EUROSCEPTICISM AS A RESPONSE TO EU POLICIES: PERSPECTIVES AFTER 2014 239

Abstract

By virtue of its many definitions, Euroscepticism has become an extremely broad concept encompassing a staggering variety of meanings. It is our contention that, while the temptation to classify the EU-Euroscepticism link along the lines of simplistic dualities such as friend and foe, good and bad is indeed justifiable, the reality is far more nuanced and intriguing. In order to illustrate this perspective, our paper aims to tackle a few important mental landmarks in order to construct a believable explanation: Firstly, we offer a review of the current literature on Euroscepticism so as to come up with a realistic interpretation of the concept that will be applied throughout the article. Secondly, we address some recent events such as the hotly debated anti-crisis measures, the 2014 May elections and the Ukrainian crisis in order to determine how they may have swayed the formation of Eurosceptic opinions. Thirdly, we analyse a few scenarios concerning possible evolutions of Euroscepticism starting from the current context and tracing the potential of such views for becoming fully antagonistic and overly simple on the one hand, or valid, argument-backed concerns on the other hand. Last but not least, we argue that the more nuanced and moderate view of Euroscepticism advocated throughout this article may prove itself an undeniable source of benefits, as the Union can gain the potential to engage its critics in fruitful dialogue instead of hateful and counter - productive mutual ignorance.

Headnote

Abstract:

By virtue of its many definitions, Euroscepticism has become an extremely broad concept encompassing a staggering variety of meanings. It is our contention that, while the temptation to classify the EU-Euroscepticism link along the lines of simplistic dualities such as friend and foe, good and bad is indeed justifiable, the reality is far more nuanced and intriguing. In order to illustrate this perspective, our paper aims to tackle a few important mental landmarks in order to construct a believable explanation: Firstly, we offer a review of the current literature on Euroscepticism so as to come up with a realistic interpretation of the concept that will be applied throughout the article. Secondly, we address some recent events such as the hotly debated anti-crisis measures, the 2014 May elections and the Ukrainian crisis in order to determine how they may have swayed the formation of Eurosceptic opinions. Thirdly, we analyse a few scenarios concerning possible evolutions of Euroscepticism starting from the current context and tracing the potential of such views for becoming fully antagonistic and overly simple on the one hand, or valid, argument-backed concerns on the other hand. Last but not least, we argue that the more nuanced and moderate view of Euroscepticism advocated throughout this article may prove itself an undeniable source of benefits, as the Union can gain the potential to engage its critics in fruitful dialogue instead of hateful and counter - productive mutual ignorance.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, discourse, parties, citizens, scenarios

Introduction

As an especially popular concept in academia, politics, the media and the everyday world, Euroscepticism encompasses a staggering number of different meanings, which have steadily gained ground by virtue of the fluid way in which the concept itself has been defined up to this point in time. By uttering this apparently benign word, one may refer to any type of behaviour from outright rejection of European integration to simple opposition to certain EU policies by otherwise Europhile elements; furthermore, one may also characterize political parties, public opinion segments, individuals or even civil society organisations as 'Eurosceptic' without having misappropriated the term itself; last but not least, so-called 'Eurosceptic' attitudes can stem from very different sources and have a whole range of targets hiding under the vast umbrella of European integration. For these reasons, it does not come as a surprise that our current topic has stirred much debate and even unresolved controversy, thus further entrenching itself as an issue that needs to be addressed, even if it is only to deconstruct its mantle of threatening obscurity.

Bearing these considerations in mind, the current article does not pretend to offer the assiduously sought after conceptual key to Euroscepticism, nor does it intend to add yet another layer of confusion by proposing an alternative approach to or classification of our subject matter. Our main research interest lies in the fact that the answer which is offered to the steps taken towards the widening and deepening of the European Union is crucial to the future development of the integration project itself. Therefore, our main goals are to analyse how the potential scenarios for the evolution of this loosely defined phenomenon relate to the matter of European integration and, at the same time, to propose a more moderate course of action for dealing with Euroscepticism.

In order to achieve what we have set out to do, this article is structured in five main parts, each representing an essential building block of our case for a nuanced and more tolerant perception of Euroscepticism. The first section of this paper provides a brief account of the controversies surrounding our key concept, while the next section moves on towards delineating the framework that will be used to understand Euroscepticism throughout the article. The third part focuses on a set of empirical data describing the current conditions affecting potentially Eurosceptic views, which are then included in a more organised scheme describing the context from which the two scenarios analysed in the fifth section are likely to evolve; the paper ends with a conclusion arguing for the usefulness and logic of a multi-faceted perception of Euroscepticism.

