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[...] it offers a substantial revision of the popular narrative. [...] it contributes to the study of economic nationalism; that is, an ideological and social movement led by the state for the maintenance and affirmation of progress, unity, and pride through economic policy.
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On 30 July 1979, Festus Marinho, the managing director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) on behalf of Nigeria's military leader, General Olusegun Obasanjo, dispatched a telegram to BP (Nigeria) Ltd. stating that Nigeria intended to "increase its participation to 100%" in Shell-BP and BP (Nigeria).1 He went on to say, without elaboration, that the decision stemmed from the United Kingdom's (UK) proposed change in policy favoring the resumption of oil supplies to apartheid South Africa.2 Not surprisingly, this same message was repeated in Nigeria's government-monitored newspapers a day or two later.3 Within a week, however, journalists and scholars offered a modified version of the declaration by stating that Nigeria- one of the world's largest producers and exporters of petroleum- had "nationalized" the London-based British oil company, British Petroleum (BP).4 Yet, we find little agreement in their reports over why this "Giant of West Africa" nationalized BP. Some mention South Africa, others Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe); some mention oil, while others solely discuss British diplomacy. In looking at how the announcement has been presented, it is evident that the nationalization of BP was more complicated than suggested in the news reports and scholarly essays with regard to Nigeria's intended purpose and execution.
Within the broad "popular narrative,"- that is, the nationalization presented by journalists and scholars and accepted by the public- the nationalization of BP rarely appears within discussions of economic policy, but almost always receives attention within the context of foreign policy- even in publications about Nigeria's economy. Within these works, the narrative runs like a melodrama with new developments unfolding incrementally with clearly recognizable villains, such as South Africa. Nigeria, on the other hand, is represented as a liberation hero. It is easy to see how it has become, for all its ambiguity, an important part of historical memory in Nigeria and endured as the narrative. In general, the popular narrative asserts that Nigeria nationalized BP as punishment for the UK's wrong-headed policies in southern Africa. Beyond this broad conclusion, however, we find no consensus on the specifics within the secondary literature.
Some scholars mention South Africa, others Southern Rhodesia; but, only a few identify oil as the central feature. For example, Okon Akiba writes that Nigeria nationalized Shell-BP in response to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's announcement that the UK would be lifting economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.5 J.K. Onoh writes that Nigeria nationalized BP in response to Thatcher's "de facto recognition of the minority government in Zimbabwe."6 Scholars who incorporated South Africa into their conclusion focused on oil sales, which is supported by the official announcement, and repeated in the newspapers, given by Marinho in July 1979.7 A variation, which surfaced in the Nigerian press just after the nationalization, involved a complicated oil swap. Nicolas J. Spiliotes suggests in his 1981 publication that the nationalization occurred in response to "BP setting up swap arrangements with its North Sea and Nigerian oil, enabling it to sell to South Africa."8 His conclusion echoes that which was presented in the Nigerian news.9 And, with the exception of a few, the nationalization is nestled in discussions of Nigeria's boisterous foreign policy.10 The numerous reasons for the nationalization indicate that the purpose and execution of the nationalization was not, at the time, abundantly clear. Further, they suggest that the specifics about why, within the context of southern Africa, were irrelevant. These works offer the ambiguous popular narrative, falling perfectly in line with the nationalist agenda of the Obasanjo regime. The revised narrative introduced here is the result of the historical investigation and analysis of recently declassified materials from BP's private archives as well as Nigeria's and the UK's national archives, and illustrates how the nationalization of BP is central to Nigeria's economic nationalism. In this article, I argue that the nationalization of BP was part of a project of economic nationalism- an ideology to rally a population around a statesponsored economic vision- in Nigeria. Obasanjo simply used the threat of nationalization as a tool to apply pressure on the UK and white-supremacist regimes in southern Africa. Ultimately, however, Nigeria took over aspects of BP's operations on its own economic timetable with little regard to the events unfolding in southern Africa.
This argument contributes to the existing studies of oil and nationalism in Nigeria in two ways. First, it offers a substantial revision of the popular narrative. In this article, I offer a revised narrative that provides for the first time a detailed chronology of events (others simply mention a reason in the context of Nigeria's foreign policy). This new narrative emphasizes Nigeria's preference for negotiation, not hostile threats, and logical economic policy, not reprisals based on soured foreign relations. Second, it contributes to the study of economic nationalism; that is, an ideological and social movement led by the state for the maintenance and affirmation of progress, unity, and pride through economic policy. The case of Nigeria and BP requires us to clarify the definition and usage of the term in order to appreciate that Nigeria's government promoted a sense of proprietorship over the country's oil within and outside its boundaries and the takeover of BP was a part of planned economic policy.
The Nationalization of BP: A Revised Narrative
In the 1970s, Nigeria's federal military leaders facilitated the transformation of the oil industry, over which it had previously maintained little control and developed supernationalist policies. These plans were carried out by two different military regimes: the first under General Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975) and the second under Generals Multala Mohammed (1975-1976) and Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1978). All three leaders contributed to shifting Nigeria's foreign policy from one of non-alignment to one of activism and expanded Nigeria's membership in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into a leadership role, both formally and informally. Nigeria's geographic size and large population of an estimated 51.6 million in 1960 (with an estimated 2.5 percent increase annually) made Nigeria, in Nigerian eyes, a natural choice to act as the powerhouse behind African politics. Additionally, all three leaders placed Nigeria's oil wealth at the core of their economic nationalism strategies.
Amidst the turbulent transition from British colony to independent state, Nigeria joined the top ranking oil-producers in the world. BP played a major role in this transformation. Nigeria's oil industry had developed rather slowly over a span of some fifty years in the twentieth century, but once established it expanded into the country's largest source of revenue. The success of Nigeria's industry comes from the high quality of crude oil- low in sulfur and light in consistency- that it produces. For several years, the Shell-BP Petroleum Company, a joint venture of Royal Dutch/Shell and BP, held the distinction of being the sole oil producer in Nigeria After Nigeria became independent in 1960, it invited several other major oil companies from the United States and Europe to explore. Shell-BP maintained its top position, extracting 56.6 percent of Nigeria's crude oil, until the nationalization.11 With several companies operating in Nigeria at one time, the pressure to watch over and protect Nigeria's upstream12 interests became a major challenge to successive Nigerian governments. For this reason, Nigeria created the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) as a holding company (not operating company) in 1971 to oversee several subsidiaries. Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that same year, which made BP and the British government continually wonder if Nigeria would "take action along Libyan lines"; meaning, nationalize its oil industry.13 Nigeria took away from OPEC meetings the value of having a national oil company that controlled the industry and the sense of national pride derived from being a major oil producer. On 1 April 1977, the NNOC was replaced by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), which served as an operating company and as such exercised the power to conduct research on oil and invest in new oilrelated activities.
