Content area
Work on the psychological aftermath of traumatic events suggests that people ordinarily operate on the basis of unchallenged, unquestioned assumptions about themselves and the world. A heuristic model specifying the content of people's assumptive worlds is proposed. The schema construct in social cognition is used to explore the role of these basic assumptions following traumatic events. A major coping task confronting victims is a cognitive one, that of assimilating their experience and/or changing their basic schemas about themselves and their world. Various seemingly inappropriate coping strategies, including self-blame, denial, and intrusive, recurrent thoughts, are discussed from the perspective of facilitating the victim's cognitive coping task. A scale for measuring basic assumptions is presented, as is a study comparing the assumptive worlds of people who did or did not experience particular traumatic events in the past. Results showed that assumptions about the benevolence of the impersonal world, chance, and self-worth differed across the two populations. Findings suggest that people's assumptive worlds are affected by traumatic events, and the impact on basic assumptions is still apparent years after the negative event. Further research directions suggested by work on schemas are briefly discussed.
Social Cognition, Vol. 7, No 2, 1989, pp 113-136
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS AND THE STRESS OF TRAUMATIC EVENTS: APPLICATIONS OF
THE SCHEMA CONSTRUCT
RONNIE JANOFF-BULMAN University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Work on the psychological aftermath of traumatic events suggests that people ordinarily operate on the basis of unchallenged, unquestioned assumptions about themselves and the world. A heuristic model specifying the content of people's assumptive worlds is proposed. The schema construct in social cognition is used
to explore the role of these basic assumptions following traumatic events. A major coping task confronting victims is a cognitive one, that of assimilating their experience and/or changing their basic schemas about themselves and their world. Various
seemingly inappropriate coping strategies, including self-blame, denial, and intrusive,
recurrent thoughts, are discussed from the perspective of facilitating the victim's
cognitive coping task. A scale for measuring basic assumptions is presented, as
is a study comparing the assumptive worlds of people who did or did not experience particular traumatic events in the past. Results showed that assumptions about the benevolence of the impersonal world, chance, and self-worth differed across
the two populations. Findings suggest that people's assumptive worlds are affected
by traumatic events, and the impact on basic assumptions is still apparent years after the negative event. Further research directions suggested by work on schemas
are briefly discussed.
Increasingly, psychologists have begun to recognize the tremendous
psychological toll exacted by extreme events such as criminal victim
ization, disease, accidents, and natural disasters. Following such stressful life events, individuals commonly experience intense anxiety, confusion, helplessness, and depression; in some cases the symptoms
of post-traumatic stress disorder are apparent (e.g., Horowitz, 1982; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983). One way of understanding the psy
chological reactions of individuals who have experienced extreme
Reprint requests to Dr. Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Department of Psychology, University
of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003.
113
114 JANOFF-BULMAN
negative events is to focus on people's basic assumptions about the
world and the impact of stressful life events
on these assumptions (Janoff-Bulman, 1985; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983). Work with victims
suggests that people generally operate on the basis of important as
sumptions that generally go unquestioned and unchallenged. Stressful
life events, which may dramatically challenge these assumptions, thereby serve to illustrate the otherwise tacit
implicit nature of
Past empirical research on coping with negative life events has
focused largely
on the role of attributions (e.g., Baum, Fleming, &
Singer, 1983; Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Meyer
& Taylor, 1986; Miller & Porter, 1983; Tennen, Affleck, & Gerschman,
1986; Wortman, 1976). This emphasis was
a direct reflection of the immense amount of work done on attributions by social psychologists
over the past decade. Important work has also been done in such
areas as social comparison (e.g., Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, 1983)
and interpersonal interactions (e.g., Wortman & Dunkel-Schetter, 1979)
following negative life events. This past research has contributed to
a better understanding of how people cope following stressful life
events. The present perspective represents an attempt to further extend
our
understanding of these coping processes.
The proposition that people operate on the basis of unquestioned assumptions has received little attention by psychologists in recent
years. Nevertheless, the idea is clearly not a new one. Parkes (1971, 1975) used the term "assumptive world" to refer to a "strongly held
set of assumptions about the world and the self which is confidently
maintained and used as a means of recognizing, planning and act ing. Assumptions such as these
are learned and confirmed by the experience of many years" (1975, p. 132). Bowlbv's (1969) "world models," Marris's (1975) "structures of meaning," and Epstein's (1973, 1979, 1980) "theory of reality" represent similar constructs [also compare
Kuhn's (1962) conception of "paradigm"]. In all cases the reference
is to a basic conceptual system, developed over time, that provides
us with expectations about ourselves and the world so that we might
function effectively. This conceptual system is best represented by a
set of assumptions, or theories, that generally prove viable in interactions with the world.
THE RELEVANCE OF SCHEMAS
Although relatively few psychologists have focused specifically on
people's assumptive worlds per se,
a
or
these fundamental beliefs.
large and increasing number
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS 115
have devoted attention to the cognitive concept of "schema." A schema
is an abstracted knowledge structure, stored in memory, that involves
a rich network of information about a given stimulus domain (Fiske
& Linville, 1980; Hastie, 1981). Schemas serve as preexisting theories
that provide a basis for anticipating the future and guide what
notice and remember, as well as how we interpret new information (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Taylor & Crocker, 1981).
Schemas enable us to recognize the congruence, incongruence,
or irrelevance of data by functioning as strongly held expectations against which to compare data (Hastie, 1981). Yet strong biases operate
so as to support the maintenance and stability of our schemas. We
perceive entities or events as more consistent with our schemas than
is justified, and we discount or misperceive incongruent data so as
to allow for the continued utility of our schemas. Research has shown
that people are very good at remembering schema-consistent infor
mation (e.g., Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979; Swann & Read, 1981), misremember stimuli in a schema-consistent manner (e.g., Cantor &
Mischel, 1977), and interpret information so as to support their preex
isting schemas (e.g., Langer & Abelson, 1974). Further, Ross and his
colleagues (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard,
1975) have found that people will persevere in maintaining theories they have formed on the basis of evidence in the research laboratory,
even when the evidence they relied on is subsequently presented as unequivocally false.
Research has amply demonstrated that in general we are con
servative when it comes to changing our schemas; we attempt to
incorporate the anomalous within the framework of existing schemas, and we persevere in retaining already existing schemas rather than developing new ones (see discussions in Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). The tendency is toward assimilation rather than ac
commodation (Piaget, 1971). Certainly, philosophers of science have argued in favor of this conservatism when evaluating new versus old
theories (Popper, 1963). Our conservatism in maintaining schemas derives from our fundamental need for stability and coherence in our conceptual systems (Epstein, 1973, 1979, 1980; Nisbett & Ross, 1980;
Sarbin, 1981). Generally, our schemas serve us well. They are con
structed and solidified over years of experience and, as stable knowledge
structures, provide us with the necessary equilibrium to function in
a
complex, changing world.