Euroscepticism: a controversial concept

In the introduction of this paper, we have virtually done our best to emphasise the fact that there is no carefully constructed mould which confines the notion of Euroscepticism while providing a number of noteworthy characteristics that can be used to offer a simple description of the concept. However, despite the fact that an unchallenged understanding seems a very distant dream when talking about Euroscepticism, it is no less true that we cannot operate in a mental vacuum when discussing such a noteworthy facet of European integration. This is why we have selected a simple and often cited definition provided by Paul Taggart relatively early in the context of the collapse of the so-called 'permissive consensus' that had described European dynamics until the turmoil which rose to the surface in the 1990s. For him, "Euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration" (Taggart, 1998, p. 366). Undoubtedly, Taggart referred to party-based Euroscepticism, but for our current purposes, this definition is sufficiently broad so as to allow the formation of a few mental landmarks that can be safely employed across the board when approaching this concept. An even simpler understanding would place Euroscepticism as a concept that "expresses doubt or disbelief in Europe and European integration in general" (Hooghe, Marks, 2007, p. 120).

Despite the respectably wide range of attitudes, sources and targets suggested by such definitions, the origin of the concept can be traced back to a much narrower context: coined with a great amount of contribution from the media, the term first emerged at a time when Britain's Margaret Thatcher was in a particularly shaky relationship with the European Commission and was a reference to the so-called 'anti-Marketeers', who rejected British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) (Spiering, 2004, pp. 128-129). Given this particular situation, it may be precisely because Euroscepticism is perceived as too broad a concept that criticism or even proposals to scratch the term altogether and come up with alternative conceptualisations have emerged in the literature.

For instance, Crespy and Verschueren (Crespy, Verschueren, 2009) do not agree with the idea of a permissive consensus that turned sour after Maastricht, thus enabling Euroscepticism to flourish as a mostly contemporary phenomenon; in their view, the idea of opposing the European project needs to be seen through a historically untainted lens. Thus, they come up with the concept of resistances defined as "hostility towards one (or several) aspect(s) of European integration perceived as a threat with respect to one's values"; they also argue that the idea of "resistances" is more inclusive and open to an interdisciplinary portrayal of various integration struggles, which are ultimately described as the construction of assorted "models and counter-models of Europe", taking place at various points in time.

Yet another point of contention that can be identified is that Euroscepticism itself has different sources, with some authors focusing on political parties, some on public opinion and yet others proposing the addition of civil society to the mix (Fitzgibbon, 2013, p. 105). Moreover, attitudes for or against Europe as a project, as well as their target objects can also be dissected and prove themselves multi-dimensional, an aspect which will be expanded upon in the following section.

Other authors come up with their own typologies, which introduce new concepts to the stage: for example, Kopecký and Mudde (Kopecký, Mudde, 2002) include Euroscepticism as only one element in a broader typology, consisting of four categories constructed through the combination of two distinct dimensions, namely support for European integration and support for the European Union: Europhiles, Eurosceptics, Europragmatists and Eurorejects. Another instructive example would be that of Krouwel and Abts (Krouwel, Abts, 2007), who imagine a scale of political attitudes towards European integration and the EU with five key indicators illustrating degrees of reflexivity among European citizens: trust, scepticism, political distrust, cynicism and alienation. Without a shadow of doubt, such classifications carry well-reasoned explanations behind them, but it is regrettably beyond the scope of this article to explore them. By providing this open invitation towards further exploration of the aforementioned typologies, we have merely attempted to prove that a 'permissive consensus' regarding the exact role, position, scope and desirability of the concept of Euroscepticism has not been coagulated as of yet.

In light of these arguably pertinent objections and lines of inquiry, is Euroscepticism still to be taken as a prime coagulating point for discussion on European matters? The answer provided by this article is affirmative, and the reasons for doing so are strongly tied to the notion of political discourse, which is ultimately the way in which politics 'expresses' itself. Concretely, it is our contention that Euroscepticism has gained strength as a signifier, which means its presence in political discourse taking place on the European stage is a reality that we have to contend with, in spite of any theoretical misgivings. To construct our argument, we may emphasise "the responsive nature of Euroscepticism as polity contestation that correlates with ongoing integration and the initiation of a process of democratic legitimation of the EU" (De Wilde, Trenz, 2012, p. 538). In other words, Euroscepticism has taken over the idea of opposition to European integration or the European Union in the realm of political discourse, which is why we need to aim towards the deconstruction of any simplistic dual 'us versus them' interpretations and offer a productive conceptualization of this elusive notion.

