Review Essay: Culture and Identity

Abstract

Francisco VARELA (1996) suggested that the ultimate tests of scientific theories are their ability to explain our personal experience. Although Sicher in Kreuzberg and Cultural Psychology are about culture and identity, I found both books silent about experiences of the Self in everyday praxis. Drawing on activity theory and reflexive phenomenological hermeneutics as method and praxis, I provide interpenetrating accounts of analysis of my autobiographical experiences of cultural and identity on the one hand and of Sicher in Kreuzberg and Cultural Psychology on the other. Whereas I highly recommend the first book I am much less convinced by the soundness and usefulness of the second.

URN: urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0301204

1. Preface

From the perspective of a reflexive phenomenological hermeneutic, understanding (Verstehen) and explaining (Erklären) stand in a dialectical relation (RICOEUR 1991). Reading a book, analyzing and explaining its structural features and content presuppose understanding (Verstehen); but the development of understanding presupposes explaining and the structural analysis it involves. Understanding is required to follow a story and explaining is required "when spontaneous understanding is impeded" (p.142). [1]

How then does one come to understand and read two books on culture and identity, cultural theory and activity theory, diaspora and racism? How does one write an analysis of the two books that not only accounts for the dialectical relation of understanding and explaining but that also embodies it in its very structure the very theory that underpins it--according to the dictum that the medium is the message (McLUHAN 1995)? Such questions could be stifling perhaps even stopping one from writing at all because of the chicken-and-egg problem that they pose, especially when we ponder for too long. Yet in a dialectical worldview, contradictions and aporias are allowed and expected to be central to our human condition. From a pragmatic perspective, one never ponders too long, for "meanwhile, everything begins" (SERRES 2000, p.56), always and already set in motion by the very condition that also allows us to think ourselves and the world that surrounds us. [2]

My review, as everything, also begins, perhaps twice (see 2.1), intertwining understanding and explaining, wandering (using autobiography in analysis and analysis in autobiography) and putting in opposition (facing columns), autobiographical narrative and critical analysis, one requiring the other, impossible without the other, even analytically inseparable from the other. Understanding and explaining are enfolded into one another, close and yet distant as the different parts of the trajectory of a fly or two randomly chosen pieces in the dough of a baker (PRIGOGINE 1979, SERRES 1983). And yet, while I am writing, I realize that the story I really want and have to write is an "incompossible" (DERRIDA 1998, p.7) story, one that is impossible to compose. In its completion, this story, the one you are reading right now, remains fundamentally incomplete, not in the least because it takes your own understanding and explaining to complete. This text itself is a testimony of the interaction between understanding, always mine, and the texts I read, always the others'; the text is a coming together and interaction of Self and Other. [3]

2. Introduction 2.1 Meanwhile, everything begins

I am citizen of a country, in which politicians and citizens use "multiculturalism" as a source of pride, an accomplishment, and a project. I speak French at home. In Vancouver, one of the country's biggest cities, a language other than one of the two national languages (English, French) is spoken in more than 50% of homes. Not only is Vancouver ethnically diverse but people increasingly report multiethnic origins. According to the 1996 census, over 38% of the population in the Greater Vancouver District reported more than one ethnic origin. In several municipalities, the number of individuals reporting multiple ethnic origins exceeds 50%. [4]

What characterizes this new breed of people, those that marry across traditional cultural boundaries and the children that issue from such unions? Who are we, as a culture? Who are we, as persons? Who am I? Or, who do others understand me to be after reading the autobiographical notes? What is the culture in reference to which my identity is being constructed? What is the value of the notion of culture, as in cultural psychology, cultural anthropology, or cultural sociology in a world that is increasingly characterized by is syncretism, bricolage of culture and bricolage of identity? Perhaps even the notion of bricolage has to be temporalized, leading to identities that are continuously made and remade, in and being result of practical activity, in a bricolage fashion from the structural resources at hand (ROTH et al. in press). [5]

Questions about culture and how it mediates identity are complex, and for those who have never spent time in another culture, comprise hidden dimensions. On the other hand, those who have moved between cultures, whether as individuals or living as minority or in a diaspora, often speak of the tremendous personal struggles involved along the lines of ethnicity, language, and the like. Although the authors of the following two poem excerpts are from quite different cultures and have had quite different trajectories across cultures, their experiences share some common features. In the poem "Search for my tongue" (BHATT 1988, pp.65-66), addresses the battle between the different tongues in her mouth, the mother tongue that begins to rot while the foreign tongue could never be known.