In addition to taking part in the upstream activities, the Nigerian government also became interested in the downstream. In this area, BP was heavily involved in the distribution and sale of petroleum products, operating in Nigeria between 150 and 180 petrol stations in the mid-1970s.14 Nigeria sought to expand the existing downstream sector into a more extensive network of pipelines, trading ports, refineries, and distribution depots. Nigeria strove to increase its refining capacity in the 1970s, and had four refineries in operation by the early 1980s. The first refinery was built at Alesa-Eleme near Port Harcourt by Shell-BP in October of 1965. The refinery was operated by the Nigerian Petroleum Refinery Corporation (NPRC), as a consortium in which Nigeria held 50 percent equity in the refinery with Shell and BP holding 25 percent each. In 1972, Nigeria increased its stake in the company to 60 percent in compliance with the Nigerian Enterprise Promotions (NEP) decree. Despite this change, BP remained the primary manager of the refinery. Nigeria added three more refineries after 1978. Nigeria used these refineries as a way to involve itself in Nigeria's industry and ensure that a sizable quantity of refined petroleum products remained within the country for domestic consumption.
In looking at Nigeria's oil history from the start of production through the 1970s, BP played a tremendous part in building up Nigeria's industry. Nigeria's relationship with BP in many ways mirrored that with the UK, alternating between cooperation and disagreement. This was particularly evident during the late 1970s as Nigeria increased its participation in its oil industry as well as in the liberation movements in southern Africa. Despite these tensions, Nigeria and BP maintained a cordial and productive relationship. Indeed, BP participated in several aspects of Nigeria's oil and natural gas industry during (and after) nationalization.15
Taking over some of BP' s operations was not just about financial advantage, but about post-colonial sentiment. The nationalization of BP put Nigeria's state-owned oil company, the NNPC, in a theoretically advantageous position within the largest company, Shell-BP, in the most profitable industry in the country. It represented the last major transfer of control from a transnational company to a state-owned company in Nigeria's oil industry. Since the takeover of BP almost thirty years ago, Nigeria's oil industry has undergone only a few minor changes. For many Nigerians, it also indicated a high point in history when Nigeria exercised a leadership position within the global struggle for the liberation of southern Africa by using its oil as a political weapon. Along similar lines, the takeover also added the cache of removing yet another financial remnant of British colonial rule, which lasted from the mid- 1800s to 1960. During the 1970s, the UK maintained a 40-60 percent share in BP, which, for Nigerian nationalists, made BP and its subsidiaries both the government's pawn and a vestige of colonial rule. The attitude toward Shell was not quite the same because the British government did not hold shares directly in the company (although The Shell Group was based in London). Also, 60 percent of the company was owned by the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, which was based in the Netherlands. By 1979, Shell's downstream operations had been largely taken over by Nigeria and its share of Shell-BP reduced to 20 percent.16 BP, not Shell, was clearly the focus of Nigeria's attention. The oil industry was not the only area in which nationalism and economic policy merged in Nigeria.
Throughout the 1970s, Nigeria was also engaging in a series of development plans to jump-start the economy. The goal of striking a balance between state intervention and ownership with private, indigenous businesses was essential to Nigeria's philosophy of economic nationalism. Successive Nigerian military governments implemented national development plans and Nigerian Enterprise Promotions (NEP) decrees (also referred to as indigenization programs), designed to increase equity participation within the oil industry and other foreign enterprises. Through his examination of the development plans and NEP decrees, Thomas J. Biersteker illustrates the intended transfer of jobs, equity, and ownership from (with the exception of some aspects of oil) foreign firms to private, Nigerian businessmen and women.17 Most scholars identify them as features of "nationalist economic policy" or "economic nationalism." In general, details and analyses of the development plans and NEP decrees are well covered in the secondary literature on Nigeria.18 One notable gap is the effect they had on particular oil companies.
As part of the Second Development Plan (1970-1974), Gowon put forth an innovative program for increasing participation within Nigeria's economy. Through his NEP decree, he singled out specific sectors of the economy and set timelines in the form of segmented schedules. True to Gowon' s governance style, he sought indirect input from the major foreign investors by leaking information to them to provide "a measure of consultation without loss of face and without altering their policy of government by arbitrary decree."19 Gowon attempted to reserve a range of enterprises "exclusively for Nigerians and to ban foreign firms" with capital exceeding more than £N200,000.20 The plan called for adherence based on a two-tier schedule designated by skill level and financial commitment. The businesses under Schedule 1 included such occupations as supermarkets, furniture making, poultry farming, wholesale distribution, and coastal and waterways shipping. All other kinds of businesses belonged in Schedule 2, including select activities of the major oil companies.
While the downstream operations largely fit into Schedule 2, the production companies fell under a separate participation scheme. The British firms ranked high on the list of foreign investors to replace. Almost half of Nigeria's exports and imports went to and from the UK. Shell-BP alone controlled over 70 percent of Nigeria's crude oil production. In April 1971, Nigeria acquired a 33.3 percent share in Agip's and 35 percent of SAFRAP's upstream operations (see Table I).21 These moves marked the first attempt by Nigeria at equity participation, meaning that Nigeria owned shares, or equity, in a company, but did not directly involve itself in the everyday activities. By 1974, equity participation was set unilaterally at 55 percent.22 Under the leadership of Mohammed and Obasanjo, the scope of the second NEP decree and the level of equity participation in the upstream sector were expanded.
Table 1: Upstream Participation Interests. Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, NAPETCOR: Quarterly Magazine of the NNPC 2, no. 1 (January-March, 1981).
The Third Development Plan (1976-1980), which included a revised NEP decree, modified the previous one. These new plans included three schedules with Schedule 2 revised to include banks, mining companies, upstream sector of the petroleum industry, fertilizer production, salt production, and paper production.23 The list of businesses for each schedule this time around was much more specific. Schedules 2 and 3 included many capital intensive businesses requiring highly skilled workers, which would be transferred in phases by December 1978. Schedule 3 included the largest, most technologically sophisticated industries. BP (Nigeria) and Shell-BP both fit in this category. In accordance with Schedule 3, BP (Nigeria) sold 40 percent equity on the Lagos Stock Exchange for Nigerian investors to purchase between September and December 1978.24
Obasanjo also orchestrated another wave of equity participation increases within the upstream sector (see Table 1). Since April 1974, the Nigerian government had been paying compensation to BP through a series of installments. But, what appeared progressive in 1974 among OPEC members did not seem so three years later.25 Instead of paying the fourth installment, the Obasanjo regime wanted to revise the arrangement so that the partnership, as done by Middle Eastern producers, was based on the updated book value (UBV) and no longer the net book value (NBV), as had been the original plan. Also, the OPEC commitment to 55 percent equity participation was increased to 60 percent. Instead of completing the payments, Nigeria wanted to apply this ratio in mid-payment.26 The issue was settled by a round of increases in equity participation held by the Nigerian government within the entire upstream sector to 60 percent on 1 July 1979 (see Table 1). This move proved the boldest yet because it was the third increase in nine years. It reduced the shares of all the major oil companies to 40 percent and in the case of Shell-BP, even less.