Having cleared this point, the explanatory dividends yielded by discourse theory do not stop here; following the thread provided by its rich methodology, we come across the notions of empty and floating signifiers. Specifically, European integration itself does not in fact have a stand-alone pre-fabricated significance, but is infused with a set of characteristics through discourse; consequently, it is a concept that can essentially "...have different meanings and can thereby serve to unite disparate social movements" (Craciun, 2008, p. 40). More strongly stated, empty signs such as the one addressed here "mean almost nothing by themselves until, through chains of equivalence, they are combined with other signs that fill them with meaning" (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002, p. 50).

If we were to attach the notions of federation and political institutions to the European Union, then we would have a whole different project than if we stuck strictly to ideas such as free trade, economic and monetary union and intergovernmental cooperation. Ultimately, it remains a question of the rules by which we choose to judge the European project and not of clearly defined normative expectations. While in his article Giandomenico Majone referred to the democratic deficit of Europe, his observations have not lost their salience and extended scope: the standards that we set for ourselves when talking about European integration will eventually decide how the successes and failures in this regard are judged and which benchmarks need to be set (Majone, 1998).

In light of this approach, it is obvious that Euroscepticism, which is directly tied to European integration as an attitude to an on-going process, is devoid of an independent meaning, thus becoming a floating signifier which "...can assimilate different meanings depending on the nature or topic of the discourse" (Craciun, 2008, p. 41). As a result, the definition that we choose to give to European integration will directly impact the meaning of Euroscepticism as a concept and the boundaries that describe acceptable criticism to the European project. This being said, it is imperative to keep these observations in mind, as they will re-emerge as a focal point in the discussion concerning possible scenarios for the evolution of Euroscepticism.

Having dealt with different controversies regarding Euroscepticism and having reaffirmed our intentions to tackle this concept, we now turn towards the construction of a framework that will be essential in understanding not only our approach towards Euroscepticism, but also the central argument of this article.

Euroscepticism - a framework for analysis

Considering the tone taken by our article up to this point, it is clear that we cannot come up with absolutes that would give us a smooth, perfectly refined framework; nonetheless, a few talking points can be provided, so as to have an inclusive and equidistant point of departure for our analysis.

Although broadly criticised, the distinction provided by Taggart and Szczerbiak between hard and soft party-based Euroscepticism is still considered a breakthrough in the field and it is widely referred to by students of this elusive concept. Indeed, in the context of our paper it triggers the highly necessary doubts regarding the wisdom of lumping together all Eurosceptics in one incredibly heterogeneous category. Concretely,

"Hard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived" (Taggart, Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 7).

According to the two authors, a quick way to determine whether a party can be placed in this category is to assess whether it was constructed around the single core issue of opposition to its country's membership in the EU and whether its language paints the EU as being at odds with the national trajectory (by being too "capitalist/socialist/neoliberal/bureaucratic"), thus calling for a reassessment of that country's membership (Taggart, Szczerbiak, 2008, pp. 7-8). The bottom line is that this type of party sees European integration as something harmful, to be rejected on principle, thus adopting a stance of firm opposition to the idea itself or to the EU as its current materialization.

In contrast, soft Eurosceptics have a milder attitude and are not opposed to European integration in principle, but are critical of steps taken by the EU in certain policy areas or of its evolution at certain moments in time. In the much more competent words of Taggart and Szczerbiak,

"Soft Euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory" (Taggart, Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 8).

This being said, such distinctions are far from uncommon. In fact, this well-known effort by Szczerbiak and Taggart is a refinement of a previous distinction between hard and soft Eurosceptics due to critical voices, with an example in this sense represented by Kopecký and Mudde, who were strong advocates of a clearer differentiation between European integration and the EU as the current manifestation of this process. Therefore, they came up with a distinction between diffuse and specific support for European integration, which, as mentioned previously, constitutes one key dimension of their proposed typology. In their own words, "by diffuse support we mean support for the general ideas of European integration that underlie the EU. By specific support we denote support for the general practice of European integration; that is, the EU as it is and as it is developing" (Kopecký, Mudde, 2002, p. 300).

Without too much mental effort, these two notions can be translated into diffuse and specific opposition to European integration, with the former implying a generalized rejection of the ideas of European integration and the latter suggesting opposition to the practice of European integration represented by the current form and trajectory of the European Union.

