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Abstract
Uncertainty is inherent in most decisions humans make. Economists distinguish between two types of decision-making under non-certain conditions: those involving risk (i.e., known outcome probabilities) and those that involve ambiguity (i.e., unknown outcome probabilities). Prior research has identified individual differences that explain risk preferences, but little is known about factors associated with ambiguity aversion. Here, we hypothesized that cumulative exposure to major psychosocial stressors over the lifespan might be one factor that predicts individuals’ ambiguity aversion. Across two studies (Study 1: n = 58, Mage = 25.7; Study 2: n = 188, Mage = 39.81), we used a comprehensive lifetime stressor exposure inventory (i.e., the Stress and Adversity Inventory for Adults, or STRAIN) and a standard economic approach to quantify risk and ambiguity preferences. Greater lifetime stressor exposure as measured by the STRAIN, particularly in early life, was associated with higher aversion to ambiguity but not risk preferences.
Uncertainty is a factor in most decisions. Here the authors quantify tolerance for two forms of economic uncertainty—risk and ambiguity—and show that greater lifetime stressor exposure (as assessed by a comprehensive lifetime stressor exposure inventory) was associated with higher aversion to decisions involving ambiguity, but not risk.
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1 New York University Grossman School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, New York, USA (GRID:grid.137628.9) (ISNI:0000 0004 1936 8753)
2 Neuroscience Institute, New York University Grossman School of Medicine, New York, USA (GRID:grid.137628.9) (ISNI:0000 0004 1936 8753)
3 Trinity College, Department of Psychology, Hartford, USA (GRID:grid.265158.d) (ISNI:0000 0004 1936 8235)
4 University of Arkansas, Department of Psychological Science, Fayetteville, USA (GRID:grid.411017.2) (ISNI:0000 0001 2151 0999)
5 Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, University of California, Los Angeles, USA (GRID:grid.19006.3e) (ISNI:0000 0000 9632 6718)