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Abstract
Poland's militant labor movement, Solidarity, played a key role in bringing about the collapse of the Communist regime and in establishing a new democratic, capitalist regime. Ironically, the regime that Solidarity established pursued reform policies which were harsh and damaging to the standard of living of most Polish people. This study asks, why did Polish reformers, who were part of a working-class opposition movement, implement such harsh reform measures in 1989? In answering these questions, I argue that four important conjunctural factors explain why Poland's reform program proved so harsh and why a more effective opposition to the program did not emerge early in the transition. First, Solidarity's identity and agenda changed dramatically over the course of the 1980s. Yet, while the Solidarity organization evolved, the popular myth of Solidarity as the defender of each Polish person persisted. The second important factor is that Poland's economic circumstances were critical, especially its foreign debt. The objectives of the Polish opposition had come to include renewed relationships with the West. It was impossible for Polish foreign and economic relations with Western countries to improve until Poland's credit reputation abroad improved. In order to achieve the required improvement, Poland's economic reform team established policies intended to win favor with international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, Paris Club and London Club, rather than with the Polish people. These two reasons together explain why Polish reformers designed a program of shock-therapy despite their roots in the once quite powerful trade union movement, Solidarity. The third factor is that no effective opposition to shock-therapy emerged in the early reform stage because the government, unions and many workers acted together to shield policy-makers from social protest. Fourth, once workers no longer agreed to insulate policy-makers, the reform policies themselves had profoundly different effects on groups of workers. They so divided workers from each other that their common interests were not easy to identify. I base much of my discussion of these issues on the nearly seventy interviews I conducted in Poland during 1991, 1995, and 1996.
