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The overwhelming majority of secessionist parties/movements in EU member states pursue 'independence in Europe', aiming to create a new member state. The Catalan case shows that such a project inevitably drags the EU into the political/institutional dispute between the potentially seceding region and the member state. The stance adopted by EU institutions is extremely important because it can strengthen or undermine the feasibility (and thus the credibility) of the independentist project. The analysis of the Catalan case points to an inbuilt orientation of all EU institutions to support member states' governments in their protection of territorial integrity. This support is based on an established interpretation of the Treaties (the so-called Prodi doctrine) that rules out the possibility of 'internal enlargement', as well as on a more solid connection of EU leaders with the heads of national governments (also channelled through European party federations) than with the heads of regional governments.
ABSTRACT
The overwhelming majority of secessionist parties/movements in EU member states pursue 'independence in Europe', aiming to create a new member state. The Catalan case shows that such a project inevitably drags the EU into the political/institutional dispute between the potentially seceding region and the member state. The stance adopted by EU institutions is extremely important because it can strengthen or undermine the feasibility (and thus the credibility) of the independentist project. The analysis of the Catalan case points to an inbuilt orientation of all EU institutions to support member states' governments in their protection of territorial integrity. This support is based on an established interpretation of the Treaties (the so-called Prodi doctrine) that rules out the possibility of 'internal enlargement', as well as on a more solid connection of EU leaders with the heads of national governments (also channelled through European party federations) than with the heads of regional governments.
INTRODUCTION
Calls for Irish unity have long resonated with similar nationalist appeals across the Basque Country and Catalonia. Shared experiences of a desire for self-determination are grounded in a sentiment of solidarity between independence/nationalist movements in Ireland and Spain. Although the nature and trajectory of the Catalan struggle for independence is different from that in Northern Ireland, the recent 'Catalan process', i.e. the adoption of a secessionist (pro-independence) stance and the subsequent holding of an independence referendum in 2017, provides some useful insights into how the EU mediates questions of self-determination. Given that the EU context is likely to feature in any future discussions of an Irish border poll, what can be learned from the Catalan experience?
Catalan nationalism in democratic Spain has long been politically divided between a minority force, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), which has always aimed at independence, at least as a long-term goal, and a majority federation, Convergencia i Uniò (CiU), which was clearly autonomist.1 At the beginning of 2010, despite experiencing considerable internal tensions and a certain decline in support, even the ERC seemed to have set itself on a strategy of moderation, launched in the aftermath of the 2003 regional elections and confirmed after the 2006 regional elections.2 This strategy had indeed produced the new autonomy statute of 2006, which, although unsatisfactory for the more radical wing of the nationalist movement, had both ensured symbolic recognition of the Catalan 'nation' and, from a substantive point of view, paved the way for a prominent position of the Catalan language and a significant expansion of fiscal autonomy.
This article aims to illustrate the key steps of the 'Catalan process', and, in line with the scope of this special section, to highlight the parallel involvement of the EU in the ensuing political/constitutional struggle between the autonomous community of Catalonia and the Kingdom of Spain. The stance adopted by the EU on secessionist attempts within member states is, indeed, not a negligible component of the struggle, particularly when the secessionist project is framed in terms of 'independence in Europe', i.e. aiming at creating a new EU member state. It is all too evident that the credibility of such political projects also depends on how different scenarios concerning international recognition (of the would-be new state) and the question of 'internal enlargement' (i.e. the accession of the would-be new state to the EU) are supported, ignored or undermined by international and supranational actors.
This article reports and discusses public declarations by top EU politicians-mainly presidents of the European Commission (EC), the European Council and the European Parliament (EP)-as well as material from interviews conducted with EU officers (from the EC, the EP and the Consilium), trying to advance an interpretation of the EU stance.
The article is divided in four parts. The first part explains the origin of the 'Catalan process', describing the 'perfect storm' that gave rise to a crucial turn to Catalan nationalism, from autonomism to independentism. The second part analyses the positions adopted by prominent EU figures in the first phase of the process, from the 2012 regional elections to the first (more informal) referendum on independence, held in November 2014. It is important to recall that this part of the process ran in parallel to the long campaign for the independence referendum in Scotland.3 Therefore, statements from top EU figures were often aimed (or interpreted as being aimed) at both cases. The third part deals with the most dramatic phase of the Catalan process, from the 2015 regional election to the aftermath of the second independence referendum, held on 1 October 2017. The final part discusses the constraints and incentives that shaped the EU stance on the Catalan attempt at independence.
THE 'PERFECT STORM' IN CATALAN POLITICS: THE ORIGIN OF THE PROCESS FOR INDEPENDENCE
The literature identifies the Spanish Constitutional Court's 28 June 2010 ruling on the 2006 Statute of Autonomy as the triggering element of the 'Catalan process'.4 The ruling came after almost four years of study, during which the court became the object of conflicting political pressures.5 Eventually, the court's ruling, expressed by a majority (six to four), declared fourteen articles to be unconstitutional (annulling or amending them) and clarified the appropriate interpretation of 27 other articles. The reference to Catalonia as a 'nation', expressed in the preamble of the statute, remained untouched; however, the court confirmed that it had no legal value and reaffirmed the centrality of the constitutional principle of the indissolubility of the Spanish nation. The sections that underwent the most significant downsizing vis-à- vis Catalan nationalist aspirations were those related to language, justice and taxation.6 Regarding language, the court ruled that Catalan would remain an official language in Catalonia, but would not be elevated to the normal and preferential language of use in public administration, as indicated by Article 6 of the statute.