In an important way, people's resistance to schema change also
describes their resistance to changes in their basic assumptions about
the world and themselves, for these basic assumptions can be considered schemas. Work on schemas has generally been concerned with rules
we
116 JANOFF-BULMAN
and categories that might be called middle-level abstractions (Janoff-
Bulman & Timko, 1987); most research in the area has dealt with
categories that have relatively clear, identifiable referents (e.g., common concepts, social categories, personal attributes, events; see, e.g., Abel
son, 1981; Cantor, 1980; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Markus, 1977; Rosch, 1978) and has not been concerned with the very basic theories or
assumptions people hold about the world. Nevertheless, as Rumelhart (1978) notes, schemas can represent knowledge at this grand, abstract
level as well. It is change in these most fundamental schemas, deeply
embedded within our conceptual system, that is at stake in the case
of traumatic life events.
THE CONTENT OF OUR ASSUMPTIVE WORLD
In order to examine more fully the process of change and resistance
to change following traumatic life events, it is first necessary to explore
the content of our basic assumptions. Researchers and theorists who
have discussed people's assumptive worlds or personal theories (e.g., Bowlby, 1969; Marris, 1975; Parkes, 1971, 1975) have generally not been concerned with the specific content of our assumptions. Work with victims of traumatic events, however, provides important insights
into our everyday assumptions, for such experiences lead to an ob
jectification and examination of assumptions that had previously been
relied on, though unquestioned and unchallenged prior to the crisis
situation.
Generally, the single most common response to negative life events
such as crime, disease, and accidents is an intense feeling of vulnerability
(e.g., Bard & Sangrey, 1979; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983; Janoff-Bulman, Madden, & Timko, 1983; Perloff, 1983; Weisman, 1979; Wolf-enstein, 1957). Victims report that they never thought it could happen
to them; they feel vulnerable, unsafe, and unprotected. This response of victims informs us considerably about nonvictims. We generally
operate on the basis of an illusion of invulnerability, a basic belief
that "it can't happen to me." We may intellectually maintain that one
out of four people gets cancer and that crimes and car accidents are
common. Yet we truly do not believe that these events will happen
to us (Janoff-Bulman & Lang-Gunn, in press; Perloff, 1983; Weinstein, 1980, 1983; Weinstein & Lachendro, 1982). Work by personality theorists
and object relations theorists suggests that this sense of safety and
security may be fundamental to the healthy personality and is first
developed very early in childhood through responsible, predictable
interactions with caregivers (e.g., Bowlby, 1969; Erikson, 1950, 1968;
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS 117
Fairbairn, 1952; Horney, 1937, 1939; Sullivan, 1940, 1953). Given the
posited significance and early development of an individual's sense
of safety and security, it could be claimed that the assumptions sup
porting this sense of invulnerability would be among the most fun damental postulates in our assumptive world. What are our basic
assumptions about the world and ourselves that are related to our
perceptions of vulnerability?
I would maintain that there are three primary categories of such
assumptions: (1) perceived benevolence of the world, (2) meaningfulness
of the world, and (3) worthiness of the self. Based on past research
on the experience of victimization (e.g., Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Litton, 1967; Silver & Wortman, 1980; Taylor, 1983; Timko & Janoff-
Bulman, 1985; Wolfenstein, 1957; Wortman & Dunkel-Schetter, 1979),
there is little question that assumptions about the benevolence of the world, about meaningfulness, and about oneself are central concerns
of individuals following stressful negative events; as such, they are
likely to be primary postulates of our assumptive world.
In order to conduct research investigating components of people's assumptive worlds, it became apparent that a more detailed model of vulnerability-relevant assumptions would have to be developed.
The goal was to develop a heuristic model of assumptions that would
be theoretically informative in terms of the elements included, as well
as
empirically worthwhile, in that it would provide the basis for the development of
an instrument for investigating people's basic as
sumptions. Clearly, the proposed categories and the assumptions comprising these categories are unlikely to be exhaustive of vulnerability-
related assumptions. Surely other assumptions comprise our assumptive
world as well. Nevertheless, the model is composed of assumptions
that are presumed to be core elements of our basic conceptual system.
In the general model, there
are three primary categories, each of which
is comprised of several assumptions.
MODEL OF BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
Benevolence of the World. The first category involves the extent to
which people view the world positively or negatively: To what extent
do good versus bad events occur in the world? How common are
good and bad outcomes? Essentially, this category involves an implicit
base-rate notion of benevolence/malevolence. There are two basic as
sumptions that comprise this category: the benevolence of the im
personal world and the benevolence of people. The more an individual
118 JANOFF-BULMAN
believes in the benevolence of the impersonal world, the more he
she believes that the world is a good place and that misfortune is
relatively uncommon. The more an individual believes in the benev
olence of people, the more he or she believes that people are basically
good, kind, helpful, and caring.
Meaningfulness of the World. The second category is the meaning
fulness of the world and involves people's beliefs about the distribution
of outcomes; that is, once individuals have a sense of the extent to which good versus bad outcomes occur, the question of how these
outcomes are distributed then arises. How are we to understand who gets which outcomes? In our Western world there appear to be three
primary candidates for distributional principles. First, people may believe outcomes are distributed in accordance with a principle of
justice (Rawls, 1971), by which personal deservingness determines
which events affect which people. Lerner's (1980) "just world theory" posits that people have a need to believe in a just world, a world in
which people deserve what they get and get what they deserve. For
those who believe that outcomes are distributed according to principles
of justice, the "goodness" and "decency" of one's character become
primary factors to be considered in estimates of one's own or others'
vulnerability.
The second distributional principle in the model involves people's
assumptions about the controllability of outcomes. People may consider
the distribution of outcomes in terms of people's behaviors, rather than character (see Janoff-Bulman, 1979). From this perspective, it is
the extent to which people engage in appropriate, precautionary be
haviors that best determines what will happen to them. The assumption
is that people can directly control their world through their own
behaviors (see Abramsom, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Rotter, 1966;
Seligman, 1975) and can minimize their own vulnerability by engaging
in the "proper" behaviors (e.g., careful, precautionary, foresightful).
There is considerable evidence in the psychological literature that
people overestimate the amount of control thev have over outcomes
(Langer, 1975; Taylor, 1983; Wortman, 1976), thereby presumably
underestimating the extent to which they are vulnerable to negative
outcomes.
This assumption of controllability is distinguishable from an as
sumption of justice as a distributional principle, in that behaviors,
rather than one's moral character, provide the primary basis for un
derstanding why particular outcomes happen to particular people.
Considered together, these two beliefs justice and controllability comprise what is generally termed a "sense of meaning" in psychological
literature (e.g., Frankl, 1963; Lifton, 1967; Silver, Boon, & Stones, 1983; Silver & Wortman, 1980); that is, a social event is meaningful, or makes
or
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS 119
sense, to the extent that it is consistent with predictable social laws,
and the social laws that are invoked most often in Western society
are those of justice and controllability.