Within the downstream sector, the federal military government, under both Gowon and Obasanjo, also made a few changes separate from the NEP decree. In September 1971, Nigeria increased its share of the NPRC from 50 percent to 60 percent by taking 5 percent from both Shell and BP. And, by mid-October of 1978, BP and the NNPC had completed negotiations for the sale of BP's remaining 20 percent share within the NPRC.27 At the time, P.C. Asiodu, the federal minister of mines and power, expressed plans for 100 percent equity participation in NPRC within the next five years.28 The increase in participation within the NPRC arose out of concern over a regional disparity in the price of petroleum products, especially between the South and the North. Oil experts recommended that the solution to this problem required taking over businesses within the downstream sector.29
In a similar manner, Nigeria acquired 60 percent direct participation in the Shell marketing company in April 1975 for Nl,986,768.30 Publicizing this change, several petrol stations bore the name National Oil Marketing Company to represent the new company, NOLCHEM. By 1979, then, Shell's involvement in Nigeria's oil industry had been reduced to a minority share in marketing and production. Nigeria also took over entirely Esso, the United States (US)-based marketing company, in December 1976 and renamed it Unipetrol.31 All of these expropriations resulted in the transfer of operations and management to Nigerian businessmen. To assist with the transfer of operations to local businessmen the federal military government launched a one-week training program on marketing and selling of petroleum products.32 The federal government also stated that "seven other foreign oil marketing companies will be fully nationalized by 1980."33 Anthony Kirk-Green and Douglas Rimmer saw the takeover of BP as an attempt to remove an "anomaly in the implementation of the [1976] business indigenization decree"; meaning, to complete the transfer of control within foreign marketing companies as laid out in the revised NEP decree.34 This conclusion suggests that the nationalization had been planned prior to the end of July 1979. According to Olajide Aluko, the federal military government assigned a panel of civil servants to study the feasibility of taking over BP's assets in June 1979, at least a month before the nationalization actually took place.35 Clearly, Nigerian officials dedicated themselves to incrementally taking over aspects of not only the upstream sector but also the downstream from foreign oil companies.
Between 1971 and 1979, Nigeria's leaders aggressively promoted bold economic measures to increase government participation within the oil industry as well as to transfer foreign, particularly British, enterprises to Nigerian businessmen. In terms of economic nationalism, these measures both attracted Nigerian entrepreneurs and gave citizens a sense that the government was, in fact, on their side in ridding the country of foreign control and enhancing the flow of oil wealth into their communities. By 1 July 1979, the development plans were nearing completion, albeit unevenly. While directed at all sectors of the economy, the largest success was within the oil sector. The participation of BP had been significantly diminished within Shell-BP, BP (Nigeria), and the NPRC well before the nationalization.
Creation of SPDC and AP
At the time, BP' s involvement in Nigeria included:
1. A 50 percent share in Shell-BP, through which BP held a 20 percent interest in the concessions. This arrangement provided BP with 230,000 barrels per day of crude.
2. 60 percent shareholding in BP Nigeria, the marketing company;
3. A processing deal with NNPC (in association with Total);
4. Participation in an LNG scheme;
5. A relationship with NPRC, the Port Harcourt refinery.37
The nationalization proposed in 1979 only applied to BP' s share of Shell-BP and BP (Nigeria), of which the government already had a sizable share. BP's activity in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project,38 which was still in the early planning stages, was not affected. In short, Nigeria targeted only select operations, allowing BP to continue its activities in other areas.
Marinho was careful to avoid using "nationalization" and, instead, called for an "increase in Nigeria's participation." The UK's High Commissioner in Lagos, commented on the difference and on which direction Nigeria preferred to take:
But the Nigerians' world is Africa, and,... African precedent have [sic], I think, all been of nationalization- a rather different thing and one which is regarded with some caution by the present Nigerian government and applied only in a limited area.39
Marinho deliberately used the term participation and emphasized that it was not nationalization in the popularly understood sense of an immediate and final removal of BP from Nigeria's oil industry. Nationalization is frequently viewed as cultural nationalism that crept into economic policy, as if it were contagious and emotion-driven.40
Participation was used because it refers to Nigeria's development plans and does not imply punishment. Marinho encouraged BP to see the transfer of control as routine economic policy in line with other participation decrees as opposed to a nationalization, which would have carried a hefty political message. When Marinho made his declaration, he chose his words carefully. That said, the Nigerian government had no qualms about journalists, scholars, and the general public using the potent, popular "nationalization." After all, the plan was executed with the intention of bolstering national pride.
Marinho assured BP that the action taken in 1979 should not be considered as Nigeria having "locked the door and thrown away the key."41 In accordance with international law and established protocol, compensation was determined through negotiations between BP and the Nigerian government. On 1 August 1979, Nigeria appointed 'Tunji Olutola, formerly a member of the cabinet office, to take over as chief executive of BP (Nigeria). Additionally, all employees of BP not hired by the NNPC were required to leave the country on or before 21 August.42 BP's (Nigeria) operations were replaced by those of the state-controlled African Petroleum (AP), and BP's shares in ShellBP were taken over by the NNPC. Shell remained in the latter as the primary provider of managerial expertise and skilled labor, which explains why the NNPC did not go after Shell.43
The formation of AP represented a bold and unique piece of Nigeria's political and economic history. Keeping AP on the cutting edge as a symbol of progress has been important for the NNPC. The company remained within the direct fold of the state-owned NNPC until 1998 when the company was among the first to be privatized. Within the past decade, AP has worked closely, in a technical capacity, with BP (South Africa) based in Cape Town.47
Within the context of aggressive economic policies, the nationalization of BP does not seem incongruous. No doubt the temptation of excising a 20 percent share of Shell-BP would have been strong. At the same time that Nigeria was expanding control over domestic trade and production, it also became concerned over the international trading of its crude oil. Nigeria's desire to control its oil beyond its boundaries and into a global trading network is also a key feature of economic nationalism. Nigeria attempted to control the destination of its oil by enacting and enforcing trade restrictions, starting in the early 1970s.
Nigeria's Oil Restrictions
During the 1970s, Nigeria became heavily involved in the liberation of southern Africa from oppressive white-supremacist regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, Nigeria's activities related to southern Africa are hardly peripheral in studies on its foreign policy.48 The popular narrative situates the takeover of BP in the political turmoil of southern Africa. Yet, a look at Nigeria's oil trade restrictions reveals disingenuousness. These prohibitions were poorly monitored and enforced, and opportunities to nationalize BP on account of violating these restrictions were not taken. Nigeria's threats to discontinue trade with any country associated with South Africa or Southern Rhodesia are well documented in the secondary literature on Nigeria's foreign affairs, but how Nigeria managed its trade restrictions is not. Evidence from archival sources indicates that Nigeria was much more interested in coordinating its cries of dissension about southern Africa with its economic policies rather than the other way around.