The project to autonomise the judicial system also suffered a severe blow. Of the fourteen articles deemed to be unconstitutional, six concerned this field, starting with the annulment of the Catalan Council of Justice, which was supposed to be the governing body of the Catalan judiciary. Finally, in fiscal matters, the court rejected the attribution to Catalan autonomy of legislative powers to establish and regulate local/regional taxes, in addition to annulling parts of the statute that would bind Catalonia's contribution to national (Spanish) solidarity to the condition that other regions make a similar effort.
The court's ruling sparked outrage among all political forces that had supported the statute, including the regional branch of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC), which was leading the regional government at the time. Above all, it provided a sort of casus belli for the pro-independence fringes of Catalan nationalism, starting with the association Òmnium Cultural (OC), which organised the first public demonstration against the court's ruling. On 10 July 2010, a massive march took place through the streets of Barcelona, with the participation of over a million people, led by a banner reading: 'We are a nation: we decide.' The most shouted slogan that day was, however, even more explicit: 'Independence'.7
The demonstration exerted tremendous pressure on Catalan government forces, starting with the pro-independence ERC party, which, after years of difficult self-moderation and having bet everything on the incremental achievements inserted in the 2006 statute, found itself facing a substantial institutional failure.
In addition, such a failure arrived in a context of general dissatisfaction due to the rapidly unfolding economic crisis. It is worth remembering that, in Spain, the 2007 global financial shock led to the bursting of a real estate bubble and a crisis for several banks, with almost immediate consequences for the real economy: the unemployment rate rose from 6.5 per cent in 2007 to 17.8 per cent in 2010. Under such conditions, the ERC risked completely losing face to the traditionally more moderate force of Catalan nationalism (CiU), which had been in opposition for seven years. As a result, the governing alliance broke up and, in October 2010, the Catalan parliament was dissolved, paving the way for early elections.
The Catalan election of 28 November 2010 was the first in which a race towards pro-independence radicalisation began to emerge, a dynamic that intensified and became increasingly evident in subsequent elections. This dynamic, although triggered by events relatively exogenous to the Catalan nationalist front-primarily the Constitutional Court's ruling and the financial/economic crisis-was fuelled both by the interaction between civil society mobilisation and nationalist parties8 and by electoral competition among the latter.9
During the 2010 elections, the radicalisation dynamic-i.e. the move from autonomist to secessionist positions-still manifested as a minority and potentially reversible trend. The push came mainly from civil society organisations and micro-parties, which, riding the wave of the July demonstration, gave rise to a new explicitly pro-independence electoral list: Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència (SI).10 This list, led by former Barcelona Football Club president Joan Laporta, ran in the elections with the slogan 'Catalonia, the next European state', and exerted strong pressure on (and competition with) the ERC, which responded by returning to its traditional secessionist position. However, the electoral outcome favoured the autonomist CiU, which had been in opposition since 2003 and was, therefore, perceived as being less compromised by the failure of the 2006 statute and less responsible for the economic deterioration. The new Catalan government, led by CiU leader Artur Mas, was thus an executive still committed to seeking compromises with Madrid within the Spanish state.
It was primarily focused on the economy, accepting a macroeconomic approach inspired by the principle of more balanced budgets, suddenly endorsed (in a U-turn) by the Zapatero government at the end of 2010. However, austerity made the economic situation even more dramatic, with the unemployment rate reaching 20 per cent by the end of 2011. In this context, Mas's priority became to negotiate greater fiscal autonomy for Catalonia, which would enable him to retain more resources for the regional budget. However, the Spanish elections of November 2011 brought the Spanish People's Party (PP), led by Mariano Rajoy, to national power.11 This development made Mas's ambitious plan even more difficult, as Rajoy was both more determined to pursue the austerity programme and, in line with the PP's tradition, less inclined to make concessions to Catalan nationalism.
In 2012 the confrontation between the Catalan CiU government and the Spanish PP government intensified considerably, with negotiations over the so-called 'fiscal pact' dominating the debate. During the summer, tensions escalated when Catalonia requested the allocation of euro5bn from the euro18bn liquidity fund created by the Spanish government to help struggling regions.12 Tensions were further heightened by the grassroots push from Catalan civil organisations promoting independence, such as the Catalan National Association (ANC). On 11 September 2012, to celebrate Catalonia's National Day (Diada), one and a half million people marched through the streets of Barcelona, chanting the slogan 'Catalonia, a new European state'.13 All Catalan nationalist parties endorsed the event.
Artur Mas, who was not present at the demonstration, tried to leverage the independence wave to further his reformist agenda. Mas's proposed fiscal pact was very ambitious, as it envisaged transferring the collection and management of all taxes to a new Catalan Revenue Agency, with an estimated increase in tax revenues of between 5 and 9 per cent of regional GDP.14 However, in the decisive meeting with Rajoy, on 20 September 2012, Mas received a firm rejection from the Spanish PM.