While these two types of differentiation refer to political parties, similar distinctions can also be made when discussing the stance of European citizens. In fact, Bernhard Weßels comes up with a complex typology of Euroscepticism in this respect containing nine categories, but he insists the most on the gap between adamant Eurosceptics and critical Europeans, making similar observations to those already discussed above. Specifically, adamant Eurosceptics lack any type of attachment to European integration and want to halt the process or even to abolish it altogether, as they do not identify with it. On the other hand, critical Europeans actually have a solid European identity, but they believe that the European Union could do well with some steps towards improvement (Weßels , 2007, p. 300).

In the end, it is of course a rather nebulous affair to certify the exact point at which a citizen or party breaks with its European identity altogether and becomes a hardened opponent of European integration rather than a moderate contester of EU policies, but it is nevertheless possible to regard Eurosceptic attitudes as points on a continuum with proactive, informed scepticism and constructive criticism at one end, and rejection of a threatening entity on a deep affective (identity) level at the other end.

The conclusion that we come to is that, when discussing Euroscepticism, we have to contend with differences in degree, which allows us to generalise the observations included up to this point into two broad categories. On the one hand, we have hard/diffuse/adamant/unqualified Euroscepticism, which roughly translates into full-out, principled rejection of European integration, a lack of European identity and the hostile perception of the EU as the current manifestation of the idea of European integration. On the other hand, soft/specific/critical/qualified Euroscepticism signals agreement in principle with the idea of European integration and an attachment to the EU as its expression, combined with a belief that the EU is an imperfect entity with aspects that still need work and could do well by embracing change.

However, the clarification of this issue only means that our work is halfway done. To begin with, we have to be mindful of the fact that Euroscepticism, especially when coagulated within the ranks of public opinion, has three different targets identified in the relevant literature: the authorities (political actors, decision-makers), the regime (political order, institutional structure and performance) and the community (the issue of identity, fellow member states and citizens) (Niedermayer, Westle, 1995; Boomgaarden et. al., 2011; Krouwel, Abts, 2007; Weßels, 2007).

In spite of what such a classification might suggest, these three objects of discontent are strongly linked in practice: for instance, Lauren McLaren argues that those who are attached to their national identities view European integration as a powerful symbolic threat to this seminal aspect of their being; moreover, she claims that the attitudes of citizens towards both national and European institutions impact the way in which individuals relate to the project of European integration (McLaren, 2007). Apart from this, Weßels, using the framework provided by Easton, comes up with two hypotheses that explain how the three levels identified here communicate amongst themselves: firstly, a deeper level of identification with the political community protects against specific discontent at more superficial levels (such as that of the authorities) and, secondly, scepticism cumulates when repeated instances of specific discontent reflect negatively on deeper levels, transferring from the authorities to the regime and taking on a generalized form (Weßels , 2007, p. 290).

On top of all this, Eurosceptic attitudes themselves are not one-dimensional or constructed with the same type of arguments every time; they have different sources, with a useful classification in this respect provided by Boomgaarden, who differentiated between "(1) specific, utilitarian and output-oriented attitudes and (2) diffuse, affective and input-oriented attitudes" (Boomgaarden et. al., 2011, p. 244). In other words, we have a group of attitudes that stem from utilitarian considerations and cost-benefit analyses, connecting intimately with the matter of performance and another group of attitudes which stem from diffuse sentiments towards the object itself (in this case the European Union as an entity representing the idea of European integration) and consider affective matters such as identity.

After covering all of these theoretical nuances, the next section firmly moves on to the empirical universe, providing an account of a few recent events that may influence Eurosceptic responses to varying degrees in the coming years.

Where do we stand?

While this section does not lay a claim towards constituting an exhaustive list of influential cases that will help define Euroscepticism after 2014, it does set out to demonstrate how influential and high-profile events on the European stage unavoidably sway potentially Eurosceptic views. For this purpose, three widely discussed examples have been chosen, with a view towards highlighting their impact on our subject matter even if, in some instances, this is merely an afterthought in widely publicized political debates that take on a very different slant.

