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The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. By Stephen L. Melton. Minneapolis, Minn.: Zenith Press, 2009. 306 pages. $30. Reviewed by Dr. Janeen Klinger, Professor of Political Science, US Army War College.
Stephen L. Melton in The Clausewitz Delusion offers a useful reminder that although knowledge of history is essential for military professionals, that knowledge must be broad and comprehensive rather than selective. Thus, Mr. Melton argues that the US Army failed in Iraq and Afghanistan because it drew from its Cold War experience a defensive mentality while forgetting its World War II experience concerning the character of offensive wars and the need for military governance in their aftermath. As a consequence of its narrowly historical focus, the Army did not have the doctrine, force structure, or training programs necessary to execute an offensive war with its associated mission of military governance. From this promising starting point the remainder of the book is disappointing for several reasons.
First, from the introduction the reader expects that because the author has identified critical shortcomings of the Army in terms of doctrine, force structure, and training, the rest of the book will provide an elaboration of what these elements should look like to prosecute an offensive war successfully. Yet nowhere in the book is such a blueprint provided. Rather, the author makes general criticisms...