1. Introduction
With the development and rise of 5G, more and more devices are connected to a mobile network, and the data traffic on mobile networks has increased dramatically. In daily life, people process and transmit digital information on mobile networks through various devices every day, among which, digital image information accounts for a large proportion. Preventing digital images from being stolen and tampered with by attackers and ensuring information security is a research topic that cannot be ignored.
People can intuitively obtain a lot of information through images. To prevent image information from being attacked and tampered with, digital watermarking and image encryption technologies can be used to secure data [1,2,3,4]. It is necessary to encrypt images according to their characteristics that are different from text: reduce the amount of data contained in images, break the strong correlation between adjacent pixels, and reduce information redundancy [5,6]. Based on this idea, combined with chaos, DNA coding, and other theories, many researchers have proposed a variety of image encryption algorithms [7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16]. Mansouri et al. [17] proposed a one-dimensional chaotic mapping amplifier (1-DCMA) and used its generated chaotic sequence to design an asymmetric image encryption scheme which uses a key to add rows and implements a new index representation (IR) concept using a shift sequence to manipulate the position and value of pixels synchronously. Cao et al. [3] proposed a 2D infinite collapse map and compared it with the existing 2D chaotic maps.Two-dimensional ICM has better ergodicity, hyper chaos, unpredictability, and a wider chaotic region. The image is encrypted by 2D-ICM, which makes the system more secure. Wang et al. [18] used the chaotic sequences generated by the Chen hyperchaotic system for interblock index scrambling and intrablock Fisher–Yates scrambling, and then diffused by different DNA encoding rules and different operating rules corresponding to the chaotic sequences, thereby improving the algorithm security. Encryption methods based on chaotic mapping have better performance. However, one-dimensional chaos-based ones only have a very limited range of parameters. Although hyperchaotic ones have a wider range of chaotic regions, most suffer from high-computational cost. In addition, researchers have proposed new methods for image encryption models based on fractal theory [19,20,21], optical theory [22,23], neural network models [4,24,25,26,27], compressed sensing [28,29], optimization algorithms [30,31,32], and quantum theory [33,34].
Quantum walks are divided into two models: continuous and discrete. Discrete quantum walks are nonlinear mappings between quantum operators and the probability of their occurrence positions and are extremely sensitive to the initial state. A discrete quantum walk ensures the security performance of the system through the infinite possibility of the initial state. It has similar characteristics to the chaotic dynamics in determining the walk state in the system, so it is used by researchers in image encryption models [35,36,37]. Yang et al. [38] used the nonlinear chaotic dynamic performance of a quantum walk (QW) to construct a key generator with good performance, and based on this, they proposed an image encryption algorithm that combines quantum computing with image encryption, which has better security. In addition, Yang et al. [39] designed a quantum hash function based on one-dimensional controlled alternating quantum walks and applied it to image encryption. Abd EL-Latif et al. [40] designed an image encryption mechanism based on the controlled alternating quantum walk model. The replacement and scrambling stages are based on independently calculated quantum walks, which well protect the patient privacy in the medical system. However, the initial parameters of the quantum wander described above are fixed, and the quantum wander key is fixed for different images, which has low security and poor key sensitivity. When performing a controlled alternating quantum wander, its controlled coin operator is relatively single, and the redundancy of binary messages is high. At the same time, it only encrypts the original image in the two-dimensional plane using the probability matrix, which has a limited effect on image dislocation and diffusion.
Based on the above research questions, in this paper, we propose a new 3D cuboid image encryption algorithm based on message-encoded controlled alternating quantum walks. In order to solve the problem of fixed initial parameters of quantum wandering, we designed a key set with good security that can calculate the initial parameters of the quantum system and perform a one-dimensional quantum walk to generate a probability distribution sequence. In order to avoid excessive message redundancy, we encoded this sequence into a quaternary message and used multiple sets of encoded messages to control the alternate quantum walk model. Meanwhile, we divided the plane image into blocks and converted it into a three-dimensional cuboid image for processing. Combined with the quantum mechanical properties of the quantum walk model, our scheme has good security performance and can effectively prevent digital image information from being stolen and tampered with by attackers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents one-dimensional discrete quantum walks and controlled alternating quantum walks on circles. Section 3 presents 3D cuboid image encryption based on the message-encoded controlled alternating quantum walks model. The fourth section introduces the security performance analysis and testing of this model. The last section is the conclusion.
2. Preliminary Works
The quantum walk model is a quantization of the classical random walk model by using a quantized description of the position of the particle to construct the entanglement between the particle position and the quantized Markov state variable [35]. There are two models of quantum walks: discrete QWs and continuous QWs. Discrete quantum walks determine the motion state of the system and have similar properties to chaotic dynamics, which can be used in the process of image encryption algorithms. The discrete QWs model consists of two parts: the coin and the walker. The coin and the walker are in a Hilbert space . By applying a conditional shift operator to the coin operator, the moving state of the walker is changed. On an odd circle with nodes, the probabilities at all points are essentially nonzero when .
2.1. One-Dimensional Discrete Quantum Walks (1DQWs) on Circles
A one-dimensional discrete quantum walk on a circle [38] whose initial state of the coin operator is , where and are the amplitudes of the initial coin operator which satisfy the normalization equation . During the evolution of the quantum system, the quantum walk is realized by applying the shift operator to the coin operator, which is represented by the global unitary operator , such as in Equation (1):
(1)
where represents the shift operator, and its expression is Equation (2):(2)
represents the identity matrix. represents the coin operator, and its expression is Equation (3):
(3)
where .After steps, the final state of the entire quantum system is Equation (4):
(4)
After steps, the probability of finding a walker at position is Equation (5):
(5)
The general situation of the probability distribution of one-dimensional discrete quantum walks on a circle (number of nodes 75; ; step count ; the initial coin operator is ) is shown in Figure 1.
