Abstract

This article employs the bootstrap Granger full-sample and sub-sample rolling window estimation to explore the time-varying property between bilateral political relations and foreign direct investment based on Sino-Japanese relations. The result identifies a one-way causal nexus running from bilateral political relations to foreign direct investment. Bilateral political relations have both positive and negative influences on foreign direct investment inflows in different sub-stages, but merely negative impacts on outflows. However, the reverse causality has not been proven, which is inconsistent with the model of Polachek et al. that the increased foreign direct investment is conducive to improving bilateral political relations. We also divide the BPR into two dimensions: leader’s visits and diplomatic conflicts to examine the role of specific political actions. Leader’s visits can significantly increase FDI inflows and outflows, but diplomatic conflicts have less impact on FDI. China and Japan should increase dialogue to ensure bilateral relations’ stability and seek common ground in economic interests, ultimately providing investors with a favorable political environment.

Details

Title
Does bilateral political relations affect foreign direct investment?
Author
Song, Yu 1 ; Chen, Bo 1 ; Tao, Ran 2 ; Chi-Wei, Su 3 ; Adelina Dumitrescu Peculea 4 

 Institute of Defence Economics and Management, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China 
 Qingdao Municipal Center for Disease Control & Prevention, Qingdao, China 
 School of Economics, Qingdao University, Qingdao, China 
 Department of Economics and Public Policies, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania 
Pages
1485-1509
Publication year
2020
Publication date
Dec 2020
Publisher
Taylor & Francis Ltd.
ISSN
1331677X
e-ISSN
18489664
Source type
Scholarly Journal
Language of publication
English
ProQuest document ID
2504143552
Copyright
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.