The failure to reach an agreement on the fiscal pact, in the context of a palpable surge in the independence sentiment, marked the real turning point in the Catalan process. A few days later Mas announced early elections, and on 27 September the Catalan parliament approved a resolution urging the regional government to hold a referendum on self-determination within the following legislative term.15
THE FIRST INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM AND THE GROWING INVOLVEMENT OF THE EU (2012-2014)
The election campaign was immediately characterised by a polarising dynamic that accompanied the entire continuation of the Catalan process.16 On one side were the forces of Catalan nationalism that had enthusiastically embraced the independence demonstration of the Diada. The ERC's electoral programme, in addition to claiming the party's historical role as a political force for Catalan independence, promised a referendum on independence by 2014. Additionally, the 2012 Catalan elections saw the participation for the first time of a new openly pro-independence and republican party, which had previously competed only in local elections: People's Union Candidacy (CUP). This party occupied the left-wing populist and Eurosceptic niche of the (pro-independence) Catalan electoral market.17 More importantly, the traditionally autonomist CiU started to support the construction for Catalonia of a state of its own, thus indicating a predominance of pro-independence attitudes in the Catalan party system.18
The PSC was caught in the middle of the polarisation dynamic, while the forces aligned with Spanish nationalism or, at least, opposed to Catalan nationalism-the PP and the Citizens' Party (Cs)-proposed a Spanish and European way out of the economic crisis, stigmatising the divisive effects of the policies proposed by the pro-independence forces. These two political forces thus positioned themselves as a bulwark against the growing pro-independence wave.
The results of the November 2012 election confirmed an evident swing in favour of independence. CiU, ERC and CUP won 74 out of 135 seats. In addition, the Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV), an environmentalist force that was not secessionist but supported the independence referendum, won thirteen seats. Furthermore, within the pro-independence front, ERC gained eleven seats (from ten to 21), while CiU lost twelve (from 62 to 50). This outcome consolidated a trend already evident within the Catalan nationalist electorate in previous elections: parties that appeared willing to negotiate and compromise with the Spanish government, moreover without achieving tangible results, were systematically punished by voters. The presence of a rigid (PP) Spanish government pushed Catalan politics on an increasingly slippery slope: the actors involved appeared trapped in a sequence of moves and countermoves that made an institutional crisis increasingly likely.19
In the meantime, the parallel process for Scotland's independence produced a first direct involvement of EU institutions, whose response had clear relevance also for the Catalan process. Questioned by the UK's House of Lords on the EU position on 'internal enlargement', the then EC president Manuel Barroso replied with a letter that confirmed the so-called 'Prodi doctrine':
a new independent state would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the EU ... if an application [for membership] is accepted by the Council acting unanimously, an agreement is then negotiated between the applicant state and the Member States on the conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties which such admission entails. This agreement is subject to ratification by all Member States and the applicant state.20
EU rigidity on the issue of 'internal enlargement' will remain the main argument for undermining the feasibility, and therefore the credibility, of the projects for 'independence in Europe'. Nonetheless, the new CiU-ERC Catalan government, still led by Artur Mas, immediately began to act on the parliamentary resolution of 27 September 2012, which urged the executive to call a self-determination referendum during the following legislative term.21 On 23 January 2013, the regional parliament adopted the 'Declaration of Sovereignty and the Right to Decide of the Catalan People', supported by CiU, ERC and IVC. The explicit reference to the political and legal sovereignty of the Catalan people prompted the Spanish government to file an appeal of unconstitutionality.22 In May 2013, the Constitutional Court accepted the government's appeal and suspended (pending a ruling) the declaration of sovereignty. However, the Catalan parliament had already taken further action in mid-March by approving a document urging the executive to negotiate with the Spanish state to hold a referendum on self-determination.
The National Day of Catalonia on 11 September dawned in the context of these rising institutional tensions. On this occasion, nationalist civil society associations organised an event inspired by the independence movements of the Baltic states in the late 1980s (the 'Baltic Way' of 1989). The 'Catalan Way (towards independence)' saw the participation of more than a million people, forming a human chain through various cities in Catalonia and along the main streets of Barcelona.23 The demonstration was dominated by pro-independence slogans, aiming to pressure the political forces supporting the Catalan government to move forward with the call for a referendum on self-determination.
