Content area
Abstract
Why do international agreements within the same issue area vary drastically in their enforcement and monitoring? Consider the case of international institutions handling firearms trafficking. Between 1997 and 2001, overlapping delegates negotiated these agreements, with states consistently showing similar preferences. However, in various negotiation venues, their decisions to include institutional measures to ensure sound implementation of their obligations diverged significantly. For example, the OAS Convention that regulates illicit firearms trafficking includes embedded enforcement mechanisms. Yet, despite strong advocacy from the US and European countries for their inclusion, the United Nations Firearms Protocol did not incorporate any monitoring mechanisms. In contrast, the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons did include such mechanisms.
To account for this puzzling divergence in institutional design, I draw from 6 months of fieldwork in UN Vienna and the Organization of the American States in Washington to implement cross-case comparisons and process trace these negotiations. I also implement a contrasting case study with the UN Drug Control Regime, known for its robust monitoring mechanisms. My findings reveal that when delegates commit to negotiating based on consensus—even if procedural rules permit voting—weaker states can politicize essential institutional elements, removing them entirely from the negotiation text. The implications of this research show that seeking international legitimacy through consensus and collegiality amongst delegates could paradoxically diminish the strength of an international treaty, posing a dilemma between consensus and efficacy. It also shows that specific organizational cultures matter in negotiations of international agreements.
