased from 41 per cent in February to 51 per cent in October, as well as safety and security risks, which went up from 43 per cent to 49 per cent during the same period.42 Concerns in these two areas were linked to the SAC's battlefield and territorial losses, most prominent in Northern Shan and Rakhine states, but also in parts of Kayah (Karenni) and Kayin states as well as parts of Tanintharyi Region. Losses included those of important trading routes, such as the main highway to China, and border posts critical for both imports and exports.43

These changes on the ground further fuelled structural transformation in Myanmar's trade patterns following the coup. Myanmar's trade patterns have been affected by the closure of important trading routes and other factors. The amount of "investment products" in the country's reported trade data had fallen to below 20 per cent following the SAC's capture of power in 2021, in comparison with 30 to 50 per cent in the 2010s.44 This data point epitomized the fact that many businesses, both foreign and domestic, had stopped investing in production facilities in the country given the political crisis and associated risks.

Not only were businesses investing less, but some were also leaving the country altogether. The year 2024 saw the market exit of a second foreign telecommunications operator following the symbolic one of Telenor in 2022 when the Norwegian investor-whose entry into the Myanmar market in the early 2010s had epitomized the peak opening of the country-departed because of the political crisis. Ooredoo, the Qatari operator that, like Telenor, had entered Myanmar during the "golden era" of economic reforms and liberalization in the early 2010s, sold its telecommunications assets to a littleknown Singapore firm with Myanmar owners for US$110 million-US$50 million less than the originally agreed amount. Media reports also indicated that Ooredoo might have incurred a loss of US$2.7 billion on its investment in Myanmar, providing another example of the substantial business impacts generated by the coup.45

The year 2024 also witnessed Chevron, the American energy major, follow in the footsteps of French firm TotalEnergies, which left Myanmar in 2022. Chevron transferred its shares in the Yadana offshore gas field and associated pipeline to Thailand's PTT and state-owned Myanma Oil & Gas Enterprise. Chevron's withdrawal took over two years to complete because it faced various business and regulatory challenges that prevented its sale to a new buyer. It finally concluded with Chevron handing over its stake to the remaining shareholders of the assets.46

The withdrawals of leading foreign investors from critical sectors, including telecommunications and energy, is the direct consequence of the 2021 coup, with no prospect of an upturn till the crisis is addressed. These consequences are made particularly dire because these sectors require long-term, substantial and complex investments to bring about sustainable change.

The energy sector was particularly affected by the coup, with the halt to exploration for new gas fields, the exit of foreign investors from gas, renewable and hydropower projects, and the suspension of grants and soft-term loans from international financial institutions. These decisions meant that the people and businesses in Myanmar would suffer a further reduction in their access to electricity in the years to come, leaving the country in darkness.47

Conclusion

The year 2024 was another long one for people in Myanmar on either side of the political divide. The SAC's orchestrated optimism for Myanmar's future that it presents to external interlocutors belies the realities of an economy struggling under the SAC's centralized command and control of policies. "Struggle" summarises 2024 for Myanmar as each side of the political divide battled against the other to achieve its vision for Myanmar's post-coup future.

Acknowledgement

The authors thank Ben Brand for his research and insights on various developments in Myanmar in 2024.

Footnote

Notes

1. "Worst Leader': Military's Winter of Discontent", Frontier Myanmar, 19 January 2024, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/worst-leader-militarys-winter-of-discontent/.

2. Aung Zaw, "The Myanmar Junta's North Eastern Command Has Fallen: What's Next", The Irrawaddy, 6 August 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/commentary/themyanmar-juntas-north-eastern-command-has-fallen-whats-next.html#google_vignette.

3. "Myanmar Rebels Claim Control over Major Western Military Headquarters", The Guardian, 21 December 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/21/ myanmar-rebels-claims-control-over-major-western-military-headquarters.

4. David Scott Mathieson, "Myanmar Junta Press-Gang Drive Certain to Backfire", Asia Times, 14 February 2024,<https://asiatimes.com/2024/02/myanmar-junta-press-gangdrive-certain-to-backfire/.

5. Rebecca Henschke, Ko Ko Aung, Jack Aung, and Data Journalism Team, "Soldier-Spies in Myanmar Help Pro-democracy Rebels Make Crucial Gains", BBC, 20 December 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c390ndrny17o.