2.2. Controlled Alternate Quantum Walks (CAQWs) on Circles
A controlled alternate quantum walk process on a circle has a string of messages controlling the transform operator at each step [41]. When the -th bit of the message is zero or one, the evolution operator or is applied to the coin operator, which is expressed as Equations (6) and (7):
(6)
(7)
where , represent the shift operators acting in the and directions, respectively, which are expressed as Equations (8) and (9):(8)
(9)
represents the identity matrix. , represent two alternating coin operators, whose construction is in the following Equations (10) and (11):
(10)
(11)
After steps, the final state of the entire quantum system is Equation (12):
(12)
After steps, the magnitude of the probability of finding a walker at position is Equation (13). The probability is Equation (14):
(13)
(14)
The probability distribution of quantum walks controlled by binary message string M on a circle (number of nodes: 19;;; the initial coin operator is ; ), as is shown in Figure 2.
3. Proposed Method
In the following subsections, we describe our proposed encryption algorithm in detail.
3.1. Generate Initial Key
Our key consists of four parts: initial parameters , of plaintext image pixel values, image block size , supplementary parameters ,, and the number of blocks .
3.1.1. Initial Parameters
We took a plaintext image as the input of SHA-512 and obtained a 128-bit hexadecimal sequence which was divided into 64 groups of sequences . Each group was an 8-bit byte sequence. According to the 64 groups of sequences, we calculated and generated initial parameters and use them as keys, such as in Equation (15), the specific steps are as follows:
Step one: Convert to binary sequence.
Step two: Convert into a decimal sequence and take the entire sequence modulo 8 to obtain the cyclic shift bits of the sequence .
Step three: According to , we need to rotate , convert it into a decimal sequence, and calculate the initial parameters .
(15)
where represents a cyclic left shift to the binary sequence, represents a cyclic right shift to a binary sequence, and represents the exclusive-or operator.3.1.2. Sum of Plaintext Image Pixel Values
Accumulate and sum all pixel values of the plaintext image to obtain the key , whose expression is Equation (16):
(16)
where represents the pixel value at the position.3.1.3. Image block size
First, select the short side of the image, and assume is the short side. Then, divide by an odd number within 1130, and select the odd number corresponding to the number with the largest fractional part from the result as the block size .
3.1.4. Supplementary Parameters , and Number of Blocks
According to the block size , the rows and columns of the image are filled with numbers that are divisible by , and the number of rows and the number of columns of the supplementary element 0 are used as the key. The calculation formula is Equation (17):
(17)
where represents the modulo, and are the number of rows and columns of the original image, and is the block size.After adding elements to the original image, its row and column are , and the number of blocks is calculated by the following Equation (18):
(18)
3.2. Generating 3D Probability Magnitude Matrix, 3D Probability Distribution Matrix, and 3D Quantum Hash Sequence by Using Quantum Walks
We used a one-dimensional quantum walk to generate a one-dimensional probability distribution sequence, then encoded the probability distribution sequence to generate a quaternary message and performed controlled alternating quantum walks by encoding the message. Finally, it generated the probability amplitude matrix and probability distribution matrix of multiple CAQWs by combining a 3D probability amplitude matrix and 3D probability distribution matrix and then generated a 3D quantum hash sequence according to the probability distribution matrix. We applied the generated one-dimensional probability distribution sequence, 3D probability amplitude matrix, 3D probability distribution matrix, and 3D quantum hash sequence to the three-dimensional cuboid image encryption algorithm.
3.2.1. Generation of Initial Parameters for 1DQWs
-
(1). Number of nodes on the circle
According to the key generated in Section 3.1.2, the ten-digit number of the sum of pixel values is calculated by Equation (19). Then calculate the length of the message through the parameter in Section 3.1.1, as shown in Equation (20). If , then the length of the message is Equation (21). Finally, the number of nodes of the circle is given by Equation (22).
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
where means rounding down, is a logarithmic function with base 10, and means a modulo operation.-
(2). Coin parameter
The coin parameter is calculated by the parameter of Section 3.1.1, as shown in Equation (23).
(23)
where represents the modulo operation.-
(3). The initial state of the coin
The initial state of the coin is . We used the parameters and in Section 3.1.1 to generate the initial state of the coin , is expressed as the following Equation (14). Because the coin operator needs to satisfy , we constructed the quadratic equation of one variable of Equation (25) to calculate the initial state of the generated coins.
(24)
(25)
where are the amplitude and phase of the initial state (complex number), represents the complex unit, represents the quadratic equation to be solved, and represents the unknown parameter.3.2.2. Generation of Initial Parameters of CAQWs
-
(1). The number of nodes on the circle of CAQWs is equal to the block size .
-
(2). Coin parameters
The coin parameters are calculated by the parameters and in Section 3.1.1, as shown in Equations (26) and (27)
(26)
(27)
-
(3). Initial state of the coin
Similar to the initial state of the coin of 1DQWs, the expressions of are Equation (28). Because the coin operator needs to satisfy , we constructed the quadratic equation of one variable of Equation (29) to calculate the initial state of the generated coins.
(28)
(29)
where are the amplitude and phase of the initial state (complex number), represents the complex unit. represents the quadratic equation to be solved, and represents the unknown parameter.3.2.3. Generating Probability Distribution Sequences Using 1DQWs
According to the initial parameters, we performed a 1D discrete quantum walk [38]. After steps, the probability of finding a walker at position is Equation (30), and we denoted this sequence of probability distributions as .
