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Abstract
Theories of collective action argue that a large group of states should be incapable of acting together to bring about the provision of a common good. Yet despite their inherent weakness, African regional organizations have implemented several peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War, displaying a puzzling level of cooperation among African states. This study finds the reason for this cooperation in the payoffs that lie in the domestic politics of the countries that participate in these interventions and most particularly in the relationships with foreigners that are integral elements of the domestic political strategies of these regimes. Specifically, African leaders are contributing troops to peacekeeping operations to gain the approval of western states. The diplomatic and military benefits that comprise this approval allow African countries to retard liberalization processes, making peacekeeping a strategic tool for authoritarian leaders seeking to maintain power. This dissertation utilizes a mixed methods approach, beginning with a series of negative binomial regression tests. These statistical models show that, on average, the level of dependence an African country has on foreign aid is positively correlated with sending troops to an African-led peacekeeping mission. They also find that regime type, previous peacekeeping experience, and size of a country are not significantly correlated with peacekeeping behavior, while strength of a country's armed forces is negatively associated. Four case studies are then explored in order to more fully explain the causal mechanisms that lead countries to include peacekeeping with the African Union as part of their foreign policy. In the cases of Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda, strategies of extraversion are followed, with all three leaders using peacekeeping to build their political capital in order to stabilize their regimes and allow them leeway to pursue other unpopular strategies. Ethiopia, however, chooses to forgo the practice of extraversion and the potential gains in military and diplomatic payoffs, showing that where other more pressing security concerns are present, an African country is likely to act as a more traditional political unit.
