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Abstract
Recent theories suggest that self-consciousness, in its most elementary form, is functionally disconnected from the phenomenal body. Patients with psychosis frequently misattribute their thoughts and actions to external sources; and in certain out-of-body experiences, lucid states, and dreams body-ownership is absent but self-identification is preserved. To explain these unusual experiences, we hypothesized that self-identification depends on inferring self-location at the right angular gyrus (i.e., perspective-taking). This process relates to the discrimination of self-produced signals (endogenous attention) from environmental stimulation (exogenous attention). Therefore, when this mechanism fails, this causes altered sensations and perceptions. We combined a Full-body Illusion paradigm with brain stimulation (HD-tDCS) and found a clear causal association between right angular gyrus activation and alterations in self-location (perspective-taking). Anodal versus sham HD-tDCS resulted in: a more profound out-of-body shift (with reduced sense of agency); and a weakened ability to discriminate self from other perspectives. We conclude that self-identification is mediated in the brain by inferring self-location (i.e., perspective-taking). Self-identification can be decoupled from the bodily self, explaining phenomena associated with disembodiment. These findings present novel insights into the relationship between mind and body, and may offer important future directions for treating psychosis symptoms and rehabilitation programs to aid in the recovery from a nervous system injury. The brain’s ability to locate itself might be the key mechanism for self-identification and distinguishing self from other signals (i.e., perspective-taking).
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Details
1 Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Psychology and Counselling, Faculty of Health, Kelvin Grove, Australia (GRID:grid.1024.7) (ISNI:0000000089150953); Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Institute of Health and Biomedical Innovation (IHBI), Brisbane, Australia (GRID:grid.1024.7) (ISNI:0000000089150953)
2 Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Exercise and Nutrition Sciences, Faculty of Health, Kelvin Grove, Australia (GRID:grid.1024.7) (ISNI:0000000089150953); Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Institute of Health and Biomedical Innovation (IHBI), Brisbane, Australia (GRID:grid.1024.7) (ISNI:0000000089150953)
3 The University of Queensland, Centre for Clinical Research (UQCCR), Brisbane, Australia (GRID:grid.1003.2) (ISNI:0000 0000 9320 7537); University Medicine Greifswald, Department of Neurology, Greifswald, Germany (GRID:grid.5603.0)
4 Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation Group (CO3), Centre for Research in Cognition and Neurosciences (CRCN), ULB Neuroscience Institute (UNI), Brussels, Belgium (GRID:grid.4989.c) (ISNI:0000 0001 2348 0746)