Construction of evolutionary game model between actors and governance system in forest operation

Abstract

With the continuous development of evolutionary game theory, evolutionary game is widely used in various fields of society. This paper constructs the evolutionary game model of actors and governance system in forest resource operation and management, and analyzes the stability strategy of each break-even point of the game system. The results suggest that: (1) When the parameters meet the conditions C ₅ > pC ₄ + C ₂ R + C ₃ < pC ₄, the evolutionary stability strategy of the game system is of (no protection, no regulation), which may lead to the continuous deterioration of forest resources; (2) When the parameters meet the conditions C ₅ < pC ₄ + C ₂ R + C ₃ > pC ₄ C ₅ < C ₂, the evolutionary stability strategy of the game system is of (no protection, regulation), which is to strengthen the supervision mechanism and improve the consciousness of actors to protect forest resources; (3) When the conditions are satisfied C ₅ < pC ₄ + C ₂ R + C ₃ < pC ₄, there is no evolutionary stability strategy in the game system.