(30)
where represents the probability of finding a walker at after steps.3.2.4. Message Encoding
We mapped the probability distribution sequence generated by 1DQWs to values 0–255, as shown in Equation (31), and quaternary encoded it and the encoded as the message.
(31)
where represents the modulo operation, and represents the rounding down.3.2.5. Controlled Alternate Quantum Walks for Message Encoding
In the proposed image encryption algorithm, we improved the two-dimensional controlled alternating walk model and encoded the sequence generated by 1DQWs into a quaternary sequence as a control message. We also applied the quaternary message encoding to the evolution process of the quantum system [40] by using Equation (32) to represent the global unitary operators , , , .
(32)
Assuming that the message string generated by 1DQWs is “320102”, the state of the entire system can be expressed as Equation (33):
(33)
After steps, the final state of the entire quantum system is Equation (34):
(34)
After steps, the probability amplitude of finding a walker at position is Equation (35), and the probability is Equation (36):
(35)
(36)
3.2.6. Three-Dimensional Probability Amplitude Matrix and Three-Dimensional Probability Distribution Matrix
According to the number of blocks in Section 3.1.4, we divided the message encoding into groups and used Section 3.2.2 to calculate the generated initial parameters of the system. According to the corresponding message encoding, we performed times of message encoding-controlled alternate quantum walks on the circle and finally generated a 3D probability amplitude matrix of size , whose expression is Equation (37). At the same time, a 3D probability distribution matrix of size was generated, and its expression is Equation (38).
(37)
where represents the probability amplitude matrix which generated under the control of the group of encoding messages.(38)
where represents the probability matrix which generated under the control of the group of encoding messages.3.2.7. Three-Dimensional Quantum Hash Sequence
Quantum hash sequences have chaotic-dynamics-like properties and can be used to generate pseudorandom numbers. We converted the 3D probability distribution matrix , which was generated in Section 3.2.6, into a binary string using Equations (39) and (40) and finally obtained the 3D quantum hash sequence . In the diffusion stage, we used the 3D quantum hash sequence to complete the diffusion operation.
(39)
(40)
where means converting a decimal number to binary.3.3. Image Encryption Process
Combining the discrete quantum walk model, we propose a three-dimensional cuboid image encryption algorithm with two rounds of scrambling and two rounds of diffusion operations. First, we used 1DQWs to generate a probability value sequence , then encoded into a quaternary message . Then, we used the encoded message to control the alternate quantum walk model to generate a 3D probability amplitude matrix and 3D probability distribution matrix. Finally, we used the 3D probability distribution matrix obtain the 3D quantum hash series. The operation is shown in Algorithm 1. We used the probability value sequence and 3D probability distribution matrix to complete the image scrambling and used the 3D probability magnitude matrix and 3D quantum hash series to diffuse the image to obtain the final encrypted image. The operation is shown in Algorithm 2. The following are the specific steps of our proposed encryption scheme, and its flow chart is shown in Figure 3.
Algorithm 1. Sequence generation. |
Input: Original image(PlainImg) |
Algorithm 2. Encryption algorithms. |
Input: Original image(PlainImg), , , , , |
3.3.1. Generation of Image Cuboid
Step one: Image segmentation
According to the supplementary parameters and generated in Section 3.1.4, the plaintext image blocks were supplemented with zero elements in row and column , and then according to the image block size generated in Section 3.1.3 and the number of blocks generated in Section 3.1.4, we divided the filled image into image blocks whose size is , number.
Step two: Combine into a 3D image cuboid
The image blocks generated by Step One were converted into a three-dimensional image cuboid with the size of , line by line, from left to right, and from top to bottom, as shown in Figure 4.
3.3.2. Two Rounds of Scrambling
Step one: Interlayer scrambling based on one-dimensional quantum walk.
According to Equation (41), we divided the probability distribution sequence generated in Section 3.2.3 into groups and then summed the sequences of each group to obtain the sequence . The operation process is shown in Figure 5.
Then, Equation (42) was used to sort from small to large, and the image cuboid was scrambled between layers according to its index sequence to obtain the scrambled image block between layers, as shown in Figure 6.
(41)
where is an array reconstruction function, represents the message length, represents the number of blocks, and represents the sum of the array by columns.(42)
where is the sorting function and is the sequence of index sorting.Step Two: Layer-by-layer scrambling based on 3D probability distribution matrix
The three-dimensional probability distribution matrix generated in Section 3.2.6 sorted the image block from smallest to largest in order from top to bottom in each depth layer and used the index sort matrix generated at each layer. The image block was scrambled layer by layer to obtain a new image block , as shown in Figure 7.
3.3.3. Two Rounds of Diffusion
Step one: Binary cube rotation based on probability magnitude matrix
As shown in Figure 8, each 0–255 pixel value of the image block obtained by scrambling in Section 3.3.2 was operated from left to right, layer by layer. Then, we operated it from back to front and top to bottom and encoded as a binary cube. According to the 3D probability amplitude matrix obtained in Section 3.2.6, the binary cube was rotated. We divided the probability amplitude into A direction and B direction. If A > B, the upper layer of the binary cube was rotated 90 degrees counterclockwise; otherwise, the lower layer of the binary cube was rotated 90 degrees clockwise. Finally, the binary cube corresponding to each pixel value was converted into a binary sequence, and we obtained the 3D image block after the binary cube rotation operation.
Step two: Diffusion based on 3D quantum hash sequence
By using the 3D quantum hash series obtained in Section 3.2.7, we performed a global bitwise XOR operation with the 3D image block according to Equation (43). We converted it into a decimal sequence and obtained the image block . Then, we tiled the image block to obtain the final encrypted image .
