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Abstract
This study examines the effectiveness of workers' mobilization as non-oligarchic actors under oligarchic rule, focusing on the role of state coercion through the cases of workers’ mobilization in influencing the Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) and the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (OLCK). It argues that the degree of state coercion, shaped by oligarchs' perceptions of threat, determines the opportunities for workers’ movements to mobilize. While oligarchic power often captures state institutions to suppress grassroots movements, which I call the condition of an “oligarchic state,” historical legacies of repression—such as Indonesia’s violent suppression of the left in 1965—further entrench elite fears of mass mobilization. This was evident during the OLCK protests, where workers' mobilization failed to prevent the policy’s enactment due to increased state repression driven by oligarchic interests.
However, this study challenges the notion that the state actors are entirely subordinate to oligarchic power. Instead, it highlights instances of relative state autonomy from oligarchs, where the state's structural dependence on elite interests weakens, creating opportunities for mobilization. Under conditions of reduced state coercion, non-oligarchic actors can leverage political alliances and institutional openings to influence policy. While such mobilization does not necessarily dismantle oligarchic dominance, it can shape political outcomes within existing structures. This was evident in the case of JKN, where workers successfully advocated for its legalization, without facing state repression, by forming strategic alliances with segments of the political elite. By examining the interplay between oligarchic power, the state’s relative autonomy, and bottom-up mobilization, this study provides a nuanced understanding of political change under oligarchic rule and the conditions under which non-oligarchic actors can or cannot assert their power.