The third and final assumption under the category of distributional
principles is that of chance. According to
assumption of chance,
or randomness, there is no way of "making sense" of why particular
events happen to particular people; it seems to be a matter of chance
alone, and meaninglessness appears to prevail. A person who believes
strongly in randomness will not regard justice or controllability as
powerful determinants of outcomes and will argue that there is nothing
one can do or be that will serve to protect an individual from negative
outcomes. Certainly, one would expect beliefs in the random distribution
of outcomes to be associated with strong beliefs in personal vulnerability. Nevertheless, to the extent that a person perceives the world and
people as extremely benevolent, feelings of personal vulnerability
would be minimized. Further, realistically, the three assumptions regarding the distribution of outcomes are not truly mutually exclusive;
rather, people are apt to believe in the operation of all three principles
to a greater or lesser extent and with more or less emphasis on each.
Worthiness of Self. The third major category of component as
sumptions of vulnerability involves beliefs about oneself. Certain in
dividuals may believe that the world is very malevolent (i.e., high
base-rate perception of negative outcomes) and that the primary dis
tributional principle is justice. We would not know the extent to which
these people felt vulnerable unless we also knew the extent to which they believed they
personally deserving of good versus bad
outcomes. If these people felt they were highly moral, decent indi
viduals, perceptions of vulnerability would be minimized, for despite frequent negative events, their moral character would serve as a pro
tection in a just world. Similarly, if the world is seen as largely benevolent
and justice is the primary distributional principle, people could still perceive themselves as vulnerable if they had self-perceptions of low self-worth; in this case, the few negative outcomes that might exist
would be regarded as most likely to strike these particular individuals.
The same analysis could be made with different combinations of be
nevolent/malevolent world and the principle of controllability as well.
It seems necessary, then, to include assumptions about the self in a
heuristic model of vulnerability-related assumptions.
The three self-relevant dimensions in the present model parallel
the three distributional principles discussed above. The first assumption
related to the self is the belief in one's self-worth. This involves the extent to which people perceive themselves as good, moral, worthy,
decent individuals. To the extent that they maintain a positive perception
of their moral character they would presumably feel invulnerable in
an
were
120 JANOFF-BULMAN
a just world; in such a world their "goodness" determines their out
comes.
The second self-relevant assumption parallels the distributional principle of controllability (and is thus labeled self-controllability) and
involves the extent to which individuals see themselves as the type
of people who engage in appropriate, precautionary behaviors. Do
they generally engage in the "right" behaviors,
or do they act carelessly,
without regard for what might happen? The question here is not
whether people can control outcomes (as in the distributional principle
of controllability) but whether the individual in question does what
is necessary to control outcomes. In a controllable world, it is the individual whose behaviors are most exemplary who will be minimally
vulnerable.
The third assumption with regard to the self is related to perceptions
of chance as a distributional principle. Certainly, to the extent that randomness is assumed to operate, no aspect of the self should logically
serve as a protection against negative outcomes. Nevertheless, people
do have self-perceptions of themselves as lucky or unlucky, and thus
the third assumption is that of luck. This is an elusive self-perception
that allows individuals to believe that they will be protected from ill
fortune, despite the fact that they are unable to point to particular,
well-defined aspects of themselves to account for this belief. From this perspective, the world may operate on the basis of chance, but
the lucky person for reasons unknown but labeled "luck" will
come out ahead nevertheless.
Considered in total, there are eight primary postulates in our
conceptual system: benevolence of the world, benevolence of people,
the distributional principles of justice, controllability, and randomness, and the self-relevant dimensions of self-worth, self-controllability,
and luck. These are our most fundamental schemas, the assumptions
most apt to be affected by the experience of traumatic events.
THE COPING TASK OF THE VICTIM
Although maintenance of schemas and theories are the norm, it is
certainly the case that changes can and do occur. Gradual schematic
changes are no doubt more common than we realize, in that the process of learning involves small, gradual changes in our schemas
as a result of interactions with our environment. In these cases, the overall structure of the system is not threatened, and thus change
occurs in the absence of instability and incoherence. These changes
are not likely to be stressful or even noticed, for the process is gradual
and incremental. This process of change is consistent with the "book
keeping model," one of two models proposed by Rothbart (1981) to
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS 121
account for changes in stereotypes in response to incongruent infor
mation. According to this model, schemas change a bit each time
incongruent instances are perceived, and thus the change process is very gradual, deliberate, and predictable, involving minor adjustments
over time (Rothbart, 1981; also see Weber & Crocker, 1983; cf. Taylor,
1981).
A second model of schema change proposed by Rothbart (1981; also see Gurwitz & Dodge, 1977) is the "conversion model," which argues that change is relatively "catastrophic," involving a few highly salient, critical instances of incongruence. Instances that are only slightly
or
moderately incongruent will be assimilated into the preexisting schema, whereas salient, dramatically incongruent instances will pro
duce schema change (Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, 1984); see Kuhn's
(1962) conception of "scientific revolutions."
In the case of traumatic negative events, individuals confront very salient, critical "anomalous data," for the victimization cannot be readily
accounted for by the person's preexisting assumptions (Janoff-Bulman, 1985; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983). Traumatic negative events, such
as serious illness, disasters, severe accidents, and criminal victimizations
are too vivid and too emotionally powerful to ignore or easily discount.
The data do not fit. Yet as research on schemas amply demonstrates, people are resistant to changing their theories and schemas. Further,
"catastrophic" change at the level of people's most basic assumptions,
their highest-order schemas or theories, may threaten the breakdown
of the entire conceptual system; for the primary postulates represent
the foundation on which other beliefs are built. Following traumatic
life events, victims' basic assumptions do not seem viable in light of
the data from the victimization, yet stability and coherence are threat
ened by change. The coping task facing victims is largely a difficult cognitive dilemma; they must integrate the data of their dramatic, negative experience and their prior assumptions, which cannot readily
assimilate the new information. Victims must rework the new data
so as to make it fit and thereby maintain their old assumptions, or
they must revise their old assumptions in a way that precludes the
breakdown of the entire system and allows them to perceive the world
as not wholly threatening. A number of cognitive strategies and pro
cesses that are used by victims, perhaps even unwittingly, are par
ticularly functional in enabling victims to resolve their cognitive crises.
USEFUL COGNITIVE STRATEGIES
Following traumatic life events, victims often engage in particular
behaviors that appear puzzling to nonvictim observers. Among these
are self-blame, reinterpretation of the victimization in a positive light,
122 JANOFF-BULMAN
denial, and recurrent, intrusive thoughts. When considered from the perspective of schema change in the face of dramatic negative events,
these postvictimization responses become quite comprehensible. Self-
blame attributions and positive interpretations of the event involve
working with the incongruent data so as to render it more assimilable.
Denial and recurrent thoughts, on the other hand,
psychological
processes that facilitate the course of cognitive integration, particularly
when the potential for total schema breakdown exists.