[Table omitted, see PDF]

The poet had left her native Gujarat and moved to the United States where she received her masters degree in English and, though she moved to and now lives in Germany, she continued to write in English and Gujarati. "Being bi-cultural," so the text on the back cover suggests, "is a mixed blessing," for being attached to both cultures, BHATT cannot do without either. A similar experience transpires from the poem "Doppelmann" by the Turkish-German Zafer SENOCAK (1984, p.102). He too writes about the two worlds within him that pull him in different directions, neither being whole, the split between them running right through his tongue.

[Table omitted, see PDF]

Both of these poems, as testimonies of a bi-cultural, or shall we say, trans-cultural experience, suggest that the movement from one cultural context, understood in language and perhaps ethnic terms, is associated with struggles of identity, knowing who we are when the cultural referents are changing. But my own experience of moving between cultures was different. I deeply feel, and think of myself, as Canadian, involving all the sensibilities that are often attributed to them in the context of multicultural society and the tolerance for others, in "othering the other" (KAYA, p.108), that go with it. I do not feel split but rather, after having lived the two halves of my life in Germany and Canada, feel in a foreign country when I visit Germany. I hear and presumably comprehend what people say, but do no longer understand. I have a command of English that I never had of German, though it was my mother's tongue, the kind of tongue that BHATT cannot seem to spit out, and which continues to grow back. [8]

VARELA (1996) suggested that the true test of a (natural) science is individual experience. If we use this dictum, a good cultural theory of identity and personal experience should be able to explain the rather different experiences expressed by BHATT and SENOCAK, on the one hand, and my own experience, on the other. Because I know my own experience better than the two poets', I will follow VARELA and use it as a test bed for the two books that I have read, and which constituted the starting point of this inquiry. Thus, my autobiographical reflections emerged from my encounter with the two books, but the review of the two books necessarily emerged from the encounter of the books with me, this reader. The two texts (Section 3 versus Sections 4 and 5) emerged together, simultaneously, as products of the dialectic of this particular reader and the text; these texts are similar but they are also different, interacting with one another. To represent the parallel genesis and nature of the two texts, I chose to place them in two columns, both facing one another and Janus-like heading into different directions. "I have my feet, two planets/ when they begin to move/ they drag me with them" (SENOCAK 1984, p.102). [9]

When these texts are facing one another or rather, seem to look in different directions, I encourage readers to also read across the column, experience how the two texts, which are also one, talk, interpenetrate, co-inform, and relate to one another. The additional work that this requires of reading is, in my view, directly related to the work accomplished in separating the testimony of lived experience, autobiography, from critical reflection on the texts authored by the other and by othering the other. [10]

But these two texts also interpenetrate, irremediably bound up with one another forming one text, clearly in Sections 1, 2, and 6, but also in Sections 3, 4, and 5. In fact, these two texts form a dialectical unit even when they pretend to be separate and facing one another. [11]

2.2 Culture, activity, and identity

Traditionally, cultures were approached as something stable, fixed, centered and coherent. Even Michelle and Renato ROSALDO subscribed for a long time to culture as something stable ("if it's moving, it isn't cultural" [ROSALDO 1989, p.209]). Parallel to this approach to culture is the treatment of identity as stable, fixed, centered and coherent. Although suggesting that the real character of the roles persons take are a function of the concrete activity and therefore must be empirically ascertained, Cultural Psychology in fact promotes a stance in which culture and personality are changing little and slowly: "Culture is a system of enduring behavioral and thinking patterns that are created, adopted, and promulgated by a number of individuals jointly. These patterns are social (supraindividual) rather than individual, and they are artefactual rather than natural" (RATNER, p.9). Thus, RATNER cites correlational studies that link socioeconomic status and IQ and other factors, all treated as being independent of the particular situation; similarly, he proposes to use interviews as a way of accessing moral reasoning using textually presented dilemmas and assuming that the reasoning exhibited shows the true person (Chapter 6). This view constitutes a holistic notion, culture as a "highly integrated and grasped static 'whole'" (KAYAN, p.33), and developed as the dominant paradigm of classical modernity and the nation state (territoriality). This notion of culture as static has come increasingly under scrutiny, and, Sicher in Kreuzberg (feeling safe in Kreuzberg [Kreuzberg is a part of former West-Berlin known for its run-down housing and its counter culture of intellectuals and non-German immigrants]) is but one case study that shows the shortcomings of the holistic notion--I believe that our Canadian experience detailed below is another counter example. [12]