On this occasion, a prominent Spanish politician with an important role in the EC, Joaquin Almunia (EC vice-president and commissioner for competition), intervened to restate that if a region becomes independent from a member state, 'the separated part is not a member of the EU'24-a concept reported in the Spanish press under the title: 'Brussels shuts down any options about a European future for a Catalan state'.25
On 12 December 2013, the Catalan government announced that an agreement had been reached among nationalist forces on both the date and the referendum questions. The referendum was to ask two questions-'Do you want Catalonia to become a state?' and 'Do you want this state to be independent?'-with the date set for nearly a year later: 9 November 2014.26 However, another top EU figure-president of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy-intervened immediately to confirm the restrictive EU position already stated by Barroso and Almunia.27
The same message was delivered in even more explicit terms by Jean-Claude Juncker in May 2014, when he was the European People's Party's (EPP) leading candidate in the imminent EP election, and therefore the leading candidate for the EC Presidency. On that occasion Juncker declared that the self-determination referendum was illegal and that Catalans should 'Beware of thinking that, out of the blue, a province could become a new Member of the EU'.28 This clear siding with the Spanish government, while preaching EU neutrality on the matter, was criticised by Guy Verhofstadt (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, ALDE) during the first debate among leading candidates on 15 May 2014.29 On that occasion, the most explicit opposition to any hypothesis of 'internal enlargement' came from the candidate of the European Left, Alexis Tsipras, who expressed the view that the EU should not encourage changing borders and that such matters could be solved with more autonomy within existing member states.30 In contrast, the Party of European Socialists (PSE) candidate (and EP president), Martin Schulz, left the door open for an ad hoc approach, in consideration of the fact that some states' constitutions allow legal independence referendums while others do not; and recognising that the EU cannot have common rules on the subject because it is not a federation but a union of sovereign member states.31 Finally, the candidate of the Greens, Ska Keller, whose party has an established alliance with the regionalist European party-the European Free Alliance (EFA)-expressed a position in favour of the right to hold independence referendums and declared that, as EC president, she would ensure automatic accession for Catalonia (and Scotland).
Under pressure from the Spanish Constitutional Court, the Catalan government decided to change the name of the referendum, adopting the label 'citizens' participation process' or, more briefly, 'alternative consultation', thus signalling the unofficial and non-binding nature of the vote.
Nevertheless, once again, the Spanish government appealed to the Constitutional Court, which suspended the 'citizens' participation process' on 4 November, just five days before the consultation was scheduled to take place. At that point the Catalan government faced a clear choice: either obey the Constitutional Court, temporarily annulling the 'alternative consultation', or proceed in open defiance of the court's decision. Pressured by the ERC and the independence movement, Mas chose the latter path, even threatening to take the Spanish government to the Supreme Court for violating the fundamental rights of the Catalan people.
On 9 November 2014, in direct defiance of the Constitutional Court's decision, the 'alternative consultation' on self-determination was held. About 80 per cent of valid votes favoured a double 'Yes'-that Catalonia should be a state and that this state should be independent-but the low turnout, estimated at around 37 per cent of eligible voters,32 raised serious doubts about the political value of the result. As expected, the political reactions to the 9 November vote were highly polarised. While Mas presented it as a great exercise in democracy and invited Rajoy to negotiate a mutually agreed referendum, the Spanish prime minister condemned the entire operation as illegal and 'a political propaganda act', also highlighting its 'profound failure' in terms of turnout.33
THE MORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES, THE MORE THE EU GETS INVOLVED (2015-2017)
The reaction of the pro-independence Catalan government to the impasse of the post-2014 consultation was to interrogate voters again, this time with an early election explicitly centred on the independence issue.34 The plan was announced by Mas in January 2015, and it consisted of calling the election for 27 September, a year earlier than the normal electoral cycle. The chosen date allowed for the full emotional impact of the Diada demonstrations (11 September), which had become a key annual event in Catalan politics. Moreover, it allowed the new Catalan government to act ahead of the (potentially new) Spanish government to be formed after the December 2015 general election.
The preparation of the election was rather problematic for CiU, as it was determined to create a common list with ERC, while at the same time struggling to keep its two internal components-Convergencia Democratica (CDC) and Uniò Democratica (UDC)-together. Both belonged to Catalan nationalism and both had embraced (albeit with varying degrees of conviction) the pro-independence cause, but many within the UDC considered the strategy of challenging the Spanish constitutional order to be overly reckless. Indeed, in June 2015 (after 37 years), the CiU federation ceased to exist. Most of the UDC left and went its own way, betting on a more moderate strategy. CDC and a small splinter group from the UDC joined a common list with ERC, called 'United for Yes' (JxS).
The formal start of the campaign coincided with the Diada 2015 demonstrations, which were marked by large popular participation under slogans like 'Make way for the Catalan Republic' and 'Now is the time'.35 Predictably, the single-issue nature of the campaign, reinforced by the Spanish government's anti-independence and anti-referendum stances, worked to the advantage of political forces that, on either side, had clear and established positions on the subject.
The EU tried again to provide some support to the anti-independence political forces, but this led the European Commission to become involved in a sort of scandal: just a few days before the Catalan election, EC president Juncker's written reply to a question from an MEP had different content in the English and Spanish versions.36 While the English version simply stated that 'It is not for the Commission to express a position on questions of internal organisation related to constitutional arrangements of a particular Member State',37 the Spanish version continued reporting art. 4 (2) of the TEU, adding that 'The determination of the territory of a Member State is established only by the national constitutional law and not by a devolved parliament's decision that is in contrast with the constitution of that State.'38 Obviously, the episode attracted a lot of criticism by the Catalan institutions, sparking accusations of manipulation and calls for an investigation. An EC spokesperson had to intervene to clarify that President Juncker stood by the only version that he had signed, the one in English. According to an internal EC source:
That episode is a proof of the ambivalence of the Commission (and I am not talking only of Juncker but also of people around him) to follow the technical legal line, on one side, and to please or support Rajoy, on the other.39
The 27 September election produced yet another ambiguous result, reflecting a complex political landscape and increasingly divided public opinion on the independence issue, nearly evenly split. The 'United for Yes' coalition received 39.6 per cent of the vote, which, combined with CUP's 8.2 per cent, brought the pro-independence vote to 47.8 per cent, still below an absolute majority. In the anti-independence but pro-referendum camp, the Podemosled coalition garnered 10.1 per cent, while the UDC obtained a modest 2.5 per cent. Finally, the anti-independence and anti-referendum parties (PP, PSC and Cs), running separately, collectively obtained 39.1 per cent of the vote. Among these, the Cs took the lion's share of the vote-17.9 per cent- while the PSC marginally declined to 12.7 per cent, and the PP plummeted to 8.5 per cent.40
However, the passage from vote percentages to allocated seats revealed a substantial difference, as the pro-independence forces (JxS and CUP) secured a clear majority: 72 seats out of 135. This gave the secessionist parties the opportunity to form a new pro-independence government, albeit without having won a majority of votes in favour of independence. Yet the formation of the new government was anything but simple, given the continued CDC vs ERC competition and the CUP's reluctance to accept Artur Mas as president. Only in January 2016, after Mas had decided to step aside, could a new executive, led by Carles Puigdemont (CDC) and externally supported by CUP, be formed. The key objective of the new government was to achieve Catalan independence.