Self-blame is a common response following victimization (for
review, see Janoff-Bulman & Lang-Gunn, in press). Victims often
seem to blame themselves for traumatic events more than would appear appropriate to outside observers. Janoff-Bulman (1979) has
argued that self-blame is not a unitary phenomenon; rather, there are
(at least) two types of self-blame: behavioral self-blame, which involves
blaming one's past behaviors (or behavioral omissions) for one's mis fortune; and characterological self-blame, which involves blaming one's
character or particular traits for the negative outcome. Although both
are internal attributions, behavioral self-blame is a far less stable, global, generalized response (see Abramson et ai, 1978); it involves
attributions to a modifiable source (behavior), one that can be changed
as a result of one's own efforts. Janoff-Bulman (1979) has argued that
behavioral self-blame, and not characterological self-blame, is adaptive,
in that it enables victims to minimize their sense of vulnerability and maximize their feelings of control following victimization (also see
Wortman, 1976). By blaming one's behavior, a victim can believe that future changes in this behavior will enable him or her to avoid the
negative event in the future. Research has provided empirical support for the adaptiveness of behavioral self-blame (e.g., Affleck, Allen,
Tennen, McGrade, & Ratzan, 1985; Baum et ai, 1983; Peterson, Schwartz, & Seligman, 1981; Tennen et ai, 1986; Timko & Janoff-
Bulman, 1985).
From the perspective of the cognitive crisis confronting the victim,
behavioral self-blame is adaptive because it enables the victim to main
tain preexisting basic assumptions, or at least minimizes the need for schema change. By engaging in behavioral self-blame, the individual
who has experienced a traumatic event can continue to believe that
the world is benevolent and meaningful and that he or she is worthy
and decent (Janoff-Bulman & Thomas, in press); this was not a random
incident in a malevolent world. Work on schema change suggests that
behaviors that are incongruent with a person's schema tend to be
attributed to situational, as opposed to dispositional cues (Crocker et
ai, 1984; Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983); the behavior is then more
readily discounted. Similarly, behavioral self-blame, as opposed to
characterological self-blame, enables the victim to discount to a con-
are
a
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS 123
siderable extent, the schema-discrepant implications of the traumatic
event. The event is interpreted in a manner that maximizes the pos
sibilities for assimilation.
Victims often reinterpret their negative experience in a positive light (e.g., Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Collins, Taylor, & Skokan, 1987;
Silver & Wortman, 1980; Taylor, 1983; Taylor et ai, 1983), and this process too involves an interpretation of the new information in a
manner that maximizes its conformity with preexisting basic
sumptions. Victims often report benefits gained from their traumatic experience, including self-knowledge, a reordering of priorities, and
a
reappraisal of their life. By emphasizing benefits derived or lessons
learned from the experience, victims can continue to believe that the world is a benevolent, just place and that they are worthy people.
Positive interpretations of the trauma serve to reduce the trauma's
attack on victims' assumptive worlds.
Behavioral self-blame and positive interpretations of the traumatic
event help to resolve the victim's cognitive crisis by affecting the data
that must be integrated into one's conceptual system. Two other com
mon victim responses denial and intrusive, recurrent thoughts
facilitate the fit between the new information and old schemas, not
by affecting the interpretation of the new information but rather by affecting the course of the accommodation process. When
a person
integrates new, discrepant information, the schema, or knowledge
structure, is modified (Higgins & Bargh, 1987); when a victim integrates
the data of the traumatic event, the most fundamental assumptions
are
changed.
One's assumptive world, built and solidified over many years of
experience, cannot simply be dramatically altered overnight; rather,
the change must be made a gradual one so that the conceptual system
is able to maintain stability and coherence during the cognitive in
tegration process. Denial allows for the proper pacing in rebuilding
one's assumptions, and
one would expect highest levels of denial
immediately following the traumatic event, when the potential shock
to the conceptual system is greatest. Denial slows down the change
process, moderating the attack
on the victim's basic assumptions
(Janoff-Bulman & Timko, 1987). This view of denial is consistent with the work of Horowitz (1980, 1982, 1983; also see Epstein, 1967; Lazarus, 1983), which emphasizes the victim's tendency to integrate reality
and inner models (the "completion tendency") and recognizes the
important role played by denial in reducing threatening information
to tolerable doses.
Horowitz (1980, 1982, 1983) also discusses the phenomenon of
intrusive, recurrent thoughts following traumatic life events. He argues that these thoughts are indications that the new information (i.e.,
as
124 JANOFF-BULMAN
data from the experience) is being stored in active memory,
worked on until "completion" occurs. Denial and recurrent thoughts,
in other words, are mutually dependent regulating processes; intrusive, negative thoughts about the traumatic event alternate with denial,
for the latter process kicks in when the intrusive thoughts become overwhelming. Yet through the recurrent thoughts, the victim is actually actively trying to process the information. From this perspective, re peatedly thinking about one's traumatic experience contributes to the
eventual assimilation of these new data (for a discussion of limits to the adaptiveness of intrusive, recurrent thoughts, see Janoff-Bulman
& Thomas, in press; Silver et ai, 1983; Tait & Silver, 1987). In the end,
the victim must have a viable assumptive world,
one that is able to account for the data of his or her victimization experience. No doubt, this integration of new information and old schemas involves both assimilation and accommodation.
LONG-TERM CHANGES IN VICTIMS' ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS
The stress of victimization can in part be understood in terms of the
cognitive crisis confronting the victim. Somehow the data and personal
theories must fit together. Several strategies minimize the likelihood
of psychological breakdown, either by minimizing the inconsistencies
between the old theories and new data or bv moderating and modulating
change in the victim's basic assumptions or highest-order schemas.
What do the assumptive worlds of victims actually look like? With the intent of getting some beginning descriptive data of victims' basic assumptions, a scale was developed to tap people's basic assumptions.
The World Assumptions Scale was then used in an exploratory study
that compared the basic assumptions of victims and nonvictims.
THE WORLD ASSUMPTIONS SCALE
Scale construction involved three separate phases. In phase 1, items
were
generated for potential inclusion in the scale. Items were generated
for each of the eight assumptions proposed in the model of basic
assumptions. The eight "best" items (clearest, most straightforward,
most unambiguous) for each assumption were combined in a single questionnaire. In phase 2, 254 subjects (155 females, 99 males) completed
this 64-item questionnaire. Alpha coefficients revealed that the scale could be pared down to four items per assumption (i.e., a total of 32
to be
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS 125
items) while maintaining good reliabilities. All of the eight four-item
subscales (representing each of the assumptions) had reliabilities be
tween .67 and .78. These 32 statements were then combined to produce
the final version of the World Assumptions Scale, which can be seen
in Table 1. The letters preceding each item indicate the particular assumption represented by each: the benevolence of the world (BW),
the benevolence of people (BP), justice (J), controllability (C),
domness (R), self-worth (SW), self-controllability (SC), and luck (L).
In phase 3, this final version of the questionnaire was completed by
356 subjects (212 females, 144 males), who responded
8-point
scales with endpoints "disagree completely" and "agree completely."
(In subsequent research we have reduced the response choices to 6-
point scales, with endpoints "strongly agree" and "strongly disagree.")
Scores on each of the subscales were obtained by summing responses
across the items for that assumption.