(43)
where means bitwise exclusive or.3.4. Image Decryption Process
The image decryption process is the reverse operation of the encryption process, and the steps are as follows:
Step one: According to the key in Section 3.1.3 and the key in Section 3.1.4, we divided the encrypted image into blocks and then combined them into cubes .
Step two: We converted each pixel value of the cube into a binary sequence and performed a global bitwise XOR operation with the 3D quantum hash series which was obtained in Section 3.2.7 to acquire the image block .
Step three: Each pixel value of image block was encoded into a binary cub, and a reverse rotation operation was performed on the binary cube according to the three-dimensional probability amplitude matrix obtained in Section 3.2.6. This operation is a reverse of Section 3.3.3, resulting in an image block .
Step four: The 3D probability distribution matrix generated in Section 3.2.6 was sorted by index for each layer, in the order from the top to the bottom. The image block was inversely indexed and scrambled layer by layer according to the index order to obtain .
Step five: According to the index generated in Section 3.3.2, was scrambled with interlayer inverse index to obtain .
Step six: By tiling the image block obtained in the previous step and removing the supplementary zero elements by row and column according to the keys and obtained in Section 3.1.4, we obtained the final decrypted image .
4. Simulation Results and Security Analysis
In order to test the security performance of the proposed image encryption scheme, we used MATLAB R2020b software to conduct simulation experiments on a computer with Windows 10 system, 16 GB memory, and i5-10500 CPU. The images we used in testing included 256 ∗ 256 square images (Lena, Baboon, Peppers, White, Black), 512 ∗ 512 square images (Barbara, Cameraman, Livingroom), irregular Lena image, and images from standard 25 grayscale images of the USC-SIPI image database.
4.1. Encryption and Decryption Results
In this paper, 256 ∗ 256, 512 ∗ 512 square images and irregular Lena image were used for testing. The test results of 256 ∗ 256 images (Lena, Baboon, Peppers, White, Black) are shown in Figure 9. The encryption and decryption results of 512 ∗ 512 images (Barbara, Cameraman, Livingroom) and irregular Lena images are shown in Figure 10. The encrypted images shown in the figure cannot show any meaningful information, and the original images with rich information can be obtained by decrypting with the correct key.
4.2. Histogram Analysis
The pixel histogram shows the distribution of different pixel values in the image. We tested and analyzed the histogram of encrypted images. The histogram analysis results of 256 ∗ 256 size images are shown in Figure 11, and the histogram analysis results of 512 ∗ 512 size images and irregular Lena image are shown in Figure 12. It can be seen that the distribution frequency of pixel values in the encrypted images is relatively uniform, and the trend of the histogram is stable, which has a good ability to resist statistical attacks.
4.3. Test
We use the test to describe the distribution of the pixel histogram [42], whose formula is Equation (44):
(44)
where represents the value of the chi-square test, represents the pixel value, represents the frequency of the pixel value in the image, and represents the expected frequency of the pixel value , . The smaller the value of the test, the more uniform the pixel distribution. When the confidence is , the condition for passing the test is that is less than .Table 1 (Lena, Baboon, Peppers, White, Black) and Table 2 (Barbara, Cameraman, Livingroom, Irregular Lena) show the test results of plaintext images and the results in comparison with others’ methods. The images were encrypted with different sizes, and all results passed the test conditions, which shows that our algorithm has a good ability to resist statistical attacks.
4.4. Correlation Coefficient Analysis
There is a strong correlation between the adjacent pixels of the original image, and the lower the correlation of the ciphertext image, the stronger the resistance of the algorithm to statistical attacks. The calculation formula of pixel correlation is such as Equations (45)–(47):
(45)
(46)
(47)
where is the pixel correlation coefficient, and and are the expectation and variance.We selected 2000 pairs of pixels on the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal lines of the image for 30 tests and took the average value. Figure 13 shows the correlation distribution of the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal lines of the images in the USC-SIPI image database, and their values all hovered around zero. For example, the correlations in the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal directions are shown in Figure 14, Figure 15 and Figure 16. Table 3 shows the results of ours and the comparison with others’ methods, bold indicates the average of pixel correlation coefficients in different directions of the image, and the pixel correlation coefficient is much lower than that of the plaintext image, which fully shows that our method has strong resistance to statistical analysis.
4.5. Information Entropy Analysis
Information entropy can be used to measure the randomness of information [43]. Its calculation formula is Equation (48):
(48)
where represents the information entropy, represents the information source, represents the gray value of the pixel value , and represents the probability of the gray value.The closer the information entropy is to eight, the stronger the randomness of the image and the higher the security performance of its encryption algorithm. We selected multiple sets of images from the USC-SIPI image database for testing, and Table 4 is a comparison of our results with other methods, bold indicates indicators of better performance. The results show that the entropy of the images encrypted by our method is closer to eight.
4.6. Antidifferential Attack (NPCR and UACI Standard Evaluation)
Differential attack is to change specific elements of the plaintext image, corresponding to the degree of influence of different ciphertexts, to obtain as much of the key as possible. The ability of an encryption algorithm to resist differential attacks can be measured by two important parameters: number of pixel change rate (NPCR) and uniform average change intensity (UACI) [44], which are calculated as Equation (49)–(51):
(49)
(50)
(51)
where and are the height and width of the image, and and represent the encrypted ciphertext images of two different original images.In the paper [44], we can see the theoretical values of the three levels of NPCR and UACI for images of different sizes. We chose the confidence level to be 0.05 and tested the images in the USC-SIPI image database. The results are shown in Table 5, which shows that our results are in line with the theoretical expectations, underlined data indicates that the test did not pass, so our algorithm can resist differential attacks.
