La funcion del pensamiento y el discurso en Hannah Arendt. De los juicios reflexivos a los juicios politicos

Abstract

The paper argues that reective judgments presuppose an agent determined by discursive functions. In order to demonstrate that there is a discursive or narrative subject in Arendt, the following issues are dealt with. First of all, that there is a direct relation between the political subject and its space of emergence or degree of publicity. In this sense, the subject is not just any subject, but rather one who has the possibility of appearing before others. This experience makes it possible to think of human action in a certain way. Reective judgments operate on particular cases that enable the emergence of a discursive subject that orients action. Secondly, the purpose of this analysis is to nd out whether it is possible or legitimate to think discourse as a strictly narrative resource, and to inquire into Arendts position in this respect: is it possible to think about reective judgments on the basis of that which is narrated? This question leads to our conclusion, since the possibility of thinking about that which is narrated on the basis of reective judgments presupposes a specic subject with certain prior characteristics that enable the categories of the visible, of the invisible, and of appearance and reality.