South Africa had been ruled by an oppressive apartheid state since the mid- 1900s, which deliberately marked Africans as laborers without political and social rights. In Southern Rhodesia, a white-supremacist group, led by Ian Smith, illegally declared independence on 11 November 1964. To pressure Smith into accepting a democratic government with African participation, the United Nations (UN) passed Resolution 232 calling for mandatory sanctions against the country on 16 December 1966. Items specifically mentioned in the resolution included tobacco, petroleum products, and military supplies to name a few.49 Within the first year of the sanctions, it became apparent that Southern Rhodesia's economy was not buckling and trade had not ceased. Nigeria saw this as evidence of British political and financial support. Africans in southern Africa launched liberation wars, which the OAU supported financially and militarily. While adding South Africa to its agenda of African liberation, Nigeria also maintained pressure on Southern Rhodesia both through the OAU and UN, as well as through its own initiatives. Actions taken by Nigerian officials included threatening boycotts and trade interruptions to various foreign governments and international organizations.50 One news article encouraged the government to use "the oil weapon- the manipulation of oil exports to serve unrelated political purposes."51 To the UN Security Council, Nigeria made a bold declaration: Nigeria "would take stern measures against foreign firms which retained investments in South Africa operating in Nigeria."52 In 1977, Nigeria and the UN jointly organized the five-day World Conference for Action against Apartheid to prepare an anti-apartheid agenda for the UN General Assembly.53 At this conference Obasanjo extended his warning that Nigeria intended to compile a list of companies that depended on its goods and markets, and violated sanctions.54 Additionally, the Nigerian government cultivated and disseminated information about Nigeria's commitment to the liberation movement to journalists, eager citizens, and scholars. In July 1971, the government supported the printing and circulation of Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, which served as a forum to declare Nigeria as the liberator of Africa and to remind its educated citizens of its success as such.
While Nigeria agreed with the idea of "African solutions to African problems," it saw that the UK needed to finish the process of decolonization in southern Africa. Nigeria held the UK responsible for the settlement of Southern Rhodesia, and, in part, for dismantling apartheid in South Africa. From the African perspective, the white regimes maintained power because of European political, financial, and military assistance. As much as Nigeria wanted to align itself with other African countries and movements to eradicate European dominance in southern Africa, however, it still remained fettered to European, primarily British, financial and military assistance. For this reason, Nigeria's foreign policy at the time was described as having bark but no bite.55 In Nigeria's oil trade network, the UK represented the primary trading partner. As a result, Nigeria developed a split personality between the mid-1960s and 1980.
Throughout the 1970s, Nigeria presented itself to the outside world as a leader of an African liberation movement as well as a critic of British policy; at the same time, it acted as a cooperative and agreeable host to British firms operating in the country. Nigeria's leaders seized public opportunities to denounce British activity, while privately assuring that British investment in Nigeria was secure. The British High Commission in Lagos, Shell, and BP saw any action regarding southern Africa on political grounds (particularly involving oil) as unlikely.56 Shell stated:
the Nigerian government is not very likely to take real action, and the specific judgment that if nevertheless they do, they will be more likely to go for British interests other than oil.57
However, when Shell and BP were asked by the British government about the trajectory of Nigeria's economic policy in the 1970s, a representative from Shell discussed the extreme likelihood that Nigeria intended:
to achieve substantial ownership of the existing oil business and to cut out a figure on the international stage to reflect Nigeria's growing political importance within Africa.58
What is emphasized in the passages above is an important distinction between Nigeria's foreign policy and its economic one. Nigeria may have used its oil as the threat, but it was evident that action stemming directly from developments in southern Africa alone was doubtful. This detail, of course, did not deter Nigeria from publicly abusing the UK and making threats of reprisal, with particular reference to the failure of economic sanctions.
The mandatory economic sanctions established in 1966 by the UN against Southern Rhodesia continued until 21 December 1979, although the impact was questionable. Reports from a range of sources confirmed suspicions that trade with Southern Rhodesia continued, especially in petroleum products, with the assistance of South Africa. Nigerians criticized the UN for not expanding sanctions to include South Africa, the largest supplier of goods to Southern Rhodesia. The Anti-Apartheid Movement (based in London) claimed in an investigative report that "BP was the first to breach [sanctions], followed by Shell and the others."59 Nigeria saw the UK, BP, and Shell as not only failing to prevent oil from reaching Southern Rhodesia, but actively collaborating and engaging in the trade. Nigeria took it upon itself to aggressively enforce sanctions within its own capabilities based on the assumption that its oil produced by Shell-BP reached Southern Rhodesia through South Africa. A front-page article in Sunday Punch, for example, attempted to outline how Nigeria's oil reached Southern Rhodesia. The article states that "crude oil from Nigerian oil fields is sometimes carried surreptitiously to be refined in South Africa and sent to oil the murderous war machine of rebel Ian Smith."60 Behind closed doors, the Nigerian government understood that it could not entirely control the destination of its crude oil but hoped to appear unquestionably proactive.
Under Gown and Obasanjo's leadership, Nigeria appeared to be engaged in a rigorous campaign against the trade of its oil to southern Africa. For example, on 1 December 1971, Nigeria placed several countries on a list of prohibited destinations, including Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and inserted a new clause into its oil contracts prohibiting the shipping of its crude oil to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia61 At the opening of the World Conference for Action against Apartheid, Obasanjo declared that transnational companies contributed to the "evil machinery" of white-supremacist regimes and that Nigeria would no longer deal with businesses that "are party to the system that holds our brothers and sisters in southern Africa in bondage."62 With this new ambition, Nigeria began probing into the comings and goings of ships calling at its ports.
In 1978, rumors circulated that Nigeria unknowingly supplied to Southern Rhodesia. The largest producer and trader of Nigeria's crude oil, Shell-BP, attempted to disprove this by producing destination lists and quantities loaded and discharged.63 With no further action, the matter seemed closed for several months. Then, an extremely damaging and provocative article in Piatt's Oilgram dated 31 January 1979, forced the issue of ports of call and destinations open again. The article, titled "South Africa Reported in Secret Supply Arrangement with Nigeria," claimed that Nigeria had entered into a secret agreement with South Africa to supply crude oil.64 According to the Cape Times of South Africa, Nigeria agreed to secure oil supplies for South Africa through Middle Eastern middlemen to maintain supplies amidst the Iranian Revolution.65 Other reports circulated that BP, as directed by the UK, had a special arrangement with South Africa, involving Nigeria's oil. In response, Nigeria resurrected the list of prohibited countries and started making inquiries into the activities of the major oil trading companies; namely, BP and Shell. Aside from enforcing its own rules, Nigeria also appeared interested in simply whipping the companies into a panic. The move to monitor the ports of call and the destinations of the oil tankers lacked clear planning and policy cohesion, making the entire endeavor confusing for all involved. Nigeria lacked the capabilities, and perhaps the interest, to enforce the prohibition consistently. At the same time, the process proved highly effective in putting these companies and home governments on their guard. Within the next two months, Nigeria caught several BP-chartered ships violating Nigeria's prohibition list and augmented its inquiries into oil transport operations.66 One in particular, a ship called KuIu, caught the attention of the national press. None of these captures, however, resulted in nationalization. The real benefit to enforcing these restrictions was in fostering national pride in Nigeria's oil-based economy. Let us take a look at the case of the BP-chartered ship called KuIu.
Table 2: A Complete Journey of KuIu Vessel. Source: 'KuIu,' memo from Shell to BP, 3 May 1979,4822, 1,BPA.