First of all, the waves made by the recent economic crisis have yet to die down, with the sovereign debt crisis having exposed significant cracks in EU solidarity. While some countries (such as Greece, Ireland or Portugal) found themselves under a sustained siege from various financial ailments, others have had to help in order to maintain their thinly stretched viability, which was not easily accepted by their taxpayer publics (Hartleb, 2012, p. 45). Moreover, the issue may also be discussed in terms of the single currency itself: according to Matthias Kaelberer (Kaelberer, 2004), the Euro was not exclusively designed as a single-minded tool for economic and trade efficiency, but also as a political means to coagulate European identity, with an imagery of the new bills and coins designed with this exact goal in mind. In addition to this, a certain level of pre-existing European identity was also needed for the project of a single currency to be enacted and to maintain its functionality; for these reasons, it is not a particularly impressive leap of logic to associate trust in the Euro with trust in the European Union as a whole, with the somewhat obvious conclusion that a negative attitude towards money as a symbol would translate into a more reserved attitude towards the entity it is meant to bolster.

In light of these observations, the most concerning fact is that, in spite of the primarily financial characteristics of the crisis, it is not economic issues that constitute the foundation for the ensuing rise in Eurosceptic attitudes; there is evidence that matters of identity still set the tone in this matter (Serricchio, Tsakatika, Quaglia, 2013), which means that the integration project suffers on a deep, affective level; thus we can find confirmation of the uncomfortable fact that negative attitudes towards the European institutions who failed to come up with better solutions translated into dissatisfaction with the community as a whole, which is inherently more difficult to dislocate. On the other hand, this can also be interpreted as a sign that authorities in their role as decision-makers need to be more mindful of citizen/civil society input, so as to avoid this exact type of results yielded by what can be classified as single-mindedness in policy-making.

If we were to discuss strictly the 2014 moment, we would easily come across the hotly debated May European Parliament elections, which were expected to herald a renewed surge of negative attitudes towards European integration and the EU embodied by the rising success and expected good results of Eurosceptic parties. In fact, prior to the elections there were talks of a potential new Eurosceptic group in the European Parliament; the aforementioned discussions were spearheaded by the French National Front, headed by Marine Le Pen, and the Dutch Party for Freedom, led by Geert Wilders (Piedrafita, Renman, 2014). However, the initiative launched after the elections failed to meet the required criteria for a new EP political group (25 members from at least one quarter of the member states240), which signals that Eurosceptic voices are much more disjointed than fearful expectations and evaluations of EP politics might suggest. Indeed, Euroscepticism is not a homogeneous attitude and fails to coagulate around a common project that could arguably present a united front in the European Parliament; furthermore, the roots of Euroscepticism cannot be traced to a single ideological origin, as this type of attitude can be encountered in left or right-wing parties and in populist/extremist or mainstream parties (Hartleb, 2012).

One situation that can nevertheless work in the favour of Eurosceptics of all colours is that voter turnout at EP elections has declined from 62% in 1979 to 43% in 2009 (Duff, 2013, p. 147), with a similar number in 2014 (42,54%241). This can be used to argue that European ideals are suffering since they fail to stir the interest of the electorate but it is more likely the case, as we shall see, that European elections do not offer an appropriate climate for contestation on actual EU matters, which can account for the low turnouts by suggesting that it is citizen interest in EU matters which is misrepresented.

All things considered, careful observation reveals that, in spite of concerning trends in the most recent elections, Euroscepticism fails to be a monolithic force which sets out to undermine past, present and future efforts towards European construction. While the votes received by parties who share an animosity towards the European Union may be a cause for concern in Brussels, it must be understood that their voices create a dissonance, rather than a smooth collective discourse of opposition.

One other event that does not automatically lead to considerations regarding Euroscepticism is represented by the Ukraine crisis, specifically the annexation of Crimea by Vladimir Putin's Russia. While the juxtaposition between this event and our subject matter may seem counter-intuitive at first, the link becomes more easily understandable if we refer to the idea of national sovereignty: concretely, far right Eurosceptic representatives such as Marine Le Pen share a certain affinity with the Russian president precisely because of their mutual attachment to this very idea and to conservative cultural values (Polyakova, 2014). This way, Eurosceptics can place the blame for the Ukraine situation at Brussels' feet, by arguing that the EU is a staunch believer in flawed policies such as the expansion that led to Russian retaliation in the first place. It is the mission of the following sections of this paper to suggest what can be done to prevent such simplistic expositions from gaining ground and supporters in an EU that is still arguably in search of its own defining values.

This being said, it is to be expected that the future of Euroscepticism may be strongly influenced by such events which suggest an immediate cause for concern and agitation, while also carrying within them the potential for the tempering and dilution of their Eurosceptic fuel. The following section assumes a more organized character, as it outlines the current European context which forms the background for the evolution of Euroscepticism as predicted by the two diverging scenarios developed in the last part of our article.