6. Ye Myo Hein, "Myanmar's Fateful Conscription Law", United States Institute for Peace, 26 February 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/myanmars-fatefulconscription-law,

7. "SAC Reshuffles the Union Cabinet on Feb 1", Eleven Media Group, 2 February 2024, https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/sac-reshuffles-the-union-cabinet-on-feb-1.

8. Institute for Strategy and Policy Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar), "Naypyitawlolgy-4", 1 March 2024, https://ispmyanmar.com/ie-v02n03/.

9. Maung Kavi, "Myanmar Junta Boss Promotes Loyalist in Regime Reshuffle", The Irrawaddy, 19 December 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmarjunta-boss-promotes-loyalist-in-regime-reshuffle.html.

10. Morten B. Pedersen, "Outrage Is Not a Policy: Coming to Terms with Myanmar's Fragmented State", Lowy Institute, 12 May 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/ publications/outrage-not-policy-coming-terms-myanmar-s-fragmented-state.

11. Rachel Moon, "Purity or Pragmatism: The CDM Dilemma", Frontier Myanmar, 19 February 2024,<https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/purity-or-pragmatism-the-cdmdilemma/.

12. "'We Can't Afford to Treat Them Equally': Non-CDM Students Enter the Revolutionary Fold", Frontier Myanmar, 13 June 2024, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/we-cantafford-to-treat-them-equally-non-cdm-students-enter-the-revolutionary-fold/.

13. In January 2023, a National Unity Consultative Council policy paper had suggested that deputy directors and higher-ranking civil servants should be permanently blacklisted, while lower-level civil servants should be fired and allowed to reapply for entry-level roles. As of June 2024, a central policy by the NUG on admitting non-CDM students was still pending.

14. "Is the NUG's Latest Force Up to the Task?", Frontier Myanmar, 3 May 2024, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/is-the-nugs-latest-force-up-to-the-task/.

15. "Members of Myanmar's National Unity Government Urged to Return from Exile", Myanmar Now, 28 November 2024, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/members-ofmyanmars-national-unity-government-urged-to-return-from-exile/.

16. Amara Thiha, "The Silent Winner of Myanmar's Northern Conflict", Peace Research Institute Oslo, 10 September 2024, https://www.prio.org/blogs/1139.

17. Many battalions are reportedly at half their authorized strength of two hundred men.

18. Kyi Sin and Thida, "Conscription in Myanmar Pushing Young Men to Choose Sides", Fulcrum, 6 March 2024,<https://fulcrum.sg/conscription-in-myanmar-pushing-youngmen-to-choose-sides/.

19. "Overseas Employment Suspended as Myanmar Junta Activates Military Conscription", The Irrawaddy, 15 February 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/overseasemployment-suspended-as-myanmar-junta-activates-military-conscription.html.

20. "SAC Activates Reserve Forces Law Enacted in 2010", Eleven Media Group, 14 February 2024, https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/sac-activates-reserve-forces-lawenacted-in-2010.

21. RFA Burmese, "Dozens of Officials Carrying Out Myanmar's Draft Have Been Killed", Radio Free Asia, 13 June 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/ officials-draft-killed-06132024164830.html.

22. "Communities Strive to Shield Youth from Conscription", Frontier Myanmar, 22 April 2024,<https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/communities-strive-to-shield-youth-fromconscription/.

23. Rachel Moon, "An 'Outburst of Anger': Local Administrators Under Fire", Frontier Myanmar, 6 May 2024,<https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/an-outburst-of-angerlocal-administrators-under-fire/.

24. RFA Burmese, "Families in Myanmar Forced to Pay Ransoms to Spare Members from Military Service", Radio Free Asia, 5 December 2024, https://www.rfa.org/ english/myanmar/2024/12/05/myanmar-conscription-shakedown-ploy/.

25. "'No Future Here': Youth Exodus Leads to Labour Shortage", Frontier Myanmar, 19 July 2024,<https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/no-future-here-youth-exodus-leadsto-labour-shortage/.

26. "Myanmar Junta Forms Nationwide Militia Panel Amid Mounting Losses", The Irrawaddy, 20 August 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-juntaforms-nationwide-militia-panel-amid-mounting-losses.html.

27. Than Lwin Times, "Junta Resorting to Desperate Conscription Methods in Mon State", Burma News International, 23 December 2024, https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/ junta-resorting-desperate-conscription-methods-mon-state.

28. Morgan Michaels, "Is Myanmar's Regime at Risk of Collapse?", International Institute for Strategic Studies Myanmar Conflict Update, December 2023, https://myanmar. iiss.org/updates/2023-12; See also Kyi Sin and Thida, "Conscription in Myanmar".

