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Abstract
The explanation for political stability in Mexico has largely focused on the resourcefulness and flexibility of the PRI state. With sufficient resources to coopt potential opposition and the infrequently employed capacity for repression, the PRI has maintained political control even while many other Latin American nations experienced transitions from authoritarianism. This work argues for more attention to the character of opposition movements and the nature of their struggle in order to understand that Mexican exceptionalism.
The study looks in particular at three independent organizations in Puebla during the period 1961-1992: an association of street vendors, Volkswagen autoworkers, and a movement based in the university community. The history of each organization is chronicled from origins to status in the early 1990s; sections that follow address such issues as the internal practices of the movement, ideological positioning, strategies and tactics, relationships to other organizations, and responses by the PRI state.
Given the disparity in resources and strategic locations, the parallels among the organizations were particularly striking. By the early 1990s, all were in steep decline, and the factors contributing to their respective falls were quite similar. In each case, the organization's internal practices replicated the structuring of similar organizations affiliated to the PRI. Each movement avoided any attempts at coordinating its struggle with other organizations, including political parties. Finally, none of the movements was able to maintain a hold on the "ideological higher ground" during the struggle with the PRI state. These independent organizations were unable to construct a compelling alternative to Mexico's authoritarian political system ideologically, or through the creation of participatory practices within their organizations. While some of the explanation for their defeat lies with effective responses by the PRI state, the conclusion here is that the opposition organizations themselves must take responsibility for the failure to mount forceful pressure from below. In the final section of this study, a comparison to the role of social movements in the transition from authoritarianism in Brazil is made in order to support the general argument about the failure of independent opposition organizing in Puebla.