Meanwhile, the December 2015 Spanish general election's results proved inconclusive, leading to a new election in June 2016, which took place in a climate of increasing polarisation, along both the left-right axis (with the rise of Podemos and its strategic alliance with the radical left) and the centre-periphery axis, dominated by the Catalan question. Predictably, the results were not very different from those of December 2015. The Catalan pro-independence parties went into the general election separately, with ERC performing better than CDC, which shortly after the election rebranded itself as the European Democratic Party of Catalonia (PDeCAT).
The new Spanish government was formed at the end of October 2016, after the socialist leader Sanchez was temporarily removed due to the PSOE's disappointing electoral performance in the Basque regional elections. The new interim socialist leadership decided to abstain from the investiture vote, enabling the formation of a new PP government, still led by Rajoy.
Once again, the Catalan question saw a harsh confrontation between a pro-independence Catalan government in Barcelona and a Spanish nationalist (PP) government in Madrid. As usual, both tried to pull the EU onto their side. In particular, the Catalan government tried to have the EU adopt a mediating role between the two contenders.
On 24 January 2017, the Catalans organised an event in Brussels, inside the building of the European Parliament, attended by both President Puigdemont (PDeCAT) and Vice President Junqueras (ERC). The presentation by the two leaders, which was attended by many journalists and several MEPs, reiterated the intention to hold a referendum on independence, appealing to the EU to take on a broker role in the Catalan issue and 'not to turn a blind eye'.41
In spite of warnings and notices from judicial authorities, the Catalan government continued working for the achievement of independence. On 6 September, just days before the 2017 Diada, a decree was issued calling for the independence referendum to be held on 1 October 2017. The question voters would find on the ballot was: 'Do you want Catalonia to be an independent state in the form of a republic?'
Predictably, the central government appealed to the Constitutional Court, which immediately suspended the decree and warned Catalan authorities and media not to participate in organising the referendum. The court asked local administrations to respond within 48 hours on whether they intended to comply with the warning or follow the regional government. The vast majority-though with significant exceptions-responded that they intended to participate in organising the referendum.
On 20 September, in the midst of the referendum campaign, unrest began following an operation in Barcelona by the Spanish police (the Civil Guard). The operation aimed to seize referendum materials in some printing shops and to arrest regional administration staff in various government buildings. However, responding to a call from pro-independence organisations (OC and ANC), a crowd of thousands gathered outside the Ministry of the Economy.42 The calls explicitly referred to a peaceful demonstration, but the crowd effectively prevented the officers from leaving and completing the arrests. To complicate matters, requests for help from the Spanish police to the Catalan regional police went unanswered.
In the following days, Barcelona and much of Catalonia increasingly took on the appearance of a militarised area, with thousands of police officers (from the Civil Guard, National Police and Military Police) arriving from other Spanish regions, and continuing to inspect places suspected of producing referendum materials. On 22 September, the Catalan Electoral Commission, which was organising the referendum, was suspended; shortly thereafter, following instructions from the High Court of Justice of Catalonia, more than 140 websites, including that of the regional government, were deactivated.
In this increasingly heated context, protests against police raids multiplied in Catalonia (with large demonstrations of solidarity in the Basque region and Galicia), while in the rest of Spain, demonstrations began to appear against the organisation of the referendum and in support of the police.
On the day of the referendum, various Spanish police forces raided many polling stations, trying to prevent voting and seizing ballots and records. In some cases, acts of violence by law enforcement against citizens waiting in line to vote were witnessed. Subsequently, the judiciary identified 218 people injured in the 1 October clashes, including 20 police officers, in Barcelona alone.43 These episodes of violence were condemned by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and by independent organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as, of course, by the Catalan government.
Moreover, the software used for the electoral register and vote counting was deactivated by the police, making it very difficult to determine the electoral outcomes. The pro-independence organisers responded by taking stacks of ballots out of polling stations and distributing them to passers-by in public places, thus contributing to undermining the credibility of the vote. Furthermore, the Spanish authorities' sabotage prompted the Catalan government to change the voting rules just minutes before the consultation began, allowing each voter to vote in any district of their choice (rather than where they were registered).
