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Abstract
When human infants are intentionally addressed by others, they tend to interpret the information communicated as being relevant to them and worth acquiring. For humans, this attribution of relevance leads to a preference to learn from communication, making it possible to accumulate knowledge over generations. Great apes are sensitive to communicative cues, but do these cues also activate an expectation of relevance? In an observational learning paradigm, we demonstrated to a sample of nonhuman great apes (bonobos, chimpanzees, orangutans; N = 24) how to operate on a food dispenser device. When apes had the opportunity to choose between an effective and an ineffective method in the baseline conditions, the majority of them chose the effective method. However, when the ineffective method was demonstrated in a communicative way, they failed to prioritize efficiency, even though they were equally attentive in both conditions. This suggests that the ostensive demonstration elicited an expectation of relevance that modified apes’ interpretation of the situation, potentially leading to a preference to learn from communication, as human children do.
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1 Central European University, Department of Cognitive Science, Budapest, Hungary; Eötvös Lóránd University, Faculty of Education and Psychology, Department of Cognitive Psychology, Budapest, Hungary (GRID:grid.5591.8) (ISNI:0000 0001 2294 6276)
2 University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical University of Vienna, University of Vienna, Messerli Research Institute, Vienna, Austria (GRID:grid.5591.8); University of St Andrews, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, St Andrews, UK (GRID:grid.11914.3c) (ISNI:0000 0001 0721 1626)
3 York University, Department of Philosophy, Toronto, Canada (GRID:grid.21100.32) (ISNI:0000 0004 1936 9430)
4 Central European University, Department of Cognitive Science, Budapest, Hungary (GRID:grid.21100.32)
5 University of St Andrews, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, St Andrews, UK (GRID:grid.11914.3c) (ISNI:0000 0001 0721 1626); Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany (GRID:grid.419518.0) (ISNI:0000 0001 2159 1813)