Scenarios for the evolution of Euroscepticism - context

After the predominantly empirical character of the previous section, the following exposition aims at painting a broader and more carefully structured picture of the background political elements which have a strong potential to sway Eurosceptic positions after the 2014 moment.

The first aspect which immediately claims our attention is represented by an observation made by van der Ejik and Franklin around a decade ago, which has yet to lose its salience: national elections are mostly dominated by national matters and the left-right cleavage, which leaves very little room for actual competition and debate based on EU matters to take place. Taking this into consideration, the two authors argue that, while divisions along the line of EU issues are prominent among the European electorates, there is still little chance for this dimension to actually find an expression in usual party politics; for this reason, the great unexploited potential for electoral contestation on European matters may be characterized as a "sleeping giant", a fact which suggests the enormous political capital and momentum to be gained by capitalizing on European affairs (van der Ejik, Franklin, 2004). On top of this, at EP elections we find ourselves once again on the familiar grounds of national games dominating the competition, as it is national political parties "who select (and ditch) the candidates, finance the campaign and draft the electoral programmes" (Duff, 2013, p. 149).

In other words, what this situation suggests is that there is a strong need for a reliable outlet which may be used to express opinions and attitudes regarding European matters (be they friendly or critical), an outlet which is severely lacking at present. Thus, we need to ask ourselves whether this status-quo is not harmful in terms of qualified, specific criticism turning itself into unqualified and diffuse rejection if it cannot access the system at a point in time when the input it provides might actually be well-informed and productive. Similarly, we need to take into account the fact that a continued lack of debate can also prove especially discouraging for enthusiasts who are likely to want to take part in the march towards further integration, but might become frustrated by their inability to do so.

A practical reflection of these observations can be found in the Eurobarometer surveys, specifically when tackling the trend regarding the following statement: "My voice counts in the EU". As can easily be seen, there is a positive shift in election years, when citizens tend to agree with this assertion in larger numbers, as indicated by the upwards surge in the "Agree" category for 2004, 2009 and 2014. Once again, this can be interpreted as proof that a great appetite for discussion on EU matters exists and takes advantage of any potential channel for expression; the concerning side of this discussion suggests that an important number of voices is not heard, which means that the "sleeping giant" state of affairs presented above becomes even more noteworthy in the sense that its resolution will have a strong direct impact on the evolution of EU-related attitudes: will the EU become an entity citizens can relate with or a closed-off system in dire need of more transparency and input?

Remaining within the realm of citizen mobilization, we can find further confirmation for these remarks by including the civil society dimension in our explanation. Concretely, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are considered by EU bodies such as the Parliament or the Commission in capacities that suggest a top-down approach; namely, they are perceived mostly as information suppliers, knowledge and expertise sources, partners in EU-directed projects and legitimacy providers meant to represent an answer to accusations of democratic deficit directed at the Union (Rodekamp, 2014, pp. 59-63). As a result, the potential of CSOs as much needed outlets for contestation on EU issues is diminished when they are cast in the role of obvious supporters of a European project whose characteristics are a foregone conclusion, instead of being assigned the part of forums where different versions of 'Europe' can compete for consideration in mainstream political debates.

With regard to Eurosceptic parties, the observations which can be made are highly likely to alleviate fears concerning their transformative potential on the European political stage. Firstly, as pointed out previously, they are incapable of presenting a united front capable of articulating the various anti-EU and anti-integration positions into a coherent, powerful block capable of radically reshaping European politics.

In addition to this, Szczerbiak and Taggart point out in a comprehensive study regarding Eurosceptic parties as part of government that, when these parties do manage to reach such a privileged position, they generally (not always) tone down their Eurosceptic stance, in substance if not in rhetoric, in a bid to move towards the centre of the ideological spectrum and become more desirable as coalition partners (Taggart, Szczerbiak, 2013). Therefore, even though they may insert a Eurosceptic slant into politics, the danger is not as categorical as one might initially believe, as these parties have a strongly limited potential to 'contaminate' the political environment with their 'harmful' views.

Last but not least, we pre-face our backtracking towards the notion of discourse in the next section by drawing attention to the fact that Euroscepticism can also be used as a political label by parties who need a weapon to differentiate themselves from adversaries; by calling your rival Eurosceptic you can disqualify or marginalize him and consolidate your own position. Similarly, by normatively adhering to the European track you can afford to criticize the EU without automatically being accused of scepticism (Neumayer, 2008). This way, 'Europhile' and 'Eurosceptic' run the risk of becoming superficial designations employed in a nebulous political battle for votes with blurred lines instead of signifiers which describe an actual position on European matters.

