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Abstract
Some recent studies of co-management have focused on social networks among local resource users but only a few have attempted to include other decision-makers in these networks. The Chilean Management and Exploitation Areas for Benthic Resources (MEABR) system provides a good opportunity to study co-management networks. The MEABR applies to the small-scale benthic fishery sector and it has not been studied from a network approach. The MEABR system has attracted a great deal of international attention as a model of co-management. However, there are various critiques of the system. Novel and on-going challenges suggest there is room for adaptation and fine-tuning given that co-management is not an end-point but a process and is always changing.
The purpose of my research was to explore the organizational networks of actors and interactions that comprise the small-scale fisheries co-management system in Chile. Further, the thesis looks at existing adaptive capacities of these networks and its members that could affect the long-term sustainability of the Chilean fishery co-management policy. Using mixed methods, this study is based on one detailed case. Drawing from this case, the study expands to cover 38 small-scale fisher organizations from two administrative regions. Information from these organizations was used to investigate (1) the key actors and relationships of Chile's fisheries co-management system, (2) the relevant governance networks of the system, and (3) the implications of individual networks for the functioning of co-management. The analysis is based on a two-mode network centrality analysis. The focus is placed in the linkages between fisher organizations and other co-management counterparts (including fisher and non fisher actors).
The overall MEABR system is mostly supported by facilitating relationships among fisher organizations and their counterparts. However, decision-making seems to be highly centralized, and power is concentrated in state institutions. There is little horizontal exchange and cooperation among local fisher organizations. Nonetheless, other self-organized networks have emerged to respond to growing drivers of change. Some of these are long-standing regional and national fisher associations, which play key political and bridging functions. Others represent novel partnerships with the goal of increasing resource productivity. In some cases these alliances are hampered by the rigidity of the policy structure. For example, there have been experimentation initiatives involving universities and fishers. Conflictive linkages between fishers and other sectors, such as large development projects, were identified and require conflict resolution mechanisms.
Findings suggest that the presence of broad and strong social networks, as an expression of linking social capital (i.e., between local organizations and actors at other scales), are positively correlated with external prestige of fisher co-managers. These networks are also correlated with fishers' pride in their management areas and with the current results obtained from these areas. Preliminary conclusions are: (1) social networks are relevant and associated with perceived success of co-management; and, (2) networks are actively established by fishers over time to cope with difficulties or to take advantage of opportunities. Social capital and networks are certainly not only the only predictors of co-management success. There are multiple conditions that can lead to better functioning and performance of management areas.
The findings have several policy implications. To achieve the goal of increased resilience and better governance we need a way to transform organizations that are relatively poor in social and natural capital, into organizations that are relatively rich. To do this may require greater flexibility to experiment and innovate and greater autonomy to carry out such experimentation independent of top-down government management. The "engines" for innovation in the MEABR system are those organizations which are already rich in social and natural capital. Flexibility can be introduced step-wise, gradually reducing fishers' dependence on external actors. For example, reducing the amount of money spent on resource inventory, by fishers themselves taking over that function, may allow fisher organizations to invest more in services in other areas, such as marketing, processing, and infrastructure.