4.7. Anticlipping and Noise Attacks
When the image information is transmitted on the channel, the image information may be subjected to cropping attacks, noise attacks, and other attack methods by the attacker so that the transmitted image information is damaged, and the useful information cannot be obtained after decryption with the correct key. Therefore, we conducted cropping attack and noise attack tests on the images respectively to check the robustness of our algorithm. We used the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) between the ciphertext image and the plaintext image as a standard [45], and its calculation formula is as Equations (52) and (53):
(52)
(53)
where is the image size, and and represent the original image and the encrypted image.We cropped the image by 1/16, 1/8, 1/4, and 1/2, and set the pixel value of these parts to zero. Table 6 shows the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) of different degrees of cropping attack; Figure 17 shows the decrypted image after the ciphertext is subjected to different degrees of cropping attack. We can see that the general information of the decrypted image can still be identified after being subjected to different degrees of cropping attack; therefore, our algorithm is resistant to clipping attacks.
Then, we applied noise of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.15 intensity to the ciphertext image and decrypted it with the correct key. The PSNR of the decrypted image is shown in Table 7, and the decrypted image is shown in Figure 18, which means that our algorithm is also resistant to noise attacks.
4.8. Key Space Analysis
When the key space is large enough, the algorithm can resist brute force attack. The key in this paper has four parts: initial parameters , of plaintext image pixel values, image block size , supplementary parameters , , and the number of blocks Bnum. The calculation accuracy is . Taking a 256 ∗ 256 image as an example, the main key space is Equation (54):
keyspace = 1015 ∗ 8 + 108 + 10 + 20 + 102 > 2100(54)
Its key space is much larger than , so it can resist brute force attacks [46].
4.9. Key Sensitivity Analysis
An encryption algorithm is sufficiently secure when it is sensitive to subtle changes in the key, so we tested this on the peppers images. Since our main initial keys are generated by the SHA-512 function, we randomly selected the correct key , then increased the last digit sequence value generated by SHA-512 by 1, and then calculated and generated a new initial key , which was only slightly different from the correct key. Figure 19 shows the results of decryption with the changed key, indicating that our method has better key sensitivity.
(275afc80927870608dfa79743a56d02e3ff7d009aa78655e9affbcb25e74e1ce102df926ffe0670ca599cc5ef2d57299429bfba3d45b66143fb075b69e590896);
(0.385365853658537, 0.412682926829268, 0.578536585365854, 0.237354085603113, 0.038910505836576, 0.578947368421053, 0.578947368421053, 0.290448343079922);
(275afc80927870608dfa79743a56d02e3ff7d009aa78655e9affbcb25e74e1ce102df926ffe0670ca599cc5ef2d57299429bfba3d45b66143fb075b69e590897);
(0.385365853658537, 0.412682926829268, 0.578536585365854, 0.237354085603113, 0.038910505836576, 0.578947368421053, 0.426900584795322, 0.391812865497076);
4.10. Computational Complexity
Our computational complexity is divided into three parts: generation of initial values, disorder, and diffusion. In the process of generating initial values, we computed them within a constant value , where and denote images and rows and columns, respectively. In the process of dislocation, we dislocated between layers and layers, and its computational complexity is a constant value , where denotes the corresponding maturity. In the process of diffusion, we performed cubic diffusion, whose computational complexity , are the sizes of the three dimensions of the probability amplitude matrix. With the change of image size and resolution, its computational complexity is , which is roughly the same for different images. Therefore, it can be better implemented in practical applications.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a 3D cuboid image encryption scheme based on message-encoded controlled alternate quantum walks. We used SHA-512 to obtain the key set and used the key set to generate the system parameters of a one-dimensional discrete quantum walk and controlled alternate quantum walk on a circle. Then, we used the one-dimensional discrete quantum walk model and controlled alternating quantum walk model encrypted image to design a three-dimensional cuboid image encryption algorithm. In the scrambling stage, the image was scrambled between layers and layer-by-layer cross-sections; in the diffusion stage, the pixel binary cube was rotated first and combined with the 3D quantum hash, then XORed with the 3D quantum hash sequence and tiled to obtain the encrypted image. Simulation results and image data tests show that the scheme can resist various typical attacks and has good security performance. In the future, we plan to introduce advanced, new technologies and methods [47,48,49,50,51,52], such as deep learning models, neural networks, some concepts of image fusion and recognition, etc. into image encryption and further propose new algorithms with better encryption effects.
Data curation, P.L.; Formal analysis, P.L.; Investigation, P.L.; Methodology, S.Z.; Project administration, S.Z.; Software, W.Q.Y.; Supervision, W.Q.Y.; Validation, P.L.; Writing—original draft, P.L.; Writing—review and editing, S.Z. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Not applicable.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Figure 2. Controlled alternate quantum walk probability distribution on a circle.
Figure 3. A 3D Cuboid Image Encryption Framework Based on Message-Encoded Controlled Alternate Quantum Walks.
Figure 7. Top-down layer-by-layer scrambling based on 3D probability distribution matrix.
Figure 9. Simulation results (256 ∗ 256): (a–e) original images; (f–j) encrypted images; (k–o) decrypted images.
Figure 10. Simulation results (512 ∗ 512 and irregular): (a–d) original images; (e–h) encrypted images; (i–l) decrypted images.
Figure 10. Simulation results (512 ∗ 512 and irregular): (a–d) original images; (e–h) encrypted images; (i–l) decrypted images.
Figure 11. Histogram Analysis (256 ∗ 256): (a–c) original images; (d–f) encrypted image.