The data provided by the Catalan government, contested by many, indicated a voter turnout of 43 per cent, with over 90 per cent of the votes in favour of independence. However, as expected, the referendum's outcome was deemed unreliable by observers, including those invited by the Catalan government, who primarily blamed the intervention (and violence) of the Spanish police.
The day after the referendum the European Commission released a formal statement, making five substantive points: three legal and two political ones.44 The legal points were: first, the Catalan referendum was not legal vis-à-vis the Spanish constitution; secondly, the matter is reserved to member states and the EU does not intend to interfere; thirdly, in a hypothetical situation in which a referendum is held legally and citizens choose independence, the new state will be out of the EU. The two political points were a general call to all actors involved to work for 'unity and stability, not divisiveness and fragmentation', and an expression of trust in Rajoy's government to handle the issue within the limits of constitutional rights.45
An interviewee from the EC confirmed that the Commission-in line with the traditional EU position-remained deaf to Catalan arguments and requests, while it was rather sensitive to the requests of the Spanish government: 'Catalan actors tried to knock on the door of the Commission in order to seek some political support. However, the door remained absolutely closed.'46
The political and institutional situation in Spain and in Catalonia remained in limbo for about ten days, during which there were significant demonstrations in favour of a political compromise. On 7 October, thousands of demonstrators dressed in white and without flags marched in both Madrid and Barcelona under the slogan 'Shall we talk?'47 At the same time, many companies announced their intention to move out of Catalonia, while others threatened to do so in the event of a declaration of independence. Moreover, on 8 October, about 400,000 people marched in Barcelona in a demonstration against independence.48
However, on 10 October, in a speech before the Catalan parliament, Carles Puigdemont seemed to ambiguously declare independence. On the same day, the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, made a generic call to favour unity over division.49 In the following days, the Spanish government twice asked Puigdemont to retract the independence declaration, but without success. Donald Tusk intervened again to reassure the Spanish government that Spain remained the only interlocutor of the EU for solving the issue, while also inviting all sides 'to use the force of argument, not the argument of force'.50
On 21 October the Spanish government made its move to suspend the Catalan government. This extraordinary action, regulated by Article 155 of the constitution, required approval from the Spanish senate. In response, on 27 October the Catalan parliament explicitly declared unilateral independence, prompting the Spanish senate to immediately approve a temporary receivership. As a result, Puigdemont's regional government was removed by the central government, which dissolved the Catalan parliament and called for new elections to be held in December 2017. Additionally, at the end of October, several members of the regional government received legal notices for rebellion, sedition and misuse of public funds, including President Puigdemont, who fled to Brussels.
In that context, the president of the EP, Antonio Tajani (PPE), released a tough statement condemning the choices of the Catalan secessionist parties and fully endorsed the response of the Spanish government: 'The declaration of independence in the Catalan Parliament is a breach to the rule of law ... No one in the EU will recognise this declaration ... it is up to the Spanish government to restore the domestic constitutional order.'51
The positions publicly expressed by the leading figures of the EU institutions were widely perceived as supportive of the Spanish government. A source from the Spanish permanent representation at the EU declared his complete satisfaction with the EU's response, stating: 'The reaction of EU leaders to the Catalan referendum was excellent. All of them: Juncker, Timmermans, etc ... Tajani was fantastic!'52
Needless to say, the evaluations of the EU position by Catalan pro-independence MEPs were very negative.53 Negative judgements were, overall, conveyed by all the interviewed regionalist MEPs, including those who were not sympathetic to the cause of Catalan independence: 'I did not support the unilateral approach of the Catalans ... [yet] the EU should not have taken the side of member states. Particularly, in the Catalan crisis, it should not have defended Spain. It was neither appropriate nor convenient. The EU could have played a more important role of moral suasion.'54
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The Catalan case, as analysed in this article, highlights several features of EU involvement in territorial/constitutional restructuring that may be instructive in the event of a future referendum on Irish unity. First of all, the approach and position of the EU are considered to be very relevant by both sides: state governments (or anti-secessionist political forces more generally) and the secessionist regional governments. Both the Spanish government and the pro-independence movement sought to engage the EU as an ally, albeit with very differing degrees of success.
Secondly, in line with the Treaty on the EU (TEU), which leaves constitutional matters and the defence of territorial integrity as an exclusive competence of states, the EU is dragged into the dispute rather than engaging proactively in it. State governments and anti-independence political forces want the EU to acknowledge that the constitutional struggle is a domestic issue, to be addressed according to the constitution of the member state(s). In the Catalan case, the Spanish government welcomed statements from EU leaders that delegitimised or weakened the secessionist project. The EU's restrictive position on 'internal enlargement' vis-à-vis Catalonia was underscored by the illegal nature of the referendum. This combination of opposition to the referendum worked to undermine the feasibility (and the credibility) of the Catalan 'independence in Europe' project. In contrast, the pro-independence political forces and regional governments pushed for the EU to intervene as a mediator between their position and the position of the Spanish government, with a view to gaining political legitimacy independently of the state constitution.