Factor analyses were conducted to test the factor structure of the
questionnaire; it was important to ascertain that the scale was composed
of independent factors and not simply internally consistent assumptions measuring the same construct. The factor structure that emerged from
the factor analysis (varimax rotation, Kaiser normalization) was identical
to that which was proposed, with one exception: benevolence of the
impersonal world and benevolence of people emerged
single
factor, rather than the two proposed. This single factor was composed
of the eight (and only the eight) items that were intended to measure
the two benevolence assumptions. The six other assumptions (the
three distributional principles and the three self-relevant dimensions) emerged as separate factors, and each
was composed of the four (and
were intended for that assumption. The
eigenvalues for the seven factors that emerged from the analysis were
each greater than 4.0. Reliabilities obtained for this sample were similar
to those obtained for the prior population of respondents (.66 to .76). Given the face validity of the items, the independent factor structure,
and the reliabilities of the subscales, there seemed sufficient grounds
to begin to use the scale as a heuristic tool.
THE ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS OF VICTIMS VERSUS NONVICTIMS
A study was conducted to determine the extent to which the impact
of past traumatic events would be apparent in the basic assumptions
of victims when compared with those of nonvictims. Respondents
were 338 undergraduates (136 males and 202 females). They were
only the four) items that
ran
on
as a
TABLE 1World Assumptions Scale
I 1.
BP *2
R 3.
BP 4.
BW 5.
R 6.
I 7. sw *8.
BW 9.
L 10. C 11. BP ?12. SC 13.
I 14 R 15. L 16.
SC 17. sw *18.
1 19. c 20.
L 21.
c 22.
SC 23.
R 24.
BW 25.
BP 26.
SC 27.
SW 28.
c 29.
1. Misfortune is least likely to strike worthy, decent people.
People naturally unfriendly and unkind3. Bad events distributed to people at random.
Human nature is basically good.
The good things that happen in this world far outnumber the bad.
The of lives is largelv determined by chance.
Generally, people deserve what they get in this world.
I often think I good at all.
There is good than evil in the world.
I basically lucky person.
People's misfortunes result from mistakes they have made.
People don't really what happens to the next person.
I usually behave in ways that likely to maximize good results for
People will experience good fortune if they themselves good.
Life is too full of uncertainties that determined bv chance.
When I think about it, I consider myself very lucky.
I almost always make effort to prevent bad things from happening to
I have low opinion of mvself.
By and large, good people get what they deserve in this world.
Through actions prevent bad things from happening to
Looking at my life, I realize that chance events have worked out well
for
If people took preventive actions, most misfortune could be avoided. I take the actions necessarv to protect mvself against misfortune.
In general, life is mostlv gamble.
The world is good place.
People basically kind and helpful.
I usually behave to bring about the greatest good for
I very satisfied with the kind of person IWhen bad things happen, it is typically because people have not taken
the necessary actions to protect themselves.
BW 30. If you look closely enough, you will that the world is full of
goodness.
SW *31. I have to be ashamed of my personal character.L 32. I luckier than most people.
These items reverse-scored.
126
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS 127
asked to indicate which (if any) of the following extremely negative
events had happened to them during their lives: death of a parent,
death of a sibling, incest, rape, fire that destroyed their home, and
an accident that resulted in their own serious disability. (These six
events were chosen because they were all regarded as extremely negative
in a prior pilot study that included 15 stressful events that might have happened to college students.) They also completed the Zung Self-
Rating Depression Scale; as in Janoff-Bulman (1979), a "none of the
time" response category was added to make the scale sensitive to
college students' experiences.1
In the total subject population, there were 83 "victims" (individuals who had experienced one or more of the six negative events) and 255
nonvictims. There were actually 110 separate instances of victimization
experienced by the 83 victims; no differences were found between those who had experienced single versus multiple victimizations on
any measure used in the study. Of the 83 victims, 38 were men and
45 were women, and both men and women were highly represented
within each victimization category."In analyzing data for impact on assumptions, the negative events
were examined both separately and together. There was a great deal
of consistency across the victimizations in terms of differences found for victims versus nonvictims. Consequently, results of the combined
victimizations (i.e., including all of those victimized by one or more
1. Demographic questions, including family income, respondent education, and age,
included in the study; differences between victims and nonvictims emerged
the demographic items. Respondents also asked their age at the time these
events occurred; specifically, they asked to indicate whether they less
than 4 vears old, between 4 and 7 years of age, between 8 and 11, between 12 and 15,16 years older. Victimizations occurred at all ages, with victimizations
likely to have occurred at earlier age (e.g., incest, death of sibling) and
likely to have occurred at later age (e.g., rape, accident resulting in injury to the self, death of parent). Using the five age categories noted the questionnaire, analyses
of variance conducted to determine the effects of age at time of victimization. No effect for age found for any of the individual victimizations, although small cell
sizes seriously limit interpretation of these analyses. A separate analysis of variance
conducted collapsing the individual types of victimization; age at first
victimization used for assignment in of multiple victimizations. Again, significant effects of age found.
2. In fact, it interesting to note the number of who reported that they had
been victims of rape incest. Of the 16 incest victims, 6 and 10 women; and of the 15 rape victims, 6 and 9 In addition, 31 respondents (16 males, 15 females) reported the death of parent, 18 (11 males, 7 females) reported
the death of sibling, 1 1 respondents (7 male, 4 female) experienced fire that destroyed
their home, and 19 (13 males, 6 females) had suffered serious disability result of accident.
128 JANOFF-BULMAN
events) will be reported here. In all cases, the differences reported
were found for at least four of the six individual victimizations when
analyzed separately. First,
a discriminant analysis was conducted for
the victim versus nonvictim populations, entering the eight
sumptions3 as possible discriminators. Three assumptions emerged
as reliable discriminators between the two groups: perceived self-worth (Wilks lambda .981, p
< .015), chance as a distributional
< .015), and the benevolence of
the impersonal world (Wilks lambda .970, p
< .02). Self-worth
emerged as the single best predictor of victim-nonvictim status; stan
dardized canonical discriminant function coefficients were .836 for self-worth, .515 for chance, and .384 for benevolence of the impersonal
world.
Analyses of variance (2 X 2; victim population by gender) were
conducted to provide an interpretive base for the discriminant analysis.
For perceived self-worth, these analyses showed a strong main effect
for victim-nonvictim status, with victims seeing themselves less pos
itively than nonvictims (18.40 vs. 21.27; F (1, 335) 7.14, p < .01). This victim-nonvictim main effect was found in five of the six individual
ANOVAs conducted on the separate victimizations. The only exception
was death of a parent; in this case, victims and nonvictims did not
differ on self-worth (see Table 2). An ANOVA also found a main effect for victim-nonvictim for perceived benevolence of the impersonal world, with victims seeing the world more negatively than nonvictims(17.17 vs. 18.41; F (1,335) 4.02, p < .05). This main effect was found
for five of the six individual ANOVAs, with death of a sibling emerging
as the sole exception (see Table 2).
A closer look at chance (that emerged as a significant discriminator
in the discriminant analysis) revealed not a main effect for victim status but a gender-by-victimization interaction (F (1, 335) 5.11, p < .025). Male victims believed in chance more than their male nonvictim
counterparts (14.97 vs. 13.56), whereas female victims believed in
chance less than their female nonvictim counterparts (12.78 vs. 14.27).