Figure 12. Histogram Analysis (512 ∗ 512 and irregular): (a–d) original images; (e–h) encrypted image.
Figure 14. Adjacent pixel correlation of image 5.1.09: (a–c) original image; (d–f) encrypted image.
Figure 14. Adjacent pixel correlation of image 5.1.09: (a–c) original image; (d–f) encrypted image.
Figure 15. Adjacent pixel correlation of image 5.2.08: (a–c) original image; (d–f) encrypted image.
Figure 16. Adjacent pixel correlation of image 5.3.01: (a–c) original image; (d–f) encrypted image.
Figure 16. Adjacent pixel correlation of image 5.3.01: (a–c) original image; (d–f) encrypted image.
Figure 17. Decrypted images for varying degrees of cropping attacks: (a) 1/16 crop; (b) 1/8 crop; (c) 1/4 crop; (d) 1/2 crop; (e–h) decrypted images of (a–d).
Figure 18. Noise attack test results: (a–c) noisy cipher image of different noise level; (d–f) decrypted noisy image.
Figure 19. Decryption result of correct key [Forumla omitted. See PDF.] and changed key [Forumla omitted. See PDF.].
Image | Lena | Baboon | Peppers | White | Black | Avg. | Ref. [ |
Ref. [ |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Plaintext | 39,868.727 | 44,739.305 | 26,311.578 | 16,711,680 | 16,711,680 | - | - | - |
Ciphertext | 219.269 | 216.589 | 225.765 | 259.881 | 241.390 | 232.579 | 244.159 | 254.078 |
Image | Barbara | Cameraman | Livingroom | Irregular Lena | Avg. | Ref. [ |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Plaintext | 14,4101.119 | 418,530.147 | 276,815.883 | 74,075.357 | - | - |
Ciphertext | 238.454 | 250.778 | 245.376 | 250.828 | 246.359 | 260.400 |
Pixel correlation in different directions.
Image | Plain Image | Cipher Image | Ref. [ |
||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
H | V | D | H | V | D | H | V | D | |
5.1.09 | 0.9026 | 0.9406 | 0.9098 | 0.0005 | 0.0027 | −0.0023 | 0.0031 | −0.0016 | 0.0014 |
5.1.10 | 0.9016 | 0.8688 | 0.8311 | −0.0001 | 1.0819 × 10−6 | 0.0007 | 0.0044 | −0.0006 | −0.0052 |
5.1.11 | 0.9574 | 0.9480 | 0.8966 | −0.0046 | −0.0038 | −0.0003 | 0.0005 | −0.0019 | −0.0049 |
5.1.12 | 0.9576 | 0.9741 | 0.9408 | 0.0069 | 0.0039 | 0.0048 | 0.0068 | −0.0002 | −0.0055 |
5.1.13 | 0.8804 | 0.8497 | 0.7419 | −0.0024 | −0.0027 | −0.0019 | 5.76 × 10−6 | 0.0017 | −0.0072 |
5.1.14 | 0.9522 | 0.9018 | 0.8589 | 0.0015 | −0.0057 | 0.0038 | −0.0056 | 0.0001 | 0.0044 |
5.2.08 | 0.9289 | 0.8784 | 0.8472 | −0.0014 | −0.0057 | 0.0011 | 0.0028 | 0.0006 | −0.0027 |
5.2.09 | 0.9059 | 0.8701 | 0.8122 | −0.0013 | −0.0035 | −0.0017 | 0.0006 | −0.0123 | 0.0001 |
5.2.10 | 0.9409 | 0.9274 | 0.8948 | 0.0019 | 0.0002 | −0.0026 | −0.0024 | −0.0005 | 0.0031 |
5.3.01 | 0.9756 | 0.9811 | 0.9669 | −0.0004 | −0.0006 | 0.0017 | 0.0015 | 4.43 × 10−5 | −0.0017 |
5.3.02 | 0.9154 | 0.9053 | 0.8608 | 0.0004 | −0.0020 | 0.0015 | −0.0024 | −0.0011 | 0.0008 |
7.1.01 | 0.9635 | 0.9194 | 0.9080 | −0.0015 | −0.0033 | 0.0021 | −0.0021 | 0.0011 | 0.0067 |
7.1.02 | 0.9468 | 0.9478 | 0.9032 | −0.0008 | 0.0009 | −0.0007 | 0.0084 | 0.0017 | 0.0021 |
7.1.03 | 0.9410 | 0.9306 | 0.8998 | −0.0016 | 0.0005 | 0.0033 | 0.0045 | 8.67 × 10−5 | −0.0056 |
7.1.04 | 0.9762 | 0.9646 | 0.9546 | 0.0007 | −0.0006 | 0.0003 | −0.0031 | 0.0073 | 0.0002 |
7.1.05 | 0.9449 | 0.9193 | 0.8983 | 0.0005 | 0.0024 | −0.0008 | −0.0040 | −0.0004 | −0.0002 |
7.1.06 | 0.9378 | 0.9004 | 0.8791 | 0.0025 | 0.0023 | −0.0001 | 0.0002 | −0.0014 | −0.0057 |
7.1.07 | 0.8872 | 0.8735 | 0.8296 | −0.0003 | 0.0004 | 7.5782 × 10−5 | 0.0020 | −0.0009 | −0.0160 |
7.1.08 | 0.9563 | 0.9335 | 0.9245 | −0.0007 | 0.0010 | 0.0014 | 0.0083 | −0.0008 | 0.0057 |
7.1.09 | 0.9667 | 0.9277 | 0.9160 | −0.0010 | −0.0008 | 0.0004 | 0.0007 | −0.0005 | 0.0063 |
7.1.10 | 0.9659 | 0.9497 | 0.9341 | 0.0001 | −0.0008 | 0.0007 | 0.0058 | −0.0001 | 0.0050 |
7.2.01 | 0.9670 | 0.9468 | 0.9463 | −0.0011 | 0.0002 | −0.0018 | −0.0008 | −0.0031 | −0.0044 |
boat.512 | 0.9371 | 0.9722 | 0.9220 | −0.0006 | −0.0013 | −0.0005 | 0.0024 | −6.53 × 10−7 | −0.0036 |
gray21.512 | 0.9965 | 0.9998 | 0.9963 | −0.0010 | 0.0008 | 0.0004 | 0.0011 | 0.0007 | −0.0056 |
ruler.512 | 0.4332 | 0.5068 | −0.0207 | −0.0015 | 0.0022 | −0.0002 | 0.0007 | 0.0120 | 3.59 × 10−5 |
Mean | 0.9215 | 0.9095 | 0.8581 | −0.0014 | 0.0019 | 0.0014 | 0.0013 | 0.0020 | 0.0042 |
Information entropy of encrypted images.