To conclude, the underlying context of our scenarios can be summarized as follows: while European issues are a consistent source of political attitudes, there are insufficient outlets so that citizens may express their sentiments regarding integration as embodied by the EU in a productive manner. Apart from this, while the presence and proliferation of so-called Eurosceptic parties is a reality, the threat represented by them is often overstated, not to mention the fact that, at times, Euroscepticism can become a label strategically employed against rival parties.

Euroscepticism - scenarios for evolution

After becoming more familiar with the theoretical and empirical context that describes the background upon which Euroscepticism takes shape, we are now faced with the task of anticipating the exact coordinates and colours of this still undefined and constantly evolving discursive construct. However, since "no discursive formation is a sutured totality" (Laclau, Mouffe, 2001, p. 106) our only recourse is to analyse the possible scenarios that are most likely to develop while Euroscepticism retains the defining elements outlined in the beginning sections.

The first potential track relies heavily on the notion of antagonism, as conceptualised by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau, Mouffe, 2001, pp. 122127). In this scenario, Eurosceptics become the "other", who does not allow the fervent adepts of European integration to have a fully rounded identity; rather, the existence of the "other" cannot be assimilated into the discursive system as a moment242, but remains nevertheless as a limit which constantly subverts the formation of an objective reality with universally accepted and reified characteristics known as Europe/The European Union. The logical question stemming from this vision is how exactly such a bleak scenario can materialize, given the current state of the EU as a self-proclaimed vanguard for the 'unity in diversity' ideal.

In order to provide a sufficiently satisfying answer, we may once again return to the question of standards, pointing to the fact that the way in which we define the European Union and European integration needs to be closely scrutinised so that we may adequately understand criticism directed at them (Kaniok, 2012, pp. 30-31). Consequently, if we continue to adhere to the elusive idea of an 'ever closer Union' understood as a federation with institutions similar to the nation state whose development in this respect is a foregone conclusion, then it is highly unlikely for scepticism of any kind (even soft, specific and qualified) to penetrate: any further political battle becomes a meaningless squabble between reactionary elements which detracts from the sustained march towards the logical way forward.

As post-structuralist discourse theorists might point out, this understanding of the EU is a sign of hegemonic articulation which, combined with the aforementioned notion of antagonism results in the creation of a "threatening Otherness that stabilizes the discursive system while, at the same time, preventing its ultimate closure" (Torfing, 2005, p. 15). Simply put, once a firm integration project embodied by an increasingly supranational EU is in place, Euroscepticism becomes both the unsavoury element which needs to be distanced and the limit which does not allow this project to become a static, sutured structure.

As pointed out in the previous section, there is great untapped potential for mobilization and contestation on EU matters among European citizens, while Eurosceptic parties themselves remain a fragmented and only mildly influential voice. It is our contention that, should such a state of affairs continue to be ignored and should all critical voices become lumped together irrespective of degree as part of a chain of equivalence which emphasises their sameness and threatening character (Torfing, 2005, pp. 15-16), this would result in the radicalization described above.

In other words, if outlets for much needed debate on the future of the Union are not provided, then there is a tangible risk of those that only display soft Euroscepticism and have genuine unaddressed concerns being pushed towards the 'hard' category by repeated disappointments and dead-ends. Also, as emphasised in the second section, persistent disillusionment at the more superficial levels of the authorities and the regime may well turn negative utilitarian considerations into affective ones, targeted at the EU as the flagship coagulant of European identity. It is rather obvious that the fastest way to create this brand of persistent disappointment is indiscriminately ignoring critical opinions on a regular basis, thus fostering feelings of being disenfranchised from an unresponsive polity.

On a cautionary note, this type of status-quo is a ripe ground for populist political entrepreneurs, who are prepared to seize the opportunity of gaining political capital through providing critics with a (deceptive) mouthpiece should the mainstream refuse to do so. Furthermore, as Krouwel and Abts point out, populists do not only react to discontent and scepticism, but they actually foster them, thus turning discontent into cynicism and outright rejection of an establishment that has become detached from its citizens (Krouwel, Abts, 2007, pp. 263-267). As a consequence, the desire to minimise critical voices and to exclude them from mainstream political debate might severely backfire by creating an unreasonable critical mass that has lost faith in the polity represented by the European Union.

