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Abstract
Reconstructing the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection is central to understanding the state of the pandemic. Seroprevalence studies are often used to assess cumulative infections as they can identify asymptomatic infection. Since July 2020, commercial laboratories have conducted nationwide serosurveys for the U.S. CDC. They employed three assays, with different sensitivities and specificities, potentially introducing biases in seroprevalence estimates. Using models, we show that accounting for assays explains some of the observed state-to-state variation in seroprevalence, and when integrating case and death surveillance data, we show that when using the Abbott assay, estimates of proportions infected can differ substantially from seroprevalence estimates. We also found that states with higher proportions infected (before or after vaccination) had lower vaccination coverages, a pattern corroborated using a separate dataset. Finally, to understand vaccination rates relative to the increase in cases, we estimated the proportions of the population that received a vaccine prior to infection.
SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence surveys aim to estimate the proportion of the population that has been infected, but their accuracy depends on the characteristics of the test assay used. Here, the authors use statistical models to assess the impact of the use of different assays on estimates of seroprevalence in the United States.
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1 University of Florida, Department of Biology, Gainesville, USA (GRID:grid.15276.37) (ISNI:0000 0004 1936 8091); University of Florida, Emerging Pathogens Institute, Gainesville, USA (GRID:grid.15276.37) (ISNI:0000 0004 1936 8091)
2 University of Florida, Department of Biostatistics, Gainesville, USA (GRID:grid.15276.37) (ISNI:0000 0004 1936 8091)
3 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19 Response, Atlanta, USA (GRID:grid.416738.f) (ISNI:0000 0001 2163 0069)
4 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Department of Epidemiology, Chapel Hill, USA (GRID:grid.10698.36) (ISNI:0000000122483208); UNC Carolina Population Center, Chapel Hill, USA (GRID:grid.10698.36) (ISNI:0000000122483208)
5 University of Colorado Anschutz Medical Campus, Aurora, USA (GRID:grid.430503.1) (ISNI:0000 0001 0703 675X)
6 University of Cambridge, Department of Genetics, Cambridge, UK (GRID:grid.5335.0) (ISNI:0000000121885934)