The alternative to a holistic perspective is a syncretic notion of culture, which "claims that mixing and bricolage are the main characteristics of cultures" (KAYAN, p.35). Cultures therefore do not develop along (ethnically, politically) absolute, fixed lines but in complex dynamic patterns of syncretism. [13]

It has been noted that a lot of confusion in cultural studies arises from the fact that the notion culture is used in incommensurate ways (SEWELL 1999).²⁾ On the one hand, culture is a theoretical construct that must be abstracted from social life and is to be distinguished from biology, politics, or economy, that is, things that are not culture. On the other hand, culture(s) is (are) used to refer to identifiable subgroups, using the notion isomorphic with society or, more recently, community (of practice). Here the distinction is between cultures rather than between culture and not-culture. In my reading, RATNER is using the notion of culture more in the first sense whereas KAYA is using it in the second. [14]

Two main concepts of culture can be distinguished in the scholarly literature between the 1960s and the 1990s (SEWELL 1999). On the one hand, there was culture as a system of symbols of meaning, a view championed and promulgated by Clifford GEERTZ (e.g., 1973) but also, and in a different, linguistically oriented way by Claude LEVI-STRAUSS (e.g., 1958). The main point of this approach is to disentangle what is viewed as cultural, symbols and meaning, from those things that are not-cultural, biological, technological, geographic etc. influences. On the other hand, there was the view of culture as practice, which is, in other words, an emphasis of the performative aspects of culture. Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation (LAVE & WENGER 1991) provides a theoretical framework for understanding culture as practice, including the performative aspects of the reproduction of culture. That is, the performative approach to culture highlighted the performative dimensions in cultural transformation and stasis, whereas the system-of-meaning approach explained well the perennial aspects and effects of culture but had little to say about cultural transformation. BOURDIEU's (1990) theory of practice, which highlighted the homology of habitus, structured structuring dispositions, and cultural field, was heavily criticized for the overemphasis on cultural reproduction and its lack of generative dimensions (e.g., SEWELL 1992). [15]

The most recent theoretical approaches combine the structural and the performative dimensions into a dialectic unit of structure and agency (SEWELL 1999). Such an approach has been useful, for example, in the analysis and explanation of cultural extension in the sciences, which arises as a product of the dialectical tension between (material, social) resistance and accommodation (PICKERING 1995). Accordingly, human beings, inherently imbued with agency (HOLZKAMP 1983) draw on structures that are located within themselves (as schema) and in the social and material world for the active production of cognitive and material outcomes (SEWELL 1992). Activity theory--initially articulated by MARXian (social) psychologists in the former Soviet Union (e.g., LEONT'EV 1978) and further developed largely in Scandinavian countries in recent years (e.g., ENGESTRÖM, MIETTINEN & PUNAMÄKI 1999)--can be understood in terms of the dialectic of structure and agency because it already contained these elements. More than other theories, however, activity theory highlights the mediated nature of the relation between the agent and his or her object generally by other material and social structures, including production means, community, rules, and division of labor. [16]

Different activity systems are characterized by different ideologies, different cultures. Thus, many scholars are unanimous about the fact that (North American) schools embody middle-class culture (GEE in press). Students from the middle class, being endowed with sufficient relevant cultural capital, will succeed in this environment; students with different cultural capital, one that has currency in the working- and underclasses that they come from, will fail to succeed, if the measure of success is taken in terms of grades and access to university (ECKERT 1989). Individuals who participate in different activity systems therefore participate in systems characterized by different values, culture. Their identities, therefore, have to be understood in terms of the bricolage that they accomplish, continuously, in both maintaining and transforming identity. [17]