On the other hand, this scenario is only one possible facet of the future path of Euroscepticism, just as the federalist/supranational discourse on integration is only one of the potential manifestations of the European Union. If the hegemonic articulation were to shift towards the idea of the EU as a 'work in progress', then input on the form and characteristics that this entity should assume becomes not only possible, but necessary, thus resulting in a more stable discursive formation which has assimilated soft, contingent criticism as a moment.

In order to more clearly support this point of view, we may once again turn to the ideas of Chantal Mouffe so as to envisage how accepting informed criticism and contestation is actually a pre-condition for moving away from the simplistic "us versus them" type of antagonism described as the key landmark of our first scenario. In an article introducing the idea of "agonistic pluralism" (Mouffe, 1999), Mouffe argued against deliberative democracy based on a purely rational consensus, as conflict and power cannot be fully eliminated if we are to have a truly plural democracy. Very simply put, even in democracy the creation of an "us" requires boundaries and presupposes an "other", but the resulting relation need not be that of enemies (antagonism), but may be that of adversaries (agonism), who accept each other's legitimacy, adhere to the same values, but disagree on their interpretation.

Just as the meaning and principles of liberal democracy cannot be treated as a foregone conclusion, the meaning and principles behind European integration may be seen, in this second scenario, as equally open to contestation; as a consequence, we would not have discussions on the best technical measures needed to reach a pre-set goal, but on the very essence of that goal. In other words, so-called Eurosceptics become adversaries who may bring to the table their own versions of the European project, with such an action accepted as fully legitimate.

For instance, as Kaniok points out, a more open and minimalist definition of the EU as a political system which can be supported from intergovernmental as well as supranational positions would lead to an understanding of the fact that the system needs input, evaluation and feedback; these aspects are currently lacking or are marginalized by political elites, who are in a hurry to move forward. In his view, the softer version of criticism is actually a manifestation of this necessity, which means that it can and should become 'part of the game' as a natural component of the political system (Kaniok, 2012, pp. 43-46).

In light of this reasoning, the second track for the evolution of Euroscepticism after 2014 could be described as 'acknowledgement of critical views and their constructive mobilization', which would entail widespread recognition of the unique character of the EU as an entity that still needs to be defined through broad-based input. This way, soft/specific/critical/qualified Euroscepticism gets a chance to manifest in a productive manner and to resolve its valid concerns through the political system, not by becoming weary of it. However, in order for this scenario to be achieved, discussion on all European issues (including that of further integration) needs to become more open and channels for expression on EU related matters have to be supplemented in answer to the significant potential for contestation which such problems carry.

By meeting these conditions, any future result of the integration process is likely to be faced with less resistance than at the present time; apart from this, the elements which are designated as 'threatening' would be confined solely to the harsh critics who find significant principled faults with European integration, thus resulting in a more cohesive discourse in this latter respect.

Conclusion

To sum up, this paper has sketched two potential tracks for the evolution of Euroscepticism after 2014, based on the theoretical framework developed in the first two sections and the context outlined in parts three and four. Our aim was to present and advocate a nuanced and more moderate view of Euroscepticism as an inherent part of the integration process. For this reason, theoretical differences in degree and in kind were identified and potentially influential conditions, events and processes were emphasised.

Our second scenario highlights the fact that a more nuanced approach towards European integration manages to recognise the evolution and input that qualified criticism provides for the political system. If we were to admit that the optimal integration solution has not been found yet, then the idea of Euroscepticism can be approached in a constructive manner and populist anti-establishment arguments can be safely deconstructed, as reasonable concerns would have a legitimate outlet. Moreover, this scenario presents the added benefit of dismantling a simple 'us versus them' dichotomy, by proving that integration and Euroscepticism are not static concepts but can be filled with multiple meanings, with such discursive efforts having a direct consequence on the evolution of Eurosceptic views.

All things considered, we launch the following suggestion as both a conclusion and a challenge for further research: a more moderate view of Euroscepticism which recognises the potential benefits of critical input is highly likely to generate consensus and a more inclusive European project which engenders a sense of ownership instead of a feeling of disenfranchisement.

Footnote

239 This work was possible due to the financial support of the Sectorial Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132400 with the title "Young successful researchers - professional development in an international and interdisciplinary environment".

240 European Parliament, Political groups, available online at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/007f2537e0/Political-groups.html], accessed on 24 November 2014.

241 European Parliament, Results of the 2014 European Elections, 2014, available online at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html], accessed on 20 October 2014.

242 A moment is a "differential position" "articulated within a discourse", while an element is a "difference that is not discursively articulated" (Laclau, Mouffe, 2001, p. 105).

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