Thirdly and most substantively, the Catalan case shows very clearly that the EU acted according to the Spanish government's expectations and the national legal position, while it did not engage with the pro-independence regional government. In addition, this position was adopted by all EU political institutions, supranational (EC and EP) and intergovernmental (European Council), and all major Euro-parties (with the exception of the Greens). This is a clear and direct consequence of the EU legal and institutional/political setting. While the EU legal framework imposes absolute neutrality on the independence question, the consolidated legal position on internal enlargement (the 'Prodi doctrine') represents per se a support of state governments. In addition, both the EU institutional structure (which assigns considerable power to member states' governments) and EU party politics (consisting of federations and parliamentary groups primarily based on state-wide, and thus anti-secessionist, parties) push most of the leading figures in EU institutions to help protect the territorial integrity and legal position of the member states.
This in-built tendency engenders bitter frustrations among pro-independence parties, particularly those that perceive themselves as Europhile political forces.55 Yet, having chosen an openly confrontational relation with their own state, these forces would risk complete isolation if they started to blatantly voice their disillusion with-let alone attack-the EU. After all, the presence of the EU remains a structurally favourable context condition for any political force aiming to achieve significant territorial/political restructuring. As Spain remains an EU member state, the most important Catalan pro-independence parties, at least for the time being, have no other option than to keep professing their pro-EU stance and to keep lobbying EU institutions, hoping that the latter will become more sensitive to their claims.
1 Juan Marcet and Jordi Argelaguet, 'Nationalist parties in Catalonia: Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya and Esquerra Republicana', in Lieven De Winter and Huri Tursan (eds), Regionalist parties in Western Europe (London, 1998); Oscar Barbera and A. Barrio, 'Convergencia i Unio: from stability to decline?', in Lieven De Winter, M. Gomez-Reino and P. Lynch (eds), Autonomist parties in Europe: identity politics and the revival of the territorial cleavage, vol. 1 (Barcelona, 2006).
2 Jordi Argelaguet, 'Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya: the third pole within Catalan politics', in De Winter et al., Autonomist parties in Europe.
3 James Mitchell, 'The unexpected campaign', in Neil Blain, David Hutchison and Gerry Hassan (eds), Scotland's referendum and the media: national and international perspectives (Edinburgh, 2016), 3-15; Michael Keating and Nicola McEwen, 'The Scottish independence debate', in Michael Keating (ed.), Debating Scotland: issues of independence and union in the 2014 referendum (Oxford, 2017), 152-64. See also Paul Anderson and Coree Brown Swan, this issue ('European perceptions of Scottish independence before and after Brexit', Irish Studies in International Affairs 36 (2) (2025), 100-22).
4 Peter A. Kraus and Joan Vergés, 'Introduction', in Peter A. Kraus and Joan Vergés Gifra (eds), The Catalan process: sovereignty, self-determination and democracy in the 21st century (Barcelona, 2017), 11-27: 15.
5 Giacomo Delledonne, 'Speaking in name of the constituent power: the Spanish Constitutional Court and the new Catalan Estatut', Perspectives on Federalism 3 (1) (2011), 1-14.
6 Jaume Pi, 'Los artículos declarados nulos, uno a uno', La Vanguardia, 28 June 2010.
7 Kraus and Vergés Gifra, The Catalan process.
8 Jordi Muñoz and Marc Guinjoan, 'Accounting for internal variation in nationalist mobilization: unofficial referendums for independence in Catalonia (2009-11)', Nations and Nationalism 19 (1) (2013), 44-67; Donatella Della Porta, Francis O'Connor and Martin Portos, 'Protest cycles and referendums for independence. closed opportunities and the path of radicalization in Catalonia', Revista Internacional de Sociología 77 (4) (2019), e142.
9 Astrid Barrio and Juan Rodriguez-Teruel, 'Reducing the gap between leaders and voters? Elite polarization, outbidding competition, and the rise of secessionism in Catalonia', Ethnic and Racial Studies 40 (10) (2017), 1776-94.
10 Eric Guntermann, 'Autonomy or independence: an analysis of the 2010 Catalan regional election', in Alberto Lopez-Basaguren and Leire Escajedo San Epifanio (eds), The ways of federalism in Western countries and the horizons of territorial autonomy in Spain, vol. 2 (Heidelberg, 2013), 865-72.
11 Irene Martín and Ignacio Urquizu-Sancho, 'The 2011 general election in Spain: the collapse of the Socialist Party', South European Society and Politics 17 (2) (2012), 347-63.
12 Raphael Minder, 'Protest rally in Catalonia adds a worry for Spain', New York Times, 11 September 2012.
13 Stephen Burgen, 'Catalan independence rally brings Barcelona to a standstill', The Guardian, 11 September 2012.
14 Maria Teresa Coca, 'A qué aspira Cataluña con el pacto fiscal', El Mundo, 20 September 2012.
15 Kraus and Vergés Gifra, The Catalan process, 17.
16 David Martí, 'The 2012 Catalan election: the first step towards independence?', Regional & Federal Studies 23 (4) (2013), 507-16.
17 Emanuele Massetti and Adrian H. Schakel, 'From staunch supporters to critical observers: explaining the turn towards Euroscepticism among regionalist parties', European Union Politics 22 (3) (2021), 424-45.