In the past, social research has often dissociated culture and psychology. Culture was used to articulate the relations of humans to their environment in the context of indigenous, foreign, and strange culture, whereas psychology was reserved for the relation of "modern" humans to their industrialized environments. Little over a decade ago, one anthropologist noted that

"Social analysts commonly speak, for example, as if 'we' have psychology and 'they' have culture. Current discussions about the cultural reasons that other cultures 'somatize' (experience 'their' afflictions in bodily ways) must be understood in relation to the unstated norm that human beings should 'psychologize' (as Anglo-Americans, or at any rate their therapists, presumably do)." (ROSALDO 1989, p.202) [18]

In addition, the human subject engaged in activity is treated as relatively stable; their identities do not seem to change and therefore constitute static phenomena similar to culture. This is also the approach represented in Cultural Psychology, which provides methodological advice about how to get at stable cultural psychological features--for example, there is little discussion how the cultural psychology of the Holocaust has arisen historically and how it disappeared. Viewing identities as static is problematic, as process analyses show--for example, the development of an identity as a member of alcoholics anonymous or becoming a Mayan midwife (LAVE & WENGER 1991). Here, identities are neither to be seen as something completed nor as ontological categories that a person takes into a situation. As the converse side of production in activity systems, identity is something that is continuously made and remade in activity; it is a being in continuous becoming (ROTH et al. in press). It arises from the dialectic of how we experience ourselves and how others experience us; in regard to ethnicity, KAYA (p.42) suggests that "identity is the product of a dialogical and dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes ... what you think your ethnicity is versus what they think your ethnicity is." Personal identity should therefore be as much an outcome of syncretic processes just as culture is an outcome of such processes.

"According to convention, I am not simply what I am doing now. I am also what I have done, and my conventionally edited version of my past is made to seem almost more the real 'me' than what I am at this moment. For what I am seems so fleeting and intangible, but what I was is fixed and final. It is the firm basis for predictions of what I will be in the future, and so it comes about that I am more closely identified with what no longer exists than with what actually is." (WATTS 1957, p.6) [19]

To me, theorizing identity as a dialectical entity, incorporating the contradiction between sameness and selfhood, is the currently most convincing approach (RICOEUR 1990). Identity is dialectical, because it always asserts sameness in the face of difference. This can be seen already in the case of examples that appear rather mundane and unquestionable, such as simple arithmetic. For example, identity is ascertained ("=") in the equation 2 + 3 = 3 + 2 (or 2 x 3 = 3 x 2), despite glaring differences--neither the signs are the same (e.g., different ink points) nor is their order once the sameness of the "2" and "3" appearing on the left and the "3" and "2" appearing on the right has been ascertained. That there in fact is an identity is because of the distributive nature of whole numbers with respect to addition. [20]

This identity is not given when the items combined are two operations such as "flip around horizontal axis through center" (a) and "counter-clockwise rotation" (b). As Figure 1 shows, a + b (Figure 1.i) does not give the same result as b + a (Figure 1.ii)--the triangle ends up in different orientations. (Mathematically inclined individuals represent the actions in terms of matrices A (flip) and B (rotate), which operate on some object such as vector x. During introductory lessons on linear algebra, one quickly learns that A·B x not equal B·A x.)

