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Abstract
Understanding SARS-CoV-2 transmission within and among communities is critical for tailoring public health policies to local context. However, analysis of community transmission is challenging due to a lack of high-resolution surveillance and testing data. Here, using contact tracing records for 644,029 cases and their contacts in New York City during the second pandemic wave, we provide a detailed characterization of the operational performance of contact tracing and reconstruct exposure and transmission networks at individual and ZIP code scales. We find considerable heterogeneity in reported close contacts and secondary infections and evidence of extensive transmission across ZIP code areas. Our analysis reveals the spatial pattern of SARS-CoV-2 spread and communities that are tightly interconnected by exposure and transmission. We find that locations with higher vaccination coverage and lower numbers of visitors to points-of-interest had reduced within- and cross-ZIP code transmission events, highlighting potential measures for curtailing SARS-CoV-2 spread in urban settings.
In this study, the authors analyse contact tracing records for ~650,000 suspected or confirmed COVID-19 cases in New York City during the second epidemic wave. They reconstruct transmission networks and find that vaccination and zone-based control policies likely contributed to control of the epidemic.
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1 Columbia University, Department of Environmental Health Sciences, Mailman School of Public Health, New York, USA (GRID:grid.21729.3f) (ISNI:0000000419368729)
2 Columbia University, Department of Epidemiology, Mailman School of Public Health, New York, USA (GRID:grid.21729.3f) (ISNI:0000000419368729)
3 New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), Long Island City, USA (GRID:grid.238477.d) (ISNI:0000 0001 0320 6731)
4 Columbia University, Department of Epidemiology, Mailman School of Public Health, New York, USA (GRID:grid.21729.3f) (ISNI:0000000419368729); New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), Long Island City, USA (GRID:grid.238477.d) (ISNI:0000 0001 0320 6731)
5 Weill Cornell Medical College, Department of Population Health Sciences, New York, USA (GRID:grid.5386.8) (ISNI:000000041936877X)
6 NYC Health + Hospitals, New York, USA (GRID:grid.422616.5) (ISNI:0000 0004 0443 7226)
7 Columbia University, Department of Environmental Health Sciences, Mailman School of Public Health, New York, USA (GRID:grid.21729.3f) (ISNI:0000000419368729); Columbia University, Columbia Climate School, New York, USA (GRID:grid.21729.3f) (ISNI:0000000419368729)