It appears you don't have support to open PDFs in this web browser. To view this file, Open with your PDF reader
Abstract
En contraste con la interpretación de Marta Nussbaum que adjudica a los estoicos ortodoxos una concepción meramente cognitivista de las pasiones y del rol pedagógico de la poesía en la formación moral de los individuos, en este escrito se argumentará que para estos filósofos las pasiones tienen un elemento cognitivo (juicio errado) y uno no-cognitivo (movimiento físico excesivo), razón por la cual nos podemos valer de los elementos cognitivos y no-cognitivos de la poesía para ayudar al hombre en su formación moral. Se mostrará que esta propuesta tiene sus raíces en el pensamiento platónico.
You have requested "on-the-fly" machine translation of selected content from our databases. This functionality is provided solely for your convenience and is in no way intended to replace human translation. Show full disclaimer
Neither ProQuest nor its licensors make any representations or warranties with respect to the translations. The translations are automatically generated "AS IS" and "AS AVAILABLE" and are not retained in our systems. PROQUEST AND ITS LICENSORS SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES FOR AVAILABILITY, ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, NON-INFRINGMENT, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Your use of the translations is subject to all use restrictions contained in your Electronic Products License Agreement and by using the translation functionality you agree to forgo any and all claims against ProQuest or its licensors for your use of the translation functionality and any output derived there from. Hide full disclaimer