Just prior to the nationalization of BP, the oil vessel KuIu arrived on 30 April 1979, at Nigeria's Bonny terminal, ahead of schedule (see Table 2). KuIu was owned by Safmarine (a South African company), registered in Panama, and destined for Rotterdam; it had been chartered by BP since 1972.67 Nigerian port authorities detained KuIu for being in violation of sanctions. The KuIu debacle appears only in news reports and archival documents, with the exception of an essay by Aluko.68 The case of KuIu serves as evidence of Nigeria's demand for respect by oil companies as well as its claim over the destination of its oil. Nigeria's capture of KuIu seemed an ideal moment for nationalization; the elections in April 1979 in Southern Rhodesia were viewed by Obasanjo as "unfair and undemocratic," and apartheid continued to exist in South Africa.69 However, KuIu, and others like it, did not prompt nationalization.
Upon arrival, the shipmaster of KuIu was taken onshore and detained in Port Harcourt for several weeks in May 1979 (two months prior to the nationalization of BP) because Nigerian officials discovered South African crewmembers on board. The loading of crude oil was allowed to continue, but the tanker was not allowed to sail. The Nigerian government was not unified on its assessment of the situation: the NNPC saw the fiasco as yet another unfortunate slip up by BP and government officials saw this as evidence of BP' s blatant disregard for Nigeria and the company's failure to take Nigerian policies seriously.70
To handle the matter, a military administrator, Commander Suleiman Sa'idu, set up a four-person panel to review the case. The committee expressed concern that the ship "slipped into Bonny to lift a quick cargo in a few hours for ports southwards [to South Africa]."71 The story first appeared on 12 May 1979, almost two weeks after, with a frontpage article in the Nigerian Tide (Port Harcourt). BP in Lagos described the article as making no mention of Shell-BP or BP.72 Between 30 April and 15 May, Nigeria and BP had drawn up a tentative agreement to allow Kulu's cargo to be retained by BP and transferred to a second "cleared" vessel. In preparation, BP instructed the ship World Hero to stand off at Bonny outside territorial waters.73 After some deliberation, the NNPC confiscated Kulu's crude oil, amounting to just over 1.6 million barrels, sold it for $30 per barrel on the spot market, when the world price was $18.74 The KuIu vessel returned to the sea empty on 29 May. The financial advantage of confiscating BP' s oil was clear, as was the political benefit of appearing tough on British oil companies.
The Nigerian press used the case of the KuIu as an example of how the UK and BP engaged in trickery to supply oil to the white-minority regimes in southern Africa. If foreign policy were the only consideration, this would have been an ideal moment for nationalization. In point of fact, the violation of Nigeria's prohibition list was a relatively common occurrence and, ultimately, the Nigerian government concealed the details of catching KuIu from the public and pardoned BP.75 Interestingly, when another vessel, the Reliance, arrived at Bonny 14 May 1979 (at the same time KuIu was being held), Nigerian customs and immigration officials inspected the ship's log and supplies for any evidence of visiting or trading with South Africa. While reviewing the logbook, officials found that the ship had last called at Cape Town on 18 March 1979, which violated the Nigerian ordinance. After giving the officials bottles of whisky and cartons of cigarettes, as well as imported items at discounted prices from the ship's bond store, the ship was cleared to load crude oil and depart on schedule.76 Both Reliance and KuIu show that violations were relatively frequent occurrences and only erratically enforced.
Nigeria initially expressed an interest in giving BP a stern warning and letting these violations drop. Instead, Major General Muhammadu Buhari, the petroleum commissioner, added a new component to Nigeria's prohibition. Buhari met with BP officials to discuss a suitable backdate for prohibition inquiries and settled on 1 December 1978, instead of a rolling deadline.77 Faint murmurs about Nigeria's oil reaching South Africa continued after UN sanctions were lifted in December 1979 and into the 1980s. What concerned Nigerian officials was not catching BP to punish it, but threatening BP so that its activities would not attract the press and thereby expose the weaknesses of the government in enforcing its oil restrictions. Nigerian officials warned that this incident marked the last time the Nigerian government would be lenient, and another such incident would be met with punitive action such as the revision of participation agreements.78
KuIu was the last violation of this nature to have appeared in the press or archival records presumably because BP chose its vessels more carefully and, alas, nationalization followed in less than two months. At the time of the KuIu debacle, Nigeria was a month away from deciding to takeover BP's operations, and a new round of elections were being planned in Southern Rhodesia. Accusations of Nigeria's oil reaching South Africa, even through Nigeria's own doing, continued into the 1980s after nationalization, which suggests that this alleged violation was not actually a major issue for Nigeria's leadersand not the reason for nationalization.79 It is much more likely that enforcing sanctions was less important after the takeover of BP. Also, Nigerian officials and the NNPC had to have known that the likelihood of tracing Nigeria's crude oil to South Africa's ports was nearly impossible. Nigeria's crude oil typically did not travel southward. The crude oil trade went clockwise around Africa as in the case of KuIu (see Table 2), which means Nigeria's oil went north to Europe, not south to Cape Town.80 The logistics of oceanic trade, however, did not dampen the nationalist spirit inspired by Nigeria's economic policies. Nigerian nationalists, as evident in the news reports and secondary literature, were not discouraged from claiming that their oil reached to South Africa.
In summary, the oil restrictions were poorly monitored, and those in violation of them, such as BP, endured nominal reproach. The KuIu mishap is a perfect example of Nigeria's leniency. Nigerian officials seemed much more interested in aligning their grievances about southern Africa with their economic policies rather than the other way around. As illustrated in the revised narrative above, the 1970s for Nigeria was about fruitful economic policies, including the implementation of development plans and NEP decrees. A great deal of attention was devoted to transferring aspects of Nigeria's oil industry from foreign to indigenous control. All of the major oil marketing and production companies were affected in one way or another. And, it was all done through logical development planning and negotiation. The takeover of BP, in particular, illustrates the use of deliberate, beneficial timing. This, I argue, is at the core of Nigeria's economic nationalism.
A Case of Economic Nationalism
The nationalization of BP serves as an excellent case study in economic nationalism because it highlights the government's use of economic policy to foster unity in an ethnically and religiously fractured country and instill a sense of national pride. Since the 1960s, Nigerian leaders have centered the country's identity, international influence, and economy on its status as one of the world's largest producers and exporters of oil in the world. They followed the logical actions of economic nationalism: Nigeria devoted equal energy to implementing economic programs and promoting them to citizens. Obasanjo, particularly, was successful in presenting policy as based on public recommendation. A news article on the nationalization of BP quoted the government as saying that other oil companies should not worry as long as they "continue to respect ... the feelings of the people with regard to apartheid...."81 Inspired, perhaps, by Arab members of OPEC in the early 1970s, Nigeria's government also promoted a sense of proprietorship over the country's oil within and outside its boundaries. Economic initiatives considered important to nation building were commemorated, as illustrated with the AP logo. And, Nigeria promised to make the available wealth and resources of the nation accessible to all its citizenry- through development plans and indigenization programs. The most crucial aspect of economic nationalism, of course, was the buy-in of the public, or at least, the educated elite.82 Indeed, the public served as the best promoters and defenders of the decision to nationalize.83 These are the key features of economic nationalism, and also of the takeover of BP.
