Content area
Abstract
This dissertation concerns public appeals, or outside lobbying, by interest groups in American politics. Its purpose is to contribute to our understanding of the strategic aspects of outside lobbying and to propose the idea that the state of public opinion on a given issue significantly influences when and how interest groups try to engage the public in their lobbying.
The current literature often explains outside lobbying as occurring primarily for reasons internal to organizations, like membership development or organizational culture. Some consider outside lobbying to be an extensive form of window dressing to legitimize quieter forms of influence like giving campaign money and exchanging favors.
I offer a view of outside lobbying which assumes a greater role for the policy preferences of the public. Interest groups appeal to the public to provide evidence to elected officials of impending electoral punishment if the officials do not respond to group demands, and on occasion outside lobbying actually mobilizes and organizes constituents to punish or reward these officials. I use two formal theoretical models to develop predictions concerning when outside lobbying will occur and when outside lobbying will influence policy.
To test my predictions, I gathered data on more than 60 interest groups. I interviewed leaders of the groups, asking them their official positions on policy issues and their lobbying tactics on specific issues. By comparing public opinion data and the interest groups' positions on issues, plus the lobbying activities of these groups, I test for a relationship between the popularity of groups' policy positions and their lobbying tactics. Statistical tests indicate that groups which are in general agreement with public opinion tend to outside lobby more extensively than other groups.
I conclude that public appeals by interest groups are strategic actions which reflect public preferences. Outside lobbying is not just a set of noisy signals or recruiting calls. Outside lobbying has political content, and it can influence policy.