This gender-by-victimization interaction was found in four of the six
ANOVAs conducted on the individual victimizations; significant in-
3. Based the factor analysis of the scale, benevolence of the world and benevolence
of people initially combined for analyses. This combined factor did not emerge
significant in any analysis. Analyses of variance conducted with the separate assumptions, and they appeared to operate quite differently; thev therefore entered separate predictors in the discriminant analysis. The analyses of variance reported
below considered benevolence of the impersonal world and benevolence of the personal
world separate dependent
as
principle (Wilks lambda .974, p
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS 129
TABLE 2 Mean Differences in Assumptions of Self-Worth and
World for Victims and Nonvictims
Benevolence of the Impersonal
BENEVOLENCE OF IMPERSONAL WORLD
NEGATIVE EVENT VICTIM NONVICTIM VICTIM NONVICTIM
Death of parent 20.34 (n 31)
20.93(n 307)
SELF-WORTH
16.24 (n 31)
18.33* (n 307)
Death of sibling 18.04
( 18)
21.07* (n 320)
18.26 (n 18)
18.08(n 320)
Incest 17.40 (n 16)
21.09* (n 322)
16.50 (n 16)
18.20* (n 322)
Rape 17.58 (n 15)
21.05* (n 333)
16.87 (n 15)
18.18* in 333)
Fire(house destroyed)
15.86 (n 11)
21.10* (n 327)
16.50 (n 11)
18.17* (n 327)
Accident(serious disability)
18.52 (n 19)
21.09* (n 319)
16.58 (n 19)
18.24* (n 319)
p .05.
teractions were not found in the cases of sibling death or serious
personal disability from an accident.
Analyses of variance (using gender and victim status as the in dependent variables) were conducted for the five assumptions that
did not emerge as significant discriminators in the discriminant analysis.
The only significant difference that was found was
a
gender main
effect for the benevolence of people; females, regardless of victim
status, held more positive views of other people than did males (19.34
vs. 18.43; F (1, 335) 6.47, p < .02). This finding is consistent with
much of the literature on the psychology of women, which stresses the "relational" nature of women and their greater interpersonal ori
entation (e.g., Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982).
Finally,
a 2 x 2 ANOVA using depression as the dependent
measure found both a main effect for victim status (23.24 vs. 29.20; F (1, 335) 19.69, p < .001) as well as a gender-by-victim interaction (F (1, 335) 7.28, p < .01). In general, even years after the negative
event, the victims were significantly more depressed than were non-
victims, and it appears that male victims fared worse than female victims; mean depression scores for male and female victims were,
respectively, 31.30 and 27.47, whereas for male and female nonvictims
the scores were 20.92 and 24.73. When the victimizations were examined
separately, the victim main effect was found for all six negative events, and the gender by victim interaction
was found for five of the six
130 JANOFF-BULMAN
victimizations; only serious disability following an accident showed
no interaction.Although respondents had generally experienced their victimi
zations many years prior to the study, they seemed to differ psycho logically from their nonvictim counterparts. Responses to the World Assumptions Scale continued to reflect different assumptions about
the world. Victims and nonvictims differed in assumptions representing
each of the categories proposed in the model presented above benevolence of the world, meaningfulness (i.e., chance), and self-
worth. Victims perceived themselves more negatively and perceived
the impersonal world as more malevolent. Further, male victims saw
the world as more random (whereas females saw it as less random)
than did nonvictims; and females, regardless of victim status, viewed
others as more benevolent. Both male and female victims were more
depressed than nonvictims, even years after the negative event, but
male victims appeared to be more depressed than female victims. The
greater depression of males is consistent with the assumptive world
findings, for males were apt to feel more vulnerable than females in
light of their increased perceptions of randomness and less positive perceptions of other people [see Janoff-Bulman & Frieze (1987) for a
general review and discussion of gender and victimization].
It is possible that the differences in assumptions and depression
found between victims and nonvictims can be accounted for by preex
isting differences between the groups. Perhaps, for example, the so
cioeconomic status of the populations differed, and it is this socio
economic difference that accounts for the study's findings. It is probably
the case that one would find differences in assumptions and depression
across socioeconomic groups. In the present study, no differences in
socioeconomic status were found between the victim and nonvictim groups. The study was conducted at a large state university, with a relatively homogeneous population socioeconomically and perhaps
psychologically. Yet within this sample of college students, those who
had experienced extreme negative events in the past continued to
hold different assumptions about themselves and their world. Pre
sumably, their basic theories about themselves and their world changed
as a result of their negative life experience; the data from their negative
events and their prior schemas were integrated to form a new as
sumptive world. In a recent study, Collins et ai (1987) asked 55 cancer
patients about changes in their lives and found not only that they reinterpreted their experiences in a positive light (perceived benefits,
reordered priorities) but also that they reported negative changes in
their views of themselves and their world, findings that are consistent
with the results of the present study.
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS 131
This study's findings suggest that traumatic life events have
or very threatening
views of the world, results of the study found that even years after
a traumatic event, some basic assumptions were significantly more
negative for victims than for nonvictims, and victims were significantly
more
depressed than nonvictims. This long-term impact of traumatic
events supports findings of a recent study by Lehman, Wortman, and
Williams (1987). These researchers assessed individuals' reactions to the sudden, unexpected loss of a spouse or child 4 to 7 years after
the death had occurred. They found that these losses resulted in
enduring difficulties, for psychological symptoms and distress were
typical of this group 4 to 7 years after the event, compared with a
group of matched controls. Lehman et ai argue that their study provides
little support for traditional views of bereavement, which maintain
that people "work through" the loss and experience a timely resolution
to their difficulties. Instead, these authors write that their study "sug gests that exposure to stress can trigger enduring changes in mental
health and functioning" (p. 229). Results of the present study are
consistent with their conclusion. Years after an extreme negative event,
college students' assumptions about themselves and their world differed from the assumptions of college students who had not experienced
such an event. Presumably, they resolved their cognitive crises and
continued to view the world through somewhat different lenses.
SCHEMA-RELATED QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The potential contribution of work in social cognition to an under
standing of stress following traumatic life events becomes apparent
as one considers the victim's coping task from the perspective of
schema change. In addition, other schema-related research may provide suggestions for new directions in future work on stress and coping.
For example, are the basic assumptions of victims more complex than
those of nonvictims? Research on the complexity of schemas suggests that mature schemas are more complex than immature schemas (e.g.,
Linville, 1982, 1987; Linville, & Jones, 1980). Perhaps victims resolve their cognitive crises by developing more complex schemas about themselves and their world; that is, they may make finer cognitive distinctions, thereby conceptualizing their world in terms of more
dimensions, with little overlap among them. Or do victims' schemas
about the world and themselves become simpler as a result of their
victimization? The complexity of victims' versus nonvictims' schemas,
a
long-term impact. Although the basic assumptions of victims did not
reflect extremely negative views of themselves
132 JANOFF-BULMAN
and the long-term mental health implications of this complexity, sug
gests itself as a potentially fruitful avenue for empirical research.