The nationalization of BP puts our understanding of economic nationalism to the test. I argue that Nigeria's handling of BP requires us to clarify the definition and usage of the term "economic nationalism." First, the definition of economic nationalism requires refashioning. More often than not, economic nationalism is viewed as the dramatic fusion of emotional nationalist sentiment with usually rational economic policy or, put another way, the injection of cultural nationalism into a state's economy. This is particularly evident in discussions on nationalization (the penultimate nationalistic act). For example, one scholar examines nationalization, or what he calls "forced divestment," and argues against it being classified as economic nationalism, which he defines as '"economically irrational' preferences for indigenous ownership or short-run political ... considerations" that reflects "national pride, an anti-foreign bias, and political opportunism."84 In a more subtle fashion, another scholar describes economic nationalism as a program "to extend property owned by nationals to gratify the taste of nationalism."85 To emphasize this uneasy connection, some scholars discuss economic nationalism as "nationalist economic policy," thereby making nationalism the modifier.86 To view the takeover of BP as nationalism layered on top of economic policy, as described above, is misleading. Olajide Aluko makes the important point that Nigeria's governing body, the Supreme Military Council, had made the decision to nationalize BP weeks, if not a month, before it happened and that it postponed the declaration for an opportune moment.87 And, as I have argued, the takeover was imbedded in Nigeria's indigenization program. Recently, scholars have sought to revise the meaning of economic nationalism, emphasizing the often harmonious fusion of nationalism and economic processes.88 This article complements the new direction of economic nationalism studies by presenting a case study from Nigeria that exemplifies nationalization as a deliberate, planned component of a broad economic program, with national pride as an important feature.
In conclusion, the takeover of BP had a tremendous impact on Nigeria both economically and politically. The federal government gained more control over its oil industry and was able to diversify its trading partners and invite foreign investors from all over the world. Between 1960 and 1975, Nigeria decreased its reliance on British consumers and increased its trade with the US and West Africa by 9.85 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively.89 The expropriation of BP allowed for the reconfiguration of ShellBP into SPDC, giving Nigeria a greater decision-making role in production, and complete control within BP (Nigeria). It also eased, albeit temporarily, petroleum shortages and regional price discrepancies because more control of the downstream sector meant the ability to implement more effectively petroleum price subsidies. Politically, the nationalization generated public trust and support in Obasanjo, as well as pride in being a citizen of Nigeria, an oil-rich country that earned respect from its African neighbors. Public praise circulating in the Zambian media as well as among Zimbabwe's nationalists delighted Nigerians.90 These reasons, indeed, account for the endurance of the ambiguous popular narrative. But, as this article has argued, identifying the nationalization of BP as strictly a foreign policy issue, whereby Nigeria made its economic decisions based on political developments in southern Africa, leaves many aspects of the event unexplained. To see it the other way around, as economic nationalism, offers more concrete conclusions.
1 "BP Nigeria," Shell International Petroleum (London) [hereafter Shell] to British Petroleum (London) [hereafter BP], 30 July 1979, 4823, British Petroleum Archives [hereafter BPA].
2 "Nationalisation," Shell to BP, 31 July 1979, 1, 4823, BPA.
3 See, for example, "Nigeria Takes Over BP Shares," Daily Times (Lagos), 1 August 1979, 1, and "FMG Applies Oil Squeeze," Nigerian Tide (Port Harcourt), 2 August 1979, 1.
4 See, for example, "BP: Britain Asks for Mercy," Daily Times (Lagos), 3 August 1979, 1 ; "BP Out of Nigeria," Business Times (Lagos), 7 August 1979, 3; Day o Sobowale, "Talking of Barking and Biting," Daily Times (Lagos), 8 August 1979, 9; "BP Wants to Come Back," Sunday Concord (Ikeja), 1 August 1981, 1; and Olajide Aluko, "Nationalising the Assets of BP," in Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981).
5 Okon Akiba, Nigerian Foreign Policy towards Africa (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 155.
6 J.K. Onoh, The Nigerian Oil Economy: From Prosperity to Glut (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 123-24
7 See, for example, Cyril Obi and Kayode Soremekun, "Oil and the Nigerian State: An Overview," in Kayode Soremekun, ed., Perspectives on the Nigerian Oil Industry (Lagos: Amkra Books, 1995), 20.
8 Nicolas J. Spiliotes, "Nigerian Foreign Policy and Southern Africa: A Choice for the West," Issue: A Journal of Opinion 11, 1/2 (Spring-Summer 1981), 45.
9 An editorial in the Nigerian Tide explains that the nationalization was in response to the British giving "formal permission to British Petroleum to start exporting North Sea and non-embargoed oil to the apartheid regime in South Africa." "Editorial: Nigeria Won't Stand for Blackmail," Nigerian Tide (Port Harcourt), 1 1 August 1979, 3. See also "BP Out of Nigeria," Business Times (Lagos), 7 August 1979, 3; "BP Now in Desperate Search for Oil," Nigerian Tide (Port Harcourt), 17 August 1979, 9; "BP Feels the Pinch," The Punch (Ikeja), 25 August 1979, 1; and "BP Back in Oil Business?" National Concord (Ikeja), 29 June 1980, 1.
10 A notable exception is Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria since 1970: A Political and Economic Outline (New York: Africana Publishing, 1981), 88.
11 Julius Ihonvbere, "The Foreign Policy of Dependent States: The Impact of Oil on Nigerian Foreign Policy 1960-1982," The Indian Political Science Review 18, 1 (January 1984), 100.
12 "Upstream" refers to the exploration and production of crude oil, while "downstream" refers to the refining, distribution, and sales of petroleum products.
13 GB. Chalmers, "Nigeria: Oil," 24 January 1972, FCO 65/1226, 2, British National Archives (Kew) Public Records Office [hereafter PRO].
14 Aluko, "Nationalising the Assets of BP," 214.
15 A year after the nationalization, a journalist lamented that African Petroleum, the Nigerian company that took over BP's marketing company, was simply a purveyor of BP's products. Olugbayo Ogunleye, "BP Products Still on Sale," New Nigerian (Kaduna), 21 October 1980, 1,19. Also, BP returned as a producer with Statoil of Norway in 1991. "The Second Coming of British Petroleum," The Guardian (Lagos), 27 May 1991,7.
16 "BP Qut 0f Nigeria," Business Times (Lagos), 7 August 1979, 3.
17 Thomas J. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
18 See Augustine A. Ikein and Comfort Briggs-Anigboh, Oil and Fiscal Federalism: The Political Economy of Resource Allocation in a Developing Country (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1998); Nicholas Balabkins, Indigenization and Economic Development: The Nigerian Experience (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1982); Tom Fönest, Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Gavin Williams, ed., Nigeria Economy and Society (London: Rex Collins, 1976); and Thomas J. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
19 CS. Pickard, "Indigenisation: The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree," 19 February 1972, BT 24/2558, 1,PRO.
20IbId.
21 Kayode Sote, Beyond the Crude Oil and Gas Reserves (Lagos: Lubservices Associates, 1993), 40; Federal Ministry of Information, "Press Release: Nigeria to Sign Oil Agreement with Agip," 15 September 1971,1.
22 "Indigenisation and Nationalisation in Nigeria," British High Commission (Lagos) to British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 15 June 1972, FCO 65/1221, 4, PRO.
