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Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as his epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mnd. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland (1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense; (2) cannot claim that the concepts of Folk psychology might be empty of extension and lack reference; (3) cannot sustain Churchland's criticism of Dennett's "intentional stance"; (4) cannot claim to be a form of scientific realism, in the sense of believing that what science describes is somehow realer that what other conceptual systems describe.
One of the worst aspects of specialization in Philosophy and the Sciences is that it often inhibits people from asking the questions that could dissolve long standing controversies. This paper will deal with one of these controversies: Churchland's proposal that folk psychology is a theory that might be false. Even though one of Churchland's greatest contributions to philosophy of mind was demonstrating that the issues in philosophy of mind were a subspecies of scientific reduction, still philosophers of psychology have usually defended or critiqued folk psychology without attempting to carefully analyze Churchland's theory of reduction. This is a serious mistake, for Churchland's theory of reduction, properly understood and purged of certain inconsistencies, is simply not capable of unseating folk psychology with the decisiveness that delights Churchland and frightens his adversaries. Because neither side is aware of this, the battle rages on.
There is a tension between two positions in Churchland's theory of reduction. One of these positions (which I will call Eliminativism) leads him inevitably to universal skepticism, and is also the basis for his radical dismissal of folk psychology. The second position (which I will call pragmatic pluralism) saves him from skepticism, but if he adopts it, he (1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense; (2) cannot claim that the concepts of folk psychology might be empty of extension and lack reference; and he (3) cannot sustain the criticism of...