Work in the area of schema or construct accessibility (e.g., Higgins
& King, 1981; Higgins, Rhodes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1980) presents some intriguing possibilities for future research as well. In
addition to changes in content following extreme negative events,
important changes may also
occur in the accessibility of relevant sche
mas. In other words, victims may see the world as more malevolent
following
a traumatic event, and they may also access, use, think about, or rely on their schema for the victimization. The benevolence/
malevolence of the world would therefore be more of an issue for victims, and this might lead to changes in other domains, such
perceived self-efficacy, depression, and cynicism. If a schema is very
accessible, other more ambiguous information is apt to be interpreted
in terms of that schema; it is as if the world is perceived particularly through the lenses of one's most accessible schemas. For victims, these
lenses may be their more negative assumptions about the benevolence
and meaningfulness of the world and about their own worthiness.
That the basic schemas affected by victimization may be more
accessible is suggested by research that finds highly emotional schemas
to be more accessible than neutral ones (e.g., Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980). Thus, Higgins, Kuiper, and Olson (1981), calling for greater
attention to the role of affect in social cognition, suggest that affectively significant schemas may be particularly accessible. In addition to the
intense affect associated with traumatic events, the self-involvement of the victim (Higgins et ai, 1981), and the unexpected nature of the
event may render trauma-related schemas extremely accessible.
Whether this is the case remains an open question for future research.
There is clearly much to be learned about the impact of traumatic life
events and much to be gained from applying relevant models from
other research domains. In particular, social cognition researchers can
provide extremely useful theoretical insights and empirical tools for
advancing our understanding of stress and coping.
REFERENCES
Abelson, R. P. (1981). The psychological status of the script concept. American Psychologist,
36, 715-729.
Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P. & Teasdale, J. (1978). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74.
Affleck, G., Allen, D. A., Tennen, H., McGrade, B. J., & Ratzan, S. (1985). Causal and control cognitions in parent coping with chronically ill child. Journal of Social
and Clinical Psychology, 3, 369-379.
as
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS 133
Anderson, C. A., Lepper, M. R., & Ross, L. (1980). Perseverance of social theories:
The role of explanation in the persistence of discredited information. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 1037-1049.
Bandura, A. (1982). Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. American Psychologist,37, 122-147.
Bard, M., & Sangrey, D. (1979). The victim's book. New York: Basic Books.
Baum, A., Flemming, R., & Singer, J. E. (1983). Coping with victimization by technological
disaster. Journal of Social Issues, 39, 119-140.
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss (Vol. 1): Attachment. London: Hogarth.
Brown, J. D., & Siegel, J. M. (in press). Attributions for negative life events and
depression: The role of perceived control.
Bulman, R. J., & Wortman, C. B. (1977). Attributions of blame and coping the "real world": Severe accident victims react to their lot. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 35, 351-363.
Cantor, N. (1980). Perceptions of situations: Situation prototypes and person-situation prototypes. In D. Magnusson (Ed.), The situation: An interactional perspective. Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Cantor, N., & Mischel, W. (1977). Traits prototypes: Effects recognition memory.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 38-48.
Chodorow, N. (1978). The reproduction of mothering. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
Collins, R. L., Taylor, S. E., & Skokan, L. A. (1987). A better world shattered vision?
Positive and negative assumptions about the world following victimization. Manuscript
submitted for publication.
Crocker, J., Fiske, S. T, & Taylor, S. E. (1984). Schematic bases of belief change. InJ. R. Eiser (Ed.), Attitudinal judgment. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Crocker, J., Hannah, D. B, & Weber, R. (1983). Person memory and causal attributions. lournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 55-66.
Epstein, S. (1967). Toward unified theory of anxiety. In B. A. Maher (Ed.), Progress in
experimental personality research (Vol. 4). New York: Academic Press.
Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited, theory of theory. American Psychologist,
28, 404-416.
Epstein, S. (1979). The ecological study of emotions in humans. In P. Pliner, K. R.
Blanstein, & I. M. Spigel (Eds.), Advances the study of communication and affect:
Vol. 5. Perception of emotions in self and others. New York: Plenum.
Epstein, S. (1980). The self-concept: A review and the proposal of integrated theory
of personality. In E. Staub (Ed.), Personality: Basic issues and current research. En
glewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Erikson, E. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: Norton.
Erikson, E. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York: Norton.
Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1952). An object-relations theory of the personality. New York: Basic
Books.
Fiske, S. T, & Linville, P. W. (1980). What does the schema concept buy us? Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 6, 543-557.
Fiske, S. T, & Taylor, S. E. (1984). Social cognition. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Frankl, V. E. (1963). Man's search for meaning: An introduction to logotherapy. New York:Washington Square Press.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In different voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gurwitz, S. B., & Dodge, K. (1977). Effects of confirmations and disconfirmations
stereotype-based attributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 495-
500.
134 JANOFF-BULMAN
Hastie, R. (1981). Schematic principles in human memory. In E. T. Higgins, C. P.Herman, & M. Zanna (Eds.), Social cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Higgins, E. T, & Bargh, J. A. (1987). Social cognition and social perception. Annual
Review of Psychology, 38, 369-425.
Higgins, E. T, & King, G. (1981). Accessibility of social constructs: Information-processing
consequences of individual and contextual variability. In N. Cantor & J. F. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Personality, cognition, and social interaction. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Higgins, E. T, Kuiper, N. A., & Olson, J. M. (1981). Social cognition: A need to get personal. In E. T. Higgins, C. P. Herman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds), Social cognition.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Higgins, E. T, Rhodes, W. S., & Jones, C. R. (1977). Category accessibility and impression
formation, journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 141-154.
Horney, K. (1937). The neurotic personality of time. New York: Norton.
Homey, K. (1939). New ways in psychoanalysis. New York: Norton.
Horowitz, M. J. (1980). Psychological response to serious life events. In V. Hamilton
& D. Warburton (Eds.), Human stress and cognition. New York: Wiley.
Horowitz, M. J. (1982). Stress response syndromes and their treatment. In L. Goldberger& S. Breznitz (Eds.), Handbook of stress. New York: Free Press.
Horowitz, M. J. (1983). Psychological response to serious life events. In S. Breznitz
(Ed.), The denial of stress. New York: International Universities Press. Janoff-Bulman, R. (1979). Characterological behavioral self-blame: Inquiries into
depression and rape. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(10), 1798-1809. Janoff-Bulman, R. (1985). The aftermath of victimization: Rebuilding shattered
sumptions. In C. R. Figley (Ed), Trauma and its wake. New York: Brunner/Mazel. Janoff-Bulman, R., & Frieze, I. H. (1983). A theoretical perspective for understanding
reactions to victimization. Journal of Social Issues, 39, 1-17.
Janoff-Bulman, R., & Frieze, I. H. (1987). Gender and victimization. In R. Barnett, L.Beiner, & G. Baruch (Eds.), Women and stress. New York: Free Press.
Janoff-Bulman, R., & Lang-Gunn, L. (in press). Coping with disease and accidents:
The role of self-blame attributions. InL. Y. Abramson (Ed), Social-personal inference
in clinical psychology. New York: Guilford.