18 Josep M. Colomer, 'The venturous bid for the independence of Catalonia', Nationalities Papers 45 (5) (2017), 950-67.
19 Carles Ferreira, 'Entrapped in a failing course of action: explaining the territorial crisis in 2017 Catalonia', Regional and Federal Studies 32 (5) (2022), 573-92.
20 Barroso, 2012, quoted in Emanuele Massetti, 'The European Union and the challenge of "independence in Europe": straddling between (formal) neutrality and (actual) support for member-states' territorial integrity', Regional and Federal Studies 32 (3) (2022), 307-30: 316.
21 Barrio and Rodriguez-Teruel, 'Reducing the gap between leaders and voters?', 1785.
22 Sabrina Ragone, 'Catalonia's recent strive for independence: a legal approach', in Zoltán Kántor (ed.), Autonomies in Europe: solutions and challenges (Budapest, 2014), 69-79.
23 'More than 1 million Catalans form human chain to promote their bid to break away from Spain', Washington Post, 11 September 2013.
24 Euractiv, 'Brussels says an independent Catalonia would need to leave EU', available at: https://www.euractiv. com/section/politics/video/brussels-says-an-independent-catalonia-would-need-to-leave-eu/ (11 July 2025).
25 Massetti, 'The European Union and the challenge of "independence in Europe"'.
26 Arguably, the plan of the Catalan government was to exploit a potential bandwagon effect from Scotland's independence referendum, already scheduled to take place on 18 September 2014 (see Anderson and Brown Swan, 'European perceptions of Scottish independence before and after Brexit').
27 'Bruselas reitera que Catalunya quedará automáticamente fuera de la UE si se independiza', La Vanguardia, 13 December 2013.
28 'Catalonia's independence and EU membership, feature in the EU presidential debate', Catalan News, 16 May 2014.
29 Debate available at: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/embed/index.html?ref=I-089480&lg=undefined (11 July 2025).
30 Massetti, 'The European Union and the challenge of "independence in Europe"', 317.
31 Massetti, 'The European Union and the challenge of "independence in Europe"', 318.
32 Fernando Pérez and Pere Ríos, '1,8 millones de personas votan por la independencia catalana en el 9-N', El País, 10 November 2014.
33 'Rajoy refuses to negotiate self-determination referendum after November 9's massive symbolic vote', Catalan News, 12 November 2014.
34 David Martí and Daniel Cetrà, 'The 2015 Catalan election: a de facto referendum on independence?', Regional and Federal Studies 26 (1) (2016), 107-19.
35 Julien Toyer, 'Catalan separatists take to the streets as crucial vote nears', Reuters, 11 September 2015.
36 Massetti, 'The European Union and the challenge of "independence in Europe"', 318-19.
37 European Commission, 'Answer given by President Juncker on behalf of the Commission', 21 September 2015, document E-011776/2015, English version.
38 European Commission, 'Answer given by President Juncker on behalf of the Commission.' 21 September 2015, document E-011776/2015, Spanish version.
39 Interview with a senior official of the European Commission, Brussels, 12 February 2019.
40 Martí and Cetrà, 'The 2015 Catalan election', 113.
41 VilaWeb, 'Puigdemont on the referendum: "Europe cannot look the other way and should be part of the solution"', 25 January 2017, available at: https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/puigdemont-on-the-referendumeurope-cannot-look-the-other-way-and-should-be-part-of-the-solution/ (14 July 2025).
42 John Stone, 'Spanish police storm Catalan government buildings to stop independence referendum', The Independent, 20 July 2017.
43 'Juez contabiliza 218 heridos en las cargas policiales en Barcelona el 1-O', La Vanguardia, 10 October 2017.
44 European Commission, Statement 17/3626, 2 October 2017.
45 Massetti, 'The European Union and the challenge of "independence in Europe"', 319.
46 Interview with a senior official of the European Commission, Brussels, 12 February 2019.
47 Chris Johnston, 'Rallies in Barcelona and Madrid urge leaders to hold talks on Catalonia', The Guardian, 7 October 2017.
48 Àngels Piñol, 'Masiva manifestación en Barcelona a favor de la Constitución y la unidad de España', El País, 8 October 2017.
49 Daniel Boffey, 'Don't make dialogue impossible, Donald Tusk tells Carles Puigdemont', The Guardian, 10 October 2017.
50 Reuters, 'Catalan independence declaration changes nothing for EU, says Tusk', 20 October 2017, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia-tusk/catalanindependence-declaration-changesnothing-for-eu-says-tusk-idUSKBN1CW220 (14 July 2025).
51 AP News, 'The latest: EU official says no one will recognize Catalonia', 29 October 2017, available at: https:// apnews.com/919885dc53724eadb4476350f75ac9da (14 July 2025).
52 Interview with a senior official of the Spanish Embassy at the EU, Brussels, 30 January 2020.
53 Interviews with two regionalist MEPs: via Skype on 25 February 2019 and in Brussels on 19 September 2019.
54 Interview with a regionalist MEP, Brussels, 19 February 2019.
55 Emanuele Massetti, 'Let down by Europe? Secessionist regionalist parties and the EU's reactions vis-à-vis attempts to achieve "independence in Europe"', in Sandrina Antunes (ed.), Self-determination in a context of shared sovereignty (Brussels, 2020), 68-81; Massetti and Schakel, 'From staunch supporters to critical observers'.
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