Images | Size | Plain Image | Cipher Image | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Ref. [ |
Ref. [ |
Ours | |||
5.1.09 | 256 ∗ 256 | 6.7093 | 7.9973 | 7.9971 | 7.9970 |
5.1.10 | 256 ∗ 256 | 7.3118 | 7.9973 | 7.9974 | 7.9977 |
5.1.11 | 256 ∗ 256 | 6.4523 | 7.9970 | 7.9969 | 7.9974 |
5.1.12 | 256 ∗ 256 | 6.7057 | 7.9975 | 7.9972 | 7.9974 |
5.1.13 | 256 ∗ 256 | 1.5483 | 7.9972 | 7.9969 | 7.9974 |
5.1.14 | 256 ∗ 256 | 7.3424 | 7.9970 | 7.9974 | 7.9977 |
5.2.08 | 512 ∗ 512 | 7.5237 | 7.9992 | 7.9993 | 7.9994 |
5.2.09 | 512 ∗ 512 | 6.9940 | 7.9994 | 7.9993 | 7.9993 |
5.2.10 | 512 ∗ 512 | 5.7056 | 7.9993 | 7.9993 | 7.9993 |
5.3.01 | 1024 ∗ 1024 | 7.5237 | 7.9998 | 7.9998 | 7.9998 |
5.3.02 | 1024 ∗ 1024 | 6.8303 | 7.9998 | 7.9998 | 7.9997 |
7.1.01 | 512 ∗ 512 | 6.0274 | 7.9993 | 7.9991 | 7.9993 |
7.1.02 | 512 ∗ 512 | 4.0045 | 7.9993 | 7.9992 | 7.9994 |
7.1.03 | 512 ∗ 512 | 5.4957 | 7.9993 | 7.9993 | 7.9994 |
7.1.04 | 512 ∗ 512 | 6.1074 | 7.9992 | 7.9993 | 7.9993 |
7.1.05 | 512 ∗ 512 | 6.5632 | 7.9993 | 7.9992 | 7.9993 |
7.1.06 | 512 ∗ 512 | 6.6953 | 7.9992 | 7.9993 | 7.9993 |
7.1.07 | 512 ∗ 512 | 5.9916 | 7.9993 | 7.9993 | 7.9992 |
7.1.08 | 512 ∗ 512 | 5.0534 | 7.9994 | 7.9993 | 7.9992 |
7.1.09 | 512 ∗ 512 | 6.1898 | 7.9993 | 7.9992 | 7.9994 |
7.1.10 | 512 ∗ 512 | 5.9088 | 7.9993 | 7.9993 | 7.9993 |
7.2.01 | 1024 ∗ 1024 | 5.6415 | 7.9998 | 7.9998 | 7.9998 |
boat.512 | 512 ∗ 512 | 7.1914 | 7.9993 | 7.9994 | 7.9994 |
gray21.512 | 512 ∗ 512 | 4.3923 | 7.9992 | 7.9994 | 7.9993 |
ruler.512 | 512 ∗ 512 | 0.5000 | 7.9993 | 7.9992 | 7.9993 |
Mean of 256 ∗ 256 | 256 ∗ 256 | - | 7.9972 | 7.9972 | 7.9974 |
Mean of 512 ∗ 512 | 512 ∗ 512 | - | 7.9993 | 7.9993 | 7.9993 |
Mean of 1024 ∗ 1024 | 1024 ∗ 1024 | - | 7.9998 | 7.9998 | 7.9998 |
NPCR and UACI for different images (%).