23 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Federal Military's Views on the Report of the Industrial Enterprises Panel (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1976), 9, 1 1, BT 241/599, PRO.
24 "BP Nigeria Limited," 10 August 1978, 80623, BPA; BP Nigeria Limited, "Nigerian Acceptances Limited Offer for Sale 6,000,000 Ordinary Shares of 50k Each of the Company" (Apapa: Times Press, 1978), 86011,BPA.
25 P.F. Holmes, managing director of Shell-BP to M. Buhari, chairman of the NNPC, 10 August 1978, 482, BPA.
26 "Fourth Installment of Consideration," Shell to BP, 28 October 1977, 4821, 1-2, BPA.
27 "Nigeria-Disposal of Assets," GC. Butcher to J.W.R. Sutcliffe, 19 October 1978, 4821 , 1, BPA.
28 R.M.E. Lunn to R.N. Tottenham-Smith, 4 May 1971, 118951, 1, BPA.
29 Stephen Bamigbele, "Take Over of Petrol Marketing," New Nigerian (Kaduna), 20 May 1973, 1.
30 Patrick Sanwo, 'The National Oil Marketing Company," NBC Newstalk, 4 April 1975, 1-3; Olu Akinmoladun, "Improving Petrol Distribution," Business Times (Lagos), 27 September 1977, 9. In January 1973, Nigeria switched its currency from the Nigerian pound (£N) to the naira (N).
31 Federal Ministry of Information, "Federal Ministry Government Takes over Esso Standard (Nigeria) Limited," 23 December 1976, 1-2; "Gov't Takes over Esso," Daily Times (Lagos), 24 December 1976, 1; "Nigerian Acquisition of Esso Unit Said Imminent," Piatt's Oilgram News 33, 128 (3 July 1975), 4
32 "Course Begins in Benin on Petroleum Marketing," Nigerian Observer (Benin), 18 September 1978, 3.
33 "Nigerian Acquisition of Esso," 4.
34 Kirk-Greene and Rimmer, Nigeria since 1970, 88.
35 Aluko, "Nationalising the Assets of BP," 221.
36 Federal Ministry of Trade, Annual Report of the Federal Ministry of Trade for the Period 1 January to 31 December, 1975 (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1977), 20.
37 "BP's Strategy for Nigeria," 22 August 1979, 4823, 1, BPA.
38 Shell launched an LNG project in 1966, which began operations between 1976 and 1978. The project included the establishment of the Bonny LNG consortium, in which the NNPC held a 69 percent controlling share with Phillips, Shell, BP, Agip, and Elf. Shortly after starting, however, the project ended because the consortium could not agree with European and North American distributors. At the announcement of nationalization, the managing director of the NNPC clarified that the decision did not affect "BP's shareholding in the LNG scheme" because, he contended, BP could not divert the LNG south to South Africa. "Nationalisation," Shell to BP, 3 1 July 1979, 4823, 1 , BPA.
39 CS. Pickard, "Indigenisation: The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree," 19 February 1972, BT 24/2558,3,PRO.
40 Cultural nationalism, as distinct from ethnic nationalism, is defined as a social and ideological movement established by the educated elite for the promotion and maintenance of a national culture and identity. While different, it is often seen as being hindered by ethnic nationalism. Both tend to be viewed as obstacles to nation building because they are formulated by emotional and cultural attachments. See James Coleman, "The Regionalization of Nationalism," in Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 319-31 on cultural nationalism, and Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (London: Polity Press, 2001), 10-14, 39-40, on ethnic nationalism.
41 Q.M. Morris, "Record Note," 3 August 1979, 4823, BPA.
42 BP (Nigeria) was nationalized under the Acquisition of Assets (British Petroleum & Co.) Act of 1979. "Appointment as the Administrator of BP Nigeria Ltd," A.L. Ciroma to "Tunj Olutola, 30 July 1979, 4823, BPA; "FMG Applies Oil Squeeze," Nigerian Tide (Port Harcourt), 2 August 1979, 16.
43 "BP Out of Nigeria," Business Times (Lagos), 7 August 1979, 3.
44 Ihonvbere, "The Foreign Policy of Dependent States," 101 ; John Andrews, 'Top of the League," The Guardian (London), 5 October 1981; "Another Name for Shell-BP?" Nigerian Tide (Port Harcourt), 9 August 1979, 16.
45 The website for African Petroleum provides a description of the company pre-1979, which implies that AP existed prior to then. In actuality, it is detailing the history of BP (Nigeria). Also, the African Petroleum Company under discussion here is not to be confused with an earlier established company, African Petroleum Terminals, in Nigeria that facilitated international oil trade from the Niger Delta. See "African Petroleum Terminals Ltd.- Closing Papers" 106616, BPA, and BP (Nigeria), "Notice of Extraordinary General Meeting," 24 October 1979, 125364, BPA on this issue. BP (Nigeria) to NNPC, 7 September 1979, 4823, 2-3, BPA; "African Petroleum," http://appplc.com (accessed on 1 December 2006).
46 Gari is a popular food in Nigeria derived from cassava root that has been processed and fermented. "African Petroleum," Daily Times (Lagos), 25 September 1979, 3.
47 "African Petroleum," http://appplc.com; Vincent Nwanma, "Case Study: Nigerian Privatization," Initiative for Policy Dialogue, http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/j_privatization_nigeria.html (accessed on 31 March 2006).
48 See Olajide Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981); Akiba, Nigerian Foreign Policy towards Africa; Ibrahim A. Gambari, Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making: Nigeria after the Second Republic (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989); Ihonvbere, "The Foreign Policy of Dependent States"; James Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy," African Affairs 75, 300 (July 1976), 317-30; Oyo Ogunbadejo, "Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966-1979," International journal 25, 4 (Autumn 1980), 758-71; and James H. Polhemus, "Nigerian and Southern Africa: Interest, Policy, and Means," Canadian Journal of African Studies 11,1 (1977), 43-66.
49 United Nations (UN) General Assembly, "Resolution 232 (1966)," 16 December 1966, 7-8, http://www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html (accessed on 31 May 2006).
50 Nigeria placed a ban on trade with South Africa and engaged in selective boycotts of events that included South African participants. For example, in August 1978, Nigeria boycotted the Commonwealth Games in Canada because of New Zealand's failure to condemn apartheid. One month later, Nigeria walked out of an International Institute of Administrative Sciences conference in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, because South African delegates were allowed to attend. Economist Intelligence Unit [hereafter EIU], Quarterly Economic Review -Nigeria, 4th Quarter (London: EIU, 1978), 6.
51 "Nigeria and the Oil Weapon," Daily Times (Lagos), 15 June 1979, 3.
52 Olajide Aluko, "Nigeria and Britain after Gowon," in Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 68.
53 EIU, Quarterly Economic Review -Nigeria, 1st Quarter (London: EIU, 1978), 6.
54 EIU. Quarterly Economic Review -Nigeria, 4th Quarter (London: EIU, 1977), 5-6.
55 "BP Nationalisation," Shell to BP, 31 July 1979, 4823, 1, BPA; "Nigeria Growls," The Economist (London) 4 August 1979, 11; "Talking of Barking and Biting," Daily Times (Lagos), 8 August 1979, 9. And, Mayall concludes that Nigeria's foreign policy was almost invisible to the outside and lacked cohesion. Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy," 318.
