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Contents
- Abstract
- PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS OF EMOTION EXPERIENCE
- Research Data on Emotion Experience
- Methodological Problems With the Data
- Conceptual Problems With the Theories
- Different Kinds of Question About Emotion Experience
- DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS
- Consciousness and Experience
- Emotion State and Emotion Experience
- Self, Physicality, and the Content of Emotion Experience
- A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF EMOTION EXPERIENCE
- Microgenesis and Content of Emotion State
- Relations Between Evaluative Description and Action Attitude
- Emotion State and Phenomenology
- Attention and Consciousness
- Awareness and Mode of Attention
- General Directedness: Self Versus World
- Evaluation Versus Action Focus
- The Varieties of Emotion Experience: Kinds of Content
- First-Order Emotion Experience
- Second-Order Emotion Experience
- Nonpropositional Awareness
- Self-focus
- World-focus (gerundival perception)
- Propositional Awareness—Conscious Emotion Thoughts
- Categorical-Emotion Experience
- Cultural Variation in Bodily and Mental Emotion Experience
- Hedonic Tone
- Further Comments on Processes Contributing to Emotion Experience
- General Directedness and Focal Attention
- Factors Determining Directional Focus of Emotion Experience
- Constitution of Phenomenal States and of Awareness
- APPLYING THE CONCEPTUALIZATION: VARIETIES OF UNAWARENESS OF EMOTION
- Emotion States With No Accompanying First-Order Phenomenology?
- Lack of or Reduced Second-Order Awareness of Emotion Experience?
- Failures in Categorical-Emotion Experience?
- Defense Mechanisms
- CONCLUDING COMMENTS
- Empirical predictions
- The three questions of emotion experience
- Previous accounts of emotion experience reassessed
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Abstract
Data reviewed suggest that previous theories of emotion experience are too narrow in scope and that lack of consensus is due to the fact that emotion experience takes various forms and is heterogenous. The authors treat separately the content of emotion experience, the underlying nonconscious correspondences, and processes producing emotion experience. They classify the nature and content of emotion experience and propose that it depends on 3 aspects of attention: mode (analytic-synthetic; detached-immersed), direction (self-world), and focus (evaluation-action). The account is informed by a 2-level view of consciousness in which phenomenology (1st order) is distinguished from awareness (2nd order). These distinctions enable the authors to differentiate and account for cases of “unconscious” emotion, in which there is an apparent lack of phenomenology or awareness.
Although it is acknowledged that the conscious experience of different emotions differs, it is not as widely recognized explicitly that the experience of each emotion can take different forms. For...