Image | NPCR | UACI | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Ref. [ |
Ref. [ |
Ref. [ |
Proposed | Ref. [ |
Ref. [ |
Ref. [ |
Proposed |
256 ∗ 256 | Theoretical NPCR | 99.5693 | Theoretical UACI | 33.2824~33.6447 | ||||
5.1.09 | 99.6109 | 99.603 | 99.5124 | 99.5787 | 33.4475 | 33.552 | 33.5214 | 33.3580 |
5.1.10 | 99.5972 | 99.636 | 99.6121 | 99.6565 | 33.4846 | 33.453 | 33.4215 | 33.5306 |
5.1.11 | 99.5865 | 99.942 | 99.5943 | 99.5860 | 33.4482 | 33.586 | 33.4014 | 33.5725 |
5.1.12 | 99.6323 | 99.792 | 99.5811 | 99.5992 | 33.4453 | 33.453 | 33.4158 | 33.5240 |
5.1.13 | 99.6216 | 99.792 | 99.5963 | 99.5802 | 33.4531 | 33.520 | 33.4236 | 33.4265 |
5.1.14 | 99.6078 | 99.621 | 99.5945 | 99.5831 | 33.4293 | 33.440 | 33.3951 | 33.5393 |
512 ∗ 512 | Theoretical NPCR | 99.5893 | Theoretical UACI | 33.3730~33.5541 | ||||
5.2.08 | 99.6105 | 99.960 | 99.5878 | 99.6136 | 33.5035 | 33.692 | 33.3978 | 33.5362 |
5.2.09 | 99.6033 | 99.876 | 99.5812 | 99.6022 | 33.4674 | 33.548 | 33.4182 | 33.3835 |
5.2.10 | 99.6101 | 99.654 | 99.6100 | 99.6147 | 33.4253 | 33.454 | 33.4263 | 33.4199 |
7.1.01 | 99.6136 | 99.957 | 99.6028 | 99.6310 | 33.4885 | 33.648 | 33.4474 | 33.5258 |
7.1.02 | 99.6040 | 99.918 | 99.6078 | 99.6151 | 33.4508 | 33.465 | 33.4326 | 33.4589 |
7.1.03 | 99.6101 | 99.849 | 99.5811 | 99.6124 | 33.4352 | 33.273 | 33.4836 | 33.4771 |
7.1.04 | 99.6178 | 99.991 | 99.5946 | 99.5930 | 33.5024 | 33.202 | 33.4782 | 33.4340 |
7.1.05 | 99.5979 | 99.942 | 99.5937 | 99.6136 | 33.4739 | 33.830 | 33.4716 | 33.4699 |
7.1.06 | 99.6269 | 99.670 | 99.5912 | 99.6041 | 33.4764 | 33.627 | 33.4365 | 33.4511 |
7.1.07 | 99.6193 | 99.983 | 99.6014 | 99.5995 | 33.4310 | 33.609 | 33.4313 | 33.4637 |
7.1.08 | 99.5979 | 99.818 | 99.6013 | 99.6170 | 33.4997 | 33.375 | 33.4460 | 33.4841 |
7.1.09 | 99.6113 | 99.874 | 99.6148 | 99.6109 | 33.4630 | 33.530 | 33.3856 | 33.4925 |
7.1.10 | 99.6166 | 99.697 | 99.6097 | 99.6079 | 33.4701 | 33.438 | 33.3941 | 33.4423 |
boat.512 | 99.6227 | 99.715 | 99.6101 | 99.6212 | 33.4448 | 33.374 | 33.3973 | 33.4156 |
gray21.512 | 99.6067 | 99.643 | 99.6034 | 99.5946 | 33.5113 | 33.507 | 33.4089 | 33.4367 |
ruler.512 | 99.6124 | 99.637 | 99.5945 | 99.6056 | 33.4620 | 33.415 | 33.4635 | 33.4649 |
1024 ∗ 1024 | Theoretical NPCR | 99.5994 | Theoretical UACI | 33.4183~33.5088 | ||||
5.3.01 | 99.6067 | 99.950 | 99.6032 | 99.6294 | 33.5013 | 33.508 | 33.4392 | 33.5005 |
5.3.02 | 99.6015 | 99.982 | 99.6108 | 99.6128 | 33.4255 | 33.514 | 33.4547 | 33.4263 |
7.2.01 | 99.6005 | 99.980 | 99.6036 | 99.6088 | 33.4438 | 33.487 | 33.4301 | 33.4511 |
Mean | 99.6098 | 99.8192 | 99.5957 | 99.6076 | 33.4634 | 33.5 | 33.4329 | 33.4674 |
Std | 0.0103 | 0.2665 | 0.0200 | 0.0173 | 0.0268 | 0.0459 | 0.0328 | 0.0518 |
Pass/All | 25/25 | 25/25 | 22/25 | 25/25 | 25/25 | 17/25 | 25/25 | 25/25 |
PSNR of different degrees of clipping attack.
Area | 1/16 | 1/8 | 1/4 | 1/2 |
---|---|---|---|---|
PSNR | 21.314192 | 18.380856 | 15.342343 | 12.250188 |
PSNR for noise attack.
Noise Level | 0.01 Level | 0.05 Level | 0.1 Level |
PSNR | 28.971428 | 22.408105 | 19.258843 |
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Abstract
In order to solve various security risks faced by image privacy protection, we propose a 3D cuboid image encryption scheme based on message-encoded controlled alternate quantum walks. Firstly, we calculated the initial parameters of the quantum system and performed a one-dimensional quantum walk to generate a probability distribution sequence. Secondly, we encoded the sequence into a quaternary message using multiple sets of encoded messages to control the alternate quantum walk model, generating a 3D probability amplitude matrix and 3D probability distribution matrix to obtain the 3D quantum hash sequence through the 3D probability distribution matrix. Then, the image was divided into blocks and integrated into a cuboid. The image cuboid was scrambled between layers using the probability value sequence, and the 3D probability distribution matrix was used to complete the scrambling of the cross-section between layers. Finally, we converted each pixel value of the scrambled cuboid into a binary cube and controlled it to perform the rotation operation through the 3D probability magnitude matrix, then used the 3D quantum hash sequence to XOR the obtained cuboid image and tilted it to obtain the final encrypted image. The simulation results show that the image encryption scheme can resist various typical attacks and has good security performance.
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Details

1 Key Laboratory of Advanced Design and Intelligent Computing, Ministry of Education, School of Software Engineering, Dalian University, Dalian 116622, China
2 School of Engineering, Computer and Mathematical Sciences, Auckland University of Technology, Auckland 1010, New Zealand