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Jay Schulkin. Cognitive Adaptation: A Pragmatist Perspective. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. 198. Cloth ISBN: 0-521-51791-1.
Much of the recent interest in pragmatism has been focused on social, political, cultural, and moral issues. The insights that Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey have for us today regarding such questions are of obvious value. However, there has not been a remotely parallel interest in the classical pragmatists when it comes to the impressive amount of new research in the mind and life sciences. Indeed within recent philosophical writings on cognitive neurobiology, one can count on one hand the number of pragmatist philosophers who are taking seriously and exploring what the classical pragmatists may have to contribute. Jay Schulkin is a welcome contributor to these discussions. He comes to them, however, as a neuroscientist, not a philosopher on the sidelines or in the armchair. In Cognitive Adaptation, Schulkin not only continues his career long interest in both philosophy and science but achieves something all too rare: a humanistic work that blends our best scientific knowledge about mind and life with a poetic sensibility not found among many of today's philosophers or scientists for that matter.
Schulkin's central project is to show that science and the humanities - theire two cultures or their respective conceptual objects, nature and culture - are continuous with one another. Through his vast background in psychobiology, cognitive and behavioral neuroscience, and classical pragmatism, Schulkin moves with ease from scientist to philosopher to poet and back. The key distinction he makes for this project is that between agency and animacy. Agency speaks to Schulkin's roots in the humanities. Culture, if it is concerned with anything, is concerned with the recognition that people have beliefs, desires, intentions - and above all a rich experiential life. Animacy speaks to Schulkin's roots in the sciences. It serves to emphasize that we humans are not just personal agents but natural animals as well. This distinction does significant philosophical work for Schulkin, particularly as he ties it both to evolution and the major insights of the classical pragmatists.
Throughout the book, Schulkin fluently draws on the resources of the classical pragmatists, especially their emphasis on the nature of inquiry as selfcorrective. The introduction of the book...