29. The updates in this section are drawn from a webinar organized by the Myanmar Studies Programme of the ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute on 13 November 2024, which invited insights from a long-time scholar with expertise in researching Myanmar's census exercises and the motivations of Myanmar's military.

30. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Ministry of Information, "42,000 Enumerators Using CAPI-Tablets for 2024 Census", 5 October 2024, https://www.moi.gov.mm/ moi:eng/news/15680.

31. Information Team State Administration Council, "Offer to Resolve Political Issues in Political Means", Global New Light of Myanmar, 26 September 2024, https:// cdn.digitalagencybangkok.com/file/client-cdn/gnlm/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/27- September-2024-GNLM.pdf.

32. Htet Myet Min Tun, "Beware of False Peace in Myanmar", Fulcrum, 1 June 2022, https://fulcrum.sg/beware-of-false-peace-in-myanmar/.

33. Myanmar News Agency, "26 Political Parties Support SAC's Offer to Resolve Political Issues Through Political Means", Global New Light of Myanmar, 30 September 2024, https://www.gnlm.com.mm/26-political-parties-support-sacs-offer-to-resolve-politicalissues-through-political-means/.

34. Grant Peck, "Myanmar's Opposition Rejects a Military Appeal for Talks on a Political Solution to Armed Conflict", AP News, 27 September 2024, https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-military-political-talks-proposal-oppositione42372700fbc4bc7b7cdf2917a10e81b.

35. RFA Burmese, "Ceasefire in Northeast Myanmar Ends as Junta Battles Ethnic Rebels", Radio Free Asia, 25 June 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmarceaserfire-ends-06252024080110.html.

36. Jason Tower, "Myanmar's Collapsing Military Creates a Crisis on China's Border", United States Institute of Peace, 11 April 2024, https://www.usip.org/ publications/2024/04/myanmars-collapsing-military-creates-crisis-chinas-border.

37. Chinese public security minister Wang Xiaohong emphasized this point at a meeting on 25 April with Lt. Gen. Yar Pyae, the SAC home affairs minister. See Xinhua, "China's Police Chief Meets Myanmar's Union Minister for Home Affairs", State Council of the People's Republic of China, 26 April 2024, https://english.www.gov. cn/news/202404/26/content_WS662ade30c6d0868f4e8e6702.html.

38. "China Pledges Support for Myanmar's Political Transition", Reuters, 7 November 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-pledges-support-myanmarspolitical-transition-2024-11-07/.

39. Sharon Seah and Moe Thuzar, "ASEAN Needs a Common Position on Myanmar", Fulcrum, 23 December 2024,<https://fulcrum.sg/asean-needs-a-common-position-onmyanmar/.

40. International Criminal Court, "Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Application for an Arrest Warrant in the Situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar", 27 November 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aakhan-kc-application-arrest-warrant-situation-bangladesh.

41. Jared Bissinger, "Myanmar's Military Funds Its War Through Forex Policy", Fulcrum, 11 July 2024, https://fulcrum.sg/myanmars-military-funds-its-war-through-forex-policy/.

42. Eur°Cham Myanmar, "Top Challenges for the Companies in February 2024", 7 March 2024, https://eurocham-myanmar.org/2024/03/07/eurocham-myanmar-published-its- 13th-edition-of-the-business-confidence-survey/.

43. ISP Myanmar, "The 17 Border Trade Stations and Their Conditions", 8 October 2024, https://ispmyanmar.com/mp-65/.

44. Jared Bissinger, "Myanmar's Trade Take a Turn for the Worse", Fulcrum, 23 July 2024, https://fulcrum.sg/myanmars-trade-takes-a-turn-for-the-worse/.

45. Matt Smith, "Myanmar Venture Proves a Big Loss for Qatar's Ooredoo", Arabian Gulf Business Insight, 1 September 2024, https://www.agbi.com/telecoms/2024/09/ myanmar-venture-proves-a-big-loss-for-qatars-ooredoo/.

46. Timothy Gardner, "Chevron Hands Myanmar Gas Field Stake to Junta, Thailand's PTTEP", Reuters, 9 April 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chevronhands-myanmar-gas-field-stake-junta-thailands-pttep-2024-04-09/.

47. Guillaume de Langre, "Myanmar is Running out of Gas. What Happens Next?", The Diplomat, 25 July 2024,<https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/myanmar-is-running-out-ofgas-what-happens-next/.