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Contents
- Abstract
- Objectives of the Present Study
- Testing the Revised Version of Roseman's Theory
- Comparisons With Alternative Theories
- Addressing Prior Methodological Problems
- Method
- Experimental Overview and Design
- Subjects
- Stimulus Emotions
- Procedure
- Appraisal Ratings
- Results
- Overview
- Calculation of Appraisal Scores
- Were There Differences in Appraisal of Events That Elicited Different Emotions?
- Did Each of the Hypothesized Appraisals Differentiate Among Emotions?
- Did the Appraisals Differ Among Emotions in Theoretically Specified Patterns?
- Comparison of Predictions Made by Alternative Theories
- Discussion
- Appraisals of Events That Differentiate Among Discrete Emotions
- Relationships Between Particular Appraisals and Particular Emotions
- Situational state as differentiating positive from negative emotions
- Motivational state as differentiating joy from relief, and sadness from disgust and distress
- Probability as differentiating hope from joy, and fear from disgust
- Power or legitimacy as differentiating among emotions
- Agency as differentiating among event-directed, other-directed, and self-directed emotions
- Importance of This Research
- Future Directions
- Appendix A
Figures and Tables
Abstract
A recent theory (Roseman, 1979, 1984) attempts to specify the particular appraisals of events that elicit 16 discrete emotions. This study tested hypotheses from the latest version of the theory and compared them with hypotheses derived from appraisal theories proposed by Arnold (1960) and by Scherer (1988), using procedures designed to address some prior methodological problems. Results provided empirical support for numerous hypotheses linking particular appraisals of situational state (motive-inconsistent/motive-consistent), motivational state (punishment/reward), probability (uncertain/certain), power (weak/strong), legitimacy (negative outcome deserved/positive outcome deserved), and agency (circumstances/other person/self) to particular emotions. Where hypotheses were not supported, new appraisal–emotion relationships that revise the theory were proposed.
Why do people feel particular discrete emotions, such as sadness, anger, or guilt? Why does a particular person in a particular situation (e.g., the breakup of a relationship) feel one of these emotions rather than another? Why do different people in the same situation, or the same person in a situation at different times, feel different emotions?
Appraisal theorists (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1968; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1979, 1984; Scherer, 1984, 1988;