Janoff-Bulman, R., Madden, M. E, & Timko, C. (1983). Victims' reactions to aid: The role of perceived vulnerability. In A. Nadler, J. D. Fisher, & B. M. DePaulo (Eds.),
Nezo directions in helping (Vol. 3). NY: Academic Press.
Janoff-Bulman, R., & Thomas, C. E. (in press). Towards understanding of self-
defeating responses following victimization. In R. C. Curtis (Ed.), Self-defeating
beluunors: Experimental research and practical implications. New York: Plenum. Janoff-Bulman, R., & Timko, C. (1987). Coping with traumatic life events: The role of denial in light of people's assumptive worlds. In C. R. Svnder & C. Ford (Eds), Coping with negative life events: Clinical and social psychological perspectives. New York:
Plenum.
Klinger, E., Barta, S. G., & Maxeiner, M. E. (1980). Motivational correlates of thought
content frequency and commitment, journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
39, 1222-1237.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
Langer, E. J. (1975). The illusion of control, journal of Personality and Social Psychology,32, 311-328.
Langer, E. )., & Abelson, R. P. (1974). A patient by any other Clinician group difference in labeling bias. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42,
4-9.
ASSUMPTIVE WORLDS 135
Lazarus, R. S. (1983). The costs and benefits of denial. In S. Breznitz (Ed.), The denial
of stress. New York: International Universities Press.
Lehman, D. R., Wortman, C. B, & Williams, A. F. (1987). Long-term effects of losing
spouse child in motor vehicle crash, lournal of Personality and Social Psychology,
52, 218-231.
Lerner, M. J. (1970). The desire for justice and reactions to victims: Social psvchological
studies of antecedents and consequences. In J. Macaulav & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), Altruism and helping behavior. New York: Academic Press.
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief just world. New York: Plenum.
Lifton, R. J. (1967). Death life: Survivors of Hiroshima. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Linville, P. W. (1982). The complexitv-extremity effect and age-based stereotyping.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 193-211.
Linville, P. W. (1987). Self-complexity cognitive buffer against stress-related illness
and depression, journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 663-676.
Linville, P. W., & Jones, E. E. (1980). Polarized appraisals of outgroup members. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 689-703.
Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self, journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 35, 63-78.
Marris, P. (1975). Loss and change. Garden City, NY: Anchor/Doubledav.
Meyer, B. C, & Taylor, S. E. (1986). Adjustment to rape. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 50, 1226-1234.
Miller, D. T, & Porter, C. A. (1983). Self-blame in victims of violence, journal of Social
Issues, 39, 141-154.
Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social
judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Parkes, C. M. (1971). Psycho-social transitions: A field of study. Social Science andMedicine, 5, 101-115.
Parkes, C. M. (1975). What becomes of redundant world models? A contribution to the study of adaptation to change. British lournal of Medical Psychology, 48, 131-
137.
Perloff, L. S. (1983). Perceptions of vulnerability to victimization. Journal of Social Issues,
39(2), 41-62.
Peterson, C, Schwartz, S. M., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1981). Self-blame and depressive symptoms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 253-259.
Piaget, J. (1971). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Basic Books.
Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New
York: Harper & Row.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds), Cognition
and categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Ross, L., Lepper, M. R., & Hubbard, M. (1975). Perseverance in self-perception and social perception: Biased attribution processes in the debriefing paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psycliology, 32, 880-892.
Rothbart, M. (1981). Memory processes and social beliefs. In D. Hamilton (Ed.), Cognitive
processes in stereotyping and group behavior. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rothbart, M., Evans, M., & Fulero, S. (1979). Recall for confirming events: Memory
processes and the maintenance of social stereotyping, journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 15, 343-355.
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal external control of
reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80 (1 whole No. 609).
Rumelhart, D. (1978). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. San Diego: University
136 JANOFF-BULMAN
of California, San Diego, Center for Human Information Processing.
Sarbin, T. R. (1981). On self-deception. In T A. Sebeok & R. Rosenthal (Eds.), The clever Hans phenomenon: Communication with horses, whales, apes, and people. New
York: New York Academy of Sciences.
Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Helplessness: On depression, development, and death. San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman.
Silver, R. L., Boon, C, & Stones, M. L. (1983). Searching for meaning in misfortune:
Making of incest, journal of Social Issues, 39, 81-101.
Silver, R. L, & Wortman, C. B. (1980). Coping with undesirable life events. In J. Garber & M. E. P. Seligman (Eds), Human helplessness: Theory and application. New York:
Academic Press.
Srull, T. K., & Wyer, R. S. (1980). Category accessibility and social perception: Some
implications for the study of person memory and interpersonal judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 841-856.
Sullivan, H. S. (1940). Conceptions of modern psychiatry. New York: Norton.
Sullivan, H. S. (1953). The interpersonal theory of psychiatry. New York: Norton. Swann, W. B., Jr., & Read, S. J. (1981). Acquiring self-knowledge: The search for feedback that fits. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 1119-1128.
Tait, R., & Silver, R. C. (1987). The long-term psychological impact of major negative life
events. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Taylor, S. E. (1981). A categorization approach to stereotyping. In D. L. Hamilton (Ed.), Cognitive processes in stereotyping and mtergroup behavior. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Taylor, S. E. (1983). Adjustment to threatening events: A theorv of cognitive adaptation.
American Psychologist, 38, 1161-1173.
Taylor, S. E, & Crocker, J. (1981). Schematic bases of social information processing.
In E. T. Higgins, C. P. Herman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Social cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Taylor, S. E., Wood, J. V, & Lichtman, R. R. (1983). It could be Selective evaluation response to victimization, journal of Social Issues, 39(2), 19-40.
Tennen, H., Affleck, G., & Gerschman, K. (1986). Self-blame among parents of infants with perinatal complications: The role of self-protective motives, journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 50, 690-696.
Timko, C, & Janoff-Bulman, R. (1985). Attributions, vulnerability, and psychological adjustment: The of breast Health Psychology, 4, 521-544.
Weber, R., & Crocker, J. (1983). Cognitive processes in the revision of stereotypic beliefs. journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 961-967.
Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events, journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 39, 806-820.
Weinstein, N. D. (1983). Reducing unrealistic optimism about illness susceptibility.Health Psychology, 2, 11-20.
Weinstein, N. D., & Lachendro, E. (1982). Egocentrism source of unrealistic optimism.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 8, 195-200. Weisman, A. D. (1979). Coping with New York: McGraw-Hill.
Wolfenstein, M. (1957). Disaster: A psychological essay. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
Wortman, C. B. (1976). Causal attributions and personal control. In |. H. Harvey, W. J. Ickes, & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), New Directions in Attributions Research (Vol. 1). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence.
Wortman, C. B., & Dunkel-Schetter, C. (1979). Interpersonal relationships and cancer:
A theoretical analysis, lournal of Social Issues, 3(5), 120-155.
Zung, W. K. (1965). A self-rating depression scale. Archives of General Psychiatry, 12,
63-70.
© 1989 Guilford Publications Inc.