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This essay discusses Rawlsian justice in general and the difference principle1 in particular. It does so in the light of G. A. Cohen's masterful critique of Rawls in Rescuing Justice and Equality,2 a work that not only inspires the present paper, but also serves as a point of contrast for much within it.3 Like Cohen, I argue that the difference principle and the justifications given for it pull us in opposing directions. Specifically, I argue that Rawlsian arguments for the difference principle present a puzzle and that to respond adequately to the puzzle we must engage in rational reconstruction. To respond to the puzzle we must go beyond asking whether or not a proposed interpretation is one that Rawls himself would have endorsed, and start asking whether it is one that puts Rawlsian justice in its best light.4
This much, I believe, is common ground between Cohen and myself. However, in stark contrast to Cohen, I present an interpretation--a rational reconstruction--of Rawlsian justice that shows it to be less intolerant of economic inequality than it is commonly taken to be. My aim, in short, is to rescue Rawlsian justice from its commitment to equality.5 A key motivation behind this reconstructive effort is the following simple thought. A signal attraction of the difference principle--understood as a principle of justice and not as a mere guideline for sensible policy in this or that circumstance--is that it saved, or at least seemed to save, broadly egalitarian justice6 from the so-called "leveling down objection.â[euro] This objection is that insisting on simple equality as a matter of justice is perverse, for there can be cases in which doing so means insisting on making everyone worse-off. Or, less perverse, but still problematic, it can mean insisting on making some individual worse-off without thereby making anyone else better-off. As students of Rawls standardly have been taught, the difference principle, and in particular a staggered version7 of it, avoid this problem. That is what I mean when I say that the difference principle saves broadly egalitarian justice from the leveling down objection. A good interpretation of the difference principle must stay true to this underlying motivation.
The argument of the...