56 G.B. Chalmers, "Nigeria: Oil," 24 January 1972, FCO 65/1226, 2, PRO.
57 A.R.G. Raeburn, Shell to M. Le Quesne, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London), 14 February 1972, FCO 65/1215, 1, PRO.
58 Ibid.
59 Haslemere Group and Anti-Apartheid Movement, "Submission to British Government Inquiry on Allegations of Sanction-Busting by Shell and British Petroleum," 25 April 1977, 1754, 15, Rhodes House, Anti-Apartheid Movement Collection [hereafter RH/ AAM].
60 "Nigeria's Oil for Ian Smith?" Sunday Punch (Ikeja), 1 May 1978, 1.
61 While South Africa and Southern Rhodesia remained on the list, the addition of Israel and the removal of Portugal altered it on 30 September 1976. Shell to BP, 24 March 1979, 125365, BPA.
62 Olusegun Obasanjo, No Compromise with Apartheid, speech at the World Conference for Action against Apartheid, Lagos, 22-26 August , 1977; Obasanjo quoted in "Anti-Apartheid Conference," Shell to BP, 23 August 1978, 4821, BPA.
63 "Nigerian Press and Rhodesia," Shell to BP, 5 May 1978, 4821, BPA.
64 "South Africa Reported in Secret Supply Arrangement with Nigeria," Piatt's Oilgram News 57, 22, 31 January 1979,3.
65 "SA in Secret Oil Deal with Nigeria," Cape Times (Cape Town), 27 January 1979, 1; "Nigerie los SA skip, vat olie," Die Transvaler (Johannesburg), 17 May 1979, 1.
66 At the port of Forcados, Esso Portland flying a Libertan flag called at Cape Town to collect postal mail via helicopter before calling at Nigeria en route to New York. Another vessel, Erviken bore a Norwegian flag and called at Durban en route to Trieste, France. Both vessels were released without much hassle. A major reason Nigeria caught BP was because companies such as Gulf and Mobil had already created a "safe fleet" of ships for Nigeria. Shell to BP, 23 April 1979, 125365, 1-2, BPA; "KuIu," Shell to BP, 17 May 1979, 2, 4822, BPA.
67 "Nigeria-Kulu," PJ. Gillam to J.W.R. Sutcliffe, 21 May 1979, 4822, 1, BPA.
68 Aluko, "Nationalising the Assets of BP."
69 Ibid., 224.
70 "KuIu," Shell to BP, 8 May 1979, 4822, BPA; "KuIu: From Holmes Lagos," 3 May 1979, 4822, 1, BPA; "Meeting with Buhari/Kulu," Shell to BP, 15 May 1979, 4822, 1, BPA.
71 "KuIu," Shell to BP, 5 May 1979, 1, 4822, BPA.
72 Shell to BP, 15 May 1979, 4822, BPA.
73 "KuIu," Shell to BP, 12 May 1979, 4822, BPA.
74 "S'Afrcan Tanker Detained," Nigerian Tide (Port Harcourt), 18 May 1979, 16; Shell to BP, 15 May 1979, 2, 4822, BPA; Shell to BP, 29 May 1979, 1, 4822, BPA; "Running BP Will Get You Nowhere," The Star (Johannesburg), 2 August 1979, 27.
75 "Oil: We Must Watch the Multi-National Firms," Daily Times (Lagos), 17 June 1979, 7. According to this article the offense committed by BP's tanker was that it was of South African origin and its previous port of call was Cape Town.
76 Shell to BP, 14 May 1979, 4822, BPA.
77 "Meeting with Buhari/Kulu," Shell to BP, 15 May 1979, 4822, 1, BPA. A fixed deadline meant that ships calling at Nigeria's ports had to be "clean" since 1 December 1978. A rolling deadline would have meant that this requirement would have started 1 December 1978, but the "clean" requirement would be restricted to, say, six months prior to the arrival of a vessel at a Nigerian port
78 "KuIu," Shell to BP, 14 May 1979, 4822, BPA.
79 "Shell Ships Nigerian Oil to South Africa," Daily Times (Lagos), 20 January 1981, 1; AIphonsus Ikediashi, "Nigerian Oil Flows to S. Africa," Satellite (Enugu), 15 April 1983, 16.
80 This was confirmed during a formal hearing in the United Kingdom on the issue of sanction violations by British companies. See questions posed by T.H. Bingham and S. M. Gray to CCF. Laidlaw, 31 October 1977, 1 14614, BPA and T.H. Bingham and S.M. Gray, Report on the Supply of Petroleum Products to Rhodesia (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1978).
81 "Nigerian Oil," Daily Times (Lagos), 1 August 1979, 11.
82 See, for example, Sam Okayou, "Nigeria's Slavery to Oil Companies," Daily Sketch (Ibadan), 27 February Í 971, 5; Joseph Awotayo, "Ban UK Goods from Nigeria," Daily Times (Lagos), 22 June 1979, 13; and Austin E. Nwachuke, "Nationalise All British Firms in Nigeria," Daily Times (Lagos), 22 June 1979, 13.
83 See, for example, "Editorial: Nigeria Won't Stand for Blackmail," Nigerian Tide (Port Harcourt), 1 1 August 1979, 3; Olu Akinmoladun, "Oil: We Must Watch the Multi-National Firms," Daily Times (Lagos), 17 August 1978, 7, 15; and "Editorial: Price of Perfidy," Nigerian Tide (Port Harcourt), 3 August 1979, 3.
84 Stephen J. Korbin, "Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in LDCs," International Organization 34, 1 (Winter 1980), 66, 85.
85 Harry Johnson, "Economic Nationalism in New States," in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 238-39. Italics mine.
86 See, for example, Johnson, "Economic Nationalism in New States," who uses "economic nationalism" and "nationalist economic policy" interchangeably, and Peter O. Olayiwola, Petroleum and Structural Change in a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1987), who uses it exclusively.
87 Aluko, "Nationalising the Assets of BP," 226.
88 See Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel, eds., Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics (London: Routledge, 2000); and Alice Teichova, Herbert Matis, and Jaroslave Patek, Economic Change and the National Question in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
89 Ihonvbere, "Foreign Policy of Dependent States," 98 and EIU, Quarterly Economic Review -Nigeria 3rd Quarter (London: EIU, 1977), Appendix 2.
90 Andy Akporugo, "Zambia Hails BP Take-Over," Daily Times (Lagos), 4 August 1979, 1; "Patriotic Front Hails Nigeria's Action on BP," Daily Times (Lagos), 10 August 1979, 9.
By Ann Genova
Roanoke College ([email protected])
Ann Genova is an assistant professor of African history at Roanoke College. Her research interests include petroleum, nationalism, and development in Nigeria She received her Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. Her publications include the co-authored Politics of the Global Oil Industry (Praeger, 2005) and co-edited Yoruba Identity and Power Politics (University of Rochester Press, 2006).
Copyright Boston University 2010