[Image omitted, see PDF]

Figure 1: An example showing that the commutative nature of addition or multiplication in the domain of natural numbers cannot be generalized to other domains. Here, a reflection on the horizontal axis followed by a counter-clockwise rotation is not the same as a counter-clockwise rotation followed by reflection on the same axis in the domain of triangles (for a circle, it would be the same given the axes of reflection and rotation both go through the center). [21]

Turning to the identity of human beings, the concepts that we develop need to be able to account for the fact that we experience the sense of sameness (the fifty year old adult pointing to a picture saying "this is me when I was five") and the sense of difference (the Nazi perpetrators described by RATNER, who were loving and protecting with their children, but who turned into barbaric killing machines at work in the concentration camp). [22]

[Table omitted, see PDF] 6. Coda

Time has come to change our ideas about culture and identity. The concept of culture is based on experiences of rootedness, stasis, and fixity that were associated with the activity systems of yesteryear, animal husbandry and agriculture. Now, in an age where electronic technologies give us new experiences of relating to others, where former experiences of proximity are expanded to include anyone connected to the Internet, there is a need to look at culture in a new way. The new concept has to be capable of operating against the inner character of culture to account for the syncretic nature of the new cultural identities. The "multi-" in multicultural must expand so much that the fragments are better understood as pieces serving the bricolage--all culture will be cultural bricolage.

"The construction of diasporic cultural identity derives from cultures and histories in negotiation, collision and dialogue. Diasporic identity is a disaggregated identity, and it disrupts the very categories of identity because it is not national, not genealogical, not religious, but all of these in dialectical tensions with one another." (KAYA, p.80) [93]

In this active exchange with the two books, I have been working myself toward a conception of identity that lives with and through rather than despite difference. Identity is a constant production and reproduction of Selves, through transformation and difference. But there are other aspects that of experience that require a different conception than the process of "construction." Much work remains to be done. [94]

Notes

1) The translation goes about like this: I have my feet, two planets/when they begin to move/they drag me with them/I am falling//I carry two worlds within me/ but neither one is whole/they're continuously bleeding//the border runs/right through the middle of my tongue//Like a prisoner I am shaking it/the play with a wound. KAYA (p.204) quotes the middle part of this poem, which he knew through SUHR (1989). <back>

2) LEVI-STRAUSS (1958, pp.77-78) already discussed existing problems in anthropology that arose from the confusion of the two notions of culture. <back>

3) Whether this information is absolutely accurate is not quite clear. During a search to verify the information I received when I lived in Bloomington, Indiana, near Martinsville, I found a website that suggested that a dinner in honor of an African American would provide "chances for improving the tolerance climate in Martinsville" (http://www.words-at-work.com/dateline.htm [visited September 10, 2002]). This suggests that there are still issues concerning the tolerance of African Americans that the community is working on. However, at least one website suggests that the KKK stories about "Martinsville as KKK headquarters" are "bunk" (see http://scican.net/MAPH/MAPHch13.html [visited Sept. 10, 2002; Broken link, FQS, December 2004]). The website of tolerance.org no longer lists a hate group of any kind in the community of Martinsville. <back>

4) Using Latin expressions is a cultural practice, accepted in German academic circles but rejected and even despised in Anglo-Saxon scholarly communities. My using them is an aspect of the hybrid identity that is co-constitutive of an autobiography involving different cultural contexts. <back>

Author

Wolff-Michael ROTH is Lansdowne Professor of applied cognitive science at the University of Victoria. His interdisciplinary research agenda includes studies in science and mathematics education, general education, applied cognitive science, sociology of science, and linguistics (pragmatics). His recent publications include Re/Constructing Elementary Science (with K. Tobin and S. Ritchie, Peter Lang, 2001), At the Elbows of Another: Learning to Teach by Coteaching (with K. Tobin, Peter Lang, 2002), Science Education as/for Sociopolitical Action (ed. with J. Désautels, Peter Lang, 2002), and Being and Becoming in the Classroom (Ablex Publishing, 2002).

Contact:

Wolff-Michael Roth

Lansdowne Professor, MacLaurin Building A548, University of Victoria, BC, V8W 3N4, Canada

Phone: [phone]

E-mail: [email protected]

Citation

Roth, Wolff-Michael (2003). Culture and Identity. Review Essay: Ayan Kaya (2001). "Sicher in Kreuzberg" Constructing Diasporas: Turkish Hip-Hop Youth in Berlin / Carl Ratner (2002). Cultural Psychology: Theory and Method [94 paragraphs]. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 4(1), Art. 20, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0301204.

© 1999-2011 Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research (ISSN 1438-5627)

Supported by the Institute for Qualitative Research and the Center for Digital Systems, Freie Universität Berlin

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